Originally posted by Nashwan
The Jagdwaffe alone claimed nearly 2,000 single engined fighters during the battle, out of a total of around 900 actually lost to all causes, including bomber defensive fire.
I`d like to see a source for this "2000 claimed by the Jagdwaffe" claim... Don`t really except it to turn up ! :cool
I believe Groehler`s numbers are far more credible (if I am reading his chart right), given they are taken right from the German archieves! Those 915 German claim from 10th July - 31st October, vs. 934 Spits/Hurris admitted by the British to be lost to enemy action.
Deighton also shows an interesting table in his book "Fighters", showing the RAF`s claims of 1940 vs. the real numbers recorded in the LW`s Kriegstagebuchs. , for 15th, 18th August and 15th and 27th September. The total number of British claims for are 678 (185+155+185+153), vs. only 196 German planes that lost in reality.
The Luftwaffe certainly managed to "grind the RAF down", but at no point during the Battle did they do so at a faster rate than the RAF was inflicting on them.
Well, the Luftwaffe was loosing something like 550 fighters in the whole BoB to all reasons, vs. 1960 British fighters to all reasons (combat, accidents, bombing etc.). Certainly the British were loosing a lot more fighters than the Germans, which was partly balanced out by the British advantage of returning pilots.
This is true for only 2 weeks of the battle, but the Luftwaffe were losing pilots faster than they could be replaced throughout the battle.
As of 29th June 1940, the 109 force was supposed to have a strength of 1171 pilots, but actualy had 1126 available, and 906 of those were fit for duty.
By the 28th September, established strength had fallen to 1132 pilots, but only 917 were available, and only 676 were fit for duty.
In contrast, RAF pilot strength grew throughout the battle, reaching over 1400 by late September 1940. The RAF has a list of pilots who fought during the battle, and those who were killed. Just over 500 were killed, but around 2800 actually flew at least 1 operational sortie with a fighter squadron during the BoB.
Lies, damned lies, statistics as they say... numbers don`t show everything, especially if selectively qouted. First, your numbers include British pilot reserves but ignore the German reserves - why? Second, in air combat, and this was proven hundreds of times, it was pilot quality that mattered. The British could only keep up with their pilot`s losses if they drastically reduced their training. The RAF took severe losses in experienced pilots over France and especially over Dunkirk, about 25% of the pilots being rookies at the start of BoB. However by early September, over 50% of British fighter pilots had only really marginal training 5-10 flying hours on their combat types, sometimes not even that much, vs. many hundred hours of their LW adversaries.
Wonders do not happen in war, the British were able to raise so many new pilots because they cut back on training. In fact, even pupils and whole classes were taken out of fighter schools and sent to the frontline units, which would mean the RAF would be in serious trouble with replacement pilots in a few months if the air battle continues. However it was correctly noted that if the LW breaks the RAF in the meantime, they would of little importance..
Now, which do you think is going to break first, the force with 1400 pilots and 1000+ fighters, or the force with less than 900 pilots and planes? Especially considering that the smaller force was training pilots and building planes at a slower rate.
Given that both parties are of equal quality, the more numorous should of course. But this wasn`t the case, it was quality vs. quantity again. 1000+ fighters, yes, but only 1/3 of them were equal to the 109s. The same goes to pilots : 1400 pilots, most of them rookies having great difficulity just taking off and landing their planes, with only a small core of veteran Wing Commanders who, if fell, could not be replaced, vs. 900 pilots, most of them veterans of Spain, Poland and France, already mounting up dozens of kills and gaining lot of experiance, and even the rookies have dozens of time of training time than their British adversaries. And there`s the human factor as well, the British rotated their pilots, the Germans did not (or at least not so often), however the LW was on it`s peak of power, and morale was very high, whereas the RAF was sustaining defeats after defeats, and their inexperienced rookies were often so scared as they refused to engage the enemy planes and fled (as happened with 92nd Squadron).
So the question is : 300 first rate and 700 second rate fighters, flown by 1400 pilots, mostly rookies with low morale (but rested), vs. 900 first class planes flown by 900 first class pilots, who are quite tired by now, but have very high morale and commitment to their cause? Well I don`t know the answer, there are just too many variables, but history showed that if the odds are near-even, then quality is the deciding factor.
The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September.
... and similiarly, the RAF`s fighter sorties also dropped? Why?
Well, the weather:
7th September 1940 : Fair with some haze.
8th September 1940 : Fair early morning and evening, cloudy for the remainder of the day
9th September 1940 : Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Channel fair.
10th September 1940 : Generally cloudy, some rain.
11th September 1940 : Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
12th September 1940 : Unsettled, rain in most districts
13th September 1940 : Unsettled.
14th September 1940 : Showers and local thunder. Cloud in the Straits, Channel and Thames Estuary
That sortie rate should tell you the strain the Luftwaffe were under. To fly 4000 sorties in a week with 675 pilots means each pilot flying 6 times in a week, and much longer sorties than the RAF flew. Little wonder they couldn't sustain it more than 2 weeks.
It`s more like a simple case that the Automn was coming, and the weather turned bad, making flying impossible.
As the British themselves admit, ie. on 16th September :
16th September 1940 :
Weather: General rain and cloud.
Enemy action by day
An attack by some 350 enemy aircraft developed in Kent at about 0800 hours and formations flew in the direction of London, but the attack was not pressed home.
Other activity during the day consisted of a large number of reconnaissances off and over the Coast mostly by single aircraft, but one raid totalling 30 aircraft approached Dover. No attack, however, developed.
Weather largely hindered fighter action.
