Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => Aces High General Discussion => Topic started by: XxDaSTaRxx on December 30, 2013, 01:49:15 PM
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According to unnamed individual(s), Rook country chat today. Bombers were the workhorse of the 8th Air Force. Here's my theory.
Oh boy am I playing with fire on this one. Now, before fighter pilots get angry and start burning crosses in my yard, hear me out.
Bombers did have an impact on World War Two, A big one. Allied bombers were a primary factor in shutting down Germany's Oil Production, Fighter Production, Steel Production, etc. Until 1943 no allied fighter was able to strike deep into occupied territory and come home. Major targets such as Bremen, Hamburg, Dresden, Munich, Kassel, were all select targets for bombers because of their production and output to the German War Machine. From 1942 when bombers hit the ground in England, to the perfection of the long range mustang, which wasn't until mid/late war, bombers remained unescorted because no fighter could follow them in. Thus being said, it was up to the bombers to take care of Germany's production.
Time to switch the base. Some fighters could reach these targets as soon as Late '43 and later. Fewer fighters were able to carry ordinance to targets. Perhaps it could have been possible to hit these targets with late war fighters. But, if 42-late 43 we had not been hitting targets with bombers, Germany could have possibly carried on the war a year or two more, and not to mention they could also produce more weapons and produce new and better vehicles/guns/aircraft.
My point is here is that bombers are just as useful as fighters. Sure they can't fill a fighters role, and for the most part a fighter can't fill a bomber's role. That's why we still have them today.
To conclude this post, I am not biased on bombers even though my post may make it seem so. (okay maybe a little) I honestly believe that Bombers are most effective when working with fighters. No escort, get shot down. No bombers, no stopping the war machine. :salute
(http://www.collingsfoundation.org/media/cdsource_images/3%20plane%20formationWP51Large.jpg)
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The game wouldn't be any fun without bombers. I used to fly with the Bloody 100ths back in the day, flying B-17's. The best fun I've ever had in this game.
Coogan :airplane:
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How would I get a kill is bombers weren't in the game? I run out of noobs, really quickly..... :)
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How would I get a kill is bombers weren't in the game? I run out of noobs, really quickly..... :)
Oh don't worry. You won't run out. I'm occasionally seen flying a fighter. ;)
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i read somewhere 1 time, that late in the bombing of germany,that some bomber groups had special b-17's armed to the teeth with just .50cals, more than normal..no bombs just guns,2 or 3 per group..don't know if it's true... and how many times have you seen 12'oclock high-the movie???????? they also had a tv series of the same name..
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They didn't shut down any production. German industrial production increased by percentage points in the 100s right up until March 1945. The main contribution from airpower to the defeat of Germany was tactical air support suppressing logistics, thereby preventing the stuff being produced from being delivered. Strategic bombing on the scale seen in Europe in WWII has long been dismissed as largely pointless, especially given the lack of results vs. the horrendous human sacrifice.
The Russian infantryman defeated Nazism on the battlefield.
If you want an opposing view of the effect strategic bombing had on German Industrialism during the war read Albert Speer's book. It makes for revealing reading.
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i read somewhere 1 time, that late in the bombing of germany,that some bomber groups had special b-17's armed to the teeth with just .50cals, more than normal..no bombs just guns,2 or 3 per group..don't know if it's true... and how many times have you seen 12'oclock high-the movie???????? they also had a tv series of the same name..
Deathstars were dropped fairly quickly as they couldn't keep up with a bomb-laden standard B17, let alone one that had delivered its payload.
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They didn't shut down any production. German industrial production increased by percentage points in the 100s right up until March 1945. The main contribution from airpower to the defeat of Germany was tactical air support suppressing logistics, thereby preventing the stuff being produced from being delivered. Strategic bombing on the scale seen in Europe in WWII has long been dismissed as largely pointless, especially given the lack of results vs. the horrendous human sacrifice.
The Russian infantryman defeated Nazism on the battlefield.
If you want an opposing view of the effect strategic bombing had on German Industrialism during the war read Albert Speer's book. It makes for revealing reading.
:headscratch: I'll have to do more studying. Thanks for the book. I'll look into it. :salute
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They didn't shut down any production. German industrial production increased by percentage points in the 100s right up until March 1945. The main contribution from airpower to the defeat of Germany was tactical air support suppressing logistics, thereby preventing the stuff being produced from being delivered. Strategic bombing on the scale seen in Europe in WWII has long been dismissed as largely pointless, especially given the lack of results vs. the horrendous human sacrifice.
The Russian infantryman defeated Nazism on the battlefield.
If you want an opposing view of the effect strategic bombing had on German Industrialism during the war read Albert Speer's book. It makes for revealing reading.
Yes. Read it. Read also the US Strategic Bombing Survey report, compiled after the war when records were fresh and Germans were available to interrogate. (http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#pagei). That study concluded that strategic bombing crippled the German transportation and oil industries and seriously disrupted a vast amount of warmaking capability. Richard Overy, so far as I know, said it best:
From Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won," W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., London and New York 1995, at pp. 131-133 (footnotes and sources omitted):
"The stifling of industrial potential caused by bombing is inherently difficult to quantify, but it was well beyond the 10 per cent suggested by the post-war bombing survey, particularly in the cluster of war industries specifically under attack. At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 per cent fewer tanks than planned, 31 per cent fewer aircraft and 42 per cent fewer lorries as a result of bombing. The denial of these huge resources to German forces in 1944 fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion, and eased the path of Allied armies.
"The indirect effects were more important still, for the bombing offensive forced the German economy to switch very large resources away from equipment for the fighting fronts, using them instead to combat the bombing threat. By 1944 one-third of all German artillery production consisted of anti-aircraft guns; the anti-aircraft effort absorbed 20 per cent of all ammunition produced, one-third of the output of the optical industry, and between half and two-thirds of the production of radar and signals equipment. As a result of this diversion, the German army and navy were desperately short of essential radar and communications equipment for other tasks. The bombing also ate into German's scarce manpower; by 1944 an estimated two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defence, in repairing shattered factories and in generally cleaning up the destruction. From the spring of that year frantic efforts were made to burrow underground, away from the bombing. Fantastic schemes were promoted which absorbed almost half of all industrial construction and close to half a million workers. Of course, if the German efforts to combat the bombing had succeeded the effort would not have been wasted. As it was the defences and repair teams did enough to keep production going until the autumn of 1944, but not enough to prevent the rapid erosion of German economic power thereafter, and not enough to prevent the massive redirection of economic effort from 1943. Bombing forced Germany to divide the economy between too many competing claims, none of which could, in the end, be satisfied. In the air over Germany, or on the fronts in Russia and France, German forces lacked the weapons to finish the job. The combined effects of direct destruction and the diversion of resources denied German forces approximately half their battle-front weapons and equipment in 1944. It is difficult not to regard this margin as decisive.
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"The impact of the bombing was profound. People became tired, highly strung and disinclined to take isks. Industrial efficiency was undermined by bombing workers and their housing. In Japan absenteeism from work rose to 50 per cent in the summer of 1945; in the Ford plant in Cologne, in the Ruhr, absenteeism rose to 25 per cent of the workforce for the whole of 1944. At the more distant BMW works in Munich the rate rose to one-fifth of the workforce by the summer of 1944. A loss of work-hours on this scale played havoc with production schedules...
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"There has always seemed something fundamentally implausible about the contention of bombing's critics that dropping almost 2.5 million tons of bombs on tautly-stretched industrial systems and war-weary urban populations would not seriously weaken them. Germany and Japan had no special immunity. Japan's military economy was devoured in the flames; her population desperately longed for escape from bombing. German forces lost half of the weapons needed at the front, millions of workers absented themselves from work, and the economy gradually creaked almost to a halt. Bombing turned the whole of Germany, in Speer's words, into a 'gigantic front'. It was a front the Allies were determined to win; it absorbed huge resources on both sides. It was a battlefield in which only the infantry were missing. The final victory of the bombers in 1944 was, Speer, concluded, 'the greatest lost battle on the German side...' For all the arguments over the morality or operational effectiveness of the bombing campaigns, the air offensive was one of the decisive elements in Allied victory."
This topic comes up every few years. We thrashed it out, last time I can recall, back here: http://bbs.hitechcreations.com/smf/index.php/topic,177015.0.html
- oldman
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I would like to thank oldman for taking his time in writing that post he did....
They found that Germany had produced 35 per cent fewer tanks than planned, 31 per cent fewer aircraft and 42 per cent fewer lorries as a result of bombing. The denial of these huge resources to German forces in 1944 fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion, and eased the path of Allied armies.
"There has always seemed something fundamentally implausible about the contention of bombing's critics that dropping almost 2.5 million tons of bombs on tautly-stretched industrial systems and war-weary urban populations would not seriously weaken them. Germany and Japan had no special immunity. Japan's military economy was devoured in the flames; her population desperately longed for escape from bombing. German forces lost half of the weapons needed at the front, millions of workers absented themselves from work, and the economy gradually creaked almost to a halt. Bombing turned the whole of Germany, in Speer's words, into a 'gigantic front'. It was a front the Allies were determined to win; it absorbed huge resources on both sides. It was a battlefield in which only the infantry were missing. The final victory of the bombers in 1944 was, Speer, concluded, 'the greatest lost battle on the German side...' For all the arguments over the morality or operational effectiveness of the bombing campaigns, the air offensive was one of the decisive elements in Allied victory."
Can't say that's not cutting production. :D
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Remember, the victor gets to write history. German production capability exceeded Allied estimates by orders of magnitude and they were producing vastly more munitions and aircraft in late 1944 than the early years of the war combined. Production was not shut down, merely reduced to levels below potential capability. Speer delivered more equipment and supplies than the German military could use.
The inability to deliver equipment, munitions, and fuel to the frontline had a far greater effect on the German war effort than strategic bombing. Destroying transport junctions and fuel and ammunition stores was almost entirely within the remit of Tactical airforces and therefore medium bombers and fighter bombers. There is a tendency to lump the effects of tactical and strategic bombing together to avoid the awkward gap between effort and effect of Strategic bombing. Area bombing cities doesn't do much except make the populace work and hate harder. Post D-Day with European airfields available, Medium bombers and Fighter/Bombers achieved far more in terms of limiting production and distribution than the Strategic bombing efforts prior to D-Day. Post D-Day more and more of the heavy bombers concentrated on what had previously been considered tactical targets. This had the effect of preventing daylight hours movements of troops and logistics. If you have few pilots and no fuel for your aircraft, you can't do much about limiting enemy air incursions. Galland and Steinhoff both bemoan their inability to respond as they would have liked in the Defence of Germany simply due to lack of fuel at airbases.
The biggest effect the air war had on the fight in Europe was limiting the ability of Germany to respond effectively in any arena of war.
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Bombing in our game is maddenly effective or a joke.
When bombing is coordinated with an attack force, and more than a single box brought over the target. Bases drop in minutes for capture. The same bombers in the same attack profile on the other side of the map, if they drop too soon, or show up late. Are a tooth grinding joke helping get the base out of sequence on the "down time" timer.
But, then there is the lone box that happened to be near by, and wanders over just in time to save your base capture.
The most effective use of bombers in the game is with several boxes circling watching the "down time" timer visa (.dt). And just as resources come up, exactly the minimum number of bombs puts the resource back down with in 30 seconds. Or as M3 run in to resupply, 30 seconds later bombs insult the M3 drivers efforts for the last 10 minutes.
In the AH universe, bombers are either a terrible tool of pinpoint aggravation, or wandering jokes oblivious to the aid and comfort they give the enemy. Yet, because AH has unlimited lives, they have unlimited opportunities to learn from their mistakes.
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Remember, the victor gets to write history. German production capability exceeded Allied estimates by orders of magnitude and they were producing vastly more munitions and aircraft in late 1944 than the early years of the war combined. Production was not shut down, merely reduced to levels below potential capability. Speer delivered more equipment and supplies than the German military could use.
The inability to deliver equipment, munitions, and fuel to the frontline had a far greater effect on the German war effort than strategic bombing. Destroying transport junctions and fuel and ammunition stores was almost entirely within the remit of Tactical airforces and therefore medium bombers and fighter bombers. There is a tendency to lump the effects of tactical and strategic bombing together to avoid the awkward gap between effort and effect of Strategic bombing. Area bombing cities doesn't do much except make the populace work and hate harder. Post D-Day with European airfields available, Medium bombers and Fighter/Bombers achieved far more in terms of limiting production and distribution than the Strategic bombing efforts prior to D-Day. Post D-Day more and more of the heavy bombers concentrated on what had previously been considered tactical targets. This had the effect of preventing daylight hours movements of troops and logistics. If you have few pilots and no fuel for your aircraft, you can't do much about limiting enemy air incursions. Galland and Steinhoff both bemoan their inability to respond as they would have liked in the Defence of Germany simply due to lack of fuel at airbases.
The biggest effect the air war had on the fight in Europe was limiting the ability of Germany to respond effectively in any arena of war.
:airplane: Do you have any idea how many American lives were saved because of the bombing of Japan with the B-29?
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i read somewhere 1 time, that late in the bombing of germany,that some bomber groups had special b-17's armed to the teeth with just .50cals, more than normal..no bombs just guns,2 or 3 per group..don't know if it's true... and how many times have you seen 12'oclock high-the movie???????? they also had a tv series of the same name..
There was an incident of an Italian, guido rossi, using a captured P38 to form up on a straggling bomber then open fire on them. An ack star B17 / YP-40, renamed Gini after rossi's wife who was then in allied held territory, was used to down rossi and he was captured.
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The problem is people see the "German and/or Japanese production rose through 1944 and 1945" and they just jump to "Well, then the bombing didn't work." without asking "What would the production have risen to if the bombing wasn't happening?"
The thing is that we don't have an absolute answer to the last question, but as Oldman pointed out planned output was significantly higher than what was actually achieved.
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Production was not shut down, merely reduced to levels below potential capability.
Production didn't have to be entirely shut down. If it did, ENTIERELY, Germany, give or take, would have a few weeks before being entirely powderized by the Allied powers.
The 8th AF knew they could not shut down production, but instead harm it. If the axis powers had kept a steady production rate, there would be no saying how far the war would have carried on. Let's talk fighters again. The ME-262. If the 262 had been perfected, it would have kept air supremacy all over Europe. It was effective at taking down bombers, and... was... a mediocre fighter. The whole reason the 262 didn't work out, it was deployed in too few numbers, fresh pilots were target practice for allied pilots, and it was NOT reliable. The 262's engines had MAJOR problems. The standard life expectancy of the 262 engines were 48 hours. For this fighter to be effective, they have to have the fuel to keep it flying, and metals to keep building the things, which Germany did not have due to allied bombing raids, cutting production. The 262 was also deployed too late in the war to change the outcome. Had the thing been deployed in 43, yes, it could have very well turned the tides, even after the allies gained the upperhand in early 43. That was not secure until late 43/early 45. It all comes down to production rates. Everything.
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i read somewhere 1 time, that late in the bombing of germany,that some bomber groups had special b-17's armed to the teeth with just .50cals, more than normal..no bombs just guns,2 or 3 per group..don't know if it's true... and how many times have you seen 12'oclock high-the movie???????? they also had a tv series of the same name..
I think 999's is related to them gunners
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German aircarft production was incredibly resilient to the Allied bombing campaigns as it was spread across the country in "boutique" plants manufacturing only specific components which were then shipped for final assembly. The loss of any one plant had minimal impact. I know this was true for FW production but am not as sure about Me production.
The lack of trained pilots contributed more to the decline of the Luftwaffe than lack of equipment.
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perhaps it didnt slow down production. one thing is for sure. it did slow down the over all scheme of things.
most people are too narrowed in focus and they want a "body count" like in vietnam. if we killed "20 gooks and used xxx numbers of bullets we did good".
but what nobody worries about is the "downstream effect on things". the reason russians won the offensive wasnt because of the number of germans they killed. but most likely because the supply was slow to get there. remember in war most deaths arent to bullets or guns but to the "other things" like cold, "will", and supplies. you can have 1 billion soldiers around stalingrad but it wont matter if you have no winter coats, they will fricking freeze to death.
I believe patton was slowed down on it's way to germany, not because the german put a great effort, but because he was almost out of gas.
semp
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i read somewhere 1 time, that late in the bombing of germany,that some bomber groups had special b-17's armed to the teeth with just .50cals, more than normal..no bombs just guns,2 or 3 per group..don't know if it's true... and how many times have you seen 12'oclock high-the movie???????? they also had a tv series of the same name..
They did and they were called YB40's but they proved too heavy and therefore could not keep up with the normal B17's.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_YB-40_Flying_Fortress
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A nation's war effort is more than how many fighter planes it produces in a year. Even if it were, for those fighter planes to be useful, they need to work reliably (have acceptable production quality) and they need gasoline, oil, ammunition, pilots, spare parts, mechanics, transportation, food, facilities, housing for support staff, and coordination. If a nation lacks some of those aspects, it doesn't matter how many fighters are counted as produced.
What bombing did to Germany was to greatly harm most of those aspects. To conclude from a few statistics (production numbers for aircraft, guns, and tanks, for example) that bombing wasn't effective is to leave uncounted a large number of other vital factors.
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The real question is not whether the bombing campaign had any effect - of course it did, even complete random bombing will have some effect. The better question to ask is whether the resources could have been better spent elsewhere.
The bombing campaign cost a huge effort to the allies. Both in money, production and man power. The heavy bombers casualty rates in the 8AF and RAF bomber command were horrendous. I think I read somewhere that more 8AF men were lost than Marines. Was it worth it? What if instead of building thousands of bombers, the allied would have built a massive tactical airforce and saturated the front lines with close air support and interdiction? That is a different way of strategic thinking - instead of trying to halt the industry, you prevent the arms from reaching combat. This is what the Germans almost managed to do to the British with their Atlantic U-boat wolfpacks. Also RAF Coastal command caused a huge damage to the German war effort by sinking and disrupting shipments of arms and supplies to the front. This damage was way out of proportion to the meager resources given to coastal command to work with.
Germany did not lose the war because it could not make enough tanks and planes. Sure they produced perhaps a little less than they would like, but what they were really in short supply of was men. More planes with noobs driving them would not have helped the LW much. Tanks driven by 15 years olds would not have helped them much either. Unlike the Russians, they could not afford to lose millions of their young-adult male population and just send the next wave into the fray until the enemy runs out of bullets. Perhaps the RAF bomber command night raids on cities contributed by prevented the Germans from making babies?
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Bomber Command destroyed the German means to follow a war of their choice :)
The German bomber force was not very good as well :old:
If it was they would have won :old:
if it was not for Hitler they would have surrendered earlier as well :old:
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There was an incident of an Italian, guido rossi, using a captured P38 to form up on a straggling bomber then open fire on them. An ack star B17 / YP-40, renamed Gini after rossi's wife who was then in allied held territory, was used to down rossi and he was captured.
This is a myth, just one of many created by Martin Caiden. There are quite a few online sources discussing this particular fairy tale. Among other things, there was no Italian ace named Rossi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_World_War_II_aces_from_Italy#R), there were no YB-40s in Italy (the twelve made were all assigned to the 92nd BG at Alconbury; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_YB-40_Flying_Fortress#Operational_history), and the only known kill of an Allied plane by a captured and Italian-operated P-38 was by Angelo Tondi on August 11, 1943, shooting down B-17F "Bonnie Sue."
- oldman
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Germany did not lose the war because it could not make enough tanks and planes. Sure they produced perhaps a little less than they would like, but what they were really in short supply of was men.
And fuel. They didn't have enough fuel even for the lower number of planes they were flying.
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And fuel. They didn't have enough fuel even for the lower number of planes they were flying.
there are conflicting views regarding the fuel situation in Germany. If indeed there was a shortage was this because of 8AF bombing? or was it because Germany failed to secure oil wells around the world and safe transport of it to Germany?
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Just because Germanys war production increased does not mean that the bombing had no effect. One does not nullify the other. We will never know how many more tanks, ships, trucks, guns, fuel ect would have been produced had Germany not been bombed. Not to mention the enourmous industrial and manpower effort that Germany put into Reich Defence everything from radars to aaa gun crews and all the rest of it not least of which the day and night fighters. It was an enourmous cost.
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This is a myth, just one of many created by Martin Caiden.
Well dang, and it was such a good story and with the added twist of his wife's name... Oh kind of like most of the crap circulating on the interwebs today.
Except published in 1971. I wonder if he made it up or just perpetuated and embellished a story someone told him without any verification.
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there are conflicting views regarding the fuel situation in Germany. If indeed there was a shortage was this because of 8AF bombing? or was it because Germany failed to secure oil wells around the world and safe transport of it to Germany?
They had a lot of oil-production capacity except that it kept getting bombed.
From the Wiki entry on the Oil Campaign (with good references) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II :
" Several prominent Germans described it as critical to the defeat. Adolf Galland, of the Luftwaffe, wrote in his book "the most important of the combined factors which brought about the collapse of Germany,"[32] and the Luftwaffe's wartime leader, Hermann Göring, described it as "the utmost in deadliness." [19]:287 Albert Speer, writing in 1970, said that "It meant the end of German armaments production."[4]:412–4 It has been stated to have been "effective immediately, and decisive within less than a year."[33] Luftwaffe Field Marshal Erhard Milch, referring to the consequences of the Oil Campaign, claimed that "The British left us with deep and bleeding wounds, but the Americans stabbed us in the heart."[8]
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They didn't shut down any production. German industrial production increased by percentage points in the 100s right up until March 1945. The main contribution from airpower to the defeat of Germany was tactical air support suppressing logistics, thereby preventing the stuff being produced from being delivered. Strategic bombing on the scale seen in Europe in WWII has long been dismissed as largely pointless, especially given the lack of results vs. the horrendous human sacrifice.
I would agree that suppressing tactics had more to do with winning the war then strategic bombing. But Strategic bombing also had a lot to do with German having to divert fighters to the defense of the bombers when they were desperately needed on the fronts
Though it could be argued that that precise human sacrifice is what drove Germany into submission after the war. Utterly devastated and becoming dependent on the allies for even basic needs
Starvation can be a great motivator
Japan was a little different because of the cultural code they lived by
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there are conflicting views regarding the fuel situation in Germany. If indeed there was a shortage was this because of 8AF bombing? or was it because Germany failed to secure oil wells around the world and safe transport of it to Germany?
No there was a significant drop in fuel production once the Allied air power was aimed at German fuel factories. However they werent targeted enough or early enough. We should have found the one weak link, fuel production would have been best, and just concentrated on that full time. Do remember "Over Lord" interrupted the strategic campaign at a crucial phase.
But more then anything the air war over Germany took away from the Germans much badly needed resources that could have been used to great effect on other fronts. All those men, all that steel production/ammo production, all the guns, the planes, the fuel, tied up needing to protect the skies over the FatherLand. If there was no air war what would the effects have been if those resources were instead aimed at the two other fronts? We'll never know exactly but I bet the impact would have been significant.
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:)
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We should have found the one weak link, fuel production would have been best, and just concentrated on that full time.
We thought we had that with the ball bearing industry. Speer wondered why we didn't attack chemical factories and electrical production facilities, both of which he thought were few in number and susceptible to severe damage from bombing.
Hey, you don't get everything right the first time.
- oldman
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I'll just go by the conclusion of Roger A. Freeman, author of "The Mighty Eighth" and a consultant for the National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force. The museum’s study department is today known as the ‘Roger A. Freeman Eighth Air Force Research Center’. So I think he's an authority on the subject.
"The Eighth Air Force was looked upon by USAAF commanders as their prime instrument to test their doctrine of strategic bombardment. The supreme hope was that such a campaign could render massive devastation to the war industry of a highly industrialised nation, like Germany, so that it would be unable to supply and support its armed forces; in effect, bombing into submission. In the event the combined strength of all Allied strategic forces proved unable to achieve this against Germany. What strategic bombing could achieve was evinced in the spring of 1945, but that it was decisive with the weapons and delivery systems of the Hitler war, must always remain speculative."
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Interesting site:
http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/ussbsindex.html (http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/ussbsindex.html)
I really liked the statement "There's a saying that amateurs study strategy while professionals study logistics."
What lead me to the site was this analysis of explosive production http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/ussbspowder.html (http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/ussbspowder.html) Interesting analysis of Germany's use of natural camouflage and dispersed production at explosive processing facilities. The knockout blow to the explosives production wasn't direct bombing but killing oil production deprived them of raw materials and transportation among the dispersed facilities.
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I'll just go by the conclusion of Roger A. Freeman, author of "The Mighty Eighth" and a consultant for the National Museum of the Mighty Eighth Air Force. The museum’s study department is today known as the ‘Roger A. Freeman Eighth Air Force Research Center’.
"The Eighth Air Force was looked upon by USAAF commanders as their prime instrument to test their doctrine of strategic bombardment. The supreme hope was that such a campaign could render massive devastation to the war industry of a highly industrialised nation, like Germany, so that it would be unable to supply and support its armed forces; in effect, bombing into submission. In the event the combined strength of all Allied strategic forces proved unable to achieve this against Germany. What strategic bombing could achieve was evinced in the spring of 1945, but that it was decisive with the weapons and delivery systems of the Hitler war, must always remain speculative."
Heh. You're cherry-picking.
I consider Freeman to be one of aviation history's foremost authors, and "The Mighty Eighth" is a fantastic book. So I think he's an authority on the subject, although his prime area of study was 8th AF operations, rather than economic analysis of the results thereof. The language you quote from his Chapter 30, however, is followed by these observations:
"The Eighth Air Force delivered 75% of its bombs after the Allies invaded the Continent, and it was the cumulative effect of sustained bombardment on such target systems as oil and transportation with its direct and indirect strain on German war economy, that brought the B-17s and B-24s their greatest contribution to victory."
"The effect of the US heavies from the fall of 1942 until the spring of 1944, although often spectacular, was never serious enough to have profound effect. Germany's powers of recuperation were far greater than appreciated, and the small bombs carried by the B-17s and B-24s might destroy a factory building but not the precious machine tools within. Attacks against aircraft factories, even the intensive period in early 1944, saw only a temporary decline in production. On the other hand, it has been estimated that the dispersal programme instigated by the Germans in 1943 to escape the bombing possibly cost them more lost production than through actual damage to installations. In assessing the part played by the Eighth and other Allied strategic bombing forces, the considerable tying down of personnel and material in defence, both active and passive must not be overlooked. Such manpower and material might have been channelled into extra panzer divisions and so turned the scales in a land campaign."
Which, I think, is what we've been saying.
- oldman
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The bombers had little effect until after the Germans had already lost the war. In the end the greatest contribution they made was sacrificing themselves as bait so that the Allied fighters could draw the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition. The bombing itself didn't do much until 1945; after the Allies and Russians were at the gates of Germany itself and the German war machine was manned by children and geriatrics. Too little too late.
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ww2 proved for the first time that those who controlled the sky would win the war. and you say that bombing had no effect on the war. I find that ironic.
semp
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ww2 proved for the first time that those who controlled the sky would win the war. and you say that bombing had no effect on the war. I find that ironic.
How did it prove that? because the side that won also controlled the sky?
Well, the side that lost has really good beer. What does that prove?
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ww2 proved for the first time that those who controlled the sky would win the war. and you say that bombing had no effect on the war. I find that ironic.
semp
If that was true the Germans would have won at Leningrad, Stalingrad, Moscow and Kursk. They didn't. Air power is a great force multiplier, but the only thing that will win a war is boots on the ground.
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If that was true the Germans would have won at Leningrad, Stalingrad, Moscow and Kursk. They didn't. Air power is a great force multiplier, but the only thing that will win a war is boots on the ground.
they didnt control the air. otherwise the il2's wouldnt have had a field day with tanks.
semp
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In my opinion, the best book on bombing in the ETO is "Masters of the Air", by Miller. It goes into all of this stuff in very great detail.
Also, with regard to effectiveness of bombing in war, it seems like most people here are forgetting what impact it had against Japan. It reduced the country to rubble, making production by any means (even highly dispersed) a shambles. Don't forget that, in the end, it was bombing that caused capitulation and eliminated the need for a huge invasion ("boots on the ground") and perhaps as many as 1 million allied and 10 million Japanese casualties. Japan had plenty of troops and fight left on the home islands. It would have been an Okinawa times 10.
And for anyone wanting to know what the Okinawa fighting was like, the best book on that topic is "With the Old Breed," by Sledge -- one of the very best 1st-hand accounts of war ever written, in my opinion.
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The bombers had little effect until after the Germans had already lost the war. In the end the greatest contribution they made was sacrificing themselves as bait so that the Allied fighters could draw the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition.
I agree with both of these points. The Germans lost the war on June 22, 1941. You've read Freeman, so you know that 8th AF, after they switched Doolittle for Eaker, was sending the bombers on missions which clearly could not involve precision bombing, just so the escorts could destroy the Luftwaffe. It worked very well.
The bombing itself didn't do much until 1945; after the Allies and Russians were at the gates of Germany itself and the German war machine was manned by children and geriatrics. Too little too late.
You aren't keeping up. Even the ineffective 1942-43 bombing prompted the Germans to disperse their factories. Once 8th AF woke up and started bombing the oil production facilities, Germany's armed forces slowed down right quick because they had no gas for training pilots, no kerosene for running tanks...and this was happening before the Normandy invasion.
- oldman
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Yet the Germans had significant fuel stocks left at VE Day, and had rebuilt much of their production. Their problem was distributing the fuel; air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network. The fuel was there, and the Luftwaffe flew even on the last day of the war in Europe. Also, their tanks did not run on kerosene.
(http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/images/ussbs/fig22.gif)
As you can see, even when Hitler gave his Walter a blowjob there were tens-of-thousands of metric tons of fuel in stock.
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I agree with both of these points. The Germans lost the war on June 22, 1941. You've read Freeman, so you know that 8th AF, after they switched Doolittle for Eaker, was sending the bombers on missions which clearly could not involve precision bombing, just so the escorts could destroy the Luftwaffe. It worked very well.
You aren't keeping up. Even the ineffective 1942-43 bombing prompted the Germans to disperse their factories. Once 8th AF woke up and started bombing the oil production facilities, Germany's armed forces slowed down right quick because they had no gas for training pilots, no kerosene for running tanks...and this was happening before the Normandy invasion.
- oldman
I don't know of any german tank that ran on kerosene.
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they didnt control the air. otherwise the il2's wouldnt have had a field day with tanks.
semp
The Il-2s didn't have a field day with German tanks. The Luftwaffe had a field day with Il-2s. Two-thirds of all Il-2s built were destroyed, the highest of all types of Soviet aircraft; they were practically shot down as soon as they came off the production line.
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It was not Hitlers war it was Germany's war :)
Lucky they lost again :)
Or the radiation levels in Berlin would have a bit higher today :rofl
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Their problem was distributing the fuel; air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network.
I was surprised to find that the chief cause of damage to the German transportation system was from the heavies - Lancs, 17s and 24s - dropping on railway marshalling yards. The jabos shut things down closer to the front, but the heavies caused the real logistic nightmare. Eisenhower was right to overrule Spaatz and Harris and insist that the air forces switch their targets from oil and cities to transportation centers. Towards the end of the war the Germans weren't able to move coal to their factories in the Ruhr.
- oldman
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That's not what we're discussing; we're discussing the distribution of fuel already in stockpiles to front line units: Tanker trucks. As it had been on the Eastern Front, air interdiction and CAS was the best use of the Allied air forces. The Luftwaffe knew this and after Normandy they prioritized attacking Allied fighter-bombers and medium bombers over the strategic bombers.
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IT's an interesting Question, and I think that many have posted answers to how the bombing did little to stop war production. But the bombing broke the heart of the German people. City after city were reduced to rubble. In the end it was the bombers the bombed the nazism out of the Germans, in the same way they bombed the imperialism and militarism out of the Japanese. The bombers made the civilian population pay the price for the mistakes of their leaders. This caused a permanent shift in the political and cultural thinking of both countries, and that change was permanent.
In contrast I believe it's why the war's in the middle east have had little effect. Because in those wars we specifically set out to only target Soldiers. While killing soldiers temporarily stops aggression, it does very little to change the political climate and beliefs of the people. So it just reverts back to its old paradigm after it recruits and trains more soldiers.
:salute
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That's not what we're discussing; we're discussing the distribution of fuel already in stockpiles to front line units: Tanker trucks.
News to me. I thought we were discussing your point that "air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network." It wasn't the fighter-bombers that shut it down, it was the heavies. Germany didn't transport fuel from Romania to Normandy in tanker trucks.
I note, while I'm at it, this passage from Williamson Murray's "Luftwaffe," 1985, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, Inc., at page 268:
"At the end of June [1944], the Luftwaffe's strategic position, as well as the Reich's, gave the Germans small cause for optimism. A Luftwaffe intelligence report summed up the situation. While Allied air operations over Germany had declined due to the invasion, the authors felt that Allied bombers would soon return to Germany. In France, air attacks had destroyed the transportation system, while bombing attacks in Germany had extensively damaged the fuel industry. Production of aircraft fuel was off by 70 percent, synthetic fuel production was down by 60 percent, and refinery output (including Rumania) had dropped to 70 percent of total capacity. The report noted that aerial attacks on transportation and petroleum industries had provided substantial aid to the ground battle in the west. Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system. In conclusion, the report warned that the great danger was a continuation of attacks on the synthetic fuel industry. Thus, the German high command needed to provide adequate support for the great fuel plants. Attacks on transportation were almost as dangerous, but there was little that could be done because one could not protect an entire rail system." The report reference is to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab Ic, Nr. 3080/44, 16.7.44, Nryt.: "Britischnordamerikanische Luftkriegsfuhrung gegen Deutschland, " Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Roll #21, FD 3046/49.
As it had been on the Eastern Front, air interdiction and CAS was the best use of the Allied air forces. The Luftwaffe knew this and after Normandy they prioritized attacking Allied fighter-bombers and medium bombers over the strategic bombers.
Educate me. I've never heard of any such formalized prioritization. And I question the conclusion that this was the best use of air power in WWII. Until forward air controlling was well-developed - which didn't really happen until Viet Nam - close air support was a chancy proposition. I can't think of any battles in WWII, in the west, at least, where close air support was effectively employed during a ground battle.
- oldman
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News to me. I thought we were discussing your point that "air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network." It wasn't the fighter-bombers that shut it down, it was the heavies. Germany didn't transport fuel from Romania to Normandy in tanker trucks.
I note, while I'm at it, this passage from Williamson Murray's "Luftwaffe," 1985, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, Inc., at page 268:
"At the end of June [1944], the Luftwaffe's strategic position, as well as the Reich's, gave the Germans small cause for optimism. A Luftwaffe intelligence report summed up the situation. While Allied air operations over Germany had declined due to the invasion, the authors felt that Allied bombers would soon return to Germany. In France, air attacks had destroyed the transportation system, while bombing attacks in Germany had extensively damaged the fuel industry. Production of aircraft fuel was off by 70 percent, synthetic fuel production was down by 60 percent, and refinery output (including Rumania) had dropped to 70 percent of total capacity. The report noted that aerial attacks on transportation and petroleum industries had provided substantial aid to the ground battle in the west. Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system. In conclusion, the report warned that the great danger was a continuation of attacks on the synthetic fuel industry. Thus, the German high command needed to provide adequate support for the great fuel plants. Attacks on transportation were almost as dangerous, but there was little that could be done because one could not protect an entire rail system." The report reference is to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab Ic, Nr. 3080/44, 16.7.44, Nryt.: "Britischnordamerikanische Luftkriegsfuhrung gegen Deutschland, " Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Roll #21, FD 3046/49.
Educate me. I've never heard of any such formalized prioritization. And I question the conclusion that this was the best use of air power in WWII. Until forward air controlling was well-developed - which didn't really happen until Viet Nam - close air support was a chancy proposition. I can't think of any battles in WWII, in the west, at least, where close air support was effectively employed during a ground battle.
- oldman
This is very informative and points out why the Germans lost the war, and why they were destined to lose the war. The Germans had no strategic offensive capability.
Bombing was the allies greatest contribution because it was a unique capability they had, and developed to great extent during the war. The Germans and Russians, largely ignored developing Strategic weapons. If left to themselves, they would have fought a very long, drawn out, war of fronts and advances and retreats....until the Germans ran out of soldiers and pilots. then the outcome would have happened much the way it did, albeit years later.
I've often felt the US and Britain and France could have sat it out. :salute
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France did sit it out :old:
Hitlers position in Germany before his success was still not secure.
Once it was clear that the European democracies were incapable the Germans gains were easy.
The German "Myth" :rofl
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Two-thirds of all Il-2s built were destroyed, the highest of all types of Soviet aircraft; they were practically shot down as soon as they came off the production line.
lol :rofl
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In contrast I believe it's why the war's in the middle east have had little effect. Because in those wars we specifically set out to only target Soldiers. While killing soldiers temporarily stops aggression, it does very little to change the political climate and beliefs of the people. So it just reverts back to its old paradigm after it recruits and trains more soldiers.
:salute
Never thought about it that way. Maybe we will wise up someday.
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Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system.
I believe you just disproved your point. You said they didnt truck their fuel in from Romania. You seem to be reinforcing what I recall, that the allied assaults on rail systems were mostly in France and Italy. Which only forced Germans to start trucking the fuel during the last leg of it's dispersal.
And the heavies were certainly not capable of stopping the flow on country roads. On the other hand, Long range fighters making attacks on rail could and did have the same if not better effect on transportation at less cost.
The bottom line is, strategic bombing did not have a significant effect on the war by any standards especially when you compare costs to results. And if fighters had not taken control of the sky, the biggest impacts it did have would likely not have occurred.
All you have to do is look at the evolution of precision weapons to see that it was a poor concept that had limited success only because precision strikes by attack aircraft had not been fully developed as a consequence of the same ridiculous belief that rendered the USAAF unprepared at the beginning of the war... "bombers were the future of warfare."
American high command was a stubborn good ol'boy, political club that looked out for each other instead of the good of the country. They completely ignored the fact that fighters were faster and harder targets to hit, they were ten times more accurate bomb for bomb and could have potentially cleaned the skies of German fighters faster than they could have built them if they had not wasted money and materials on bombers instead of building an overwhelming force of fighter aircraft and fighter bombers.
I believe the greatest contribution heavies made to the war, mentioned by Vinkman, was the effect of piercing through the hard headedness of political beliefs.
...But we didn't HAVE to do that to win the war.
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News to me. I thought we were discussing your point that "air interdiction by allied fighter-bombers almost completely shut down the German transport and logistics network." It wasn't the fighter-bombers that shut it down, it was the heavies. Germany didn't transport fuel from Romania to Normandy in tanker trucks.
I note, while I'm at it, this passage from Williamson Murray's "Luftwaffe," 1985, The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of America, Inc., at page 268:
"At the end of June [1944], the Luftwaffe's strategic position, as well as the Reich's, gave the Germans small cause for optimism. A Luftwaffe intelligence report summed up the situation. While Allied air operations over Germany had declined due to the invasion, the authors felt that Allied bombers would soon return to Germany. In France, air attacks had destroyed the transportation system, while bombing attacks in Germany had extensively damaged the fuel industry. Production of aircraft fuel was off by 70 percent, synthetic fuel production was down by 60 percent, and refinery output (including Rumania) had dropped to 70 percent of total capacity. The report noted that aerial attacks on transportation and petroleum industries had provided substantial aid to the ground battle in the west. Particularly worrisome from the German perspective was the possibility that the Allied air forces might do in the Balkans what they had accomplished so successfully in France and Italy; that is, destroy the rail and road system. In conclusion, the report warned that the great danger was a continuation of attacks on the synthetic fuel industry. Thus, the German high command needed to provide adequate support for the great fuel plants. Attacks on transportation were almost as dangerous, but there was little that could be done because one could not protect an entire rail system." The report reference is to Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab Ic, Nr. 3080/44, 16.7.44, Nryt.: "Britischnordamerikanische Luftkriegsfuhrung gegen Deutschland, " Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Roll #21, FD 3046/49.
Educate me. I've never heard of any such formalized prioritization. And I question the conclusion that this was the best use of air power in WWII. Until forward air controlling was well-developed - which didn't really happen until Viet Nam - close air support was a chancy proposition. I can't think of any battles in WWII, in the west, at least, where close air support was effectively employed during a ground battle.
- oldman
GO OM GO! :lol
I believe you just disproved your point. You said they didnt truck their fuel in from Romania. You seem to be reinforcing what I recall, that the allied assaults on rail systems were mostly in France and Italy. Which only forced Germans to start trucking the fuel during the last leg of it's dispersal.
And the heavies were certainly not capable of stopping the flow on country roads. On the other hand, Long range fighters making attacks on rail could and did have the same if not better effect on transportation at less cost.
The bottom line is, strategic bombing did not have a significant effect on the war by any standards especially when you compare costs to results. And if fighters had not taken control of the sky, the biggest impacts it did have would likely not have occurred.
All you have to do is look at the evolution of precision weapons to see that it was a poor concept that had limited success only because precision strikes by attack aircraft had not been fully developed as a consequence of the same ridiculous belief that rendered the USAAF unprepared at the beginning of the war... "bombers were the future of warfare."
American high command was a stubborn good ol'boy, political club that looked out for each other instead of the good of the country. They completely ignored the fact that fighters were faster and harder targets to hit, they were ten times more accurate bomb for bomb and could have potentially cleaned the skies of German fighters faster than they could have built them if they had not wasted money and materials on bombers instead of building an overwhelming force of fighter aircraft and fighter bombers.
I believe the greatest contribution heavies made to the war, mentioned by Vinkman, was the effect of piercing through the hard headedness of political beliefs.
...But we didn't HAVE to do that to win the war.
The USAAF did build an overwhelming force of fighters and fighter bombers along with the heavies. That's why there was barely a Luftwaffe at the end of the war and why the German Army could only launch an offensive like they in in December of 44 depending on bad weather to keep Allied Tactical Air Forces grounded. Yes Germany was still producing a large numbers of fighters late in the war but they didnt have the experianced pilots of the past thanks to Allied fighters, and they didnt have fuel to persecute the war offensively anymore thanks to the bombing of their oil and rail networks. Ask Japan about about the ability of strategic bombing to win a war. The ability to do precision strikes by any aircraft wasn't achieved until Vietnam and even then it was in its infancy. It really wasn't realized until the Gulf War.
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I believe you just disproved your point. You said they didnt truck their fuel in from Romania. You seem to be reinforcing what I recall, that the allied assaults on rail systems were mostly in France and Italy. Which only forced Germans to start trucking the fuel during the last leg of it's dispersal.
And the heavies were certainly not capable of stopping the flow on country roads. On the other hand, Long range fighters making attacks on rail could and did have the same if not better effect on transportation at less cost.
In order to get to the last leg of fuel dispersal, the fuel had to go through all the preceding legs. Those legs were by rail. When Eisenhower ordered the RAF and 8th AF to switch from "strategic" targets to transportation targets, those targets were marshalling yards in France, Germany and elsewhere. The strategic bombing survey has a chart that shows the enormous amount of ordnance which was dropped by the heavies on those targets, crippling the rail transportation system. The fuel wasn't making it to the tank trucks because it was stuck in transit further back in the system. Had we been able to hit the transportation systems in the Balkans, closer to the oil production facilities, the effect would have been even more pronounced.
The bottom line is, strategic bombing did not have a significant effect on the war by any standards especially when you compare costs to results.
I don't know how to respond to this, in light of the sources people have already cited in this thread.
American high command was a stubborn good ol'boy, political club that looked out for each other instead of the good of the country. They completely ignored the fact that fighters were faster and harder targets to hit, they were ten times more accurate bomb for bomb and could have potentially cleaned the skies of German fighters faster than they could have built them if they had not wasted money and materials on bombers instead of building an overwhelming force of fighter aircraft and fighter bombers.
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, when the strategic doctrine was fashioned and the planes to implement that doctrine were developed, this simply was not true. Waves of P-35s, P-36s, P-39s and P-40s would not have accomplished what the B-17s and B-24s did. If nothing else, they couldn't carry bombs and had comparatively pathetic range. The ability of fighters to carry heavy ordnance loads, and to deliver them with any accuracy at a reasonable distance from their bases, didn't occur until the middle of the war (if not later) and, so far as I can tell, was not anticipated before then (hence the continued development of dive bombers such as the SB2C).
Oddly enough, the notion that strategic bombing in WWII was unsuccessful didn't come up until the Viet Nam war. You can read all of the sources, by all of the participants, written during the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s and you won't find any of them that say "hey, strategic bombing was a failure!" It was only when Rolling Thunder was producing questionable results, and the anti-war movement was gaining strength, that you first started to see people proclaiming that strategic bombing had never worked - as justification for why it should have been discontinued in the 1960s.
- oldman
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Oddly enough, the notion that strategic bombing in WWII was unsuccessful didn't come up until the Viet Nam war. You can read all of the sources, by all of the participants, written during the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s and you won't find any of them that say "hey, strategic bombing was a failure!" It was only when Rolling Thunder was producing questionable results, and the anti-war movement was gaining strength, that you first started to see people proclaiming that strategic bombing had never worked - as justification for why it should have been discontinued in the 1960s.
- oldman
Linebacker II was the last great strategic bombing offensive during Vietnam and it seemed to get everyone's attention.
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Linebacker II was the last great strategic bombing offensive during Vietnam and it seemed to get everyone's attention.
True. But I remember reading plenty of predictions at the time that WWII had proven it couldn't work.
Surprise, surprise, surprise.
- oldman
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Gibberish :old:
The V2 and V1 threat and the 262's were weapons of desparation :old:
The bombing of Germany would have increased until they had surrendered.
If the Germans instigated war had carried on for another 2 years would allied bomber production decreased?
The Gloucester meteor would have been properly deployed :old:
And have I stated before the Allies "Would" have dropped the "A" bomb on the "narzzies"
The 'A' bomb was the expression of 'Allied' superiority which out shined anything the 'Axis' achieved
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^^^^ Gloster.
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In the late 1930s and early 1940s, when the strategic doctrine was fashioned and the planes to implement that doctrine were developed, this simply was not true. Waves of P-35s, P-36s, P-39s and P-40s would not have accomplished what the B-17s and B-24s did. If nothing else, they couldn't carry bombs and had comparatively pathetic range. The ability of fighters to carry heavy ordnance loads, and to deliver them with any accuracy at a reasonable distance from their bases, didn't occur until the middle of the war (if not later) and, so far as I can tell, was not anticipated before then (hence the continued development of dive bombers such as the SB2C).
That's true. The idea of the development of the P-38 Droop Snoot was born from the idea of two senior 8th AF officers when they tried to think of ways to cut down on the bomber losses. They concluded that we had fighters at the time (P-47 and P-38) that could carry pretty much the same bomb load of the early B-17s. From this they concluded that a fighter-bomber would have a better chance to make it to the target, drop its bombs and be able to fight its way back and stand a much better chance than a heavy bomber. 8th AF High Command gave the okay to pursue the idea further and the P-38 was selected and the Droop Snoot was born.
ack-ack
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One thing that people have been ignoring was the Goring was a complete idiot when it came to tactics. Also Hitler was not the brightest tacticsion either. Another fault of the German industrial area was perfection in there military equipment. If they would have been able to build rough battle equipment like the t-34 it would have been better. If hitler would have not focused so much on jet power bombers the 262 could have seen squadron strength a year earlier.
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The USAAF did build an overwhelming force of fighters and fighter bombers along with the heavies.
You miss the point. It could have been 3x as overwhelming and without the losses they sacrificed in bomber crews.
That's why there was barely a Luftwaffe at the end of the war and why the German Army could only launch an offensive like they in in December of 44 depending on bad weather to keep Allied Tactical Air Forces grounded.
Why are you arguing this? You're trying to argue the usefullness of Bomber Command while telling me that the Germans only moved when Tactical air units were grounded by weather. I agree. The German forces were more affected by tactical air power than bombers.
Yes Germany was still producing a large numbers of fighters late in the war but they didnt have the experianced pilots of the past thanks to Allied fighters,
Again, because fighters cleared the sky. Are you having trouble remembering which argument your trying to make?
and they didnt have fuel to persecute the war offensively anymore thanks to the bombing of their oil and rail networks.
The Germans had fuel. Bombers did not change that. and they tried desparately to get it to their forces, but roving fighter bombers prevented any road travel. Downed Rail stations are an inconvenience, but they dont stop trains from moving.
Ask Japan about about the ability of strategic bombing to win a war.
Are you seriously suggesting strategic bombing defeated Japan?
The ability to do precision strikes by any aircraft wasn't achieved until Vietnam and even then it was in its infancy.
And that was because thick headed Army brass wouldnt let go of the heavy bomber. Kinda like what's going on here. And no, Vietnam wasn't the infancy stage of precision strikes, WW2 was. They didnt call it precision because compared to the weapons and aiming avionics of Vietnam, it wasn't considered precise. But Japanese dive bombers at Pearl Harbor were certainly precision strikes just as much as allied fighters shooting train cars with machine guns.
In order to get to the last leg of fuel dispersal, the fuel had to go through all the preceding legs. Those legs were by rail. When Eisenhower ordered the RAF and 8th AF to switch from "strategic" targets to transportation targets, those targets were marshalling yards in France, Germany and elsewhere. The strategic bombing survey has a chart that shows the enormous amount of ordnance which was dropped by the heavies on those targets, crippling the rail transportation system.
Destroying a marshaling yard does not stop a train. The cars were without a doubt stopped just outside the yard and unloaded at some incidental inconvenience. And they very likely turned around on a temporary fix of the system. It's not difficult. The fighters killed locomotives, they conducted "PRECISION" strikes on vital bridges. That was what crippled the rail system.
The fuel wasn't making it to the tank trucks
Fuel was making it to trucks and to the front lines. The Germans never stopped fighting with tanks or planes. No doubt in short supply, but it was short because of fighters.
Had we been able to hit the transportation systems in the Balkans, closer to the oil production facilities, the effect would have been even more pronounced.
1x0=0 Bombers were a waste of money.
Waves of P-35s, P-36s, P-39s and P-40s would not have accomplished what the B-17s and B-24s did.
You're right. It would have been silly to waste good mens lives trying to accomplish half of the useless attacks the bombers made.
If nothing else, they couldn't carry bombs and had comparatively pathetic range. The ability of fighters to carry heavy ordnance loads, and to deliver them with any accuracy at a reasonable distance from their bases, didn't occur until the middle of the war
Again, due to stubborn brass that refused to admit they could be wrong and dictated development and procurement to match their beliefs.
Oddly enough, the notion that strategic bombing in WWII was unsuccessful didn't come up until the Viet Nam war. You can read all of the sources, by all of the participants, written during the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s and you won't find any of them that say "hey, strategic bombing was a failure!" It was only when Rolling Thunder was producing questionable results, and the anti-war movement was gaining strength, that you first started to see people proclaiming that strategic bombing had never worked - as justification for why it should have been discontinued in the 1960s.
Apparently you are unfamiliar with the manner and lengths the military and government will go to protect its reputation.
Do you think if some officer in the US military would have done his own assessment of the results of strategic bombing that you would have seen it before Vietnam?
Do you know what happens when you buck the system in the military? I'll tell you in two words... Billy Mitchell. His story is the epitome of how stubborn and in-adaptable high command was.
Even today, you will not get the US military to admit the failings of strategic bombing. It will not happen for another hundred years.
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Are you seriously suggesting strategic bombing defeated Japan?
Strategic bombing played a vital part in Japan's surrender. Without it, the end might have been enormously different.
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We used the buffs because it was the only means available to take the fight to the enemy. Round the clock bombing put a strain on the German war machine and helped divert resources until a land invasion by Britain and the US could commence.
We tried the fighter bomber thing going against Ploesti with P-38s and it didn't really work. Losses were still high. Just as they were on the error-plagued initial raid with B-24s.
The German Air Force was potent. It wasn't until fighter sweeps were undertaken at the expense of close escort that the tide turned. But until that day, we had only one tool to prosecute the war and that was the heavy bomber. JDAM would have been a big help. Precision bombing wasn't that precise. But it contributed.
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Strategic bombing played a vital part in Japan's surrender. Without it, the end might have been enormously different.
Soldiers and sailors defeated Japan O<-----PERIOD
They got the bombers within reach of Japan and decimated Japanese forces long before then.
The ONLY thing strategic bombing did to "encourage" the Japanese to surrender, was drop the A bomb. They would not have surrendered because of strategic bombers and no amount of fantasy can give "strategic bombing" credit for winning a war because they dropped the A bomb.
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The Germans had fuel. Bombers did not change that. and they tried desparately to get it to their forces, but roving fighter bombers prevented any road travel. Downed Rail stations are an inconvenience, but they dont stop trains from moving.
Destroyed rail road marshalling depots do stop trains from moving. Bombing key rail road bridges and transfer stations do stop trains from moving and the supplies and soldiers they carry.
Are you seriously suggesting strategic bombing defeated Japan?
USAAF generals in the PTO argued against the invasion of Japan because by the summer of 1945, virtually all of Japan's strategic targets were destroyed and were virtually out of strategic targets to bomb. LeMay was opposed to the invasion for this reason and believed that Japan would surrender by November due to the US bombing of Japan and Japanese strategic targets throughout the Pacific. US Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946 concluded that Japan would have surrendered by November 1st due to the US strategic bombing without having to resort to an invasion.
Fuel was making it to trucks and to the front lines. The Germans never stopped fighting with tanks or planes. No doubt in short supply, but it was short because of fighters.
When Allied heavy bombers were finally able to reach targets deep into eastern Germany and hit the synthetic fuel production plants, Speer sent this message to Hitler after the Politz plant (70% destroyed) was bombed by US B-17s and B-24s.
'The enemy has struck us at one of our weakest points. If they persist at it this time, we will soon no longer have any fuel production worth mentioning'." (May 19th, 1944)
After the Normandy landings, Speer sent another message to Hitler about the attacks on the synthetic fuel plants.
"... the allies staged a new series of attacks which put many fuel plants out of action. On June 22, nine-tenths of the production of airplane fuel was knocked out." (June 24th, 1944)
A month later, Speer appealed to Hitler to increase fighter defenses over the synthetic fuel plants.
"I implored Hitler ... to reserve a significantly larger part of the fighter plane production ... to protecting the home hydrogenation plants ...." (July 28th, 1944)
The Battle of the Ruhr was a 5 month strategic bombing campaign of the Ruhr Valley, Germany's industrial heart. In Adam Tooze study of the German war economy, he found British and US bomber raids had severely disrupted German production. Steel production had fallen by 200k tons, the armaments industry was left with a steel shortfall of 400k tons. After doubling production in 1942, steel production only increased by 20% in 1943. This caused Speer to cut planned increases in production and the bombings also caused a critical shortage in sub-components. The increase of Luftwaffe aircraft production also came to a halt. Monthly production failed to increase between 7/43 and 3/44. According to Tooze, British and US bombers stopped "Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks". Krupps Works was so severly damaged that Krupps never restarted locomotive production after the raids in March and April of 1943.
ack-ack
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Soldiers and sailors defeated Japan O<-----PERIOD
They got the bombers within reach of Japan and decimated Japanese forces long before then.
The ONLY thing strategic bombing did to "encourage" the Japanese to surrender, was drop the A bomb. They would not have surrendered because of strategic bombers and no amount of fantasy can give "strategic bombing" credit for winning a war because they dropped the A bomb.
You should read up on the strategic bombing in the Pacific/CBI theaters of operations. If you do, then you'd see that your post is incorrect. One could make the argument that strategic bombing in the Pacific/CBI was far more successful than the strategic bombing operations of the 8th AF in the ETO.
ack-ack
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Japanese efforts were also clobbered by submarine warfare. Hard to get fuel from the Dutch East Indies or wherever when your tankers get sunk with impunity.
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Japanese efforts were also clobbered by submarine warfare. Hard to get fuel from the Dutch East Indies or wherever when your tankers get sunk with impunity.
Yep, it was another nail in the coffin for Japan.
ack-ack
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Japanese efforts were also clobbered by submarine warfare. Hard to get fuel from the Dutch East Indies or wherever when your tankers get sunk with impunity.
Very true.
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When the firebombs started raining down on the Japanese civilians Japan had lost the war a long time ago. Conventional strategic bombing alone would not have broken the Japanese fighting spirit; it didn't in Britain in 1940, nor in Germany in 1945. Only nuclear warfare could achieve that since you can't hide from "canned sunshine". Strategic bombing in WWII was a failure, and a huge waste of resources. By today's standards it was also a crime against humanity.
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Yep, it was another nail in the coffin for Japan.
ack-ack
Very true.
:salute :salute
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By today's standards it was also a crime against humanity.
So is the uniform in your avatar.
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It's a costume.... He's an actor.
However, your point is taken; I do consider the Waffen-SS to be in the same league as RAF Bomber Command and USAAF/USAF in the crime against humanity department.
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It's a costume.... He's an actor.
However, your point is taken; I do consider the Waffen-SS to be in the same league as RAF Bomber Command and USAAF/USAF in the crime against humanity department.
No doubt you do.
I believe the tone of WWII bombing campaigns was forged in Warsaw Rotterdamn London and Coventry.
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They would not have surrendered because of strategic bombers and no amount of fantasy can give "strategic bombing" credit for winning a war because they dropped the A bomb.
Since when is dropping an A bomb not strategic bombing? That was my point -- that no amount of anything else would have averted a large bloodbath at the end.
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One thing that people have been ignoring was the Goring was a complete idiot when it came to tactics. Also Hitler was not the brightest tacticsion either. Another fault of the German industrial area was perfection in there military equipment. If they would have been able to build rough battle equipment like the t-34 it would have been better. If Hitler would have not focused so much on jet power bombers the 262 could have seen squadron strength a year earlier.
Again complete gibberish :old:
The German people were 100% behind THEIR government :old:
The fact that ALL the German people from the factory worker up to the likes of Albert Spear were
working for a German speaking empire was why military incompetence was prevalent.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqN_Pd58MFw
Well that looks like an awful lot of moving trains in 1945 and I am quite sure there were lots more.
Destroyed rail road marshalling depots do stop trains from moving. Bombing key rail road bridges and transfer stations do stop trains from moving and the supplies and soldiers they carry.
They stop them at THOSE locations only. Bombers weren't destroying miles of rail systems. They were destroying a rail yard that might be a one mile square.
Any materials they destroyed was pure luck and damage to tracks was a very temporary interruption.
Bombers didn't hit rail yards to kill trains or material, they blew up a flat piece of ground with a few sticks of steel and lumber. It is not a difficult task to repair a damaged rail line. Even a couple miles of destroyed track, which btw would have been a miraculous success for high alt bombers.
Marshaling yards are large turn around/switching networks. Losing them is an inconvenience, not a show stopper. Trains could be re-routed. All construction units have to do is repair ONE SINGLE LINE through a damaged yard, a job that could take less than a day, and the train continues on to another station or they just unload where they stopped. After all, those yards we are talking about were already trucking distance from German troops.
It can be a large time consuming task to rebuild a bridge. Fighter bombers destroyed bridges, saboteurs destroyed bridges and blew up trains. Heavy bombers probably rarely if ever destroyed a bridge.
All these reports about "bombing effects" getting tossed around in this debate ...could never in a million years, be so meticulous as to be able to precisely differentiate the results of fighter attacks on rail transportation, resistance saboteurs, and heavy bombers... no expert in the world can say with any certainty which attacks had x/amount of effect.
I can guarantee that reports by Bomber Command about the effect their attacks had on the transportation system conveniently failed consider all, if any of the disruptions by fighter bombers and resistance groups.
USAAF generals in the PTO argued against the invasion of Japan because by the summer of 1945, virtually all of Japan's strategic targets were destroyed and were virtually out of strategic targets to bomb. LeMay was opposed to the invasion for this reason and believed that Japan would surrender by November due to the US bombing of Japan and Japanese strategic targets throughout the Pacific.
I'm not sure what targets you are referring to. Japan was cut off at the end of the war because the Navy, Army and Marines had Japan surrounded. Strategic bombing of the main island was incidental and completely unnecessary considering the A bomb was almost finished. We could have ordered our troops to stand down except to blockade the Island until the A bomb was dropped. We could have starved them into submission without hitting a single target in Japan if we really had to.
Japan was beat and virtually helpless.
Maybe you are including the use of any heavy bombers in the island hopping as "strategic bombing." While it may have fit a strict definition of strategic bombing at times, use of heavy bombers in the PTO was nothing like what high command was doing in the ETO.
From what I have seen, the vast majority of heavy bomber use in the pacific was tactical in nature. They were smaller scale attacks, the populations in the PTO were occupied and generally friendly, whatever effect bombers had in the island campaigns was local in nature, their targets were not typical of ETO strategic targets like material sources, production centers or enemy populations. And if I'm not mistaken, the overwhelming majority of their targets were military or shipping. None of which fits the ideal strategic campaign of the ETO.
US Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946 concluded that Japan would have surrendered by November 1st due to the US strategic bombing without having to resort to an invasion.
Ah yes, another report by Strategic Bomber Command. And from right after the war too. That wouldn't be at all biased would it.
I've seen several historians say that neither Germany nor Japan would have surrendered because of bombing. So perhaps that survey was based on the fact that Japan now had no way to fish commercially which was their primary meat source and no safe supply route in or out of their country.
'The enemy has struck us at one of our weakest points. If they persist at it this time, we will soon no longer have any fuel production worth mentioning'." (May 19th, 1944)
After the Normandy landings, Speer sent another message to Hitler about the attacks on the synthetic fuel plants.
"... the allies staged a new series of attacks which put many fuel plants out of action. On June 22, nine-tenths of the production of airplane fuel was knocked out." (June 24th, 1944)
Look at the dates of those statements. How far into Europe were the allies at that point? Close enough to use strike fighters to hit those fields?
A month later, Speer appealed to Hitler to increase fighter defenses over the synthetic fuel plants.
"I implored Hitler ... to reserve a significantly larger part of the fighter plane production ... to protecting the home hydrogenation plants ...." (July 28th, 1944)
And in these quotes you can again see the writing on the wall. fighters were a determining factor for both sides.
When Allied heavy bombers were finally able to reach targets deep into eastern Germany and hit the synthetic fuel production plants, Speer sent this message to Hitler after the Politz plant (70% destroyed) was bombed by US B-17s and B-24s.
I'm not saying the strikes on oil plants was a waste of time. It was the smartest part of the strategic bombing campaign. But it didn't happen soon enough, it most likely could have been done better with less loss and it didn't win the war.
The Battle of the Ruhr was a 5 month strategic bombing campaign of the Ruhr Valley, Germany's industrial heart. In Adam Tooze study of the German war economy, he found British and US bomber raids had severely disrupted German production. Steel production had fallen by 200k tons, the armaments industry was left with a steel shortfall of 400k tons. After doubling production in 1942, steel production only increased by 20% in 1943.
Adam Tooze wanted to validate strategic bombing and even he said "they often chose the wrong targets."
Historians emphatically agree that prior to 1944 the strategic bombing campaign was a complete failure. Whatever minor successes you can point to mean nothing in the overall picture. Germany won many battles, in the end you can't call them successful for it.
After doubling production in 1942, steel production only increased by 20% in 1943. This caused Speer to cut planned increases in production and the bombings also caused a critical shortage in sub-components. The increase of Luftwaffe aircraft production also came to a halt. Monthly production failed to increase between 7/43 and 3/44. According to Tooze, British and US bombers stopped "Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks". Krupps Works was so severly damaged that Krupps never restarted locomotive production after the raids in March and April of 1943.
You know as well as I do Germany produced more aircraft at the end of the war than they did in the beginning. So obviously this shortage wasn't that detrimental. If they had produced as many fighter pilots, then we would have been in trouble.
The strategic bombing campaign was born in a belief that a country could win a war with bombers alone. RAF Air Marshal Harris was called "obsessed" with his version of strategic bombing and almost lost his command over it. He wanted so bad to prove the strategic bombing could win a war, he was blinded to any rational alternatives in spite of the cost.
It was mistaken concept that was poorly thought out and executed. The tons of materials and thousands of men wasted because of it could have had better effect in an overwhelming fighter force that provided tactical air support and precision strikes against whatever targets it could reach.
A small heavy bomber force defended with an almost excessive use of fighters could have done what little fighter bombers couldn't do.
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double post
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I do consider the Waffen-SS to be in the same league as RAF Bomber Command and USAAF/USAF in the crime against humanity department.
Not all Waffen SS were involved in the concentration camps, but for the ones that were, you don't see a difference between murdering your own helpless citizens and attacking an enemy?
I think that, in a war where one nation, supported by its citizenry, is trying to conquer or exterminate your nation -- in a war to the death between nations -- you don't popsiclefoot around. You attack the enemy with what you can until it's defeated as quickly as possible. Second is that I think it's easy for people today, who weren't there, who are sitting in comfort and have no worries for their safety, and who have perfect after-the-fact knowledge of how everything worked out to say that people back then should have held back this or that.
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Since when is dropping an A bomb not strategic bombing? That was my point -- that no amount of anything else would have averted a large bloodbath at the end.
Since always. I have never seen them referred to as strategic strikes in any materials I have ever seen.
It wasn't considered strategic bombing before the A bomb because they didn't exist.
No one at the time of those 2<---- count them, occurrences could have possibly been thinking this is just another day at strategic bomber command.
They were super-weapons the world had never seen before and they were unique unto themselves and cannot possibly be put in to the same category as strategic bombing of that time.
I fully understand what you were suggesting, but you don't get to give strategic bombing credit for winning the war just because they happened to deliver "that package." Too many people gave their lives to put those bombers on Japans doorstep.
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double post
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Muzik, I believe that bombers dropping A bombs on cities does come under the definition of strategic bombing.
I completely agree that a lot went into the Pacific war to get things to that point -- horribly difficult battles to take islands to get B-29's in range, amazingly courageous and dangerous submarine action that cut off supplies, great battles to defeat a powerful enemy navy, and so on. A bombs were not the only thing of significance.
I also agree that the US would have won without the A bombs, but the A bombs significantly reduced the end conflict.
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I also agree that the US would have won without the A bombs, but the A bombs significantly reduced the end conflict.
Yes, but would the A-bombs end the war if their power was demonstrated on something other than the most densely populated cities that were selected to yield the highest casualties number?
Don't get me wrong, I do not yell war crimes at the carpet bombing in an all out war against the kind of evil normally found in comic books rather than in the real world. I do question the wisdom of it and whether the carnage of civilian populations was really needed.
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Not all Waffen SS were involved in the concentration camps, but for the ones that were, you don't see a difference between murdering your own helpless citizens and attacking an enemy?
Very few were involved with the death camps. Those were mostly SS-Totenkopfverbände and Allgemeine-SS and is in a completely different league only matched in cruelty by the Soviet NKVD. I was considering the atrocities committed by Waffen-SS against the civilian populations on the Eastern Front. Mostly anti-partisan reprisals and the like. Whether you're burned to death inside your home by German flame throwers or burned to death inside your home by British firebombs makes little difference to the victims, no?
I think that, in a war where one nation, supported by its citizenry, is trying to conquer or exterminate your nation -- in a war to the death between nations -- you don't popsiclefoot around. You attack the enemy with what you can until it's defeated as quickly as possible. Second is that I think it's easy for people today, who weren't there, who are sitting in comfort and have no worries for their safety, and who have perfect after-the-fact knowledge of how everything worked out to say that people back then should have held back this or that.
Indeed. I'm not saying anyone should have held back. Adhering to rules in warfare is silly in my opinion. I was only pointing out that today the actions of the RAF and USAAF/USAF would have been considered crimes against humanity. Shifty added the Waffen-SS to the list, although I though it was generally agreed upon that they committed war crimes...
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Yes, but would the A-bombs end the war if their power was demonstrated on something other than the most densely populated cities that were selected to yield the highest casualties number?
Don't get me wrong, I do not yell war crimes at the carpet bombing in an all out war against the kind of evil normally found in comic books rather than in the real world. I do question the wisdom of it and whether the carnage of civilian populations was really needed.
horrible yes. Nessary probably. It is kinda like the moral question; if you are working the switches at a rail yard and a loaded car breaks off of train and comes rolling down the line. There is five guys working down the line that there is no way to warn. Your only option of just letting the car go is a spur that you can turn it down. At the end of that spur is a man working. Your choice is wether you turn down the spur Nd kill one man or let it go and kill ifve men. The choice is yours. A bombs I believe were war crimes. But are you going to try the president over that. The side that wins isn't tried. As far as Germany goes most cilvians killed were not innocent do to the fact that they were working in the war industry.
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Whether you're burned to death inside your home by German flame throwers or burned to death inside your home by British firebombs makes little difference to the victims, no?
It depends. If you are part of a citizenry that voted in a regime and supported its conquests then you probably have in mind that your city (in the days of WWII weaponry) might get bombed as a consequence of your nation's activities, whereas if you are a passive dweller in a conquered country, you probably have in mind that that it's not just for you to be rounded up and killed.
Indeed. I'm not saying anyone should have held back. Adhering to rules in warfare is silly in my opinion. I was only pointing out that today the actions of the RAF and USAAF/USAF would have been considered crimes against humanity.
"I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal. Fortunately we were on the winning side. Every soldier thinks something of the moral aspects of what he is doing. But all war is immoral and if you let that bother you, you're not a good soldier." -- Curtis LeMay
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Never thought about it that way. Maybe we will wise up someday.
and maybe the moon is made of cheese :)
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Shifty added the Waffen-SS to the list, although I though it was generally agreed upon that they committed war crimes...
No you added them to the list I just made a remark about the uniform in your avatar. The list si all your doing. I do find it amusing you leave the Luftwaffe off your list.
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No you added them to the list I just made a remark about the uniform in your avatar. The list si all your doing. I do find it amusing you leave the Luftwaffe off your list.
Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Belgrade, Stalingrad....hey, those were honest mistakes, quite different from deliberate terror raids.
Blood and honor, Shifty, get with the program.
- oldman
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It depends. If you are part of a citizenry that voted in a regime and supported its conquests then you probably have in mind that your city (in the days of WWII weaponry) might get bombed as a consequence of your nation's activities, whereas if you are a passive dweller in a conquered country, you probably have in mind that that it's not just for you to be rounded up and killed.
Perhaps, if not for the fact that the German people thought they were the defenders. After all, France and Britain declared war on them right?
“Naturally the common people don't want war; neither in Russia, nor in England, nor in America, nor in Germany. That is understood. But after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.”
- Hermann Goering
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When the firebombs started raining down on the Japanese civilians Japan had lost the war a long time ago. Conventional strategic bombing alone would not have broken the Japanese fighting spirit; it didn't in Britain in 1940, nor in Germany in 1945. Only nuclear warfare could achieve that since you can't hide from "canned sunshine". Strategic bombing in WWII was a failure, and a huge waste of resources. By today's standards it was also a crime against humanity.
So is the uniform in your avatar.
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No you added them to the list I just made a remark about the uniform in your avatar. The list si all your doing. I do find it amusing you leave the Luftwaffe off your list.
Nah... You made the connection. And now I see others like Oldman pile on the "they did evil things too!" bandwagon. "Other people did it too" has never been a reasonable or viable defense for war crimes (or any other crime for that matter).
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Blood and honor, Shifty, get with the program.
- oldman
Huh, the US Marines?
(http://www.csmonitor.com/var/ezflow_site/storage/images/media/content/2012/0209_naziflag/11715506-1-eng-US/0209_NaziFlag_full_600.jpg)
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Huh, the US Marines?
(http://www.csmonitor.com/var/ezflow_site/storage/images/media/content/2012/0209_naziflag/11715506-1-eng-US/0209_NaziFlag_full_600.jpg)
Again.. The list is yours, you're the one making the list and you made this list and made your moral judgements while proudly displaying the uniform of one of the most evil regimes in history. Which I pointed out to you. As for the photo they dishonored the American flag by displaying that filthy SS flag below it. They were reprimanded for it, not worshiped as heroes of the state. A far cry from wearing the symbol as part of their uniform and purposely killing non combatants and POWs as part of their regular duties and swearing allegiance to a lunatic who started a world war by attacking his neighbors. You're grasping at straws and you've still failed to add the Luftwaffe the very people that wrote the book on terror bombing to your list. Your misguided Teutonic hero worship isn't going to change history. Germany started the war using the very tactics you denounce. In fact Germany's leader publically called for the complete and utter destruction of cities. You can blame the USAAF and RAF Bomber Command until your swastika's fall off but what happened to Germany in WWII was brought on by Hitler and the German people who supported him.
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"...while proudly displaying the uniform of..."
:rofl
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"...while proudly displaying the uniform of..."
:rofl
What would you call it? A giddy smarmy looking Nazi character is not most people's first choice for an avatar.
You seem to be quite proud of it.
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Personal attacks is all you have left. Pathetic, but not unexpected, and quite amusing. :aok
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"Other people did it too" has never been a reasonable or viable defense for war crimes (or any other crime for that matter).
While this sounds nice, it's just not so. The most obvious example in our current context is that the Germans weren't tried for their own "terror bombing" war crimes. "He did it first" is a recognized basis for self-defense in criminal law, for equitable estoppel in civil law, and has been a general principle of society, everywhere, since someone first came up with the "eye-for-an-eye" notion.
That doesn't make the conduct pleasant, or even useful, you understand.
- oldman
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Huh, the US Marines?
(http://www.csmonitor.com/var/ezflow_site/storage/images/media/content/2012/0209_naziflag/11715506-1-eng-US/0209_NaziFlag_full_600.jpg)
Those don't look like Marines to me...
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What would you call it? A giddy smarmy looking Nazi character is not most people's first choice for an avatar.
You seem to be quite proud of it.
It is from that Tarantino film. The guy was a dork.
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Perhaps, if not for the fact that the German people thought they were the defenders.
That's a valid point. I still think, though, that there would be a difference in feeling about their situation between a citizen of Germany post 1940 subject to bombing and, say, a person living in the Ukraine or Poland subject to being rounded up and executed.
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People often say that Germany started the war, but Germany and the Soviet Union together, as allies and with a pact to divide up Europe between them, started the war in Europe.
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While this sounds nice, it's just not so. The most obvious example in our current context is that the Germans weren't tried for their own "terror bombing" war crimes. "He did it first" is a recognized basis for self-defense in criminal law, for equitable estoppel in civil law, and has been a general principle of society, everywhere, since someone first came up with the "eye-for-an-eye" notion.
That doesn't make the conduct pleasant, or even useful, you understand.
- oldman
Of course they didn't. They'd look like complete hypocrites. Nevertheless, in 1949 willful killing of civilians became a war crime, less than five years after the major parties to WWII had willfully killed civilians en masse.
No. Just no... Murdering a man's family is not justified because "he did it first". No court in the world would forgive you for murdering a child just because the child's father murdered yours. That's what were talking about here; using military force to deliberately kill defenseless civilians. Women, children, infants.
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That's a valid point. I still think, though, that there would be a difference in feeling about their situation between a citizen of Germany post 1940 subject to bombing and, say, a person living in the Ukraine or Poland subject to being rounded up and executed.
I don't know about that, but German women had a saying: "Better to have a Russian on your belly than an American over your head."
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Those don't look like Marines to me...
I only go by what the news said: http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/09/10364262-marines-posed-with-flag-resembling-nazi-ss-logo-in-afghanistan?lite
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It is from that Tarantino film. The guy was a dork.
:aok
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Those don't look like Marines to me...
Those are USMC snipers in that picture.
ack-ack
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I have reported you because I am the best looking in game :)
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I only go by what the news said: http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/09/10364262-marines-posed-with-flag-resembling-nazi-ss-logo-in-afghanistan?lite
That's one scruffy Marine Recon Team right there. Dang.
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Those are USMC snipers in that picture.
ack-ack
So it says. Geeze. I was thinking Seals maybe but Marine Snipers (Recon)? Tsk tsk.
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(http://25.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_lsbzslSc9x1qcga5ro1_500.jpg)
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It is from that Tarantino film. The guy was a dork.
Yeah I've seen the movie I liked Reservoir Dogs better. :P