Aces High Bulletin Board
General Forums => The O' Club => Topic started by: Toad on November 26, 2019, 07:46:24 AM
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Another armchair aviator weighs in on the crew aspect of the Lion Air Accident.
https://www.airlineratings.com/news/highly-respected-aviation-experts-critical-lion-air-pilots-crash-report/
Former NTSB crash investigator is highly critical of the Indonesian NTSC report and the primary conclusion that the MCAS software caused the crash of LionAir Flight 610 in October last year.
Well known, former NTSB crash investigator and air safety expert Greg Feith, says the Indonesian NTSC 322-page report, issued last month, into the LionAir 737MAX tragedy presents an in-depth account of the “factual” information developed during the course of the investigation.
Ok, I admit. He's not your average armchair investigator. He's an experienced NTSB investigator.
However, Feith says of the report, “there are so many flaws in logic, failures to properly analyze the facts, and failures to hold persons or organizations accountable and much more. They (NTSC) obviously reverse-engineered the “facts” to support their preconceived conclusions that the airplane and MCAS are to blame,” said Mr Feith.
“The NTSC stated the pilots, especially the First Officer, had significant training deficiencies and lacked basic flying skills. These same deficiencies occurred during the accident flight. These two pilots had no business being in the cockpit and the airplane should not have been operated because of all the maintenance issues that began at the beginning of October, and were not corrected, making the airplane unairworthy.”
Training deficiencies? Lack of basic flying skills? Maintenance issues? This all seems like I've read it all before. I wonder where I read that stuff?
Mr Feith’s views are supported by a well-respected Airbus training captain, who told AirlineRatings.com the first officer “could not fly”.
“The report on the FO is an eye-opener as he is constantly very poor in all phases of operating an aircraft,” the training captain said.
“The report indicates a lot of additional training in standard operating procedures and emergencies and this was repeated on almost every subsequent training session but the problems were never resolved.
“There is a continual mention of a very poor instrument scan which was also never resolved. Even more deeply troubling was that, according to the pilot reports, the first officer didn’t understand and had difficulty handling aerodynamic stalls, a fundamental of flying.”
“That FO could not fly and I wonder why the Lion Air trainers didn’t cull him as his performance at proficiency checks are all fail items.”
That assessment is supported by one of the world’s leading flight crew trainers, who told Airline Ratings.com “it would appear that much had been overlooked in order to keep the FO operational”.
But yeah...it's all Boeing's fault.
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Strange, the pilot had flown for 7 years and lacked basic flying skills. Co-pilot, also had several years.
Can somebody explain to me how somebody that lacks basic skills can up and land several hundred times. Shouldn't they have had crashed the first time?
I know nothing about planes but I'm skeptical. Did the plane had a fault, I say yes, did the pilot made errors, yes. Was boeing totally at fault, no, were the pilots? no.
I saw a film on YouTube describing that to be certified on that plane other than having experience on other planes was an iPad. This was a us pilot by the way.
semp
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Can somebody explain to me how somebody that lacks basic skills can up and land several hundred times. Shouldn't they have had crashed the first time?
semp
Saving face. Just got lucky numerous times until a very serious malfunction occurred. Now, the company can’t admit to training and leadership failure.
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Saving face. Just got lucky numerous times until a very serious malfunction occurred. Now, the company can’t admit to training and leadership failure.
... Chuck Yeager said it well for all pilots "It's the man, not the machine."
Unless your wings explode and fall off your aircraft.
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Another armchair aviator weighs in on the crew aspect of the Lion Air Accident.
https://www.airlineratings.com/news/highly-respected-aviation-experts-critical-lion-air-pilots-crash-report/
Ok, I admit. He's not your average armchair investigator. He's an experienced NTSB investigator.
Training deficiencies? Lack of basic flying skills? Maintenance issues? This all seems like I've read it all before. I wonder where I read that stuff?
But yeah...it's all Boeing's fault.
I love Greg Feith. He's a top notch guy all the way. Been a fan of his since I saw him on SURVIVAL IN THE SKY in 1996. This is a scathing commentary by Mr. Feith. Long overdue.
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Strange, the pilot had flown for 7 years and lacked basic flying skills. Co-pilot, also had several years.
Can somebody explain to me how somebody that lacks basic skills can up and land several hundred times. Shouldn't they have had crashed the first time?
I know nothing about planes but I'm skeptical. Did the plane had a fault, I say yes, did the pilot made errors, yes. Was boeing totally at fault, no, were the pilots? no.
I saw a film on YouTube describing that to be certified on that plane other than having experience on other planes was an iPad. This was a us pilot by the way.
semp
They get lucky. Nothing bad happens to them, the automation and other pilots babysit. It's for those times when HAL 9000 won't open the pod bay doors that we get paid. These happen to be the moments when skill deficit is all-but-guaranteed to kill the inept. Heck, they even sometimes get the good ones.
The pilots were let down by the system. Their company didn't train them properly and the certification authority didn't mandate it. But the pilots are the ones who flipped the switch back on. Once that happened it was game over. The jet could have been saved. They blew it.
As for being certified on an iPad that's nonsense. Context is everything. They're already typed on the aircraft. There is a lot of training that takes place to get there, at least in the US. An iPad might explain what we call Differences. Perfectly acceptable. I don't need a complete course to use my EMB-145 type rating to fly a -140 or -135. They're nearly the same.
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Saving face. Just got lucky numerous times until a very serious malfunction occurred. Now, the company can’t admit to training and leadership failure.
I just heard that the data was sent to Toulouse after the crash. Hmmmmmm.
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Are not we all arm chair pilots?
:devil
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Are not we all arm chair pilots?
:devil
I fly for a living, so no. :D
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But... u are in aces high
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But... u are in aces high
Might be in Aces High but real world experience will always trump a video game.
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Might be in Aces High but real world experience will always trump a video game.
Exactly my point C... tho AH closely mimics the physics of flight...
It is not exactly like flying a real plane much less a ftr
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Exactly my point C... tho AH closely mimics the physics of flight...
It is not exactly like flying a real plane much less a ftr
Your comment then seems to be a bit to boxed in, speaking from experience refers to RL experiences. For instance, if there was an issue posted concerning an ejection mishap, I could speak on that all day long from an SME standpoint and still fly AH3.
Make sense?
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Your comment then seems to be a bit to boxed in, speaking from experience refers to RL experiences. For instance, if there was an issue posted concerning an ejection mishap, I could speak on that all day long from an SME standpoint and still fly AH3.
Make sense?
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And I'll add... nothing, and I mean nothing can prepare or train some than real-life experiences. Simulator training is just that - simulated training. And simulated cockpit trainers contain a real-life motion-cockpits that mimics flying so you can go through systems failure training and LEARN what to look for and start the long process of memorizing key emergency checklists. The difference that if you muck up in the sim, you can learn from your mistakes again and again so that when real life does happen, your flying experience + sim training = successfully overcoming aircraft issues.
This is what we know:
1. The Lion Air pilot's inability to decipher the technical issues was simply from a lack of proper training and experience and as a result thundered that plane into the sea.
2. The Ethiopian pilots were even more inexperienced and made a 200-foot smoking hole in the ground for exactly the same reason.
3. The EU was quick to jump on the "BAN THE MAX" simply to put pressure on Boeing to prop up Airbus and the sheeple effect took over. They know the MAX is safe.
4. Boeing did cheap out/over-simplify on the re-cert program for the MAX and the design. But this has happened with dozens of other aircraft version upgrades and yet no one is talking about those or that the 737 has actually 3 similar trim systems for in their airplanes for decades.
5. Boeing also didn't anticipate equally inexperienced pilots behind the controls who couldn't figure out a runaway trim procedure and that the maintenance programs would be terrible as it was contributing to this issue.
I'm really happy to see Greg Feith comment on this - I always loved the aircraft accident shows he was interviewed in. Always direct. Always honest. Always spoke the truth.
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3. The EU was quick to jump on the "BAN THE MAX" simply to put pressure on Boeing to prop up Airbus and the sheeple effect took over. They know the MAX is safe.
Suck it up, the USA happily do that all the time to non-US products (see Huawei).
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Suck it up, the USA happily do that all the time to non-US products (see Huawei).
Oh we both know what Boeing does on the protectionist side of things. They lobbied the US government last year to block the sale of Canada's Bombardier's C Series jet into the US with tariffs.
Some would call it 'Karma.'
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Suck it up, the USA happily do that all the time to non-US products (see Huawei).
Two wrongs don’t make a right.
Huawei deserved what they got in any case.
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Oh we both know what Boeing does on the protectionist side of things. They lobbied the US government last year to block the sale of Canada's Bombardier's C Series jet into the US with tariffs.
Some would call it 'Karma.'
And they ultimately lost because the C series is being built here.
Airbus is subsidized massively. They should be out of business.
Boeing is no angel but at least they actually have to deliver a product to survive.
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Suck it up, the USA happily do that all the time to non-US products (see Huawei).
The US did not say it was bad. It is just a security issue. That is a communist country.
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The US did not say it was bad. It is just a security issue. That is a communist country.
yeah well the plane wasnt bad, it just didnt have a light to tell the pilot something was wrong with it.
semp
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yeah well the plane wasnt bad, it just didnt have a light to tell the pilot something was wrong with it.
semp
It doesn't need a light. It has a gigantic trim wheel that goes KA-CHUNK! KA-CHUNK! KA-CHUNK!
The plane was flyable until some idiot decided to re-engage a failed system. Play stupid games, win stupid prizes.
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Are not we all arm chair pilots?
:devil
Not all of us.
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Not all of us.
Agreed.
Its disappointing that reports from individuals as knowledgeable and respected as Mr. Feith do not top the headlines as often as the drivel that the talking heads regurgitate. Time will tell if the damage to the Boeing Company is reversible.
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yeah well the plane wasnt bad, it just didnt have a light to tell the pilot something was wrong with it.
semp
Close.... it didn't have a pilot.
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Close.... it didn't have a pilot.
At least not a competent, sufficiently experienced one, or two.
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Close.... it didn't have a pilot.
#Burn
Also, I just passed my B-737 SIC Course. I'm now qualified as a 737NG/MAX copilot. :banana:
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#Burn
Also, I just passed my B-737 SIC Course. I'm now qualified as a 737NG/MAX copilot. :banana:
Grats!
.... and Puma I should have said "competent pilot" of course. :salute
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Both Airbus and Boeing enjoy subsidaries - from reseach, Airbus from state owned research, and US from such as NASA, I have no idea, I guess we never find out who get the most.
Airbus have assembly plants both in US ((320 and A220) and China (who also makes A320 copies, Comac, and AR 21 (DC9 copy).
Airbus and Boeing are nowhere as subsided as Chinas effort to build their own civil aircraft industry, wait 20 years and see their cheap planes sell like hot cakes.
Russia have not succeeded with their civil aviation, mainly due to bad maintance, and support.
<taildragger pilot>
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Airbus is directly subsidized by government. Boeing is not.
The 380 debacle should have put them under but the governments involved will eat the loss instead.
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Both Airbus and Boing lost alot of money on their 4 engined planes, both A380 ( FAL being closed), and 747-8 (FAL being closed).
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Both Airbus and Boing lost alot of money on their 4 engined planes, both A380 ( FAL being closed), and 747-8 (FAL being closed).
Boeing didn’t lose much on the -8 at all, if anything, especially compared to the 380. A tax write-off isn’t always a direct loss.
Also, the -8 put price pressure on the 380 which is partly why the latter imploded. The -8F will make the overall program profitable for Boeing and with the demise of the 380 it just might increase demand for the aircraft long-term.
And Boeing has made a killing on 777/787.
Airbus should have died back in the days of the 300, but the 380 would have done it, too. They exist solely due to direct government subsidy.
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Not all of us.
Sorry Puma... but we are in front of a monitor and in a chair without wings or an engine, then by definition we are all armchair pilots :salute
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2 engined planes like 777, 330 and later 787, 350 killed the 4-holers as passenger planes, an era that probably never will come back.
Lets see what Boeing - Embraer can do vs Airbus - C-series (220). interesting times indeed.
Sweden SAAB set up a FAL with Embraer in Brazil- the JAS Gripen.
Boeing and SAAB won USAF contract for the T-X trainer , Airbus is lagging in military applications.
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2 engined planes like 777, 330 and later 787, 350 killed the 4-holers as passenger planes, an era that probably never will come back.
Not exactly. ETOPS regulations killed the tri-jet. Engine technology combined with ETOPS and RVSM mortally wounded four-engine jets. But they still have their place. Turnaround times still matter, though, so they can become TOO big like the 380, which was a triumph of ego over common sense.
Lets see what Boeing - Embraer can do vs Airbus - C-series (220). interesting times indeed.
Sweden SAAB set up a FAL with Embraer in Brazil- the JAS Gripen.
Boeing and SAAB won USAF contract for the T-X trainer , Airbus is lagging in military applications.
Boeing is going to be too prideful to listen to Embraer. I don't predict good things as a result. Embraer is masterful at building airplanes, particularly the 145/Legacy 600 & 650 and 170/190/E2. Boeing will thumb their noses at the Embraer way and hose themselves--again.
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Grats!
.... and Puma I should have said "competent pilot" of course. :salute
Thanks, bro.
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Grats!
.... and Puma I should have said "competent pilot" of course. :salute
No sweat, my friend. Just a friendly reminder that books, simulators, and computers a competent pilot does not make.
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Sorry Puma... but we are in front of a monitor and in a chair without wings or an engine, then by definition we are all armchair pilots :salute
You are more than welcome to assume that status. I chose otherwise.
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Sorry Puma... but we are in front of a monitor and in a chair without wings or an engine, then by definition we are all armchair pilots :salute
You are comparing apples to buckets of water.
When discussing a real life event from a professional standpoint, you are not being an arm chair general.
To be an arm chair general would be that dude crying on country that base A is priority over base B.
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Good analogy. :aok
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Agreed.
It's disappointing that reports from individuals as knowledgeable and respected as Mr. Feith do not top the headlines as often as the drivel that the talking heads regurgitate. Time will tell if the damage to the Boeing Company is reversible.
You can say that again.
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The US did not say it was bad. It is just a security issue. That is a communist country.
Nah it was all good until they started competing with a US Company - Cisco... who used to get Huawei to make their kit.
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Boeing and Airbus are in the business to sell airplanes - lots of airplanes. Development and Certification costs demand huge sales numbers. As you have said, the bill for the A380 debacle must be biblical.
But its time that Regulators world wide get together and set a uniform minimum standard of pilot performance. I don't really care if the American, Canadian, British or German standard is used (or a combination of all) to set the base line but the status-quo left untouched is going to lead to a lot more death.
For your consideration:
1: Garuda Indonesia Flight 200 (GA200/GIA 200) was a scheduled domestic passenger flight of a Boeing 737-400 operated by Garuda Indonesia between Jakarta and Yogyakarta, Indonesia.[1] The aircraft overran the runway, crashed into a rice field and burst into flames while landing at Adisutjipto International Airport on 7 March 2007.
-The Captain attempted to land the airplane at 220 knots - more than 80 knots fast. When his First Officer asked him to go around, all the Captain could say was "landing checklist complete, right?"
2: Asiana Airlines Flight 214 was a scheduled transpacific passenger flight from Incheon International Airport near Seoul, South Korea, to San Francisco International Airport in the United States. On the morning of 6 July 2013, the Boeing 777-200ER crashed on final.
- Of the claimed more that 20000 flying hours between the 2 pilots, neither had ever hand flown a visual approach to a landing. The weather was clear and the winds were light.
3: Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 was a scheduled international passenger flight operated by Indonesia AirAsia – an AirAsia Group affiliate – from Surabaya, Indonesia, to Singapore. On 28 December 2014, the Airbus A320 flying the route crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 162 people on board.
- A snag not critical to safety lead the Captain to try an unapproved circuit breaker reset. His action led to the loss of all automation and neither pilot had the basic operating skills to prevent a total loss of the aircraft and its contents.
4: TransAsia Airways Flight 235 was a TransAsia Airways domestic flight from Taipei to Kinmen (Quemoy), Republic of China. On 4 February 2015, the aircraft serving the flight, a ten-month-old ATR 72-600, crashed into the Keelung River shortly after takeoff.
- After an engine failure the Captain disengaged the autopilot and shutdown the healthy engine. Post accident tests proved that had he left the autopilot engaged and done nothing, the airplane would have flown safely.
I didn't even mention Air France 447 but these are only a few examples of unconscionable incompetence. For those not yet convinced, I can list dozens more. I for one, cannot understand the strange inner-confidence that must exist in these individuals that allows them to take an airplane into the air. The manufactures along with the training organizations they contract are overdue for a butt-kicking. What they are turning out in the interest of selling a larger fleet of jets, just ain't making the grade.
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Of course no American pilot ever crashed and airplane due to pilot it training error.
semp
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Of course no American pilot ever crashed and airplane due to pilot it training error.
semp
I don't recall anyone stating that.
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I don't recall anyone stating that.
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implied, read 2 post before. only foreign airplane crashes listed. also has been mentioned several times of shoddy maintenance on the 2 specific crashed talked about, while in the us, well it happens too. several crashes due to faulty maintenance.
been looking at the list of airplane crashes on wikipedia, the one that made me laugh is this one, oh the irony, Daallo Airlines Flight 159. only the suicide bomber died. the untrained pilots managed to land back.
I once saw a recreation of an airplane crash, think I mentioned before, the airplane was giving both high speed and stall warnings, low terrain, and many others. they asked this expert what he would have done, and he gave the best answer. "based on what I know now, I would have put the plane in cruise control and wait for the other plane to catch up to me, but I wont question what the pilots did, I wasnt there, I dont know the confusion they felt".
none of you guys were there, you may have experience and be top of your training class/best at your job, but none of you were there. you read the after reports and say, well it was an easy fix, airplane could have been saved. but you still werent there. I even find it hilarious, when I mentioned they had 100's of flights without a crash and somebody said well they were lucky, it's automated or something like that.
so when somebody said you were arm chair captains or something like that, it's true. but I'll apologize if you tell me that while flying that plane, the same malfunction happened, you identified it correctly and landed that plane.
semp
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implied, read 2 post before. only foreign airplane crashes listed. also has been mentioned several times of shoddy maintenance on the 2 specific crashed talked about, while in the us, well it happens too. several crashes due to faulty maintenance.
In the cases of those crashes mentioned, the fact that they were all foreign is irrelevant and in no way removes any doubt that we have our own fair share if poorly trained pilots and MX crews. I have worked with both foreign and US MX crews and I can say with out a shadow of a doubt that in my experience (21 yrs) that rules tend to a bit more like suggestions with our foreign counterparts than with American trained crews.
Complacency will almost always end in a fatal accident when working in and around military and civilian aircraft.
none of you guys were there, you may have experience and be top of your training class/best at your job, but none of you were there. you read the after reports and say, well it was an easy fix, airplane could have been saved. but you still werent there. I even find it hilarious, when I mentioned they had 100's of flights without a crash and somebody said well they were lucky, it's automated or something like that.
We had a Talon go down about three years ago, both crew members were instructor pilots with 4 yrs of stick time in the Talon. They ended up losing hydro power resulting in a loss of flight controls. The back seater was able to punch out and the front seater rode that talon in to the ground. He could have ejected but HE failed to arm his ejection seat. I know exactly what happened to cause the pilots death, I knew before the investigation even started. How did I know, I have been working on Ejection seats for 19 yrs at that time and 16 of those years as a subject matter expert certified to troubleshoot and overhaul seats made by two different manufacturers with 5 sub designs between them on 5 different aircraft (F-16, F-15, A-10, T-38C and T-6 Texan II, soon to add the T-7). I responded to the crash, walked the debris field, located, dearmed and removed the unfortunate deceased pilots seat (It was in pieces). There was not a single explosive that was fired or a single component that was actuated.
So, yes, experience does play a role with ones ability to diagnose a situation properly.
so when somebody said you were arm chair captains or something like that, it's true. but I'll apologize if you tell me that while flying that plane, the same malfunction happened, you identified it correctly and landed that plane.
So, no, being called an arm chair general is about as far out in to left as you can get.
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ciaphas did you walk the lion air crash site?
semp
edit: actually the above was a bad way to put it. did you ever find out why the pilot didnt arm whatever? I mean you would think that was taught on first day. same as the 2 crashes. why they did what they did we can only speculate, but in reality you dont really know. the only people that were there are dead. nobody knows their state of mind, confusion, maybe. but who knows.
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ciaphas did you walk the lion air crash site?
semp
Don't have to walk that scene to know that there are several points of failure that lead to the crash.
You have the MX issues that were probably downgraded by a yes man mx super and then an aircrew that was probably pencil whipped through their training and reoccurring certs and you have the ingredients for a perfect storm.
as for the patsy, add the MCAS system that has been all over the news to the incident as the whipping boy and you now have a company that can hide subpar training standards for both aircrew and MX personnel.
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Nah it was all good until they started competing with a US Company - Cisco... who used to get Huawei to make their kit.
I guess that depends on how you view communism.
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ciaphas did you walk the lion air crash site?
semp
edit: actually the above was a bad way to put it. did you ever find out why the pilot didnt arm whatever? I mean you would think that was taught on first day. same as the 2 crashes. why they did what they did we can only speculate, but in reality you dont really know. the only people that were there are dead. nobody knows their state of mind, confusion, maybe. but who knows.
Well.... they did fly those planes into the ground. There is that. The throttles were even still set for takeoff thrust on at least one of the aircraft.
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edit: actually the above was a bad way to put it. did you ever find out why the pilot didnt arm whatever? I mean you would think that was taught on first day. same as the 2 crashes. why they did what they did we can only speculate, but in reality you dont really know. the only people that were there are dead. nobody knows their state of mind, confusion, maybe. but who knows.
The official statement said it was due to an interrupted pre-take off checklist.
If a checklist is interrupted, start it again but for the love of god do not ignore it. This was pilot error and nothing more.
On an airfield that sees over 50,000 sorties per year with no major mishaps it is easy to slip in to a state of complacent behavior. The whole "it'll never happen to me" mentality affects everyone.
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Of course no American pilot ever crashed and airplane due to pilot it training error.
semp
When American pilots crash we take our lumps. We don't blame the airplane when it's our fault. Derp.
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none of you guys were there, you may have experience and be top of your training class/best at your job, but none of you were there. you read the after reports and say, well it was an easy fix, airplane could have been saved. but you still werent there. I even find it hilarious, when I mentioned they had 100's of flights without a crash and somebody said well they were lucky, it's automated or something like that.
so when somebody said you were arm chair captains or something like that, it's true. but I'll apologize if you tell me that while flying that plane, the same malfunction happened, you identified it correctly and landed that plane.
semp
I was "there" two weeks ago. You know what I did? I disabled the stab trim and I did not re-engage it. I used the toboggan method and had my PM manually trim the airplane when I unloaded it. I did NOT re-engage the stab trim in direct violation of the QRH like these two idiots did, and I didn't stay at takeoff thrust nor did I accelerate beyond the speed I was at where the airplane was still flyable.
The procedures in the book are written for a reason--often in blood. This is a case in point. They screwed up. Had they followed the procedures and still crashed then my commentary would be much different. But they didn't so it isn't.
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Don't have to walk that scene to know that there are several points of failure that lead to the crash.
You have the MX issues that were probably downgraded by a yes man mx super and then an aircrew that was probably pencil whipped through their training and reoccurring certs and you have the ingredients for a perfect storm.
as for the patsy, add the MCAS system that has been all over the news to the incident as the whipping boy and you now have a company that can hide subpar training standards for both aircrew and MX personnel.
I guess that depends on how you view communism.
Stop confusing the boy with facts, you guys.
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The official statement said it was due to an interrupted pre-take off checklist.
If a checklist is interrupted, start it again but for the love of god do not ignore it. This was pilot error and nothing more.
On an airfield that sees over 50,000 sorties per year with no major mishaps it is easy to slip in to a state of complacent behavior. The whole "it'll never happen to me" mentality affects everyone.
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Richard Bong and Don Gentile fall into that category quite directly.
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The official statement said it was due to an interrupted pre-take off checklist.
If a checklist is interrupted, start it again but for the love of god do not ignore it. This was pilot error and nothing more.
On an airfield that sees over 50,000 sorties per year with no major mishaps it is easy to slip in to a state of complacent behavior. The whole "it'll never happen to me" mentality affects everyone.
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Complacency can and will kill everyone, given a chance.
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Complacency can and will kill everyone, given a chance.
Yup. So will ego. B-52 pilot Arthur "Bud" Holland's last flight is now a training video for all military pilots on how to NOT fly an aircraft and what impact of not addressing ego and bad flying behaviours.
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Yup. So will ego. B-52 pilot Arthur "Bud" Holland's last flight is now a training video for all military pilots on how to NOT fly an aircraft and what impact of not addressing ego and bad flying behaviours.
Bud should have been stripped of his wings long before that fatal incident.
My father tagged and bagged the body parts from that crash... .
Often times people will allow people to slip through the cracks because they cannot be bothered to do the paperwork required to remove someone from a situation. the thought process " If I can make it through without this guy killing someone then it's someone else's problem" is all to common from people in positions of transitioning authority.
... .
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Yup. So will ego. B-52 pilot Arthur "Bud" Holland's last flight is now a training video for all military pilots on how to NOT fly an aircraft and what impact of not addressing ego and bad flying behaviours.
I was on staff at an intermediate headquarters when he killed the two guys with him. Fairchild AFB was under our sphere of command. As such, many of us were involved and privy to the AF Safety board investigation. When the numerous loose cannon events in his past were revealed, it was obvious that this guy should have been grounded L O N G before this entirely preventable tragedy happened. The associated tragedy of this mess was that the base command structure did absolutely NOTHING to stop his behavior. Accident? More like a criminal act when the full story was revealed.
And by the way, this guy’s act wasn’t one of complacency. It was pure out of control ego that killed two innocents. Absolutely no excuse for it.
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Yup. So will ego. B-52 pilot Arthur "Bud" Holland's last flight is now a training video for all military pilots on how to NOT fly an aircraft and what impact of not addressing ego and bad flying behaviours.
DARKER SHADES OF BLUE is a precautionary tale for anyone involved in flying airplanes--or managing those Who do. It's essential reading for anyone involved in leadership.
Edit in: http://sbfpd.org/uploads/3/0/9/6/3096011/darker_shades_of_blue.pdf
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Bud should have been stripped of his wings long before that fatal incident.
My father tagged and bagged the body parts from that crash... .
Often times people will allow people to slip through the cracks because they cannot be bothered to do the paperwork required to remove someone from a situation. the thought process " If I can make it through without this guy killing someone then it's someone else's problem" is all to common from people in positions of transitioning authority.
... .
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I believe he killed four people to include himself. The squadron commander, Lt. Col. Mark McGeehan, tried to protect his men by refusing to allow anyone else to fly with Holland. McGeehan (co-pilot on Czar 52, the accident aircraft) attempted to eject too late and was only part way out the hatch when the plane hit. His wife and kids saw it happen.
Here's the paper I referenced above. Well worth reading.
Here is the best version in terms of format: http://sbfpd.org/uploads/3/0/9/6/3096011/darker_shades_of_blue.pdf
Here are backup links should the other go down.
http://www.hptinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CZAR-52-A-Prelude-to-Disaster-Revised.pdf
http://gwclei.com/darker-shades-of-blue-a-case-study-of-failed-leadership/
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And by the way, this guy’s act wasn’t one of complacency. It was pure out of control ego that killed two innocents. Absolutely no excuse for it.
Definition of complacency
1 : self-satisfaction especially when accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies When it comes to safety, complacency can be dangerous.
2 : an instance of usually unaware or uninformed self-satisfaction
That dude was flying B-52's like they were an F-16 for a very long time. He grew comfortable with it regardless of his knowledge of the B-52's flight/performance characteristics. His chain of commands refusal to deal with his reckless rogue behavior created an environment of normality that removed his respect of the air-frame, blatant disregard to SOPs in a manner that made his behavior the norm. This norm ultimately resulted in his B-52 kissing the earth with a total of four officers on board. Sad though, you can see one of the hatches jettison as if someone tried to punch out... .
So complacency killed the cat again... .
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That dude was flying B-52's like they were an F-16 for a very long time. He grew comfortable with it regardless of his knowledge of the B-52's flight/performance characteristics. His chain of commands refusal to deal with his reckless rogue behavior created an environment of normality that removed his respect of the air-frame, blatant disregard to SOPs in a manner that made his behavior the norm. This norm ultimately resulted in his B-52 kissing the earth with a total of four officers on board. Sad though, you can see one of the hatches jettison as if someone tried to punch out... .
So complacency killed the cat again... .
See above. McGeehan tried to eject. He got part way out. His wife and kids saw the whole thing from their back yard.
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See above. McGeehan tried to eject. He got part way out. His wife and kids saw the whole thing from their back yard.
+1
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When American pilots crash we take our lumps. We don't blame the airplane when it's our fault. Derp.
So we crash in a more professional way than anybody else.
semp
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So we crash in a more professional way than anybody else.
semp
part of a crash is the response from the company or parent company. The difference is when the company takes responsibility for the crash (training and MX) instead of blaming the whipping boy as if it somehow negates their responsibility in the situation.
Are you really this dense?
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So we crash in a more professional way than anybody else.
semp
At this point you’re just being obtuse.
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part of a crash is the response from the company or parent company. The difference is when the company takes responsibility for the crash (training and MX) instead of blaming the whipping boy as if it somehow negates their responsibility in the situation.
Are you really this dense?
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It appears thus.
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At this point you’re just being obtuse.
From my point of view, you are.
This is what I read from you guys, it at least my impression. Yes there's a problem but real pilots should have handled it and no reason to ground the plane.
semp
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Wow, this discussion lead me to look at a video of this clown's crash.
First thing that came to mind.... Don't get your spurs caught in the rudder pedals.
Second thing... why would his co-pilot allow him to get the airplane to a bank angle like that so close to the ground (chain of command be damned).
Third thing.... basic flying skills suggest that when recovering from steep bank angle descent, roll wings level before attempting to raise the nose with the elevators. Moron must have missed that part... shame other people had to die... his fate was only a matter of time.
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From my point of view, you are.
This is what I read from you guys, it at least my impression. Yes there's a problem but real pilots should have handled it and no reason to ground the plane.
semp
This industry requires brutal honesty. There is no place here for participation trophies. Your point of view (not you personally) is ignorant and uninformed. That's an assessment not a personal attack.
You don't know what you're talking about. The bulk of the rest of us do, particularly those with relevant experience. Simple as that.
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Wow, this discussion lead me to look at a video of this clown's crash.
First thing that came to mind.... Don't get your spurs caught in the rudder pedals.
Second thing... why would his co-pilot allow him to get the airplane to a bank angle like that so close to the ground (chain of command be damned).
Third thing.... basic flying skills suggest that when recovering from steep bank angle descent, roll wings level before attempting to raise the nose with the elevators. Moron must have missed that part... shame other people had to die... his fate was only a matter of time.
During the course of the incident investigation when the video became available, our resident senior Command Pilot Buff expert noted that the initial stall indications were visible at about 90 degrees of turn and the stall was exaggerated by the continued steep bank. He was amazed that the AC didn’t simply roll wings level and fly out of it.
The investigation team discovered numerous eye opening facts. The most glaring was that the pilots of the squadron Holland was attached to for flying adamantly refused to fly with him, especially on this air show event. When the squadron ops officer relayed this to the wing command structure, he was directed to take the copilot’s seat instead. This was a perfect point to break the safety chain and stop the lunacy.
The investigation team also learned or a change of command fly over where Holland flew extremely low, below AF and FAA restrictions, not to mention good judgement.
Another time, he buzzed his daughter’s softball game in downtown Spokane at low altitude.
Adittionally, when being filmed for a documentary, he cleared a ridge line by a mere 30’. When the very low time, new lieutenant sitting in Holland’s copilots seat for that flight was interviewed, he stated being so scared at the approaching ridge line, he grabbed the yoke and pulled. The investigation determined the lieutenant’s action most likely saved them from impact with the ridge.
https://youtu.be/LTOOtPST4Rs
https://youtu.be/YQa4PpIkOZU
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Wow, this discussion lead me to look at a video of this clown's crash.
First thing that came to mind.... Don't get your spurs caught in the rudder pedals.
Second thing... why would his co-pilot allow him to get the airplane to a bank angle like that so close to the ground (chain of command be damned).
Third thing.... basic flying skills suggest that when recovering from steep bank angle descent, roll wings level before attempting to raise the nose with the elevators. Moron must have missed that part... shame other people had to die... his fate was only a matter of time.
You should read the study I posted above. It's really really worth your time.
(Also, my PMs to you are blocked. Is it something I said? 😉 )
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LOL
PMs in this case mean Pilot Memos :aok
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You should read the study I posted above. It's really really worth your time.
(Also, my PMs to you are blocked. Is it something I said? 😉 )
No Sir, not at all. I will try and figure out why PMs to me fail.
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PUMA44. I did not fly in the Air Force. I have the utmost respect for those that did. I trained numerous pilots from both Fighter and Transport Command how to fly large airliners. And that was an easy job. The commitment to the discipline of "doing it right" made them, without exception, easy to train.
I spent many years of my career as a Check Airman/Instructor and a couple of years as Director of Flight Standards, so I have zero tolerance for any "crap" of any kind in the cockpit.
Maybe you can comment on USAF protocol but any kind of "cowboy antics" - even once - was a guaranteed trip out the door of my airline... no talking to... no additional training... just a pink slip. It only happened once to a cowboy in my airline - he died flying a DC3 in Sri Lanka a couple of years later. It was probably the only job he could get.
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PUMA44. I did not fly in the Air Force. I have the utmost respect for those that did. I trained numerous pilots from both Fighter and Transport Command how to fly large airliners. And that was an easy job. The commitment to the discipline of "doing it right" made them, without exception, easy to train.
I spent many years of my career as a Check Airman/Instructor and a couple of years as Director of Flight Standards, so I have zero tolerance for any "crap" of any kind in the cockpit.
Maybe you can comment on USAF protocol but any kind of "cowboy antics" - even once - was a guaranteed trip out the door of my airline... no talking to... no additional training... just a pink slip. It only happened once to a cowboy in my airline - he died flying a DC3 in Sri Lanka a couple of years later. It was probably the only job he could get.
If a USAF pilot commits a serious act of buffoonery, especially intentional, a Flying Evaluation Board (FEB) of senior officers is convened to determined if the pilot will keep that set of hard earned wings.
On the other hand, the occasional cowboy who always seems to be doing a carpet dance, can be delt with during the annual OPR (Officer Performance Rating i.e., report card that is a permanent part of an officer’s records and weighs heavily during promotion board considerations). A less than sterling OPR can send a subtle message that it’s time to separate from the USAF and move on.
These are the primary methods of dealing with frequent trouble makers. For the random occurances, there are numerous other techniques, such as a time period sitting in the RSU (Runway Supervisory Unit) watching everyone else fly and checking that they have landing gear down and locked before landing.
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This industry requires brutal honesty. There is no place here for participation trophies. Your point of view (not you personally) is ignorant and uninformed. That's an assessment not a personal attack.
You don't know what you're talking about. The bulk of the rest of us do, particularly those with relevant experience. Simple as that.
you talk about brutal honesty, but you forget that the problem started with a software malfunction. yes the pilots screwed up, I have never denied that. but you hold on to the idea that a real pilot would have fixed that and there shouldnt have been cause for grounding the plane. as a passenger, since I have no knowledge of how an airplane works, it bugs me to think there's pilots out there who think like you do, yes there's a problem with the software and I say that loosely , but a real pilot should manage it. not like let's fix the software so the problem doesnt happen again.
have read reports of a pilot that all he had to do was to watch a video and was certified to fly that plane even though he wanted extra training. he was denied based on he was certified to fly another version of it. just like you mention, I have been certified in this plane and I can fly plane b and c since basically they're the same. also read reports that and forgive me for not knowing the proper structure, that training manuals didnt have "what to do in case of this" whatever. also 2 american airlines didnt even know the change in the plane software change, and again forgive me for not describing the right way.
semp
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you talk about brutal honesty, but you forget that the problem started with a software malfunction. yes the pilots screwed up, I have never denied that. but you hold on to the idea that a real pilot would have fixed that and there shouldnt have been cause for grounding the plane. as a passenger, since I have no knowledge of how an airplane works, it bugs me to think there's pilots out there who think like you do, yes there's a problem with the software and I say that loosely , but a real pilot should manage it. not like let's fix the software so the problem doesnt happen again.
The software didn't crash the airplane, the crew did. Things break. It happens. How you deal with it determines the outcome.
have read reports of a pilot that all he had to do was to watch a video and was certified to fly that plane even though he wanted extra training. he was denied based on he was certified to fly another version of it. just like you mention, I have been certified in this plane and I can fly plane b and c since basically they're the same. also read reports that and forgive me for not knowing the proper structure, that training manuals didnt have "what to do in case of this" whatever. also 2 american airlines didnt even know the change in the plane software change, and again forgive me for not describing the right way.
semp
He's grandstanding. If you don't feel safe to operate the aircraft there's a simple solution: DON'T.
I've talked to friends at both United and Southwest. They say they were aware of the system long before this Lion Air fiasco. I've posted screenshots of the Differences Manual where it is discussed.
When the trim runs away FOR ANY CAUSE the procedure to deal with it is the same as it has been since the 737-100. You turn it off* and trim manually. EVERYONE typed on this jet should know that.
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*We also do this in the Embraer and Falcon. Turn it off and leave it off unless directed otherwise by the QRH.
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“....but you hold on to the idea that a real pilot would have fixed that....”
The basic point is made right here. A real pilot would not have drilled his 737 into the ground at 500 PLUS KNOTS and the thrust levers at the forward stops. These guys that did so transitioned from pilots to passengers when something out of the ordinary happened. Real pilots would have taken the proper action and saved both of these 737s and their passengers.
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I think the problem is this. Planes have become so automated that inexperienced and undertrained pilots can now fly these complex aircraft by simply using these systems.
For third world countries, they can hire these types of junior pilots for their airlines giving the bubble impression that they are modern airlines flying modern “safe airplanes.”
Then, when real sheit hits the fan with a technical problem, these pilots, who really have no business flying these complex aircraft, usually thunder in the planes. Even if you have thousands of hours flying these planes, you’re still a newb because it’s a very stale experience. It’s not like they started out as fighter pilots, or flying rubber chickens out of Hong Kong in a beat up DC-3. They’re still a monkey pushing buttons and have zero technical experience in dealing with issues.
Question is - how much does Boeing own responsibility in selling their aircraft knowing the airline has basically junior pilots flying their airplanes?
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I think the problem is this. Planes have become so automated that inexperienced and undertrained pilots can now fly these complex aircraft by simply using these systems.
For third world countries, they can hire these types of junior pilots for their airlines giving the bubble impression that they are modern airlines flying modern “safe airplanes.”
Then, when real sheit hits the fan with a technical problem, these pilots, who really have no business flying these complex aircraft, usually thunder in the planes. Even if you have thousands of hours flying these planes, you’re still a newb because it’s a very stale experience. It’s not like they started out as fighter pilots, or flying rubber chickens out of Hong Kong in a beat up DC-3. They’re still a monkey pushing buttons and have zero technical experience in dealing with issues.
Question is - how much does Boeing own responsibility in selling their aircraft knowing the airline has basically junior pilots flying their airplanes?
Good point Fork. Over the years, Boeing has done some “dummy down” things in the 737 pilot manual to take into account low time/experienced pilots. One glaring example was in the description of how to land the jet in a crosswind. Previously, it had prescribed the wing low method, i.e. Private Pilot 101. The procedure was changed to fly down final in a crab and maintain the crab through the touchdown. There was a lot of discussion within the pilot group about this change and why it had been made. Soon word came down from a source a Boeing that it was to accommodate low time/experience pilots in third world countries that had difficult with the 737 in the wing low crosswind method. In time, I met a senior Captain who had just tried it. He said that when the jet touched down in the crab, inertia jerked the nose to the centerline with such violence that he was “never going to do that again”. He was going to continue with the tried and true wing low method.
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Good point Fork. Over the years, Boeing has done some “dummy down” things in the 737 pilot manual to take into account low time/experienced pilots. One glaring example was in the description of how to land the jet in a crosswind. Previously, it had prescribed the wing low method, i.e. Private Pilot 101. The procedure was changed to fly down final in a crab and maintain the crab through the touchdown. There was a lot of discussion within the pilot group about this change and why it had been made. Soon word came down from a source a Boeing that it was to accommodate low time/experience pilots in third world countries that had difficult with the 737 in the wing low crosswind method. In time, I met a senior Captain who had just tried it. He said that when the jet touched down in the crab, inertia jerked the nose to the centerline with such violence that he was “never going to do that again”. He was going to continue with the tried and true wing low method.
Sadly the scimitar winglets are scaring people away from the wing low method.
Thankfully Embraer 145s have plenty of room for that. Makes crosswind work a breeze.
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I think the problem is this. Planes have become so automated that inexperienced and undertrained pilots can now fly these complex aircraft by simply using these systems.
For third world countries, they can hire these types of junior pilots for their airlines giving the bubble impression that they are modern airlines flying modern “safe airplanes.”
Then, when real sheit hits the fan with a technical problem, these pilots, who really have no business flying these complex aircraft, usually thunder in the planes. Even if you have thousands of hours flying these planes, you’re still a newb because it’s a very stale experience. It’s not like they started out as fighter pilots, or flying rubber chickens out of Hong Kong in a beat up DC-3. They’re still a monkey pushing buttons and have zero technical experience in dealing with issues.
Question is - how much does Boeing own responsibility in selling their aircraft knowing the airline has basically junior pilots flying their airplanes?
Automation has gone too far. There’s no question about that. It’s easy for even experienced guys to find themselves out of the loop. It’s a real problem. But with arrival, departure, and approach procedures becoming maddeningly complex we are chasing our tails...
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you talk about brutal honesty, but you forget that the problem started with a software malfunction. ...
That's not correct. Everything except the pilots and the faulty AOA sensor worked as designed.
The problem was that those pilots weren't ready to fly the airplane.
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That's not correct. Everything except the pilots and the faulty AOA sensor worked as designed.
The problem was that those pilots weren't ready to fly the airplane.
Good catch.
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That's not correct. Everything except the pilots and the faulty AOA sensor worked as designed.
The problem was that those pilots weren't ready to fly the airplane.
Bingo
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That's not correct. Everything except the pilots and the faulty AOA sensor worked as designed.
The problem was that those pilots weren't ready to fly the airplane.
yes sir, toyota had a problem with accelerator getting stuck and it was faulty along with the driver's being inexperienced enough. but the rest of the car worked as designed. 90 people died just because the driver's didnt do one of two things, turn engine off or simply put the car in neutral. it's driver's fault 100%, not the car.
semp
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Toyota had a problem with some mats interfering with the gas pedal. After that they were accused of acceleration caused by pressing the brake pedal. That never happened but it still cost them because enough people will believe anything.
Your arguments are silly and have nothing to do with pilot proficiency standards.
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I think the problem is this. Planes have become so automated that inexperienced and undertrained pilots can now fly these complex aircraft by simply using these systems.
For third world countries, they can hire these types of junior pilots for their airlines giving the bubble impression that they are modern airlines flying modern “safe airplanes.”
Then, when real sheit hits the fan with a technical problem, these pilots, who really have no business flying these complex aircraft, usually thunder in the planes. Even if you have thousands of hours flying these planes, you’re still a newb because it’s a very stale experience. It’s not like they started out as fighter pilots, or flying rubber chickens out of Hong Kong in a beat up DC-3. They’re still a monkey pushing buttons and have zero technical experience in dealing with issues.
Question is - how much does Boeing own responsibility in selling their aircraft knowing the airline has basically junior pilots flying their airplanes?
Mister Fork, I agree with Puma44 that you have made an excellent point here.
I can't decide whether to make Boeing or a consortium of Aviation Regulators responsible for pilot standards; but someone has to be. You may recall that some years ago, as a result of a horrendous accident record, Garuda Indonesian Airlines was blocked from operating anywhere in the European Union. Garuda improved their standards proving actions such as this do help.
In the latest monthly issue of ALPA's magazine, the forecast for pilot demand by 2030 in the Asia Pacific area was almost 250000 new pilots. This number exceeded North America and Europe combined. If things do not change, the hull losses could become frightening.
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as a passenger this thread scares the crap out of me. I understand that things can go wrong and a good pilot makes a difference. but I dont understand is when you know something is not working right, but you say dont worry, we can overcome that, then think this, would you let your children knowing something should be fixed before a plane is allowed to fly and the difference makes a pilot. damn I would not allow myself or my children to fly in this airplane. dont give a flying goose if the best pilot on the world flies it.
semp
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as a passenger this thread scares the crap out of me. I understand that things can go wrong and a good pilot makes a difference. but I dont understand is when you know something is not working right, but you say dont worry, we can overcome that, then think this, would you let your children knowing something should be fixed before a plane is allowed to fly and the difference makes a pilot. damn I would not allow myself or my children to fly in this airplane. dont give a flying goose if the best pilot on the world flies it.
semp
The first crash the plane was not maintained properly. It crashed but could have been saved with a trained crew. The second crash we have not heard if a sensor was known bad prior but one did go bad and the crew failed to fly the plane. Again crew training.
I would definitely not fly on either of those airlines either. No matter what aircraft they are using.
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.....and the crew failed to fly the plane. Again crew training.
I would definitely not fly on either of those airlines either. No matter what aircraft they are using.
It boils down to culture of safety, or lack there of.
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as a passenger this thread scares the crap out of me. I understand that things can go wrong and a good pilot makes a difference. but I dont understand is when you know something is not working right, but you say dont worry, we can overcome that, then think this, would you let your children knowing something should be fixed before a plane is allowed to fly and the difference makes a pilot. damn I would not allow myself or my children to fly in this airplane. dont give a flying goose if the best pilot on the world flies it.
semp
Flying is a risky endeavor on the safest airplane. Anything can go wrong at any time. If you can't accept that, don't fly. And avoid Third World carriers at all costs.
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It boils down to culture of safety, or lack there of.
I'd like to expand upon Puma44's point. Legacy carriers in North America and western Europe have a safety culture that has been developed over decades of flying. Some of the culture comes from formal Regulations, but the essence grows from all involved in operations; pilots, management, maintenance, dispatch all function as a team. Non-punitive safety reports are the new norm and they are encouraged. That exposes hidden weaknesses in any operation so that improvements can be made.
I have never worked for a low cost carrier or in the third world but I am not convinced that their operations operate with the "do it right or don't do it at all" attitude. In these situations, the last line of defence to safety has to be a well trained and experienced pilot group; and at the risk of bringing up a sore point with many, this is where the pilot Union fulfils its motto of "Schedule with Safety". Whether its unsafe weather, a poorly maintained airplane, a dangerous runway, anything; if the pilot says this flight is not going, he or she should not have to fear for his job.
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I'd like to expand upon Puma44's point. Legacy carriers in North America and western Europe have a safety culture that has been developed over decades of flying. Some of the culture comes from formal Regulations, but the essence grows from all involved in operations; pilots, management, maintenance, dispatch all function as a team. Non-punitive safety reports are the new norm and they are encouraged. That exposes hidden weaknesses in any operation so that improvements can be made.
I have never worked for a low cost carrier or in the third world but I am not convinced that their operations operate with the "do it right or don't do it at all" attitude. In these situations, the last line of defence to safety has to be a well trained and experienced pilot group; and at the risk of bringing up a sore point with many, this is where the pilot Union fulfils its motto of "Schedule with Safety". Whether its unsafe weather, a poorly maintained airplane, a dangerous runway, anything; if the pilot says this flight is not going, he or she should not have to fear for his job.
Couldn’t agree more, Busher. Well said! :aok
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Well I started this thread but then I got REALLY busy with work and personal life stuff. Just back around to checking it out. Developed about the way I thought it would.
This bit caught my eye.
...none of you guys were there, you may have experience and be top of your training class/best at your job, but none of you were there. you read the after reports and say, well it was an easy fix, airplane could have been saved. but you still werent there.
...but I'll apologize if you tell me that while flying that plane, the same malfunction happened, you identified it correctly and landed that plane.
semp
So here's a true tale of essentially the same situation that actually happened at my airline. This was late 80s IIRC.
There was a B737-200 off 17R at DFW going to ABQ, full passenger load. That day the right seater was PF. As soon as the gear unstuck, (there's that little 'click' when the landing gear solenoid unlocks) the stick shaker activated. The right seater kept flying as normal, normal pitch/normal power. In a 1/4 heart beat both the right seater's left hand and the Captain's right hand met momentarily the flap lever, confirming they were 20. In another quarter heart beat both pilot's hands then jumped to the throttles, confirming they were full forward. The right seater called out "we're doing 160, we ain't stalling". The Captain in the left seat said "keep flying". There was no configuration change at all. By this time the the FA's were dinging the hell out of the phone as the stick shaker was vibrating them in their tail seats and the Captain picked up the phone and calmed them down. The Captain noted it was his left side stick shaker motor that was activated. The Captain found and then pulled the left side AOA CB and there was instantly a return to normal flight operation and feel. The Captain then told the right seater to keep flying; he then coordinated a return to DFW. The right seater flew the entire pattern and landing. After parking an inspection was performed; the crew and mechanics looked at the left AOA at the gate. It was hanging by two wires. When the passenger service agent pulled the jetway away, the AOA vane got dinged.
This is essentially what happened to both the Lion Air and Ethiopian crews. The INITIAL problem was a plain vanilla AOA malfunction. The 737Max crews did not handle that malfunction correctly. The B737-200 crew did. It's just that simple.
So you have one highly experienced well trained crew THAT WAS THERE in essentially the same situation. They correctly identified it. In that case, after perhaps a minute, the situation was resolved with an easy fix and a normal landing was made.
Bottom line: FLY THE JET.
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So you have one highly experienced well trained crew THAT WAS THERE in essentially the same situation. They correctly identified it. In that case, after perhaps a minute, the situation was resolved with an easy fix and a normal landing was made.
Bottom line: FLY THE JET
This.
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It is probably the most repeated phrase in flying any aircraft when things get out of kilter.... just fly the damn plane
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It is probably the most repeated phrase in flying any aircraft when things get out of kilter.... just fly the damn plane
"Just fly the damn plane!" - Russian Van Driver, Firefox
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...but I'll apologize if you tell me that while flying that plane, the same malfunction happened, you identified it correctly and landed that plane.
semp
Apology accepted.
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Apology accepted.
+1
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It is probably the most repeated phrase in flying any aircraft when things get out of kilter.... just fly the damn plane
This.
Step one in ANY aircraft malfunction, non normal, or emergency event: MAINTAIN AIRCRAFT CONTROL.
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Well you can’t maintain aircraft control very long when you exceed Vmo by 100+ knots because you didn’t pull the power back...
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Are you really considering activation of the stick shaker and the plane repetitively and forcefully trying to lawndart the 'same situation'?
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Are you really considering activation of the stick shaker and the plane repetitively and forcefully trying to lawndart the 'same situation'?
Why isn't it? Both require correct evaluation of the situation.
A trim runaway is a trim runaway is a trim runaway. The airplane wasn't doing anything differently that any other jet in the world is capable of doing. If the stab trim is running when you don't want it to then you disable it. It's really friggin' simple. And at least in the Boeing you have a manual way to trim it back the proper direction. In most airplanes you're stuck with it in the position it's in once you get it stopped.
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It wasn't a trim runaway, it was a defective aoa vane.
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It wasn't a trim runaway, it was a defective aoa vane.
Wrong.
The stab trim was commanded to nose down by the MCAS. The previous version of the system known as the STS can do the exact same thing.
The 737 NNC directs the crew to engage the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches.
It's a stab trim runaway. The reason for it is irrelevant. The procedure to fix it is ALWAYS the same.
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Are you really considering activation of the stick shaker and the plane repetitively and forcefully trying to lawndart the 'same situation'?
Yes. Absolutely yes. Here's why:
Both the Lion Air and Ethiopian situations BEGAN with a incorrect/malfunctioning AOA vane. That is the origin of the problem.
The MCAS system would never have activated if they had handled the malfunction of the AOA vane correctly.
IE:
1. Maintain Aircraft Control (Fly the Jet; do not change configuration.)
2. Analyse the situation (AOA Malfunction)
3. Take the Proper Action (Disable/Deselect the malfunctioning AOA vane. Return to Airport. Land)
Do those things and MCAS is immaterial.
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For Toad, Puma44, Vraciu and any other pros (or former pros like me) I may have failed to mention, it is clear that these crashes resulted from what we would all call to some degree a "non-event". We have all attempted to explain to those that have no experience in jets, that the event could have been handled with relative ease. And now Greg Feith has publicly stated what we have saying from the beginning. I don't think they believe us.
It seems people actually want to believe that there was nothing these pilots could do. Maybe it adds to the drama.
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people tend to blame the machine before they blame the person.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
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For Toad, Puma44, Vraciu and any other pros (or former pros like me) I may have failed to mention, it is clear that these crashes resulted from what we would all call to some degree a "non-event". We have all attempted to explain to those that have no experience in jets, that the event could have been handled with relative ease. And now Greg Feith has publicly stated what we have saying from the beginning. I don't think they believe us.
It seems people actually want to believe that there was nothing these pilots could do. Maybe it adds to the drama.
people tend to blame the machine before they blame the person.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Quite true on all counts. I think we are beating a dead horse by trying to educate the unwilling.
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For the record, I have north of 15000 hours of actual stick time. I don’t find you guys beating a dead horse at all. The simple fact is this: you have a 200 hour company baby in the right seat and some other guy in the left seat without any deep systems knowledge. Yea - that’s gonna kill you when stuff goes completely stupid. Keep it coming
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Yes. Absolutely yes. Here's why:
Both the Lion Air and Ethiopian situations BEGAN with a incorrect/malfunctioning AOA vane. That is the origin of the problem.
The MCAS system would never have activated if they had handled the malfunction of the AOA vane correctly.
IE:
1. Maintain Aircraft Control (Fly the Jet; do not change configuration.)
2. Analyse the situation (AOA Malfunction)
3. Take the Proper Action (Disable/Deselect the malfunctioning AOA vane. Return to Airport. Land)
Do those things and MCAS is immaterial.
...and a fourth, vital step: Maintain situational awareness
Not that either of these crews covered the first three.
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For the record, I have north of 15000 hours of actual stick time. I don’t find you guys beating a dead horse at all. The simple fact is this: you have a 200 hour company baby in the right seat and some other guy in the left seat without any deep systems knowledge. Yea - that’s gonna kill you when stuff goes completely stupid. Keep it coming
Brilliantly stated.
:aok :salute :cheers:
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With all due respect to PUMA... accidents happen regardless of the manufacture of a plane :salute
But having been an AE in the USN and have PERSONALLY seen another AE get ejected from an F8K in a hangar
due to someone NOT placing pins in the ejection seat... I really have NO problem with stating... those of us
who were ground crew were in just the same peril as the pilots... particularly in the Nam era :cheers:
Again, :salute
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With all due respect to PUMA... accidents happen regardless of the manufacture of a plane :salute
But having been an AE in the USN and have PERSONALLY seen another AE get ejected from an F8K in a hangar
due to someone NOT placing pins in the ejection seat... I really have NO problem with stating... those of us
who were ground crew were in just the same peril as the pilots... particularly in the Nam era :cheers:
Again, :salute
Couldn’t agree more. That’s why it’s up to the crews, air and ground, to be well trained, proficient, and ready for to handle out of the normal events so no one gets hurt. :salute
Ouch! That accidental ejection out of the F-8. Knowing where my seat pin(s) were at all times and ensuring they were in the correct place for the situation, was at the forefront of my mind whenever getting ready to sit on one.
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Couldn’t agree more. That’s why it’s up the crews, air and ground, to be well trained, proficient, and ready for to handle out of the normal events so no one gets hurt. :salute
Ouch! That accidental ejection out of the F-8. Knowing where my seat pin(s) were at all times and ensuring they were in the correct place for the situation, was at the forefront of my mind whenever getting ready to sit on one.
We have pilots that are afraid to pin their seats, it's very odd.
I currently work kn the MK16 and MK16 ESUP systems.
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We have pilots that are afraid to pin their seats, it's very odd.
I currently work kn the MK16 and MK16 ESUP systems.
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Yes, very odd. Always made sense to make sure it was pinned and safe before sitting on one or getting up off it. Has a pilot ever explained why?
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For the Nth times: it is possible to raise eyebrows at Boeing's implementation of the MCAS in the 737 MAX (*) while acknowledging that other factors played key roles in both crashes, and that the Lion Air's report is biaised.
So yes, with competent crews and an adequate safety culture (more to that later), the AOA vane incidents wouldn't probably have turned into disasters.
But Boeing decided that:
- a system whose failure was eventually qualified as 'hazardous' could have a single point of failure (a single AOA vane)
- documentation of the system was minimal (before the 1st crash)
- 737 MAX simulators couldn't adequately replicate MCAS activation
- after the 1st crash, a service bulletin informing airlines was released stating that the MCAS could deflect the tail in increments up to 2.5°, up from the 0.6° told to the FAA in the safety assessment
- MCAS could reset itself after each pilot response to repeatedly pitch the aircraft down
- no provision to deactivate the MCAS system was made other than by completely shutting down the non-malfunctioning electrical trim system
which is not demonstrating a stellar 'safety culture' at their level. Safety Culture was coined in INSAG-1 summary report of Chernobyl's disaster. In this report, and in the INSAG-7 update report, you'll find this sentence: "Nuclear plant designs must be as far as possible invulnerable to operator error and to deliberate violation of safety procedure". So, a safe design must plan for stupidity and incompetence. Not to allow it to thrive, but to shield from it when (not if) it happens.
So yes, some air companies in some part of the world operate under standards not acceptable in the western world, and the rate of accidents demonstrates the difference. However, even if not quite so often, some grave operator errors happen in the western companies too: American Airlines 587, Air France 447, Colgan Air 3407... In some of those crashes, disaster would have been avoided if the crews had just left the plane fly by itself. This was not a solution in the situation leading to both MCAS related crashes.
Instead of fuming at the 'unfair' treatment of poor little Boeing, I personally hope that this will kick the company back on the track towards the safety level it was renowned for. And I also hope that the selection and training of flight crews will improve and not be allowed to deteriorate further.
(*) a previous and different form of MCAS is installed on the KC 46. This system takes input on dual redundant angle of attack sensors; it will disengage with stick input by the pilot.
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Yes, very odd. Always made sense to make sure it was pinned and safe before sitting on one or getting up off it. Has a pilot ever explained why?
They're pilots, they don't have to explain (enter the culture of arrogance).
At Columbus afb, we had a seat fire on the hammerhead. It injured some MX (egress) guys. The pilot said his initiators were partially pulled. He also stated the only thing he did was turn to look over his shoulder and when he returned to forward position his initiator were in an unsafe config. The odd thing about this incident is it takes roughly 35 lbs of force to unseat the ejection control handle and up to 55lbs of force to unseat the initiator firing sears(sp?). turning to look over your shoulder is not going to produce that kind of force. This was in a Talon with a MK16 ESUP seat installed.
We have numerous pilots calling unsafe seat conditions because they cannot get their seat pin installed. Every incident has been caused by the pilot slouching in his seat putting forward force in the control handle which prevents proper alignment of safety pin holes. Once we get them to sit back in their seats, the pins slide right in.
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- a system whose failure was eventually qualified as 'hazardous' could have a single point of failure (a single AOA vane)
It's a redundant system. You can turn it off and fly the airplane.
- documentation of the system was minimal (before the 1st crash)
Minimal does not mean insufficient.
- 737 MAX simulators couldn't adequately replicate MCAS activation
The simulators can still train the correct response without the actual force feedback.
- after the 1st crash, a service bulletin informing airlines was released stating that the MCAS could deflect the tail in increments up to 2.5°, up from the 0.6° told to the FAA in the safety assessment
The speed was increased later, the speed given the FAA was correct at the time.
- MCAS could reset itself after each pilot response to repeatedly pitch the aircraft down
There are two switches. One that resets and one that turns it off. Training is to turn it off.
- no provision to deactivate the MCAS system was made other than by completely shutting down the non-malfunctioning electrical trim system
The MCAS is a part of the trim system just like the malfunctioning AOA gauge is part of the system. Regardless of which part fails you deal with it by turning it off.
There is no reason to blame Boeing for anything except a lame PR response.
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There is no reason to blame Boeing for anything except a lame PR response.
I agree. It confused me from the beginning why Boeing behaved like the guilty party - especially in the absence of a detailed professional investigation. It's fine to be sympathetic that people died in your product but wait until all causal elements are determined before letting the PR Department talk.
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Can somebody explain to me how somebody that lacks basic skills can up and land several hundred times. Shouldn't they have had crashed the first time?
Look at the Asiana 214 crash. With the routes they flew the crew was far to dependent on automation. When the SFO ILS was down and they had to actually fly a visual approach... they crashed. Reports was that that crew had never actually flown a visual approach in that type.
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Look at the Asiana 214 crash. With the routes they flew the crew was far to dependent on automation. When the SFO ILS was down and they had to actually fly a visual approach... they crashed. Reports was that that crew had never actually flown a visual approach in that type.
And that correlated to my previous point. Third world airlines are hiring mindless monkeys to fly their airplanes, completely dependent on the automated flight control systems. One issue - they have ZERO experience in how to actually fly the damn plane without the automated nanny FCS. Push button monkeys.
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And that correlated to my previous point. Third world airlines are hiring mindless monkeys to fly their airplanes, completely dependent on the automated flight control systems. One issue - they have ZERO experience in how to actually fly the damn plane without the automated nanny FCS. Push button monkeys.
Which is sad, of course. But Langewiesche the Younger, in his article on the Lionair crash, points out that it's a reality that will be with us for a long while, as air travel increases and the number of experienced pilots decreases. For example, I know a young lawyer in over in New Jersey who had been a first officer on a small airline. I asked him what it was like to fly the big planes. He replied that he was pretty good at working the autopilot, and that was about it. Bottom line seems to be that the automated nanny equipment is increasingly vital.
- oldman
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Some North American airlines, recognizing that the automation is not fail safe, have instituted training programs to enhance basic operating skills - stick and rudder flying. Unfortunately that policy does not yet seem to be widely encouraged by managements nor by ALPA.
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For the Nth times: it is possible to raise eyebrows at Boeing's implementation of the MCAS in the 737 MAX (*) while acknowledging that other factors played key roles in both crashes, and that the Lion Air's report is biaised.
So yes, with competent crews and an adequate safety culture (more to that later), the AOA vane incidents wouldn't probably have turned into disasters.
But Boeing decided that:
- a system whose failure was eventually qualified as 'hazardous' could have a single point of failure (a single AOA vane)
- documentation of the system was minimal (before the 1st crash)
- 737 MAX simulators couldn't adequately replicate MCAS activation
- after the 1st crash, a service bulletin informing airlines was released stating that the MCAS could deflect the tail in increments up to 2.5°, up from the 0.6° told to the FAA in the safety assessment
- MCAS could reset itself after each pilot response to repeatedly pitch the aircraft down
- no provision to deactivate the MCAS system was made other than by completely shutting down the non-malfunctioning electrical trim system
which is not demonstrating a stellar 'safety culture' at their level. Safety Culture was coined in INSAG-1 summary report of Chernobyl's disaster. In this report, and in the INSAG-7 update report, you'll find this sentence: "Nuclear plant designs must be as far as possible invulnerable to operator error and to deliberate violation of safety procedure". So, a safe design must plan for stupidity and incompetence. Not to allow it to thrive, but to shield from it when (not if) it happens.
So yes, some air companies in some part of the world operate under standards not acceptable in the western world, and the rate of accidents demonstrates the difference. However, even if not quite so often, some grave operator errors happen in the western companies too: American Airlines 587, Air France 447, Colgan Air 3407... In some of those crashes, disaster would have been avoided if the crews had just left the plane fly by itself. This was not a solution in the situation leading to both MCAS related crashes.
Instead of fuming at the 'unfair' treatment of poor little Boeing, I personally hope that this will kick the company back on the track towards the safety level it was renowned for. And I also hope that the selection and training of flight crews will improve and not be allowed to deteriorate further.
(*) a previous and different form of MCAS is installed on the KC 46. This system takes input on dual redundant angle of attack sensors; it will disengage with stick input by the pilot.
It was a stab trim runaway. The cause is irrelevant. An AOA vane “issue” isn’t required for it to occur. The solution remains the same.
Also, Lion Air equipped the airplane that way when additional equipment was available. They didn’t want it. They cheap-ass their airplanes just like they cheap-ass their training and maintenance. Had they not dispatched an airplane with a known defect we wouldn’t be having this discussion. However, in Africa, broken airplanes are accepted as SOP. Until you fix that culture all the AOA vanes in the world won’t help you.
Also, the notion it can’t be trained is crap. I just finished a 737 NG SIC course and one of the training events included a surprise nose down trim runaway on takeoff caused by the STS, which is the poor-man’s MCAS. Follow the procedure and it’s a piece of cake.
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Vraciu, if you don't mind me asking, did you make a career change leading to the Boeing type endorsement?
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Vraciu, if you don't mind me asking, did you make a career change leading to the Boeing type endorsement?
I did, however, I may wind up making another one shortly. This industry is insane right now. I could wind up on anywhere from one to three airplane types at once. I'm working to catch up on my retirement now that I am finally out of debt.
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I did, however, I may wind up making another one shortly. This industry is insane right now. I could wind up on anywhere from one to three airplane types at once. I'm working to catch up on my retirement now that I am finally out of debt.
I never had the chance..... too old when they went nuts for pilots.... but I would have liked to go to Emirates International. 2 F/O's I mentored went there. They'll retire in a couple of years, still under 50 and multi millionaires. Have you considered them?
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I never had the chance..... too old when they went nuts for pilots.... but I would have liked to go to Emirates International. 2 F/O's I mentored went there. They'll retire in a couple of years, still under 50 and multi millionaires. Have you considered them?
I'm too much of a Texan to go to Emirates I think. I have fought my entire career to stay close to home. My roommate from flight school (I'm in my mid-forties and he is a bit younger so I acted as a mentor through most of his career) is a 777 Captain there. Guy is loaded but he's also flying his tail off. I don't want to fly 1000 hours a year. Anything more than about 250 is too much work from my standpoint. LOL :)
If I could find a good gig flying a Legacy 650 full-time I'd jump at that over anything the airlines are offering. Unfortunately, the average Corporate/Charter job lasts about three years before you get laid off so if stability is the goal then the airlines probably offer that better than anyone else.
I'm rambling. I still don't know what I want to be when I grow up. I guess I'm holding out for that dream job--again. I've finally decided to stop chasing rainbows and this 737 thing is definitely not what I want to do for the rest of my career, so I am throwing hooks into the water to see what bites.
I'll actually be up in Montreal next week to pick up a Legacy for its conformity/demo flights. Really looking forward to that.
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I'm too much of a Texan to go to Emirates I think. I have fought my entire career to stay close to home. My roommate from flight school (I'm in my mid-forties and he is a bit younger so I acted as a mentor through most of his career) is a 777 Captain there. Guy is loaded but he's also flying his tail off. I don't want to fly 1000 hours a year. Anything more than about 250 is too much work from my standpoint. LOL :)
If I could find a good gig flying a Legacy 650 full-time I'd jump at that over anything the airlines are offering. Unfortunately, the average Corporate/Charter job lasts about three years before you get laid off so if stability is the goal then the airlines probably offer that better than anyone else.
I'm rambling. I still don't know what I want to be when I grow up. I guess I'm holding out for that dream job--again. I've finally decided to stop chasing rainbows and this 737 thing is definitely not what I want to do for the rest of my career, so I am throwing hooks into the water to see what bites.
I'll actually be up in Montreal next week to pick up a Legacy for its conformity/demo flights. Really looking forward to that.
I feel your pain Sir. In the 1960's I chased airplanes across this continent; did the Corporate Flying thing a little (usually until the Boss's latest squeeze decided she liked yachts more than Lear jets); and finally to the airline to do as you say, 1000 hours a year for 32+ years.
All in all, a good career but in hindsight, I should have gone to veterinary school :grin:
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I feel your pain Sir. In the 1960's I chased airplanes across this continent; did the Corporate Flying thing a little (usually until the Boss's latest squeeze decided she liked yachts more than Lear jets); and finally to the airline to do as you say, 1000 hours a year for 32+ years.
All in all, a good career but in hindsight, I should have gone to veterinary school :grin:
You said it all right there, my friend. Looks like history repeats itself. :salute
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All in all, a good career but in hindsight, I should have gone to veterinary school :grin:
LOL! I was pre-med in college with vet school in mind. But I was also AFROTC and wanted to fly jets. Like you, I should have gone to vet school.
But yeah, I had a fairly good career, so...whatever. Sliding down the backside now. Tis what it tis.
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Never had the urge for vet school. But, did get the urge to fly Phantoms at age 6. 24 years later, I was in F-4 RTU realizing a dream come true. Still remember the J79s coming to life behind me for the first time, like it happened this morning.
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ACE has been surprisingly absent from this thread. Not that I ever read what he writes--I have him on ignore--but I guess the OP set his straw man afire. :rofl :aok
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ACE has been surprisingly absent from this thread. Not that I ever read what he writes--I have him on ignore--but I guess the OP set his straw man afire. :rofl :aok
You ever been wrong about something so you just sit back and listen? That’s me here.
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Never had the urge for vet school. But, did get the urge to fly Phantoms at age 6. 24 years later, I was in F-4 RTU realizing a dream come true. Still remember the J79s coming to life behind me for the first time, like it happened this morning.
I can certainly appreciate what you are saying; I think I would have enjoyed that kind of flying immensely.
I inferred from some of your posts that you did or are doing some airline flying after your military career. I hope I am not mistaken.
I am pretty confident that memories of waiting your turn at 06:30, for a de-ice spray during light freezing rain do not jump to the top of your best days in aviation list.
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I can certainly appreciate what you are saying; I think I would have enjoyed that kind of flying immensely.
I inferred from some of your posts that you did or are doing some airline flying after your military career. I hope I am not mistaken.
I am pretty confident that memories of waiting your turn at 06:30, for a de-ice spray during light freezing rain do not jump to the top of your best days in aviation list.
The military flying was beyond describable fun. The before and after BS in peacetime tended to be an irritating survival effort since it had nothing to do with flying, and everything to do with politics.
Yes, I did 21 years in the airlines after that, mostly in 737s (-100, 200, 300, 500, 700, 800). A short stint in the BE1900 before that. And yeah, just like Jeffrey Epstein didn’t kill himself, the proper use of the trim cutoff switches would have saved those two Max 8s.
Oh yes, the dreaded de-ice pad. As a mostly pm flyer, mine were very late in the evening or the wee hours of the morning. So very frustrating to have a long day of on time departures and arrivals jinxed by having to de-ice before takeoff on the last leg. That was always good for at least 20 minutes late, IF everything was going smoothly getting to the pad, getting sprayed, and out to the runway. The majority of the time, as you know, that didn’t happen very efficiently.
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You ever been wrong about something so you just sit back and listen? That’s me here.
That's a commendable course of action
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That's a commendable course of action
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True, vs taking the bait. :aok
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True, vs taking the bait. :aok
Pot meet kettle. :aok
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That's a commendable course of action
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It's about time. :cheers:
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I recognize the pilots fault. I’ve never flown a plane. I shouldn’t have joined the conversation. But I do enjoy learning. And that I have.
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Boeing is suspends production of the Max.
https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=boing+max&view=detail&mid=F94B8A16915F037D1D88F94B8A16915F037D1D88&FORM=VIRE
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Boeing is suspends production of the Max.
https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=boing+max&view=detail&mid=F94B8A16915F037D1D88F94B8A16915F037D1D88&FORM=VIRE
No big surprise. They aren't cheap to park all over the place and the regulators are dragging their feet for self-preservation. It was all quite predictable.
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Proof that the havoc incompetent pilots can wreak extends far, far beyond the actual crash site.
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Proof that the havoc incompetent pilots can wreak extends far, far beyond the actual crash site.
You said it all.
Like ripples in a pond after the stone is thrown.
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Because of the Max crashes, I have been giving all my recurrent clients the AOA malfunction/stick pusher event at unstick. For almost every crew, it's something no one has ever given them in the sim, something they have never experienced.
The pusher repeatedly pushes the nose down if AOA exceeds 1.0., which is what the AOA malfunction does. Takes 75lbs of force to overcome the pusher or holding down the A/P disconnect disables the pusher as well. (Oh, btw, although the aircraft is continuously reading both AOA vanes, either vane sensing >.99 AOA will trigger the push. Just one, in other words.)
So far not a single crew has failed to overcome this situation successfully and survive.
I guess it's fair to point out that all of these individuals have far more than 200 hours flying time.
Go figure.
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So far not a single crew has failed to overcome this situation successfully and survive.
Proof that well trained and experienced pilots can handle the “What the h_ _ _ is it doing now!” events by step one: Maintain aircraft control, etc, etc, etc.
Good on you for introducing this event in the sim. Better to see it there and no be quite so startled when/if it happens out on line. :aok
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Because of the Max crashes, I have been giving all my recurrent clients the AOA malfunction/stick pusher event at unstick. For almost every crew, it's something no one has ever given them in the sim, something they have never experienced.
The pusher repeatedly pushes the nose down if AOA exceeds 1.0., which is what the AOA malfunction does. Takes 75lbs of force to overcome the pusher or holding down the A/P disconnect disables the pusher as well. (Oh, btw, although the aircraft is continuously reading both AOA vanes, either vane sensing >.99 AOA will trigger the push. Just one, in other words.)
So far not a single crew has failed to overcome this situation successfully and survive.
I guess it's fair to point out that all of these individuals have far more than 200 hours flying time.
Go figure.
Nice job. :cheers:
I’ve been giving my guys stab trim runaways and AP hardover drills the same way. In the Falcon the last resort to a runaway is the Primary and/or Backup Stab Trim CBs. I don’t want them looking for it for the first time when it happens for real.
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Yeah, the QRH procedure is to find the CB and pull it.
However, the AOA/Stall Barrier (Pusher) is wired through the AOA heat switch. If the AOA heat is off, no shaker, no pusher.
So the quick and dirty back door is to look at the two AOA displays and turn off the heat on the one that is malfunctioning. Instant relief. Plenty of time then to go to the QRH.
File under: "Things you need to know how to do with out reference to the QRH."
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:aok :aok :aok
Falcons don’t address it other than using the backup trim. My query then becomes, “What do you do if that fails to stop it?”
That’s one good thing about dedicated cutout switches like the Embraer and Boeing have. But if you don’t use them correctly, as with Lion Air.......splat.
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Boeing is suspends production of the Max.
https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=boing+max&view=detail&mid=F94B8A16915F037D1D88F94B8A16915F037D1D88&FORM=VIRE
We all seem to be living in a time where are opinions are formed more by sensationalism than knowledge and facts. The "evil MCAS" was making headlines before the wreckage of the Ethiopian jet stopped burning. History has shown that determining the probable cause of an aviation accident can take years of investigation.
This will damage the Boeing Company. People will continue to fear flying on the newly certified airplane - whenever that happens - and apparently nothing will be done to get to the root problem. I read that Ethiopian is converting to an all airbus fleet - I wish them luck; I don't believe that Airbus jets are idiot-proof either.
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We all seem to be living in a time where are opinions are formed more by sensationalism than knowledge and facts. The "evil MCAS" was making headlines before the wreckage of the Ethiopian jet stopped burning. History has shown that determining the probable cause of an aviation accident can take years of investigation.
This will damage the Boeing Company. People will continue to fear flying on the newly certified airplane - whenever that happens - and apparently nothing will be done to get to the root problem. I read that Ethiopian is converting to an all airbus fleet - I wish them luck; I don't believe that Airbus jets are idiot-proof either.
AF 447 is but one example of how Airbus can be FUBAR.
Meanwhile the Embraer 145 fleet is approaching fifty million flight hours without a fatality. It's utterly remarkable.