Another 737 down

[Vraciu]

I remember watching the NTSB animation of AF 447 which shows the throttle and stick inputs.  Watching the FOs stick inputs was infuriating, you can tell the exact moment when captain realized what was going on and tried to recover... but the FO screwed them.

I've seen a clip with Sullenberger talking about the airbus design philosophy (non linked side sticks) as a contributing factor in that too.

Agreed.

Excellent comments, btw.   I have enjoyed reading your calm, rational, and professional insight.   

[Vraciu]

This.

EXACTLY This.

Agreed.  100%.

[Vraciu]

The sad thing is Saggs, 2 ATP qualified pilots would have found the issue to be relatively simple. Put the airplane manually into a safe attitude (with stab trim disengaged) and set a much lower thrust value (lower than the 94% N1 they kept) to establish speed in the 225 to 250 KIAS range.

These pilots by North American standards were grossly inexperienced - especially the First Officer. The pressure and stress that you mentioned was largely self imposed.

Yep.  I was speaking earlier about the US ATP so I did not mention my Canadian friends.   They, too, are very good pilots overall.   

[Vraciu]

Hey DaveBB.  You seem like a smart guy, let me ask you a simple question.

There is a guy, let's call him John, driving on the highway and he is using cruise control.  It is keeping him right on the limit and he does not fear the cops or speed cameras, life is sweet.  Ahead, there are some roadworks and John sees these roadworks but does not turn the cruise control off.  John crashes and dies.

Question:  Did the cruise control kill John?

🦗 *crickets* 🦗

[guncrasher]

Hey DaveBB.  You seem like a smart guy, let me ask you a simple question.

There is a guy, let's call him John, driving on the highway and he is using cruise control.  It is keeping him right on the limit and he does not fear the cops or speed cameras, life is sweet.  Ahead, there are some roadworks and John sees these roadworks but does not turn the cruise control off.  John crashes and dies.

Question:  Did the cruise control kill John?

it does if John doesn't know the cruise control is on because the car manufacturer decided to charge 800 bucks extra to only tap the brake once to disconnect.

semp

[saggs]

it does if John doesn't know the cruise control is on because the car manufacturer decided to charge 800 bucks extra to only tap the brake once to disconnect.

semp

I think you lost the analogy here.  If you are equating cruise control to the aircraft's automatic pitch trimming (whether by autopilot or emergency stall recovery program) The pilots know it's on because the big wheels on either side of the pedestal are turning without anyone touching them, also movement of the h-stab position indicator, and possibly an audible indication in the pilots headset whenever it is moving, I don't know if 737s have that or not.

If you are equating cruise control to the aircraft not having the optional AOA disagree warning; all I can say is that is an uncommon feature, and by virtue of the fact that there are tens of thousands of airliners operating millions of hours every month safely without that feature, it is not necessary for safe operation.

[Busher]

it does if John doesn't know the cruise control is on because the car manufacturer decided to charge 800 bucks extra to only tap the brake once to disconnect.

semp

The powers that be have done an amazing job of convincing the believers of the world that these poor expert pilots were ambushed by the evil gremlin known only as MCAS. My God, they didn't have a prayer and in a better world, that evil murderous empire know as Boeing would be burned to the ground.

Newsflash gentlemen; there are dozens of integrated systems in a commercial jet just waiting to kill you if they don't work as the computer geeks designed them to work.

Pardon the sarcasm but this crap is really getting old. If the engines still run and the wings are still attached, just fly the G*d**mn jet

[guncrasher]

you guys can sit here and debate all you want.  fact is Manu already admitted there's a problem with software, they're fixing it. fact is none of you experts were there.  one crew correctly identified the problem not because he knew but because he looked thru the manual and he wasn't distracted in flying the airplane. that info should have been passed but they didn't.

anyway what do I know about flying airplanes other than ah.

semp

[Meatwad]

Hey DaveBB.  You seem like a smart guy, let me ask you a simple question.

There is a guy, let's call him John, driving on the highway and he is using cruise control.  It is keeping him right on the limit and he does not fear the cops or speed cameras, life is sweet.  Ahead, there are some roadworks and John sees these roadworks but does not turn the cruise control off.  John crashes and dies.

Question:  Did the cruise control kill John?

No, John killed himself due to refusing to decelerate to the upcoming hazards even after knowing in advance they were there. John probably shouldnt of had his drivers license or should of  took a refresher on driving

[Vraciu]

you guys can sit here and debate all you want.  fact is Manu already admitted there's a problem with software, they're fixing it. fact is none of you experts were there.  one crew correctly identified the problem not because he knew but because he looked thru the manual and he wasn't distracted in flying the airplane. that info should have been passed but they didn't.

anyway what do I know about flying airplanes other than ah.

semp

The crew screwed up.   They reengaged a runaway trim system after disabling it.  MCAS or no MCAS, YOU DO NOT DO THAT.

I’ve been giving crews runaway stab trim in the simulator and not one has failed to follow the proper procedure.   

The rest of your commentary was adequately dealt with by others.   No need for me to add to it. 

[Vraciu]

I think you lost the analogy here.  If you are equating cruise control to the aircraft's automatic pitch trimming (whether by autopilot or emergency stall recovery program) The pilots know it's on because the big wheels on either side of the pedestal are turning without anyone touching them, also movement of the h-stab position indicator, and possibly an audible indication in the pilots headset whenever it is moving, I don't know if 737s have that or not.

If you are equating cruise control to the aircraft not having the optional AOA disagree warning; all I can say is that is an uncommon feature, and by virtue of the fact that there are tens of thousands of airliners operating millions of hours every month safely without that feature, it is not necessary for safe operation.

Bingo.  MCAS or no MCAS the procedure is the same as it has been since the 1960s.  There is no excuse for turning on a runaway trim system after disabling it.   

[Busher]

you guys can sit here and debate all you want.  fact is Manu already admitted there's a problem with software, they're fixing it. fact is none of you experts were there.  one crew correctly identified the problem not because he knew but because he looked thru the manual and he wasn't distracted in flying the airplane. that info should have been passed but they didn't.

anyway what do I know about flying airplanes other than ah.

semp

No Semp, I am sorry but the fact is, the Lion Air Crash was caused by a non-airworthy jet being dispatched. In Canada and the United States, when an airplane has a snag entered in the logbook, that airplane is grounded until the snag is rectified (or deferred under the MEL) by a qualified and endorsed mechanic. Dispatching this airplane was borderline criminal under our laws. Assuming the accident pilot knew of the snag and in our world he would have to; his acceptance of the airplane is beyond belief.

Oh and to your belief that the jumpseat pilot was studying the manual to provide the necessary guidance to the pilots; I sure as hell hope not. You only add support to those who believe the accident pilots were totally incompetent. Stab trim runaway is a basic and simple memory action dealt with easily in 99% of the checkrides carried out everyday in North America.

[Toad]

The Lion Air and Ethiopian MAX crashes were initially simply box stock AOA malfunctions that the crews failed to handle correctly.

There are many things involved here that may not be obvious to people in other industries.

For example, MCAS does not work with the flaps extended. So you retract the flaps and the aircraft pitches down and (for whatever reason) you don't understand that pitch down. What to do? Simple...the problem occurred when the flaps were retracted so just immediately "undo" what you did. Put the flaps back out. This kind of stuff is basic airmanship and should be intuitive. If the Ethiopian crew had just done THAT...no MCAS problem. They did a lot of other things wrong, starting with failing to react correctly to an AOA problem but that's just one example.

However, I realize all you folks in other industries that have never spent any time working in a transport category aircraft cockpit probably have a better understanding of what goes into being a trained and experienced ATP rated airman than people that have actually been ATP rated airmen for tens of thousands of hours and have actually trained other ATP rated airmen.

Busher: I'm with ya buddy! 

[Vraciu]

The Lion Air and Ethiopian MAX crashes were initially simply box stock AOA malfunctions that the crews failed to handle correctly.

There are many things involved here that may not be obvious to people in other industries.

For example, MCAS does not work with the flaps extended. So you retract the flaps and the aircraft pitches down and (for whatever reason) you don't understand that pitch down. What to do? Simple...the problem occurred when the flaps were retracted so just immediately "undo" what you did. Put the flaps back out. This kind of stuff is basic airmanship and should be intuitive. If the Ethiopian crew had just done THAT...no MCAS problem. They did a lot of other things wrong, starting with failing to react correctly to an AOA problem but that's just one example.

However, I realize all you folks in other industries that have never spent any time working in a transport category aircraft cockpit probably have a better understanding of what goes into being a trained and experienced ATP rated airman than people that have actually been ATP rated airmen for tens of thousands of hours and have actually trained other ATP rated airmen.

Busher: I'm with ya buddy! 

I stand with Busher as well as you, Toad. 

One of my co-pilots when I flew for a Fortune 10 company was a retired F-16 Fighter Weapons Instructor.    His favorite thing to teach his students was:

What do you do when you turn off your landing light and the engine quits?

Turn it back on because that’s what killed your engine.


The same goes for any system.  If you move a switch or a selector leave your hand there until you get the expected result.   If you don’t get said result move the switch or selector back to its previous position.    Simple. 

[Busher]

The Lion Air and Ethiopian MAX crashes were initially simply box stock AOA malfunctions that the crews failed to handle correctly.

There are many things involved here that may not be obvious to people in other industries.

For example, MCAS does not work with the flaps extended. So you retract the flaps and the aircraft pitches down and (for whatever reason) you don't understand that pitch down. What to do? Simple...the problem occurred when the flaps were retracted so just immediately "undo" what you did. Put the flaps back out. This kind of stuff is basic airmanship and should be intuitive. If the Ethiopian crew had just done THAT...no MCAS problem. They did a lot of other things wrong, starting with failing to react correctly to an AOA problem but that's just one example.

However, I realize all you folks in other industries that have never spent any time working in a transport category aircraft cockpit probably have a better understanding of what goes into being a trained and experienced ATP rated airman than people that have actually been ATP rated airmen for tens of thousands of hours and have actually trained other ATP rated airmen.

Busher: I'm with ya buddy! 

Thanks Toad. I think all our brothers in the air are probably saddened by what's going on in the profession we cherished. I worry that poorly maintained airplanes flown by crews that are thrust into the cockpit before they are ready, will lead to more totally senseless accidents.

Keep the faith Brother.