Dowding:
Good discussion here btw
Re: German pre-emptive theoryI also believe that Hitler made his attack as a pre-emptive measure. In fact, I'm sure both Germany and the Soviet Union were very aware of the overwhelming likelihood of war, even when they signed the non-aggression pact. It really was a matter of who would strike first, and Germany was ready before the Soviets. What I don't believe is that the Soviet Union was planning an offensive operation against Germany in 1941 - all evidence shows the Soviets in the midst of massive transition. An interesting side note is the STAVKA's theories on any offensive operation against them. Basically, the STAVKA believed that any attack upon the Soviet Union would be a rather
slow affair as units were mobilized into position, then moved up to the front. The reason they thought this had to do with WWI, the only other major war that such experiences could be used as a gauge. So, even though STAVKA knew the Germans were deployed along the Soviet border, it was commonly believed that it would be days before serious action would ensue once the Germans attacked. A nasty surprise it was when the Blitzkrieg came blasting across the border.
Re: "bloody determination of the Russian people"The subject of human wave attacks committed by Soviet forces in WWII is very muddled, and full of half truths. In the beginning of the war such attacks were indeed done, and were usually the result of poor leadership skills. The reason Soviet officers possessed such deplorable skills had to do with the fact that many officers had been promoted from battalion to division and corps commands within very short time spans. This was done because there were very few senior level officers in the Red Army, and the reason for that is the purge of 1937. As the STAVKA collected war experience and distributed combat regulations during the war incidents of human wave attacks decreased, though they never ceased.
One reason why they never ceased had to do with the 'styles' of certain generals. For example, Zhukov. Operationally, he was a brilliant commander, and was known for his iron will and his willingness to never call it quits. Tactically, though, Zhukov was a slugger. His method was to initiate operations by commencing attacks all along his sector, and using massive artillery support. If an area was proving stubborn, then more reserves were pressed into the attack. On the one hand, this technique usually bled the German defenders white, forcing a retreat. But on the other hand pressing the attack so forcefully into defensive positions resulted in heavy losses for the Soviets. From the Khalkin Gol until the Zeelowe Heights(?), Zhukov was always known for his heavy losses. Zhukov's Operation Mars is a stark example of what happens when things go terribly wrong during one of his attacks. It was such a horrendous loss of Soviet lives and equipment that it was effectively 'forgotten' by STAVKA and omitted from the history books until Glantz uncovered it last decade. I think Patton was sometimes referred to as 'old Blood 'n' Guts', but I think it would be much more apt for Zhukov. Not all commanders were like this, Rokossovsky being an excellent example, but there were a few who were (another that comes to mind is Konev).
As the war progressed STAVKA issued combat regulations each year, and these regulations were the result of combat experiences up until that point. Effective tactics were developed from these experiences, then codified in the regulations, resulting in higher proficiency among Soviet commanders of all levels. By wars end, the Red Army was a highly effective blitzkrieg army, relying on maneuver, both tactically and operationally, for attainment of its objectives. While not as tactically skilled as their German opponents, they were equals operationally.
As a last point I should say that many German accounts are only from 41-42, which might also lead one to believe that human wave attacks were the norm in the Red Army.
[This message has been edited by leonid (edited 09-09-2000).]
