Midway, did you know...?

[Rich46yo]

The only Japanese airplane company still producing airplanes on a regular schedule at the time of the Midway attack was Mitsubishi with the A6M Zero. The production of D3A-99's was slowed to a crawl and there were no Nakajima B5N's being produced because they were retooling the line for the B6N's.

Now I'm not 100% sure about this but I believe the only actual use of the B6N from a carrier, after they finally worked the kinks out, was at the Marianas battle where they got shot to pieces.

All 6 of the carriers sent east at the time, 2 to the Aleutions  and 4 to Midway, not only carried less aircraft then their USN counter parts but they also were at 75% aircraft strength.

[Sabre]

I did not recall that the IJN CVs were understrength. There's a great book on the air war in the Pacific, "Fire In the Sky". Don't recall the author, but it does a great job of describing the strengths/weaknesses of both the US and Japan regarding the air war. It addressed all aspects, such as equipment, training, doctrine, logistics, and the asymmetric weapons development cycles of both nations, and how all this pretty much per-ordained Japan's eventual defeat. I believe the same author also did one on the naval war, but I don't have that one (yet).

[Rich46yo]

They weren't just under strengthened but they also did not have the 3 additional reserve airframes those CVs usually carried. Of course you know about the problem with the one sea plane not be able to take off from the cruiser but did you know that they only had a couple sea planes with any meaningful range to them, 1 or 2 I dont remember. The other 3 or 4 were more used for short range naval artillery spotting.

As well their coordination was so atrocious their picket submarines got on station late which is how our three CVs slipped past with out them knowing. The IJN made so many mistakes and so many go back to the imperialistic system of their leadership. Orders are never questioned/changed , initiative is never encouraged, leadership always goes to the most senior or political ALWAYS, the army and the navy hated each other, different branches in the same service didnt get along!

What they were very good at was flying and dropping bombs. And they had good early war airplanes, courageous/skilled pilots, great torpedo's. But at Midway they still had no radar, their AA/AA fire control sucked, they were way over confident, and their Intelligence was terrible. Between our 3 big CVs and Land based aircraft they didnt even have parity but they still sent two CV groups north on a worthless mission.

Granted The Coral Sea really weakened them by putting two fast CVs into dry dock but thats even more reason not to go north to the Aleutians. Some of this I knew but this new book is a real re-awakening on how I look at Midway. https://www.amazon.com/Shattered-Sword-Untold-Battle-Midway/dp/1574889249/ref=sr_1_6?ie=UTF8&qid=1496342922&sr=8-6&keywords=midway+books

I did not recall that the IJN CVs were understrength. There's a great book on the air war in the Pacific, "Fire In the Sky". Don't recall the author, but it does a great job of describing the strengths/weaknesses of both the US and Japan regarding the air war. It addressed all aspects, such as equipment, training, doctrine, logistics, and the asymmetric weapons development cycles of both nations, and how all this pretty much per-ordained Japan's eventual defeat. I believe the same author also did one on the naval war, but I don't have that one (yet).

[Skuzzy]

Just an overview type of thought, but I thought Japan outgunned us at Midway, but the Allies had the strategic advantage due to the Japanese code being broken.

Combine that with Yamamoto's plan being very difficult to execute and it lead to disastrous results for them.

[Vraciu]

Just an overview type of thought, but I thought Japan outgunned us at Midway, but the Allies had the strategic advantage due to the Japanese code being broken.

Combine that with Yamamoto's plan being very difficult to execute and it lead to disastrous results for them.

Define outgunned

In terms of air assets for the MI operation we outnumbered them.

[Skuzzy]

Define outgunned

In terms of air assets for the MI operation we outnumbered them.

Ship to ship, sans aircraft.  Not a 100% on that one at all.  Just working from memory.

I know the code was broken, and that did give us the strategic advantage.

[Ack-Ack]

Ship to ship, sans aircraft.  Not a 100% on that one at all.  Just working from memory.

I know the code was broken, and that did give us the strategic advantage.

Yes, the Japanese had more ships in the battle than the USN, even after splitting of the Japanese combined fleet (1 fleet to Midway, 2nd fleet to Aleutians).

As for aircraft, the USN had a very slight (by 15 planes) a numerical advantage in carrier planes but the Japanese were also able to muster over a 125 land based aircraft (fighters, bombers, scout/recce planes) in addition to the 233 carrier planes taking part in the battle.

[Vraciu]

Yes, the Japanese had more ships in the battle than the USN, even after splitting of the Japanese combined fleet (1 fleet to Midway, 2nd fleet to Aleutians).

As for aircraft, the USN had a very slight (by 15 planes) a numerical advantage in carrier planes but the Japanese were also able to muster over a 125 land based aircraft (fighters, bombers, scout/recce planes) in addition to the 233 carrier planes taking part in the battle.

You mean the Americans.  ?

[Vraciu]

Ship to ship, sans aircraft.  Not a 100% on that one at all.  Just working from memory.

I know the code was broken, and that did give us the strategic advantage.

You are correct on both accounts.   However, many of the Japanese surface vessels were of no consequence, particularly Yammamoto's division to the rear.   The AO (Aleutians) Group pretty much took themselves out of the fight by default.

[Skuzzy]

You are correct on both accounts.   However, many of the Japanese surface vessels were of no consequence, particularly Yammamoto's division to the rear.   The AO (Aleutians) Group pretty much took themselves out of the fight by default.

If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.

Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill.  All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.

[Vraciu]

If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.

Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill.  All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.

Pretty much.  And when all four of his CVs were sunk he charged after the American fleet hoping to engage them in a surface battle...but he was consuming so much fuel--for almost no closure rate on a retreating adversary--that mathematics finally won out.

I recommend SHATTERED SWORD by Parshall and Tully.  Others here have read it at my suggestion and have reviewed it favorably.  It's an outstanding book on the battle.

[wil3ur]

The US had broken some but not all of the Japanese code.  They were still unaware of what the IJN's target was.  To try and figure it out, they had Midway send a message stating their fresh water reserves were tainted and the base was running out of water.  The IJN then dispatched a message stating the target was having difficulties with their water and the attack should be pressed, allowing our code guys to know for certain where they were planning to strike and allowing US forces to get into a better position for the attack.  Had this not happened, we would have been well out of range of the island, and had our forces split trying to cover the different possibilities of the attack.   

[Ack-Ack]

You mean the Americans.  ?

No.  The Japanese also launched planes from bases in the Marshall Islands like the airfield on Kwajalein Atoll and also from Wake Island.  Think a few land based naval squadrons also might have used airfields in the Gilberts.

[Ack-Ack]

If I recall the deployment of the Japanese ships was botched, which did not help matters.

Also, I believe Yamamoto's intent was to catch the American fleet by surprise by drawing them into a diversion and them closing in for the kill.  All of which would not happen due to the code being broken.

More like a trap than a diversion.   For Yamamoto, Midway was going to be the lure to draw the US into a trap and eliminate the Pacific fleet, leaving the Japanese the masters of the Pacific and the eventual capitulation of the US.  But he needed the support of the Imperial Japanese Army for his plan, and to get this support he had to go along with the IJA's plan of securing the Japanese home islands from bombers taking off from bases in the Aleutians. 

For a long time it was thought the Aleutian campaign was a diversion to draw out the USN but it is now considered to be it's own campaign.

[Vraciu]

No.  The Japanese also launched planes from bases in the Marshall Islands like the airfield on Kwajalein Atoll and also from Wake Island.  Think a few land based naval squadrons also might have used airfields in the Gilberts.

I don't think they were much of a factor in terms of the actual battle though.    Scouts?  Sure.   But, as we saw with Operation K, they were not effective.   

At the tip of the spear you had four Japanese carriers against three US carriers plus Midway.   The Japanese carriers were not carrying their full compliment of aircraft, a fact that probably wouldn't have altered the battle much, though it could have.