Pilots of transport-category airplanes should be taught to reduce the angle of attack as their first response to a stall warning,
I'm guessing a case of politicians wanting "something done".
Well shoot, I too could be an ATP!!:airplane: Unless the FAA has changed, its more political than the U.S. congress!
I'm guessing a case of politicians wanting "something done".
:airplane: Unless the FAA has changed, its more political than the U.S. congress!Not to mention the real problem wasn't addressed and corrected.
You'll have to bear with my poor memory but I thought one of the factors that contributed to the buffalo crash was that the pilot had been flying (maybe had most of his transport time?) in a plane known to be especially subsceptable to tailplane icing and consequent tailplane stall (a Saab?). The notion is that his reaction to the situation was to pull hard to to recover the aircraft he wasn't flying in a situation he wasn't in. If I recall correctly the cockpit was not sterile and they didn't seem to be paying very good attention, when the plane began to stall he didn't know what was going on and fell back on a panicky recollection of what to do about the scariest thing that came to mind. (My memory tailplane stall in the Saab or whatever, is that you don't get a second chance if it departs.) So if my memory is correct I can see why they would write down what is staggeringly obvious, though I don't see how it would make any difference.:airplane: Copy from NTSB's final report on cause of accident!
I think the strange thing is that it is as if the system thinks flying commuter planes in north east winter weather is somehow less demanding than flying JFK to Paris in a wide body.
So the horizontal stabilizers are stalling before the wings?
So the horizontal stabilizers are stalling before the wings?
From the recommendations that Earl linked to::furious This one of many accidents caused by what I said before, "lack of training" by operators who cut corners to save money!
Identify which airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K are susceptible to tailplane stalls and then (1) require operators of those airplanes to provide an appropriate airplane-specific tailplane stall recovery procedure in their training manuals and company procedures and (2) direct operators of those airplanes that are not susceptible to tailplane stalls to ensure that training and company guidance for the airplanes explicitly states this lack of susceptibility and contains no references to tailplane stall recovery procedures. (A-10-25)
I get the impression that the captain had never been exposed to the stick shaker which seems like totally inadequate training. My memory about the Saab was correct. Here is a link to a NY Times article on the crash http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/nyregion/19crash.html?_r=0 (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/nyregion/19crash.html?_r=0)
The predominant impression that's given is of pilot incompetence but the reality is that training and standards were lousy and if there had been a safety culture of any merit at that operator this particular accident would not have occurred.
I am working on a commercial rating now 243 hours and an aerospace space engineering degree. I feel the failure is in the PTS, and the design of the stalling regime.:airplane: You make some valid points and as a one time FAA designated pilot examiner for Private, Commercial and Instrument ratings and Multi-engine rating, we were required to strictly stick to the current FAA flight standards. As far as stall requirements, the recognize of an impending stall was the most important thing, but like you, I think that falls short of finding out if the applicator was truly, "the master of that aircraft". After the usual check maneuvers, I always had the applicant demonstrate a 45 and 60 degree banked turn, VFR, with a plus or minus 100 foot altitude loss or gain. (I wonder how many pilots in AH could do that in the game). Most could not do it in a satisfactorily manner, so usually retraining was required before I would pass the applicant's check ride. Very few flight instructors had completed the demonstrated spin recovery technique which I think was very important pilot training. Slow flight was another pet peeve of mine, as most couldn't maintain altitude and airspeed at the same time.
Stalls going into spins are not well understood by today's ATP commercial or CFI, and the regulation in the PTS standards are to blame. They call for a recovery with minimal altitude loss and its that second part is the problem. When training in trainers for ratings the full power stall procedure is to cut the power, nose up to bleed speed, then full power nose up into the stall. ALL effort is focused on stopping the stall before it develops, not allowing the stall to occur, then recovering, but recovering only from an incipient stall. Much would be gained by requiring a full stall demonstration allowing the stall to develop and not worrying about busting the alt on the recovery, many testing failures have resulted from accelerated stalls on the recovery trying not to drop alt in the stall. This may come from a misread altitude loss requirement, but the way it is enforced is a nearly a failure to allow the stall happen. The ultimate lesson that needs to be learned is that you MUST FIRST break the stall, then initiate recovery. I would care if every applicant lost 300 feet so long as they knew that they had to get the AOA under critical first. I think it is very likely that the Colgan Air Capt. never saw more than 4 intentional stalls in his life. Today pilots are taught that stalls are impossible to recover from (Cirrus pull the chute), and are taught cookbook style stalls that will likely never happen in real life.
This started with the FAA getting away from spin training years ago and has moved to the point where while training even a stall is to be avoided at all costs because they turn into spins which are now only taught once during CFI training and not even done on that check ride. Combine this with an overreliance on automation (see 777 SFO, Colgan Buffalo, UPS Birmingham) and its a very real issue of basic piloting skills being totally lost. Extremely low time CFi who don't know much of anything and its a case of the blind leading the blind. I'll be a CFI before long and I won't ever have been in ice before making it to a transport aircraft. I would much rather have gone to a cargo carrier and flown nights in the right seat than get my 1250 hours instructing, and it would have been far safer, than the current Rube Goldberg style regulations.
I would much rather have the FAA allow very low time 500 hour CPL pilots in cargo aircraft than the current 1500 ATP requirements that wouldn't have stopped the buffalo crash.
The Air France accident in the South Atlantic shows that commercial pilots need more basic stick & rudder time. That crew flew into a thunderstorm, lost autopilot due to systems failures and stalled their airliner. They kept it in a deep stall all the way down to the sea.IIRC the captain got back to the cockpit before they hit the water and he rapidly recognized what was happening and started to recover the plane but didn't have enough altitude left to do so.
Apparently it is not so ingrained in the younger generations of commercial pilots today. In many ways the pilots are there as a backup in case the automation fails, but they're useless if they cannot fly the airplane under difficult circumstances without automation. The automation rarely fails in any other circumstance than "difficult".:airplane: A great post sir! How about the Japanese guys who flew, or didn't fly, that 787, I think it was, into the support end of the runway at San Franisco not to long ago?
:airplane: A great post sir! How about the Japanese guys who flew, or didn't fly, that 787, I think it was, into the support end of the runway at San Franisco not to long ago?Korean guys and it was a 777. First fatalities on a 777 actually.
Again, it goes back to one of my other posts: the worst time to practice emergency procedures is in a real emergency!
JAL is extremely competent both in aircraft pilotage and engineering. The Koreans have an extreme cultural problem with flying and seniority. Junior pilots on crews won't correct a senior airmen or even announce trouble. This was a major issue in the 90s for them. They will follow a senior into a hills side or into the ground if that is what the man chooses to do. Korean Aor has implemented major saftey programs to correct his, but it can still be and issue.I seem to recall that a Japanese air liner or cargo plane crashed in the UK in the '80s due to the copilot being absolutely deferential to the pilot. I would guess, if I am correct, that the Japanese took steps to address that problem.
No it was Korean airlines 747. Capt attitude indicator failed and no one corrected him. He was a capt but low time on 747s. Prior to that he was an air force Col commanding f-16 squadrons. It was out of stanstead uk 50km north of london.Ah. Thanks for the correction. The Koreans need to do something about that.
If you stall while flying inverted is it technique increasing or deceasing AOA what you go from -10 to -9 degrees of AOA?
If you stall while flying inverted is it technique increasing or deceasing AOA what you go from -10 to -9 degrees of AOA
If you stall while flying inverted is it technique increasing or deceasing AOA what you go from -10 to -9 degrees of AOA?:airplane: :x If you stall while flying inverted: It no longer matters, your wing is through flying and you really don't have any control until the wing recovers flying speed!
One thing I am always amazed by is the fairly hi % of pilots who have never even done a roll in an aircraft. I was teaching a friend of my who has about 3000 hours of flight time including unusual attitude training.
I was teaching him hammer heads. I had talked him threw it before we left the ground, the up was no problem, I assisted a little on the kick and corner of the stick. But as soon as we were on the down line he was already pulling back on the stick, I was letting him make the mistake assuming he would feel what was happening, but he kept pulling to the point of the tail starting to slide out at which time i pushed forward and did the recovery. But what surprised me is that he never sensed the onset of the spin , nore did he sense the stall at very slow speeds even though we where headed straight down.
Another time when I was getting my check out in the RV from base to final I was a little nose hi, I simply increased the bank with a slight unload to let the nose settle. My instructor practically freaked thinking we would stall with a high bank angle not understanding what a "Knife in" Pitch down maneuver is.
HiTech
:airplane: :x If you stall while flying inverted: It no longer matters, your wing is through flying and you really don't have any control until the wing recovers flying speed!
The problem with pilots is the understanding of critical angle of attack. To people everything is a relation to what they know, people relate everything back to the horizon. What pilots need to talk about is relative wind, angle of attack, and flight path. All are very different animals. And in talking stall recovery it should be in terms of decreasing angle of attack.
Angle of attack as related to relative wind as related to flight path.
Many pilots see it as angle of attack as related flight path, without the understanding of relative wind. My jeppeson book didn't talk about relative wind, only angle of attack and the critical angle of attack. Took my aerodynamics one book to get the relative wing concept.
Inveted or upright you have to understand relative wind and the angle of attack as a function of relative wind. Having the aopa at a negative angle could work inverted providing the lift in the aero foil, much like and extra 300 with a near symetirical aero foil.
HiTech I think that is where your friend is missing a concept.
Earl you too are missing the point it's about how the critical angle of attack is defined, it's got nothing to do with speed. But the angle between relative wind, and angle of attack.
Been wondering how long it would take you to figure it out, Oldman. :lol
Well thank goodness that all of this has been made clear to me now.
- oldman
The problem with pilots is the understanding of critical angle of attack. To people everything is a relation to what they know, people relate everything back to the horizon. What pilots need to talk about is relative wind, angle of attack, and flight path. All are very different animals. And in talking stall recovery it should be in terms of decreasing angle of attack.
Angle of attack as related to relative wind as related to flight path.
Many pilots see it as angle of attack as related flight path, without the understanding of relative wind.
Earl you too are missing the point it's about how the critical angle of attack is defined, it's got nothing to do with speed. But the angle between relative wind, and angle of attack. Speed just works on the relative wind. You need to work all those variables to get the desired flight path.
I'm guessing most "pilots" that are formally trained and licensed/rated understand the relationship between AOA and relative wind.:airplane: Well put sir! Sometimes there is a lot of difference in the "text book" and what really happens in the real thing! I understand exactly what Hi Tech is asking and I was just making the point that the "hip bone" is connected to the "thigh bone", so what difference does it make if you are right side up or not, if that darn wing quits flying, you are going to have to make a recovery post haste. In an inverted "flat" spin, you better know what you are doing, but most times, instinct takes over, backed up by a lot of piratical experience. If you are on the "gauges" is one thing, but VFR, you are going to have visual clues as to your reaction during recovery.
Just a guess, but, I think Earl probably has the concept down pretty well, considering his vast aviation experience....to include those as an instructor.
How would you analyze the AOA, relative wind, airspeed, and stall potential here (just for the sake of discussion)?(http://i906.photobucket.com/albums/ac270/puma44/4230d6c9d78495b3a93b72ef84aa4a69.jpg)
9.5 out of 10 pilots today couldn't even begin to understand what is being discused here.
Where do you get that statistic?
If you stall while flying inverted is it technically increasing or deceasing AOA what you go from -10 to -9 degrees of AOA?
HiTech
Restated for colmbo
was a typo also.
To stall inverted , you are pulling negative AOA decreasing AOA would mean having less aoa, less aoa then -10 is - 11. So is the key to stall recover always decreasing AOA?
HiTech
OK so I think my confusion is semantic and about nomenclature. If I was flying inverted pushing on the stick to climb and began to stall I would not say or conceptualize recovery to be "increase angle of attack" by letting the stick come back. I would say and conceptualize that I was lowering the angle of attack by letting the stick come back. So now I think I understand Hitech's question.
Yep you understand the question.:airplane: Good point! Ever watch it while a student is doing an outside loop in a S2 Pitts? That will blow your mind!
Also from experience, the RV has a nasty snap when you stall inverted. It's stall speed is about 30 knots higher flying inverted then right side up.
I also found that the first time you use your climb rate indicator while inverted, for some reason it messes with your head which way is which.
Also, no matter how hard you try to clean the plane before planned sustained inverted flight, there will always be a special piece of dirt in the correct position to drop into your nose.
HiTech
...Also, no matter how hard you try to clean the plane before planned sustained inverted flight, there will always be a special piece of dirt in the correct position to drop into your nose.
HiTech