Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII

[Lumpy]

Its pretty obvious that you have little understanding of the history of the luftwaffe or the real issues that shaped the BoB.

The seeds for the luftwaffe were planted by Gen Hans Von Seekt in the early 1920's. He selected and nurture the original cadre of officers who would later create the luftwaffe. In 1933 the appointment of Erhard Milch began the transition of the "civil" air industry into the true luftwaffe. The chief advocate and pioneer of what would be considered the modern airforce in europe during the post WW1 era was Giulio Douhet. Hitler, Milch and the "senior brain trust" of the luftwaffe were all proponents of this new "air power". Max Wever was selected as the original Chief of the Air staff and a very forward looking strategic role for the luftwaffe was laid (the Luftkriegfuhrung). The 1st and most pressing need the new mandate required was A bomber that could fly around Britain from its base in Germany (direct quote from Milch).

General Wever was a strong proponent of a true strategic airforce and immediately began to lay the frame work needed to bring Douhet's vision to life.

The following is a summery of his speech at the 1935 opening of the air war academy taken from an other source...

He stated that "the realms of the air are not restricted to the fronts of the Army; they are above and behind the army, over the coasts and seas, over the whole nation and over the whole of the enemy's territory." Wever went on to advocate the doctrine of attack, stressing the offensive. He asserted that "the bomber is the decisive factor in aerial warfare." He warned that it was not sufficient to establish defense with only defensive weapons, instead the initiative must be taken and this meant that "the enemy bomber formations should be attacked at their most vulnerable moment; when they are on the ground taking on fresh fuel and ammunition and reservicing." In terms of established air policy, emphasis was first on the surprise attack of enemy air forces followed by attacks upon other vital enemy centers of gravity. "An initial assault by the Luftwaffe was to be directed against the enemy air force, including its supporting aircraft and aero-engine factories and ground installations, in order to gain air superiority from the outset."

General Wever was killed in a flying accident the following year and the army began to exercise a greater influence over the supposedly independent luftwaffe. From the army's perspective the role of the luftwaffe was "the role of airpower was simply to allow the maneuvers of the ground forces as much freedom as possible.". This eventually led to a focus on dive bombing vs level bombing and an operational doctrine focused on pinpoint vs area bombing and operational level bombing at lower altitudes. It led to cancelation of the JU-86 and delayed the Ju-88 development significantly and eliminated any true strategic bomber.

So when the JU-881A arrived it had a max speed of 258 mph a range of 550 miles and a 2000 bomb load. When loaded to maximum capacity it had a range of only 250 miles and a top speed of 190 mph....but with a top flight crew it could deliver 50% its bombs in a 50M radius in a dive bombing attack.

Alot of factors from the lack of quality engines to limited and lower octane fuel supplies also played a part, but the real issue here was that the army simply overrode the luftwaffe's goal to develope a true heavy bomber (4 of which were in development in 1936).

This led to operational doctrines and planes tailored to low altitude level bombing and/or dive bombing and operational combat at altitudes that favored the british. This led to very high bomber attrition (so bad that only 1 experienced officer per plane was allowed) and tied german fighters to an ineffective close escort role which maximized there own casualties and minimized there effectiveness vs there british counterparts...

So in 1940 the Germans had the 109/110/He-111/Ju-88...basically the same airforce they finished the war with.

If we look across the ocean to the US...the B-17 was already in production and the XP-38 had set a speed record in 1939. So the US had both the fighter and the bomber that would 1st reach Berlin "on the books" in the 1930's. Whats funny is that the US and germans drew such different conclusions from the spanish civil war where the germans saw validation of there tactics and the americans saw all the shortfalls in both the german bombers and the 109 itself.

So while the german loss of the BoB can be argued as a command failure with a high measure of success the real underlying issue was the failure to implement the Luftkriegfuhrung as originally conceived, which led to obvious shortcomings in equipment not suited to a strategic campaign and relagated the luftwaffe to much more marginalized role then originally hoped for. In the end Germany lost the airwar in 1944 because of choices it made in 1937...

You just tried to deflect my points with cut-and-paste irrelevancies. You didn’t answer to the facts that all of Britain was within range of German bombers already. You didn’t answer to the fact that the B-17 was not combat worthy by the time of the BoB, or indeed even a year after the BoB. You did not answer to the fact that Germany’s bomber force would only be a fifth of its size with B-17’s due to the costs involved. You didn’t answer to the fact that the strategic bombing of Britain failed, and would have failed no matter what aircraft was available to the Germans simply due to the nature of British war production.

You don’t seem to realise that strategic air warfare with conventional munitions proved a failure in WWII. Just like the British “cottage-industry”, German industry proved an elusive target. The first blow to the strategic air war doctrine was the fact that German industrial output actually went up after the “Big Week” operations. If we put aside the ethical and moral issues, the only strategic air war that proved somewhat effective during WWII was the destruction of German and Japanese cities by night-time firebombing. The shroud of darkness protects a Heinkel just as much as it does a Lancaster and even as late as January 1944 the Luftwaffe managed to mass more than 500 bombers to attack Britain at night. British cities and towns were subject to nightly bombing by the Luftwaffe right up to D-Day. The final blow to the strategic air warfare doctrine was the Vietnam War where the USAF dropped more bombs in a week than during all of WWII. Yet they failed to defeat a third-world nation or even appreciably disrupt the North-Vietnamese war effort.

Vietnam was the last time the USAF tried strategic air warfare; in Gulf War I and Gulf War II air power was used the way it’s supposed to be used:  Defeat the enemy armed forces,  and to do so in combination with the other services;  1. Achieve air superiority by destroying the opposing air force. 2. Support ground forces through direct action against enemy frontline forces and attack supply, communication and command infrastructure in the enemy’s rear areas. Only in the event of stalemate and the expectation of a long, drawn-out war should air power be used against enemy vital centres. Gulf War I & II was fought following the general instruction for the Luftwaffe, the “Conduct of Air Warfare,” first drawn up in 1935 and revised down to 1940. Even Generalleutnant Walther Wever whom you seem fond of Humble, the Luftwaffe Chief of Staff who died in 1936 and who is generally regarded as the chief German proponent of strategic air warfare, argued that “in the war of the future, the destruction of the armed forces will be of primary importance.” Strategic air warfare is today just a minor part of military thinking, with aircraft like the B-52 and B-2 originally designed for strategic use being adapted and used for tactical warfare with precision munitions.

The B-17 was a failure as well. It was designed around the misguided concept of the “self-defending bomber” – the notion that if you just put enough guns on a bomber it would be able to fend off attacks by enemy fighters. The Germans quite rudely proved that concept a fallacy in 1943 when they shot down unescorted B-17’s in droves and the USAAF had to withdraw from the battlefield to rebuild and rethink their strategy. In the end the “self-defending bomber” had to be defended by fighters (much like the German Zerstörer concept). And since the bombs they dropped on Germany did little damage to German war production the B-17 and her companion the B-24 ended up as little more than bait to lure the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition. That’s the only success of the USAAF’s strategic bombing campaign in Europe. The war itself was won in the suburbs of Moscow and the steppes of Russia using ground forces and close air support, often using planes like the P-39 and P-63 which was found undesirable by the strategic minded USAAF.

The first bomber to be designed around a truly modern and realistic concept was the de Havilland Mosquito. A bomber that only used passive defence to survive: Speed and stealth. And unlike the B-17 the Mosquito proved its concept by being the most survivable bomber of the war. After WWII bombers would carry less and less defensive armaments, until they were eliminated completely in favour of only passive defence. Modern bombers like the B-1, B-2, and Tu 160 rely completely on speed and/or stealth for protection. In the other thread I selected the B-24 as my level/strategic bomber only because it is the best level bomber in the game and per the rules cost was not an issue. If the bomber Mosquito was modelled in Aces High I would have chosen it instead.

[Lumpy]

I recommend reading Tami Davis Biddle’s book: “Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945.” http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7286.html  It’s a very good read.

[Serenity]

I recomend reading "Masters of the Air" by Donald L. Miller. Im not jumping in one way or the other on this post, but if you love the history of Strategic bombing as much as I do, you will love this book. One of the best reads ive ever enjoyed. Lots of great facts, stories, pictures, and you learn quite a bit! May sway one of you to the other side even.

[Lumpy]

I'll add it to my reading list, though it seems to focus on the airmen's war experiences rather than the strategies and thought processes behind them.

[Old Sport]

You don’t seem to realise that strategic air warfare with conventional munitions proved a failure in WWII. Just like the British “cottage-industry”, German industry proved an elusive target. The first blow to the strategic air war doctrine was the fact that German industrial output actually went up after the “Big Week” operations.

So you are saying there was in increase in the production of all manufactured good of every German industry after Big Week? I've read that fighter aircraft production increased, I didn't know that all industry surged ahead. If you have some numbers I'd be interested in seeing them.

Seems to me that if Speer had to reorganize industry, then strategic bombing was having a salutatory effect (for the allies anyway) for at least some period of time prior to and during the Nazi reorganization. It does take money, manpower and time to reorganize anything, and when you're in the midst of a war....

If we put aside the ethical and moral issues, the only strategic air war that proved somewhat effective during WWII was the destruction of German and Japanese cities by night-time firebombing...

I could be wrong, but I was under the impression that the crippling of Ploesti had a dramatic effect on the Third Reich's capacity to wage war.

Strategic bombing may not have been as successful as proponents had hoped, but I have a LOT of doubt that WWII would have ended in 1945 if the "strategic" raids had never occurred, which is the implication of calling them a failure.

[MiloMorai]

The million men could have been put to better use on the front lines than in defending the Reich, repairing the damage and fighting the fires started by the bombings. Never mind the high number of 88s that could have been put to better use defending the Third Reich. A/c used to defending against the bombers would have come in handy on the EF.

A high ranking Nazi official said the bombing cost ~30% of its production.

[jon]

If the LW would have continued to bomb the english airfields instead of the general population the outcome may have been different I belive it was the decisions not the machines that were the issue.

[Widewing]

The million men could have been put to better use on the front lines than in defending the Reich, repairing the damage and fighting the fires started by the bombings. Never mind the high number of 88s that could have been put to better use defending the Third Reich. A/c used to defending against the bombers would have come in handy on the EF.

A high ranking Nazi official said the bombing cost ~30% of its production.

Absolutely correct.

Moreover, the simple observation that Germany put such tremendous resources into defending against strategic bombing is a clear indication of the value of it. By 1944, nearly 40% of the nation's manpower and manufacturing resources were spent defending against Allied strategic air power. Maybe Lumpy can explain how something could be deemed a failure that accomplished such a stunning reduction of German offensive capability. Perhaps he may want to reconsider his argument?

My regards,

Widewing

[Lumpy]

So you are saying there was in increase in the production of all manufactured good of every German industry after Big Week? I've read that fighter aircraft production increased, I didn't know that all industry surged ahead. If you have some numbers I'd be interested in seeing them.

Big Week only targeted the German aircraft industry so that’s what you have to look at, but German war production in general steadily increased during the war until Germany itself was overrun by allied ground forces. German armament production peaked in July-August 1944 and by February 1945 it had fallen to 1943 levels, but was still twice that of 1941.

I could be wrong, but I was under the impression that the crippling of Ploesti had a dramatic effect on the Third Reich's capacity to wage war.

That the strategic bombing campaign of the USAAF was a failure does not mean that some vital targets were successfully destroyed. Besides Ploesti (Operation Tidal Wave) I can mention the dam-busters raid made by the RAF for instance. Neither of those raids were part of a greater, long-term strategic campaign, but one time strikes. And both raids were executed by a relatively small bomber force flying at treetop levels at great risk to the crews involved, not at 30,000 feet with a thousand-bomber stream. Both raids involved extensive preparation and training and staggering losses to the attacking force … and were as I said one time events (though Ploesti was “revisited” a year later).

The Ploesti raid in 1943 destroyed 50% of the Romanian refinery capacity. However this did not affect the Luftwaffe in any way, nor did it appreciably affect the German war effort. Most of Germany’s oil production was synthetic (from coal), in fact all of the aviation fuel used was synthetic, and production was increased to compensate for the Ploesti losses. Despite popular belief there was no shortage of fuel in the German national reserves until late in 1944 when production and storage sites were being overrun by ground forces. The reason so many tanks were destroyed by their crews after running out of fuel in France was because tactical air power interdicted the supply of fuel from Germany to the front lines. I.e. roving P-47’s and Typhoons shot up the fuel trucks and trains behind the German frontlines. The production of fuel was not a problem.

Strategic bombing may not have been as successful as proponents had hoped, but I have a LOT of doubt that WWII would have ended in 1945 if the "strategic" raids had never occurred, which is the implication of calling them a failure.

It is my belief (we are talking hypothetically here) that the war would have ended in 1945 with a Soviet victory no matter what. The Germans irreversibly lost the war at the battle for Moscow in 1941 (long before any bombing by the USAAF); the USAAF strategic bombing campaign may have shortened the war by a few months, but nothing more. Once the Red Army steamroller started rolling nothing the Germans did could stop it.

I find that many people have the mistaken belief that the Luftwaffe vs. USAAF was the big air war in Europe; however the fact is that the Luftwaffe never fielded more than one third of its strength in the west. The greatest air war the world has seen was fought over the Russian front. The battle of Kursk alone saw almost five thousand aircraft fight for supremacy in the air, 2,109 German and 2,792 Soviet.

[Lumpy]

By 1944, nearly 40% of the nation's manpower and manufacturing resources were spent defending against Allied strategic air power.

I doubt that very much. Can you document that number?

[Karnak]

Lumpy,

The problem is that you are making a false claim.  That Germany's production went up despite the bombing must mean Germany was unaffected by the bombing.  That does not follow at all.  Yes, Germany's production went up despite the bombing, but how much would it have gone up without the bombing?  That is the unknowable that we have to compare what really happened too.

Also, German quality suffered from it too, not as badly as Japan as Germany didn't make some of the boneheaded decisions the Japanese made, but it did suffer.

[Lumpy]

The million men could have been put to better use on the front lines than in defending the Reich, repairing the damage and fighting the fires started by the bombings.

Like I said in my first post, the firebombing of German cities was measurably effective in disrupting German war production. You are just confirming that, so why mention it at all?

Never mind the high number of 88s that could have been put to better use defending the Third Reich. A/c used to defending against the bombers would have come in handy on the EF.

All those allied aircraft used in the strategic bombing campaign could also have been put to much ... MUCH better use on the Russian front. Just like all those P-39's and P-63's and Spitfires etc.

[Lumpy]

Lumpy,

The problem is that you are making a false claim.  That Germany's production went up despite the bombing must mean Germany was unaffected by the bombing.  That does not follow at all.  Yes, Germany's production went up despite the bombing, but how much would it have gone up without the bombing?  That is the unknowable that we have to compare what really happened too.

Also, German quality suffered from it too, not as badly as Japan as Germany didn't make some of the boneheaded decisions the Japanese made, but it did suffer.

Of course, but not by so much as to make the strategic bombing campaign worthwhile. That's what determined if the campaign was a success or failure. The Allied recourses and manpower spent on the campaign could have been put to much better use elsewhere.

[Lumpy]

If the USAF had used the vast amount of resources spent on building its strategic air force to instead build a tactical air force the invasion of France could have been made a lot earlier. With the huge production capacity of the United States thousands of fighter-bombers and strike aircraft (like the Mosquito) could have been operational in 1943. Achieving local air dominance over Normandy and destroying the Luftwaffe in France would not have been a problem. Disrupting and destroying German ground forces would also have been much easier with such a force. The USAAF backed the wrong horse with regard to air warfare doctrines, and suffered for it in WWII. They had to fight with what they had instead of what they should have had.


Edit: Make that both the USAAF and the RAF. Just consider the might of their combined tactical air forces had the resources and manpower spent on all those Lancs and B-17/24 been used on Mosquitoes, Typhoons, P-47's etc. It would have been unstoppable by the Luftwaffe ... in 1943. IMHO of course (hypotheticals again).

[dtango]

Lumpy:

I would suggest reading the following book:

Why the Allies Won by Richard Overy
http://www.amazon.com/Why-Allies-Won-Richard-Overy/dp/039331619X



Dr. Overy is professor of Modern History at King's College, London and has published extensively on WW2 history.  He has a direct rebuttal to the doubt of the strategic worth of the bombing campaigns.

To add to some of the points already posted by others here are some things to consider as well:

• By the end of 1943 there were 55,000 anti-aircraft guns to fight the air offensive in the west for Germany.  75% of the feared 88's that were used so effectively in the east as anti-tank guns were diverted to defending against the bombing campaign in the west.
• The Luftwaffe was a critical part of the German combined arms successes.  The bombing campaign in the west critically drained Germany the much needed air strength which weakened German resistance against the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean.
• Albert Speer and his ministry found that 1944 production schedules had produced 35% fewer tanks than planned, 31% fewer aircraft than planned, 42% fewer lorries as a result of the bombing.  This eased the way for the allied armies in defeating Germany.
• In the Fall of 1944 the German army lost most of it's mobility because of lack of fuel which was a direct impact from the strategic bombing.  By Dec of 1944 oil production fell to only 33% of the January level and stocks were nearly exhausted.

Beyond the destruction of the Luftwaffe (which was no small feat) these were some of the contributions from the bombing offensive and as evident critically eroded Germany's capacity to fight.

Tango, XO
412th FS Braunco Mustangs