Seriously - the engagement will indeed always goes by this scenario...
See if your air force has unlimited resources and can win total air superiority than it is cool... But sometimes you need to provide CAS when you don't have total or even partial air superiority and take huge risks and continue to do missions that under "normal" situation you should never be done, because guys on the ground may pay huge price if you don't...
I suggest read about IAF during Yom Kippur War - and it isn't about technology - but rather about assumptions what should be done by the book and what actually happens.
If you lose your Air Force it wont matter what happens on the ground. For the ground war to win you have to either completely own the skies or contest their control so greatly that they are not a major problem. Without either of those conditions there has not been as successful offensive since during or since ww2.
Historically CAS has not been all that effective compared to the other types of ground support. Air power has had a much greater role in interdiction and logistical missions, or even strategic targets. Today ground attack will start with SEAD, and progress to strategic, logistical, and interdiction type missions. ISR of course must operate before and during all of this.
Against a peer opponent with a good IADS, you wont be able to conduct CAS. It is interesting that you mention the Israelis, because it was the assumption that they would control the skies that lead to problems in the 1973. The Egyptians compensated for their inability to compete with aircraft and tanks with large numbers of SAM's and ATGM's. The SAM umbrella prevented CAS and other types of strikes from occurring because Israel wasnt oriented enough towards SEAD. They did however control the skies in a Air to Air sense. IF they had been properly equipped to tackle the SAM problem, they would have needed to control the skies so that they could actually attack the SAM's. However they were not, and they were not able to perform CAS until the Egyptians made the rather stupid mistake of advancing past the coverage of their SAM umbrella. If anything the 1973 example makes the point in favor of the F-35, not against it. It shows that if you dont have the ability to penetrate the defenses, you wont be able to support the troops. And it absolutely was about technology. It was technology that prevented the Israeli's from leveraging air power early on. And it was a lack of technology the prevented them from fixing the problem. The only time you win against a technically superior opponent is when you have something of offset that shortfall. So you either need numbers or terrain etc. OR in the case of the Egyptians, a enemy who is so dumb they fail to fully exploit the advantage they have.....
Throwing your strikers at a contested airspace is a gross waste of resources. IF cant fight and win, then you hold off until you can. You do the ground troops no favors by sacrificing your strikers on suicide missions. You are just wasting resources.