Another 737 down

[Vraciu]

To answer the question above, the Falcon does not have a pusher except for British-certified airplanes.  It's their thing I guess.   

I am an EMBRAER guy all the way.   To me they do things, at least on the 145-series, that make the most sense of anyone out there (with very few exceptions).  The Legacy 600/650 manual explains the stall protection system and gives some parameters that will disable it.   Had some of these been in place the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes would have been avoided.   (This does not absolve the crew for its decision making which turned a bad situation into a fatal one.)

 
CREW AWARENESS
AIRPLANE OPERATIONS MANUAL (EMB-135BJ)
2-04-25
Page 2
Code 01
SEPTEMBER 30, 2002

SYSTEM INHIBITION

The stick pusher does not actuate in the following conditions:

−On the ground (except during test).
−Below 0.5 g.
−If the quick disconnect button is pressed (except for JAA certification).
−Below 200 ft AGL. If radio altimeter has failed, this condition reverts to a 10-second delay after takeoff.
−If any cutout buttons are released.
−Above 200 KIAS.
−If at least one channel is inoperative.


As for the jumpseater observing the trim wheels rather than the crew...   They’re right by the knees of the pilots themselves.    There’s no mistaking that thing once it starts churning butter.  It’s loud and is right there.    I find it impossible to believe they didn’t hear it.     

I hate to quote myself but I should have stated that the Et’opia crash could also have been avoided.   Sorry. 

Additionally, the June issue of BCA has an article by Fred George on the 737 MAX and MCAS, FWIW.   It seems that there is a dearth of sim sessions in the 737 world where the crews must fly all the way to a landing after a pitch trim runaway (something we routinely practice in the Embraer 135/145).

[Busher]

About 3-4 years ago Busher there was a FOQA report of 360 in a year in just the large cabin Gulfstream fleet. All models from the GI up to the G650. So about one a day.

Scary, huh?

It is... very!

Toad, I am sure you can recall the days when pilots prided themselves on the fact that they could hand fly the airplane as accurately as the automation, but far more smoothly. I don't believe we are likely to see those days return.

[Vraciu]

It is... very!

Toad, I am sure you can recall the days when pilots prided themselves on the fact that they could hand fly the airplane as accurately as the automation, but far more smoothly. I don't believe we are likely to see those days return.

(I can hand fly as well as anyone so don't take me wrong here.)

Heck, I am actually proud that I can fly smoothly *with* the automation.    There are a lot of people who either can't or won't.

[Busher]

(I can hand fly as well as anyone so don't take me wrong here.)

I have no doubt that you can. What should worry the authorities and the public is that the "modern pilot" may be losing the ability to do anything with the airplane when big Computer burps.

[Vraciu]

I have no doubt that you can. What should worry the authorities and the public is that the "modern pilot" may be losing the ability to do anything with the airplane when big Computer burps.

I don't entirely disagree with your premise, but my belief isn't that pilots are losing the ability it's that they're not fully developing it to begin with.   When I was at the Regionals I was able to hand fly enough to learn the jet.    Then I moved on to the Charter world where SOPs didn't restrict it to the extent airlines began to (you can't restrict it as much under 91/135 because often a hand flown visual is the only way you're going to get in to some of the places Charter and Corporate operators fly).

The younger group of Legacy pilots coming over from the ERJ have nowhere near the same skill flying the jet as the folks in my peer group.    Not only that but they're ham-fisted even with the automation.    They either don't notice or don't care.   Sign of the times.   

[MiloMorai]

More Boeing troubles, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/boeing-s-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers

[FLS]

They're just piling on with their pet issue. There was no software failure. From the only official reports so far, everything except the failed AOA sensor and the pilots worked properly.

[zack1234]

So Boeing is innocent of any crashes?

[Vraciu]

So Boeing is innocent of any crashes?

In this case, yes.

You can't fix stupid.

[Puma44]

So Boeing is innocent of any crashes?

Not when it’s human error, i.e. pilot incompetence as indicated in the last two 737 incidents.

[deSelys]

Well, according to Sullenberger, this is not so cut and dried:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/business/boeing-737-max-hearing.html


emphasis mine:

In an interview before the hearing, Mr. Sullenberger said he had modeled the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines flights in the simulator and had been able to gain control both times. But at the hearing he expressed sympathy for the pilots of the two flights, noting that the Lion Air pilots did not even know that the anti-stall software existed.

“Even knowing what was going to happen, I could see how crews could have run out of time and altitude before they could have solved the problems,” he said.

and

Much of the hearing focused on the issue of whether foreign pilots lack adequate training. Some pilots, and some members of Congress, have suggested that better-trained pilots would have been able to avoid accidents.
But Mr. Sullenberger said he did not believe that better pilot training alone would have prevented the crashes.

“We are all subject to hindsight bias,” he said. “I think it’s unlikely that other crews would have had very different experiences or performed very differently than these flights, certainly prior to the first flight.”

“We shouldn’t be blaming dead pilots,” Mr. Sullenberger added. “We shouldn’t expect pilots to compensate for flawed designs.”

and

“It is clear that the original version of MCAS was fatally flawed and should never have been approved,” Mr. Sullenberger said, adding that it was made too powerful and relied on only one sensor, creating a single point of failure.

[FLS]

Mr Sullenberger said he avoided crashing in both simulations but not because of better training. What does he think the difference was?   I'm guessing he would have saved it in the simulation even without prior knowledge of the defective sensor. Runaway trim, switch off.

Note Sullenberger even makes the point that the second crash occurred after knowing about the first crash and knowing about the MCAS system, but he explains it only as the Lion Air pilots not knowing about it, to change the effect. He skips the takeoff thrust setting mistake in the second crash which was possibly the most serious flight management issue. He's clearly protecting the pilots and making it sound like it could happen to anyone but so far it hasn't.  It's only happened where training and maintenance quality are issues.

I think everyone agrees there can be improvements in the aircraft but I would blame the pilots when their mistakes cause the crash.

[Vraciu]

Sullenberger is not a deity.    He did what any properly trained Captain in his situation would have done. 

When I was learning to fly (and later teaching) in 152s there was always an emphasis on where to land if the fire went out.    Same with jets.    To this day I always fly with my Display Airports  MFD option enabled and keep a sharp eye out for real estate to drop into in case of a loss of all engines event.    Any Captain worth his salt is doing something similar.   

Not taking anything away from him but Sully just happened to be the one to answer the call.   I would have done the same--and did so in the Sim a decade before this event.

[Arlo]

Mr Sullenberger said he avoided crashing in both simulations but not because of better training.

Sorry, but where did he discount his own training (or even experience)? Seems expectation of the exact situation you want to recover from and the details of how to do so would very much affect the outcome.

[FLS]

Sorry, but where did he discount his own training (or even experience)? Seems expectation of the exact situation you want to recover from and the details of how to do so would very much affect the outcome.

Did you read the quote above?  "But Mr. Sullenberger said he did not believe that better pilot training alone would have prevented the crashes." 

It's a ridiculous statement. Pilot knowledge is exactly what prevented a crash when the jump seat pilot turned off the MCAS in a previous flight of the same aircraft with the same failed sensor.