Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: artik on July 30, 2013, 08:50:24 AM
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Always when new missiles comes in place counter measures are developed.
1st/2nd generation like early AIM-9... just don't flight straight - break and missile can't follow.
3rd generation (AIM-9L/M, Python 3, etc) release flares maneuver and you are ok...
4th (Python 4, R-73 etc) - don't really know...
5th generation getting even hard: AIM-9X, IRIS-T, MICA, ASRAAM, Python-5, R-73M2
Now it is really getting scary. They actually see the target:
For example:
- Python 5: http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/9/1189.pdf
- AIM-9X: http://www.ausairpower.net/XIMG/AIM-9X-FPA-seeker-300.png
Basically it is like a small Kamikaze sitting inside the missile that can hold 50G and super maneuverable...
Su-30/Su-27/MiG-35/Typhoon/Rafael/F-22/F-15 do merge against each other shoot 5th generation missile and... AI Kamikaze/Missile wins
both aircraft loose...
Does anybody know what are the techniques for avoiding 5th generation missiles?
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Isn't it still possible to break at the last second and force the missile to overshoot?
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Nope, according to Wikipedia even 4th generation Python 4 could follow targets turning at 9G. I assume most of 5th generation missiles can do the same.
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Don't fly missions around noon? :D
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...or better yet, stay home. :D
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You have to defeat the missile long before it enters terminal guidance. ECM and a wall of chaff can still allow you to defeat a radar homing missile, but you really have to know what you're doing and where the missile/enemy is (very difficult against stealth+AMRAAM combo). 13 AMRAAMs have been fired in anger, 9 resulted in kills. If you're within the kill envelope of a modern IR dogfight missile your chances are very slim indeed.
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You have to defeat the missile long before it enters terminal guidance. ECM and a wall of chaff can still allow you to defeat a radar homing missile, but you really have to know what you're doing and where the missile/enemy is (very difficult against stealth+AMRAAM combo). 13 AMRAAMs have been fired in anger, 9 resulted in kills. If you're within the kill envelope of a modern IR dogfight missile your chances are very slim indeed.
^ this
There used to be a slim - very slim - chance you might out-run a missile if it had been launched at the extreme limit of its range. Probably not so much, any more. :O
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Radar guided missiles work best at mid range. The hydraulics and motor can correct for larger
course changes than short <time> or long <missile fuel> ranges.
This was very clear even back as far as the Phantom. The allowable steering error circle on the
HUD would change size depending on the range to target.
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Stealth?
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You have to defeat the missile long before it enters terminal guidance. ECM and a wall of chaff can still allow you to defeat a radar homing missile, but you really have to know what you're doing and where the missile/enemy is (very difficult against stealth+AMRAAM combo). 13 AMRAAMs have been fired in anger, 9 resulted in kills. If you're within the kill envelope of a modern IR dogfight missile your chances are very slim indeed.
That is the point. There are many ways to full radar homing missiles:
- Stealth (from medium range and above)
- ECM
- Chaff
- Decoys: like ALE-55 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/ALE-55_Fiber-Optic_Towed_Decoy) or X Guard (http://www.rafael.co.il/Marketing/361-940-en/Marketing.aspx)
And all this works because the radar beam resolution is relatively low.
For IR missiles with CCD seeker that actually sees the target it is impossible to fool it with a simple decoys unless you can "clone your aircraft" in midair
And modern IR missiles has huge range so virtually - it becomes not fire and forget - but rather fire and kill (at least it looks like).
The IRIS-T is told to have Anti-missile capabilities (http://www.diehl.com/fileadmin/diehl-defence/user_upload/flyer/IRIS-T_e_Eurofighter.pdf) is it reflected in modern A2A combat tactics?
Stealth?
Does not really work against IR missiles also every stealth aircraft is much fatter target that is easier to spot because of all internal bays.
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The BVR engagement is the way of air warfare these days.
Missile and Radar Tech will now outclass aircraft design as the no 1 factor for winning battles.
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Always when new missiles comes in place counter measures are developed.
1st/2nd generation like early AIM-9... just don't flight straight - break and missile can't follow.
3rd generation (AIM-9L/M, Python 3, etc) release flares maneuver and you are ok...
4th (Python 4, R-73 etc) - don't really know...
5th generation getting even hard: AIM-9X, IRIS-T, MICA, ASRAAM, Python-5, R-73M2
Now it is really getting scary. They actually see the target:
For example:
- Python 5: http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/9/1189.pdf
- AIM-9X: http://www.ausairpower.net/XIMG/AIM-9X-FPA-seeker-300.png
Basically it is like a small Kamikaze sitting inside the missile that can hold 50G and super maneuverable...
Su-30/Su-27/MiG-35/Typhoon/Rafael/F-22/F-15 do merge against each other shoot 5th generation missile and... AI Kamikaze/Missile wins
both aircraft loose...
Does anybody know what are the techniques for avoiding 5th generation missiles?
Active countermeasures i.e. blasting the missile with laser or conventional ammunition. Probably not in use anywhere and hard to implement though.
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The BVR engagement is the way of air warfare these days.
Except, that ROE tends to prevent it from being used.
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Not in the last 20+ years.
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Isn't it still possible to break at the last second and force the missile to overshoot?
yeah, just look back, cut throttle to let it get close and then do a barrel roll. Dont forget to shoot it as it is flying by :rofl
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The BVR engagement is the way of air warfare these days.
Missile and Radar Tech will now outclass aircraft design as the no 1 factor for winning battles.
The problem with BVR is that in reality it can't always be managed - and it isn't about RoE only.
Probably the classic case would be the following, take a look on the map:
http://goo.gl/maps/yZHtV
The distance between Damascus and Haifa is around 150km, it takes about 10 minutes of subsonic flight and much less of supersonic and even much less when the forces moving one to each others direction. It is very short distance.
So even if you start BVR you are ending very-very fast WVR fight.
For example, a story of a first F-15 kill: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-FMLNlMEoo#t=32m25s
It started in BVR ended with 1 AIM-7 kill, 1 Python kill and 1 Gun kill.
Yes, AIM-7 is not that good weapon and today it would be more BVR kills and less WVR kills but on the other hand the defense is better so there is no guarantee that against modern ECM the AMRAAM would behave much better.
So BVR is very good on paper and even works in some cases. But it is not the ONLY engagement we would see if not the minority of them.
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I think the next generation of fighters might be using weapons moving at the speed of light, so all this about weapon engagement zones, no escape zones, counter measures, etc won't mean anything when high tech drones or fighters are using directed energy weapons. For the next ten or twenty years missiles will still be important, and you're right IMO, the ability to out maneuver, spoof, decoy, or escape a modern AAM even IF it gets detected are closing in on zero percent.
The missiles are too fast, too maneuverable, and too smart now for any of the old Vietnam and Cold War era maneuvers to have much if any effect IMO.
Even some of the SAM's are now moving at insane speeds, well over Mach 4 or 5 - can you dodge bullets like in the Matrix, because these things are going even faster than that.
Eagl or Mace will probably stop by this thread and have some things to say.
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yeah, just look back, cut throttle to let it get close and then do a barrel roll. Dont forget to shoot it as it is flying by :rofl
http://www.youtube.com/watch?nomobile=1&v=2uh4yMAx2UA
F16 dodging 6 SAMs. It was 1991, hence my question. Granted, SAMs are heavier but my question isn't as ridiculous as you make it out to be.
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DAY THREE
The morning package had turned around at the border for two main reasons: no Wild Weasels, and poor weather. The target had been the Al Taji Rocket Production Facility located in the north of Baghdad. The package did, however, drop their bombs on the alternate target of Salman North airfield, located in central Iraq.
Meanwhile, the afternoon group had shown up for mission planning and discovered that their target had been changed from the nuclear research facility located south of Baghdad to three targets located in the heart of the city itself: the Air Force Headquarters, the Republican Guard Headquarters, and the oil refinery. The 614th TFS would fly the first daylight F-16 raid on downtown Baghdad.
As the 16-ship F-16 package arrived at the air refueling track, it was discovered that there were not enough tankers for the entire group. Consequently, the last four-ship, call-sign Stroke 1-4, was engaged in a radio conversation with any Forward Air Controller (FAC) they could raise on the radio in order to be used as opportunity air strikers in Kuwait. As the four-ship was about to deport on an alternative mission, a pop-up tanker arrived which allowed everyone to proceed as planned.
As the package proceeded to the Iraqi border the weather become steadily worse until everyone was in the weather, unable to climb out into the clear. As planes got out of position, the package finally broke out into the clear just past the Iraqi border. At this time, a large calibre AAA gun began firing on the aircraft. The AAA consisted of extremely large airbursts that looked like big black rain clouds. The AAA, coupled with the confusion of sorting out the package formation, resulted in 25% of the package being sent home at that time. Meanwhile the package, now a 12-ship, pressed on to Baghdad.
As the flight approached the Baghdad IP, AAA began firing at tremendous rates. Most of the AAA was at 10-12,000ft (3,658m), but there were some very heavy, large calibre explosions up to 27,000ft (8,230m). Low altitude AAA became so thick it appeared to be an undercast. At this time, the 388th TFW F-16’s were hitting the Nuclear Research Centre outside of the city, and the Weasels had fired off all their HARMs in support of initial parts of the strike and warnings to the 614th F-16’s going further into downtown went unheard. The F-15’s also provided air cover and departed with the first part of the strike group. Again, a warning that went unheard. Without knowing it 614th TFS F-16’s were all pretty much alone in downtown Baghdad with no air cover and no electronic support assets.
A low overcast deck covered the northern portion of the city which extended south to the point where the AF Headquarters and the Republican Guard Headquarters were mostly obscured, and the package commander, Maj. John Nips Nichols, called a weather abort for those two targets. The southern portion of the city was clear, and the oil refinery was clearly visible to Crud and Stroke flights. As they approached the action point to roll in on the refinery, an SA-2 launch warning was received. The fighters turned to honour the threat missile launch warning, and some SAMs were seen in the air, but they were not an immediate threat. The remaining F-16’s each pinpoint bombed separate refectory towers on the site, and set the refinery ablaze. The destruction was so complete that the flames from the refinery were seen on Cable News Network (CNN) film for the next two weeks.
As the initial SA-2 launch warning faded however, Maj. ET Tullia, Stroke 3, received additional SA-2 and SA-3 acquisition warnings that went unheeded as he rolled in on the towers. The high angle diving delivery, combined with the on-board ECM pod delayed a full SAM missile system acquisition until he pulled off the target and turned south. As the missiles closed, ET's tape reveals the screams of the radar warning receiver into his headset of a missile launch. The missiles overshot and harmlessly detonated above his aircraft, and he turned back to the egress heading.
Multiple SAMs were launched at the package, some ballistic and unguided and some tracking with a full system lock-on. In spite of this, some members of the package refused to jettison their bombs until clear of the city to avoid possible damage to civilian non-combatants. One of the missiles guided toward Clap 4, piloted by Capt. Mike Cujo Roberts. A missile break warning sounded over the radio and Cujo saw the missile as it guided towards him. It passes behind his aircraft and detonates, and Cujo believes he is safe until his aircraft begins to pitch over and he loses control. As the jet approaches negative 1'g', Cujo ejected over downtown Baghdad. No one observed an ejection, nor saw a 'chute.
Meanwhile, ET became separated from the rest of the package because of his missile defensive break turns. As he defeats the missiles coming off the target, additional missiles are fired, this time, from either side of the rear quadrants of his aircraft. Training for SAM launches up to this point had been more or less book learning, recommending a pull to an orthogonal flight path 4 seconds prior to missile impact to overshoot the missile and create sufficient miss distance to negate the effects of the detonating warhead. Well, it works. The hard part though, is to see the missile early enough to make all the mental calculations.
The energy required to execute these missile break turns forced Maj. Tullia's jet to descend to 10,000ft (3,050ml, which put him in the heart of the AAA envelope. The only answer in this case was to select afterburner in order to increase airspeed and climb. However, being extremely low on fuel, and 700 nautical miles from home, afterburner must be used very judiciously. Before sufficient airspeed is increased, however, ET is faced with another multiple missile launch. In this case two separate SA-6 missile sites launch at his jet while he is climbing out of the AAA envelope. By continuing to unload his aircraft, ET watches the missiles as they close on his aircraft. The unloading and accelerating causes his aircraft to change its flight path, and a change in the missile flight path can be observed as well. As the timed break turns are accomplished, one missile flies so close that ET can hear the roar of the rocket as it passes where, just a fraction of a second earlier, the right wing was. Two missiles are launched towards him from the front of his aircraft and can be easily seen on his HUD film. Finally, as he reaches the outskirts of the city an optically guided missile of unknown type is fired. There is no radar warning of the launch, but the track of the missile can easily be observed to be guiding towards his aircraft. A defensive turn overshoots the missile, and Maj. Tullia proceeds on his way, now searching for the rest of his Flight.
Unknown to Maj Tullia, Tico was hit by an SA·3. He had an uncorrelated missile launch on his radar warning receiver (RWR), and as he turned, he visually acquired the missile guiding on his aircraft from below. He timed his missile break turn, the missile overshot his aircraft and detonated behind him. Unfortunately, the miss distance was not sufficient to guarantee the safety of his aircraft, and Tico observed large, peeled-back holes on the surface of the jet with fuel, oil, and hydraulic fluid forming a smoke trail behind him.
While Tico was egressing, all the warning lights in his cockpit had illuminated, and he had no indication of airspeed, heading, or altitude. Fortunately, Capt. Bruce Crutch Cox was nearby, and the two of them formed a Flight as they headed south. As the two were egressing, Crutch received some very unusual radar warning indications. About that time the AWACS called bandits airborne and heading south out of Baghdad. The bandits in this case were MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters. Crutch pitched back to look at the source of the threat warning with his radar and saw that he was flying line abreast with one of the MiGs. As he turned into the MiG and locked onto it with his radar, it turned and ran. Since Crutch didn't have the fuel to chase him, he turned his attention back to helping Tico.
Shortly after, Tico's jet quit flying. He was forced to eject over 150 miles (240km) into Iraq. As he ejected and was descending in his parachute, he extracted his emergency radio and talked to the Flight. A large number of enemy personnel on the ground were observing his descent and they were trying to shoot at him as he was descending. He asked for assistance, but the fuel situation prohibited anyone from orbiting. Once on the ground there was no chance of evading. Tico was captured by nomadic, Bedouin tribesmen of Iraq.
After talking to Tico on the radio, the Flight passed the information on his location to the orbiting AWACS in order to begin a Search-and-Rescue (SAR). The rest of the flight home was a quiet one as everyone thought of two friends left back in Iraq.
It was a long night. It was most people's first introduction to losing friends in combat. As the night wore on, the word finally arrived, there was no contact with Tico. The largest SAR effort to date had been under way. C-130’s and F-15E Strike Eagles orbited, circling over Tico's last known position, trying to raise him on the radio. Little did anyone know that Tico was sitting in the Bedouin chief's tent listening to the C-130 fly overhead, trying to devise a way to talk on the radio. No one would hear from Tico or Cujo again until they were seen on CNN three days later.
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As stated, that was Cold War era tech for the most part, like I said last post, the missiles today are a completely different animal, while aircraft performance hasn't change a whole lot in terms of a ratio to that of the missiles.
For example, back in Vietnam, according to pilot and author Mark Berent, F4 pilots would go out and troll for SA2's, in order to train other pilots in the back seat how to dodge them, observe them, etc etc. They would literally go out and get shot at on purpose, so confident they could do, and I quote "a little maneuver that the small guide vanes on the missile wouldn't allow it to follow", and escape the warhead envelope. I can provide several books and references talking about the same thing.
My point is, back then, the pilots were confident enough that if they SAW an older missile like the SA2 or what have you, they not only had ECM/Decoys, but the ability to outfly it's flight envelope. In Gulf War 1, there is some great stuff about air to air missiles from our side, particularly the Aim 7 and Aim 9 missing like crazy, against Mig 25's and other dated Soviet aircraft. One F15 pilot had several Sparrows and Sidewinders get decoyed by a single Mig 25, and in his words, he said he was certain he would have to try and gun him before he finally hit him with one. So, even NATO weapons weren't as lethal twenty years ago.
Now however, with the Amraam, Aim9x, Python, AA11/Rwhatever, and some of the other even newer missile, the tech and speed is just too great now to be able to use maneuvers to escape. I'm not saying that maneuvering to avoid certain radar systems by beaming them etc isn't something that is completely gone, or that at certain ranges break turns are useless - it's just that the time/distance equation is far less forgiving now that it was 20 or 30 years ago.
I think the bottom line is that first detection is THE most critical thing in a2a combat now - any modern fighter with these newer generation missile can kill any other fighter so long as it can detect, track, and engage them first.
Hence the whole Stealth/F35 argument being so important.
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I think the next generation of fighters might be using weapons moving at the speed of light, so all this about weapon engagement zones, no escape zones, counter measures, etc won't mean anything when high tech drones or fighters are using directed energy weapons. For the next ten or twenty years missiles will still be important, and you're right IMO, the ability to out maneuver, spoof, decoy, or escape a modern AAM even IF it gets detected are closing in on zero percent.
The missiles are too fast, too maneuverable, and too smart now for any of the old Vietnam and Cold War era maneuvers to have much if any effect IMO.
Even some of the SAM's are now moving at insane speeds, well over Mach 4 or 5 - can you dodge bullets like in the Matrix, because these things are going even faster than that.
Eagl or Mace will probably stop by this thread and have some things to say.
The Russian BUK reached Mach 4 already in 1984.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?nomobile=1&v=2uh4yMAx2UA
F16 dodging 6 SAMs. It was 1991, hence my question. Granted, SAMs are heavier but my question isn't as ridiculous as you make it out to be.
were we talking about sams over 20 years ago? It is a ridiculous question. Maybe the planes computer could respond but the pilot could not avoid something he cant see or respond that fast when/if he sees it coming. Not to mention the lack of practice of thr manouver in order to get the timing right. The era of pilot vs pilot has come and gone.
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were we talking about sams over 20 years ago? It is a ridiculous question. Maybe the planes computer could respond but the pilot could not avoid something he cant see or respond that fast when/if he sees it coming. Not to mention the lack of practice of thr manouver in order to get the timing right. The era of pilot vs pilot has come and gone.
Pretty sure they did it during the Cold War era in combination with countermeasures. Which is why I asked, not stated. :rolleyes:
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I am off to the shops what should I do? :cry
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Not in the last 20+ years.
Based on what?
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I'm certain eagl is dying to chip in here but due to the nature of oath from his employer...he can't say a word. :)
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I realize this Ripley. The SA6 was in fact the first of the "new" generation of Soviet systems that started to really change the game. The IAF learned this the hard far earlier than 1984. My point is that the lions share of the missile systems up until recently did give the pilot and air force strategists and tactics units something to work with in terms of being able to defeat them through electronic or maneuver means, due to the missile's slower speeds overall, and their less hitech seekers and decision making circuits.
The missiles today....heh, I know I would be VERY keen on making sure I got the first shot in on any opponents, as if any of the modern missiles from any side really get flipped, odds are much higher of them connecting than before. The S300 and newer Soviet systems move at insane speeds, and lets not even consider some of the anti ballistic missiles systems the US and US Navy are using - it's like watching a beam of light bend when they are moving at max velocity, I have no idea how a targeted aircraft would even start to dodge one by maneuvering, it would be right up there with dodging bullets.
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Based on what?
Gulf War, Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq... Sparrows and AMRAAMs were the top killers.
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The Russian BUK reached Mach 4 already in 1984.
The SA-5/S-200 reaches mach 8. They were fielded in the 60s. Perfect for shooting down an SR-71 or an XB-70.
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Gulf War, Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq... Sparrows and AMRAAMs were the top killers.
What were the specific ROE for those individual conflicts?
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What were the specific ROE for those individual conflicts?
You tell me. However it is irrelevant since they clearly didn't prevent BVR engagements.
Except, that ROE tends to prevent it from being used.
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You tell me. However it is irrelevant since they clearly didn't prevent BVR engagements.
What? You don't have an answer? Your post implies some level of expertise on the subject. Is that not the case? It is relevant in that ROE applies to any missile employment.
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You're the one claiming ROEs are restrictive, the burden of proof lies with you. The fact is that regardless of ROE the Sparrow and AMRAAM are the top killers in the last 20 years of air combat. That's the important statistic. If the ROEs were restrictive, they were evidently not followed. I chose to believe they weren't that restrictive.
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... The fact is that regardless of ROE the Sparrow and AMRAAM are the top killers in the last 20 years of air combat. That's the important statistic ...
Any references for this claim?
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Any references for this claim?
The Journal of Military Aviation, Vol 1, No. 1, Jan/Feb 92, by Bill Strandberg entitled "Desert Storm Shooters":
KILLS BY TYPE AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS
06 x MiG-29 Fulcrum
... 4 x AIM-7 Sparrow Kills
... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill
... 1 x Maneuvering Suicide
08 x F-1 Mirages
... 5 x AIM-7 Kills
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
... 1 x Maneuvering Suicide
04 x MiG-21/F-7 Fishbed
... 3 x AIM-9 Kills
... 1 x AIM-7 Kill
08 x MiG-23 Flogger
... 6 x AIM-7 Kills
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
03 x MiG-25 Foxbat
... 2 x AIM-7 Kills
... 1 x AIM-120 Kill
06 x Su-7/17/22
... 3 x AIM-7 Kills
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
... 1 x Mk-83 Bomb
02 x Su-25 Frogfoot
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
01 x IL-76 Candid transport
... 1 x AIM-7 Kill
01 x PC-9 Trainer
... pilot bailout
07 x Helo
... 2 x AIM-7 Kills
... 1 x AIM-9 Kills
... 2 x Gun Kills
... 1 x LGB
... 1 x Walleye
---------------------------------------
..... 24 x AIM-7 Kills (33 launches for 73%)
..... 02 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills (4 fired)
..... 12 x AIM-9 KIlls (14 launches for 86%)
..... 02 x 30mm Gun Kills
..... 02 x Maneuvering Suicides
..... 01 x Bailout
..... 03 x Air-to-Ground Ordnance
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You're the one claiming ROEs are restrictive, the burden of proof lies with you. The fact is that regardless of ROE the Sparrow and AMRAAM are the top killers in the last 20 years of air combat. That's the important statistic. If the ROEs were restrictive, they were evidently not followed. I chose to believe they weren't that restrictive.
You clearly don't know what you are talking about with regard to ROE and BVR missile employment. Point proven. You are dismissed.
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Sure Puma... Whatever you say. Fact: Half of the total kills in the Gulf War was done with BVR missiles, more than double those of dogfight missiles, so clearly the ROE did not "prevent it from being used"... but I'm sure you know better... Show us all how the ROE has prevented BVR missiles from being used in the last 20 years. Pretty please :aok
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Sure Puma... Whatever you say. Fact: Half of the total kills in the Gulf War was done with BVR missiles, more than double those of dogfight missiles, so clearly the ROE did not "prevent it from being used"... but I'm sure you know better... Show us all how the ROE has prevented BVR missiles from being used in the last 20 years. Pretty please :aok
Fact is you still don't understand ROE.
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What do I not understand about ROE? Please enlighten me.
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Fact is you still don't understand ROE.
Puma,
If I understand you,you never said the missles weren't used but that the ROE forbid BVR launches. So If I have that right all it means is the target must be identified under ROE.
Of course I claim no expertise on this subject,just some common sense... :devil
:salute
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http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/carpente.htm
An in-depth analysis of the BVR ROE of the Gulf War. In short the coalition fighters were required to identify the enemy by two separate means before releasing weapons. The USAF was able to do this at BVR range, but the USN did not due to systems limitations. So, USAF fighters positively identified enemy aircraft electronically at range and were free to engage them at BVR ranges, but the Navy could not. It became somewhat of a controversy.
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Puma,
If I understand you,you never said the missles weren't used but that the ROE forbid BVR launches. So If I have that right all it means is the target must be identified under ROE.
Of course I claim no expertise on this subject,just some common sense... :devil
:salute
You've got it. ROE is an integral part of modern warfare. Having a requirement to ID a target, whether it be VID or EID, is essential because no fighter pilot worth his salt wants to have a fratricide kill on his hands. There are/have been scenarios were fighter jocks were required to VID even to shoot a BVR weapon because of the remote possibility of the good guys getting mixed in with the hostiles. This can result in using a "heater" or going guns when the adversary steps into the phone booth for a knife fight because the radar shot is inside the radar missile's F-pole.
ROE be very simple or very complex depending on the combat scenario, but it will be complied with or there can be dire consequences for the fighter jock's career, not to mention the political fallout. :salute
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Yet there will be fratricide if we ever go against an enemy worth their salt in a complex electronic environment. I could have sworn we lost one fighter to our own missiles in Gulf-1, or suspected. Gulf-1 WAS a turning point for BVR but I dont think it gave a clear picture simply cause the Iraqi's werent worth a darn and did more running then fighting.
I was always under the assumption that all our fighters/missiles would be networked together, and with AWACs support , that this would be the revolutionary threshhold that would allow BVR to become commonplace and extremely effective. Am I wrong here?
Cant the missiles be launched from one fighter and vectored in by others on the network? Until they turn on their own radar/IR seekers?
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So just so I understand.
We spend billions on weapons we are not allowed to use.
we are too dumb to keep track of where our planes are.
If the bad guy has BVR weapons they can just fire all day long at us with no danger to them selfs.
And the F-pole lol.
:old:
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Yet there will be fratricide if we ever go against an enemy worth their salt in a complex electronic environment. I could have sworn we lost one fighter to our own missiles in Gulf-1, or suspected. Gulf-1 WAS a turning point for BVR but I dont think it gave a clear picture simply cause the Iraqi's werent worth a darn and did more running then fighting.
I was always under the assumption that all our fighters/missiles would be networked together, and with AWACs support , that this would be the revolutionary threshhold that would allow BVR to become commonplace and extremely effective. Am I wrong here?
Cant the missiles be launched from one fighter and vectored in by others on the network? Until they turn on their own radar/IR seekers?
Yeah, the Gulf War was akin to shooting ducks in a barrel for the NATO fighters. As far as as the modern data link, I'm not aware of the capability to guide another fighter's weapons remotely within the network. :salute
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These days ID'ing and making the call to shoot is increasingly done by C3 commanders, either on the ground or in AWACS planes. F-22s and F-35s will mostly fly "blind", relying on other sensor platforms to relay target data.
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Nice discussion..
So, are any kinetic countermeasures in the works for a/c?? I did a lot of reading on land based systems from this topic.. The Israeli Iron Dome or something capable of intercepting arty fire or medium range rockets/missiles..
You know the Russians had it years ago on that Firefox bird we stole from them.. :)
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These days ID'ing and making the call to shoot is increasingly done by C3 commanders, either on the ground or in AWACS planes. F-22s and F-35s will mostly fly "blind", relying on other sensor platforms to relay target data.
According to who?
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Nice discussion..
So, are any kinetic countermeasures in the works for a/c?? I did a lot of reading on land based systems from this topic.. The Israeli Iron Dome or something capable of intercepting arty fire or medium range rockets/missiles..
You know the Russians had it years ago on that Firefox bird we stole from them.. :)
There are very few kinetic countermeasures for tanks:
One is combat proven Rafael Trophy that is operational from 2009 and now is integrated on IDF main battle tanks.
Other systems like "Ratheon - Quick Kill" are still under development (sometime I don't understand US... spends lots of money to develop their own system when alternative system already developed, proven and actively deployed by very close allies - just not to buy non-US stuff).
And the case of the tank is much easier:
- Anti-tank missiles are much slower than AA/SA
- They much lighter and easier to destroy
- Even partial damage to the missile would do the work as tank has powerful armor.
- The tank is virtually static in comparison to missiles speed.
The only active counter measures against missiles I found:
- IRIS-T has anti AA/SA capabilities (http://www.diehl.com/fileadmin/diehl-defence/user_upload/flyer/IRIS-T_e_Eurofighter.pdf)
- Python 5 has capabilities against cruise missiles and standoff-weapons (http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/9/1189.pdf) it is not known if it designed with anti-AA/SA missile capabilities.
About Iron Dome - it is absolutely fantastic system (really, I know, without it 2012 would be much harder period) with ~90% kill probability based on real world statistics. It has advantage of having relatively low cost projectiles, according to internet they are ~$50,000 per missile, which is by order of magnitude cheaper than modern AA missile, but... it it seems to be designed mostly against ballistic weapons (rockets, heavy shells etc). It is unknown (at least to the public) how it would behave against maneuverable targets like missiles, also the question does it have an abilities of be fired from the air what and kind of radar support it requires (i.e. the aircraft radar is not as powerful as ground based one).
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The Journal of Military Aviation, Vol 1, No. 1, Jan/Feb 92, by Bill Strandberg entitled "Desert Storm Shooters":
KILLS BY TYPE AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS
<snip>
There are not statistics for last 20 years. there are statistics of 1991 Dessert storm only (that was 22 years ago) also there were conflicts
afterwards.
According to this: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/42891479/Air-Combat-Past-Present-and-Future
The post 1991 conflicts have only 20 BVR weapons A/A kills out of ~60. The rest WVR weapons, also it notes that many BVR weapon kills (like by AMRAAM) were performed actually WVR.
What is also interesting is what was the ratio between BVR and WVR kills during Operation Mole Cricket 19 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mole_Cricket_19) in 1982 which employed: AIM-7F, AIM-9L, Python 3 missiles. Unfortunatly I can't find any documents about it.
It was not that time ago and it had full deployment of AWACS.
According to what I read it had quite strict restrictions about detection of enemy or friendly because there were around 50-80 friendly aircraft in the air and up to 100 enemy so there was great fear of friendly fire. At some point ground attacks stopped to prevent accidental friendly fire - till the sky would be clear of fighters.
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Yeah, the Gulf War was akin to shooting ducks in a barrel for the NATO fighters. As far as as the modern data link, I'm not aware of the capability to guide another fighter's weapons remotely within the network. :salute
Actually what I meant was for the shooting fighter to be able to use telemetry from another airplane on the network to guide the missile in.
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sometime I don't understand US... spends lots of money to develop their own system when alternative system already developed, proven and actively deployed by very close allies - just not to buy non-US stuff.
The US never buys from Israel unless it REALLY has no other choice. They prefer to imitate the Israeli system even if the end result is inferior and more costly. Then in some cases they sell their system to Israel vis the military aid deals to block competition from the local companies.
Israel was operating drones already in 1982 that made a significant contribution to the operation you mentioned and the first Lebanon war, when the world still thought "drone" meant a male bee. A lot of custom equipment installed in IAF fighters was/is better than what is installed in the American counterparts. Other contributors to the success of operation "Arzav 19" ("Mole cricket", did not know the translation for that one :) ) were various Israeli-developed EW measures that worked superbly (and given recent operations, their newer version still work wonders...).
Systems similar to the Trophy (e.g. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtMgnRMIspQ) you mentioned can be installed in ships. For planes it is a bit more complicated since planes are very vulnerable and the incoming warhead must be destroyed at a safe distance, not mere meters from the plane. In addition, kinematics and ballistics is more complicated in planes. However, mini-missiles anti-missiles are technologically feasible and I am sure that it is just a matter of time, urgency and money till they will be installed. There are also other anti-missile systems already in service which we will not discuss and I cannot attest to their effectiveness.
About the (1st) Lebanon war, Israel did not deploy AWACS. Israel only had Hawkeyes ("Daya" was the IAF name, meaning Milvus which is a kind of a Kite) which were utterly useless, except for some patrols over the Mediterranean towards the west. BVR was not common then for two reasons. One is that the Aim-7 of the time were often missing. Not aways because malfunction, they were also very sensitive to EW, even relatively low-tech one. The Bigger reason is that the Lebanon and northern Israel airspace is tiny compared to how the US operates. Where the American would operate with 8 planes max, the IAF squeezes in 100 planes and this is not an exaggeration. In 2006 (so called 2nd Lebanon war) IAF had a serious air traffic difficulties with planes, drones and Helis occupying all altitudes from 7,000 to 40,000 feet. The entire width of Lebanon from East to West is less than the range of Amraams.
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The US never buys from Israel unless it REALLY has no other choice. They prefer to imitate the Israeli system even if the end result is inferior and more costly. Then in some cases they sell their system to Israel vis the military aid deals to block competition from the local companies.
So true... That is why I don't understand US.
BTW there are several Israeli technologies that US companies "merged" into their products:
- Probably the most widely known is DASH helmet that was operational in 90th in IAF evolved to JHMCS and than to F-35's HMDS. Interesting how widely JHMCS is deployed today? AFAIK even F-22 lacks it today.
- LITENING - actually it is in USAF/USN/USMC - also after cooperation with Northrop.
There some more but these are actually widely known success of "sales" to US. I think it would be better if USA would buy some Israeli products rather than provide military aid. There are many criticisms in Israel on receiving the aid because it blocks local development. The famous example is the Lavi program and there were many other cases when because it was "cheaper" to get an aid, it killed some good domestic products that were better and had good export potential - and cheaper in long term.
A lot of custom equipment installed in IAF fighters was/is better than what is installed in the American counterparts.
Israel also deployed Python 3 missile which had 35 kills during first Lebanon war and it was deployed on F-15s.
Ironically but the first F-15 kill was done with Israeli made Python 3 missile (according to this (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-FMLNlMEoo#t=36m32s))
About the (1st) Lebanon war, Israel did not deploy AWACS. Israel only had Hawkeyes ("Daya" was the IAF name, meaning Milvus which is a kind of a Kite) which were utterly useless, except for some patrols over the Mediterranean towards the west.
According to most resources I have read the Hawkeyes played an important role in Air superiority in first Lebanon war. I assume there were not full AWACS as it means today but it proved to be an important factor in IAF air superiority.
Where the American would operate with 8 planes max, the IAF squeezes in 100 planes and this is not an exaggeration. In 2006 (so called 2nd Lebanon war) IAF had a serious air traffic difficulties with planes, drones and Helis occupying all altitudes from 7,000 to 40,000 feet. The entire width of Lebanon from East to West is less than the range of Amraams.
Yes it is quite amazing. Also this is one of the reasons that IAF WVR weapons and systems were always the state of the art: DASH helmet was first Western Head on display, the Python 4 missile was for a long time probably the best western missile, even today Python 5 considered the state of the art (but it depends who you ask).