Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: Rich46yo on May 30, 2017, 11:28:42 PM
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The only Japanese airplane company still producing airplanes on a regular schedule at the time of the Midway attack was Mitsubishi with the A6M Zero. The production of D3A-99's was slowed to a crawl and there were no Nakajima B5N's being produced because they were retooling the line for the B6N's.
Now I'm not 100% sure about this but I believe the only actual use of the B6N from a carrier, after they finally worked the kinks out, was at the Marianas battle where they got shot to pieces.
All 6 of the carriers sent east at the time, 2 to the Aleutions and 4 to Midway, not only carried less aircraft then their USN counter parts but they also were at 75% aircraft strength.
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I did not recall that the IJN CVs were understrength. There's a great book on the air war in the Pacific, "Fire In the Sky". Don't recall the author, but it does a great job of describing the strengths/weaknesses of both the US and Japan regarding the air war. It addressed all aspects, such as equipment, training, doctrine, logistics, and the asymmetric weapons development cycles of both nations, and how all this pretty much per-ordained Japan's eventual defeat. I believe the same author also did one on the naval war, but I don't have that one (yet).
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They weren't just under strengthened but they also did not have the 3 additional reserve airframes those CVs usually carried. Of course you know about the problem with the one sea plane not be able to take off from the cruiser but did you know that they only had a couple sea planes with any meaningful range to them, 1 or 2 I dont remember. The other 3 or 4 were more used for short range naval artillery spotting.
As well their coordination was so atrocious their picket submarines got on station late which is how our three CVs slipped past with out them knowing. The IJN made so many mistakes and so many go back to the imperialistic system of their leadership. Orders are never questioned/changed , initiative is never encouraged, leadership always goes to the most senior or political ALWAYS, the army and the navy hated each other, different branches in the same service didnt get along!
What they were very good at was flying and dropping bombs. And they had good early war airplanes, courageous/skilled pilots, great torpedo's. But at Midway they still had no radar, their AA/AA fire control sucked, they were way over confident, and their Intelligence was terrible. Between our 3 big CVs and Land based aircraft they didnt even have parity but they still sent two CV groups north on a worthless mission.
Granted The Coral Sea really weakened them by putting two fast CVs into dry dock but thats even more reason not to go north to the Aleutians. Some of this I knew but this new book is a real re-awakening on how I look at Midway. https://www.amazon.com/Shattered-Sword-Untold-Battle-Midway/dp/1574889249/ref=sr_1_6?ie=UTF8&qid=1496342922&sr=8-6&keywords=midway+books (https://www.amazon.com/Shattered-Sword-Untold-Battle-Midway/dp/1574889249/ref=sr_1_6?ie=UTF8&qid=1496342922&sr=8-6&keywords=midway+books)
I did not recall that the IJN CVs were understrength. There's a great book on the air war in the Pacific, "Fire In the Sky". Don't recall the author, but it does a great job of describing the strengths/weaknesses of both the US and Japan regarding the air war. It addressed all aspects, such as equipment, training, doctrine, logistics, and the asymmetric weapons development cycles of both nations, and how all this pretty much per-ordained Japan's eventual defeat. I believe the same author also did one on the naval war, but I don't have that one (yet).
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Just an overview type of thought, but I thought Japan outgunned us at Midway, but the Allies had the strategic advantage due to the Japanese code being broken.
Combine that with Yamamoto's plan being very difficult to execute and it lead to disastrous results for them.
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Just an overview type of thought, but I thought Japan outgunned us at Midway, but the Allies had the strategic advantage due to the Japanese code being broken.
Combine that with Yamamoto's plan being very difficult to execute and it lead to disastrous results for them.
Define outgunned
In terms of air assets for the MI operation we outnumbered them.
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Define outgunned
In terms of air assets for the MI operation we outnumbered them.
Ship to ship, sans aircraft. Not a 100% on that one at all. Just working from memory.
I know the code was broken, and that did give us the strategic advantage.
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Ship to ship, sans aircraft. Not a 100% on that one at all. Just working from memory.
I know the code was broken, and that did give us the strategic advantage.
Yes, the Japanese had more ships in the battle than the USN, even after splitting of the Japanese combined fleet (1 fleet to Midway, 2nd fleet to Aleutians).
As for aircraft, the USN had a very slight (by 15 planes) a numerical advantage in carrier planes but the Japanese were also able to muster over a 125 land based aircraft (fighters, bombers, scout/recce planes) in addition to the 233 carrier planes taking part in the battle.
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Yes, the Japanese had more ships in the battle than the USN, even after splitting of the Japanese combined fleet (1 fleet to Midway, 2nd fleet to Aleutians).
As for aircraft, the USN had a very slight (by 15 planes) a numerical advantage in carrier planes but the Japanese were also able to muster over a 125 land based aircraft (fighters, bombers, scout/recce planes) in addition to the 233 carrier planes taking part in the battle.
You mean the Americans. ?
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Ship to ship, sans aircraft. Not a 100% on that one at all. Just working from memory.
I know the code was broken, and that did give us the strategic advantage.
You are correct on both accounts. However, many of the Japanese surface vessels were of no consequence, particularly Yammamoto's division to the rear. The AO (Aleutians) Group pretty much took themselves out of the fight by default.
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You are correct on both accounts. However, many of the Japanese surface vessels were of no consequence, particularly Yammamoto's division to the rear. The AO (Aleutians) Group pretty much took themselves out of the fight by default.
If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.
Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill. All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.
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If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.
Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill. All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.
Pretty much. And when all four of his CVs were sunk he charged after the American fleet hoping to engage them in a surface battle...but he was consuming so much fuel--for almost no closure rate on a retreating adversary--that mathematics finally won out.
I recommend SHATTERED SWORD by Parshall and Tully. Others here have read it at my suggestion and have reviewed it favorably. It's an outstanding book on the battle.
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The US had broken some but not all of the Japanese code. They were still unaware of what the IJN's target was. To try and figure it out, they had Midway send a message stating their fresh water reserves were tainted and the base was running out of water. The IJN then dispatched a message stating the target was having difficulties with their water and the attack should be pressed, allowing our code guys to know for certain where they were planning to strike and allowing US forces to get into a better position for the attack. Had this not happened, we would have been well out of range of the island, and had our forces split trying to cover the different possibilities of the attack. :old:
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You mean the Americans. ?
No. The Japanese also launched planes from bases in the Marshall Islands like the airfield on Kwajalein Atoll and also from Wake Island. Think a few land based naval squadrons also might have used airfields in the Gilberts.
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If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.
Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill. All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.
More like a trap than a diversion. For Yamamoto, Midway was going to be the lure to draw the US into a trap and eliminate the Pacific fleet, leaving the Japanese the masters of the Pacific and the eventual capitulation of the US. But he needed the support of the Imperial Japanese Army for his plan, and to get this support he had to go along with the IJA's plan of securing the Japanese home islands from bombers taking off from bases in the Aleutians.
For a long time it was thought the Aleutian campaign was a diversion to draw out the USN but it is now considered to be it's own campaign.
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No. The Japanese also launched planes from bases in the Marshall Islands like the airfield on Kwajalein Atoll and also from Wake Island. Think a few land based naval squadrons also might have used airfields in the Gilberts.
I don't think they were much of a factor in terms of the actual battle though. Scouts? Sure. But, as we saw with Operation K, they were not effective.
At the tip of the spear you had four Japanese carriers against three US carriers plus Midway. The Japanese carriers were not carrying their full compliment of aircraft, a fact that probably wouldn't have altered the battle much, though it could have.
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More like a trap than a diversion. For Yamamoto, Midway was going to be the lure to draw the US into a trap and eliminate the Pacific fleet, leaving the Japanese the masters of the Pacific and the eventual capitulation of the US. But he needed the support of the Imperial Japanese Army for his plan, and to get this support he had to go along with the IJA's plan of securing the Japanese home islands from bombers taking off from bases in the Aleutians.
For a long time it was thought the Aleutian campaign was a diversion to draw out the USN but it is now considered to be it's own campaign.
Which then leaves Yammamoto with an island in the middle of nowhere that he has to supply or let his troops starve... Meanwhile the USA builds 65 carriers of all kinds in 1943 to the Japanese's two (or three?).
Good luck invading the USA with a rifleman behind every tree for 3000 miles.
:)
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Wake has to be right at the outer limit of combat range for any IJN aircraft. The Marshalls or Kwajalein Atoll even further. Besides I always thought the land based planes of the 11'th air fleet only did scout missions at Midway and the USN CVs made sure they were right outside their range envelope. I may be wrong but I dont remember any shore based aircraft attacking at all.
Yes, the Japanese had more ships in the battle than the USN, even after splitting of the Japanese combined fleet (1 fleet to Midway, 2nd fleet to Aleutians).
As for aircraft, the USN had a very slight (by 15 planes) a numerical advantage in carrier planes but the Japanese were also able to muster over a 125 land based aircraft (fighters, bombers, scout/recce planes) in addition to the 233 carrier planes taking part in the battle.
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The actual plan made very little sense because different elements of the IJN command had different priorities. Some of them, and all of the army, thought the actual Island of Midway and then Hawaii were the targets and thought the CVs didnt matter. It never occurred to them that even if they were able to invade, which is doubtful, they had no way of supplying either. It was to far away and they had neither the transports or the ability to protect the transports.
OK so say they were all on board with Yamamato. The plan was still overly complicated, assumed way to much, and the command/control between their units sucked. They sent the old "S" boats as pickets and they were so slow they got on station a day late because they were such easy pickings for aircraft they were ordered to stay submerged during the day whenever they were within 500 miles of an enemy. So the entire USN CV group slipped right on by before the submarines made it to their stations.
Then they had so few Recce airframes they weren't able to search to the north of Midway very well, they had no radar and with the cloud cover they didnt know the USN dive bombers were there until just about when they dived.
But from A, and then to Z, the entire plan was unsound and poorly prepared for. Even their practice drills for the attack were a joke compared to the ones for PH which were fantastic. I was aware of some of this but I was not aware of what a total cluster the Midway plan was on the IJN side. And at the heart of it was this silly Japanese belief, which Yamamato bought into 100%, and that they bought into ever since a storm wrecked the invasion force of Kublai Khan, that one great battle will set up an end to the war. The Battle of Tsushima against the Russians in 1904 only strengthened this belief and it never occurred to them the USN was not The Russian navy. BTW Yamamato was a junior officer at Tsushima and was wounded in battle there. No wonder the "One Great Battle" strategy never left him.
If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.
Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill. All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.
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Which then leaves Yammamoto with an island in the middle of nowhere that he has to supply or let his troops starve... Meanwhile the USA builds 65 carriers of all kinds in 1943 to the Japanese's two (or three?).
Good luck invading the USA with a rifleman behind every tree for 3000 miles.
:)
Yamamoto meant the battle to be the showdown in which Japan would destroy the Pacific fleet and force the US to capitulate and accept the new status quo. He also planned on using Midway as a possible staging area for the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands. Japan, at the onset of the war, did not expect to fight a protracted general war. They envisioned their campaign would last no more than 6 months, in which they would deliver a series of sharp, strategic blows to the West and the West would give in and accept Japanese hegemony.
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Yamamoto meant the battle to be the showdown in which Japan would destroy the Pacific fleet and force the US to capitulate and accept the new status quo. He also planned on using Midway as a possible staging area for the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands. Japan, at the onset of the war, did not expect to fight a protracted general war. They envisioned their campaign would last no more than 6 months, in which they would deliver a series of sharp, strategic blows to the West and the West would give in and accept Japanese hegemony.
All of which were terrible assumptions given how the war started. Short of total destruction America would have never surrendered. Japan was doomed from the start of the first bomb drop on Hawaii, if not sooner.
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Wake has to be right at the outer limit of combat range for any IJN aircraft. The Marshalls or Kwajalein Atoll even further. Besides I always thought the land based planes of the 11'th air fleet only did scout missions at Midway and the USN CVs made sure they were right outside their range envelope. I may be wrong but I dont remember any shore based aircraft attacking at all.
It was at the extreme end of their aircraft range, especially with a Zeke (Zeke land based squadrons were use to supplement carrier based squadrons for Fleet 1 and Fleet 2) but for planes like the Nell (based in Wake and the Marshalls) with a range of 3,500 miles, doable. The Japanese scouts and bombers were able to provide the necessary air cover for the fleet as it made its way to Midway.
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All of which were terrible assumptions given how the war started. Short of total destruction America would have never surrendered. Japan was doomed from the start of the first bomb drop on Hawaii, if not sooner.
It was the ultimate undoing of the Japanese High Command led by Tojo and the warhawks, the majority of them with very little, if any understanding of western thought or culture. Those admirals and generals that had served time in western countries, like Britain, France and the US, were largely opposed to starting a war they knew they would eventually lose. Those Japanese military that spent time in the '30s in Axis countries like Germany and Italy were more likely to support the Japanese High Command into going to war with the US and other western countries.
But don't kid yourself, Yamamoto, despite his initial opposition to starting the war, did believe that the US, if hit hard enough, would seek peace.
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It was the ultimate undoing of the Japanese High Command led by Tojo and the warhawks, the majority of them with very little, if any understanding of western thought or culture. Those admirals and generals that had served time in western countries, like Britain, France and the US, were largely opposed to starting a war they knew they would eventually lose. Those Japanese military that spent time in the '30s in Axis countries like Germany and Italy were more likely to support the Japanese High Command into going to war with the US and other western countries.
But don't kid yourself, Yamamoto, despite his initial opposition to starting the war, did believe that the US, if hit hard enough, would seek peace.
He believed it, but he was horribly misguided.
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It was at the extreme end of their aircraft range, especially with a Zeke (Zeke land based squadrons were use to supplement carrier based squadrons for Fleet 1 and Fleet 2) but for planes like the Nell (based in Wake and the Marshalls) with a range of 3,500 miles, doable. The Japanese scouts and bombers were able to provide the necessary air cover for the fleet as it made its way to Midway.
Don't think they had to cover for much. We weren't really down there looking for them and the storm front KB was shadowing didn't hurt any.
In the order of battle the US had about a 100-plane edge on the Japanese, which, considering our early losses, was a necessary margin.
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All of which were terrible assumptions given how the war started. Short of total destruction America would have never surrendered. Japan was doomed from the start of the first bomb drop on Hawaii, if not sooner.
Yamamoto, being schooled in the US, knew our industrial might would overcome Japan if the battle went too long. He badly underestimated the American resolve to fight. That was his major failing.
He really believed Americans did not have the stomach for war.
Although, after he heard of the communications failure of the Japanese embassy in Washington, he knew they were in trouble. It did not help when the Japanese propaganda machine boasted Yamamoto declared he was going to march into Washington to be there for the US surrender.
They poked a sleeping bear and Yamamoto knew it. This forced him into a timeline battle with the US. One that he knew if they could not win in 6 months, it was over. Midway was not his only blunder, but it was his final one, if I recall.
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That sums it up pretty well, I'd say.
I remember talking with Alex Vraciu about the war and to the last day I saw him the fire in his eyes over Pearl Harbor (and Butch O'Hare's death) still burned fiercely.
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He badly underestimated the American resolve to fight. That was his major failing.
True enough. OTOH, were the same events to occur today, I'm not sure that the U.S. would say "Yes, whatever it takes, we're going to take back all those islands and conquer Japan." Different times, different people.
- oldman
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Midway was not his only blunder, but it was his final one, if I recall.
I think touring the Solomons within the range of the 347th FG was his final blunder. :)
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I think touring the Solomons within the range of the 347th FG was his final blunder. :)
Too soon?
:rofl
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Yamamoto's famous quote predicted his success at Midway following Pearl Harbour:
"I can run wild for six months … after that, I have no expectation of success."
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It was at the extreme end of their aircraft range, especially with a Zeke (Zeke land based squadrons were use to supplement carrier based squadrons for Fleet 1 and Fleet 2) but for planes like the Nell (based in Wake and the Marshalls) with a range of 3,500 miles, doable. The Japanese scouts and bombers were able to provide the necessary air cover for the fleet as it made its way to Midway.
Well heres the breakdown, the order of battle of the shore based aircraft of the 11'th Air Fleet of the IJN at Midway.
At Wake Island, which is 1,500 miles from Midway Island.
36 A6m Zero's, range type 21 anywhere from 1,700 to 1,900 from a land base with full drop tanks. This isnt however "combat range" which is closer to 500 to 600 miles.
10 G4m "Betty" Bombers. Range about the same as the Zero. About 1,700 over all.
At Kwajalein Atoll, which is 1,806 miles from Midway.
36 Zero fighters, "Im assuming every one at Midway was the type 21".
36 B5N2 Bombers with a range of 1,237 miles.
At Aur and Wotje Atolls, both about 1,630 miles from Midway.
36 Zero's.
36 B5N2 bombers.
At Jaluit and Wotje Atolls were 36 H6K flying boats that did have a range of 4,000 miles and could have been useful but the fact is I cant find any record of any operations even around Midway and the 11'th only patrolled around there assigned bases. The exception was a plan for the H6Ks to fly to the region, after Midway was taken, to refuel from Navy ships, and to continue on to Oahu to attack there. Which of course never happened. Other then for the sea planes Midway was simply to far for the other combat aircraft to project power or to even scout. "Range" isnt "combat range".
Regarding Nagumo's orders he had more then one and it just helped conflict him and in the end defeat him. Yes Yamamato did order him to hold back 1/2 of his force for the USN CVs but everybody knew even before they got there that one land attack wasn't going to be enough. What choice did he have but to order the planes standing by to be armed for ground attack?
Changing ordinance was a very time consuming thing for the IJN because 1, it all had to be done on a lower deck "on IJN CVs all arming and fueling was done on a lower deck". And to change a 1,800 lb torpedo to a 1,700 lb bomb on a Kate needed a special cart for the ords and each CV only had 5 or 6 of these carts. Plus on the Kates you also had to change the carriage, torps and bombs had different ones. So now your in the middle of that cluster and all of a sudden USN CVs are in the area and now you have to change back to torps? on a crowded, very crowded, lower flight deck? And once you get all this done you have to inch those huge bombers onto an elevator and bring them up? See the USN gassed and loaded bombs for the entire squadron on the top deck and then <whoosh> they all took off. The IJN didnt, they did it separate flights at a time with separate airplane types.
Now for the Army to even agree to the plan they had to #1 Come along with an invasion force in ships THEY commanded and with orders that their main priority was to invade and occupy Midway Island. In fact the army only went along with the plan because of Doolittle's raid. They had wanted to invade Australia and they couldn't give a damn about USN CVs they wanted Midway and then Hawaii. Even High ranking members of the IJN General staff gave conflicting orders to Nagumo telling him Midway was the target and not the CVs. It was the same general Staff that had insisted on the stupid Aleutian offensive which took significant striking power away from the Midway Op for no good reason. They were way to far north to support the Midway operation and how can you drain resources from an enemy that didnt care if you grabbed a few meaningless Islands you couldnt possibly hold.
So it was with all these conflictions, screw ups, inter-service rivalys, conflicting orders, conflicting strategic visions, Nagumo found himself with on the faitful day.
It was just a bad plan. They trained poorly for it, they split their forces for no good reason. They underestimated the enemy and their traditionalist military methods were a real big weakness.
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Funny how we take so much for granted today in 2017, like comms. We sit in a A/C trailer in NV. flying drones in 'stan while talking to the troops on the ground and anyone else in the link.
In 1942 none of the IJN CVs heard the first sightings of USN CVs, reported by a submarine, because the antenna masts on their Islands not only weren't high enough but they were lowered in any case during flight operations to prevent accidents. The BBs and heavy cruisers had very high pagoda's and antenna masts in contrast.
The BBs far in the rear of the main force heard the warning clearly but couldn't repeat it due to radio silence being ordered. The IJN was so regimentated nobody thought to break radio silence thru initiative. Not even Yamamato.
While the Allied airmen weren't all that good, yet good enough, they surprised the IJN by their incredible bravery boring in on those CVs despite knowing it was suicide. A crippled B26 even chose trying to ram a CV instead of just going down. He wasn't able to but he tried. The Japanese had been raised to think Americans preferred chasing girls in new Cadillac's instead of fighting and were cowards.
They were about to learn different. From our allies too, especially the Aussie's who were probably the best jungle fighters in the war.
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Interesting story I read the other day about the Battle of Midway and how a reporter leaked we had broken the Japanese code. Lucky for us the Japanese weren't readers of the Chicago Tribune. The government kept it under wraps for 75 years, it wasn't until some news and historical organizations won a court fight this past December to get the records unsealed, including the grand jury testimony that the Justice Department fought to keep from seeing the light of day.
Battle of Midway 75th anniversary, and new details emerge of alarming WWII press leak (http://www.oanow.com/news/local/battle-of-midway-th-anniversary-and-new-details-emerge-of/article_520ee6d4-4a2e-11e7-86e1-3313179e364c.html)