I checked it now, your numbers refer to Spits doing economy cruise at 220-280 mph speed w/o reserves, and Bf 109s doing a max. speed cruise at 370-400mph with 1/4 of tank reserved - hardly a fair comparision, is it?
So all the German pilots are lying when they say they only had a few minutes combat time over London?
We know Spitfires flew combat missions in support of bombers over France and the Low Countries in 1941, a reverse of the situation in 1940. So surely the much longer ranged 109 must have had ample combat time?
Indeed. One has merely look on the timeline. It`s worth to compare it to the Allied efforts and plans for D-Day.
There is no comparison. The allies had a wealth of experience for D Day, and knew they would be facing a large number of well equipped german divisions, including several panzer divisions.
The first clashes with the RAF started only in July, in fact the real thing was only in early August and brought the RAF to the edge of destruction by late August / early September. But all that hardly mattered - look at the date again. Even if the LW would be even remotely capable just putting the whole RAF to the last plane into past tense - which was something, as proven by the next 5 years of air war, an impossibility vs. an industrialized nation), it would be waaaay too late to start any seaborne invasion (hypothesizing of course the Germans could gather an invasion fleet in a few weeks from what was available, which took even the Allies a good 3 years to complete) without the weather intervening.
All this is assuming the conditions were the same in 1940 as they would be in 1944, which of course they weren't.
The allies knew they could not capture a port (Dieppe proved that), and knew they would have to support a large armoured force for months of combat. The Germans believed they could capture a port (Dover), and knew that they would have to support relatively small forces in Britain for a fairly short campaign.
Resupply across the channel is not a problem if you have an operational port, and is less of a problem the smaller the enemy you are fighting.
This become appearant in the very first days for the German general staff, and they simply didn`t take the idea of an ivasion seriously. In Britiain, they took it serious of course, they were naked after Dunkirk, a single Panzer Division could wreak havoc on them with no heavy weapons to defend against..
Not really true, of course, but you are just illustrating the flaw in your argument. The allies planned to land several divisions on day 1, and support an army of 40 or more divisions in combat. Yet you think the same level of logistical planning and complication is required for 1 panzer division?
But as told, Hitler`s attention was already on the East, as Stalin took advantage of the German commitments on the West and started expanding in Eastern Europe, like in the case of Rumania.. This alone made the area far more important for Hitler than to bother with the UK that was no longer in the position to seriously challange the Germans on the continent alone.
No, Hitler planned to knock Britain out of the war. You can see that from his orders for Sealion:
In order to establish the conditions necessary for the final conquest of England, I intend to continue the air and naval war against the English homeland more intensively than heretofore.
To this end I issue the following orders:
The German Air Force is to overcome the British Air Force with all means at its disposal and as soon as possible ...
After gaining temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be carried out against harbors, especially against establishments connected with food supply ... Attacks on the harbors of the south coast are to be undertaken on the smallest scale possible, in view of our intended operations. ...
The Luftwaffe is to stand by in force for Operation Sea Lion.
I reserve for myself the decision on terror attacks as a means of reprisal.
The intensified air war may commence on or after August 6 ... The Navy is authorized to begin the projected intensified naval warfare at the same time.
and
The C. in C., Navy, having reported on July 31 that the necessary preparations for Sea Lion could not be completed before September 15, the Fuehrer has ordered:
Preparations for Sea Lion are to be continued and completed by the Army and Air Force by September 15.
Eight to fourteen days after the launching of the air offensive against Britain, scheduled to begin about August 5, the Fuehrer will decide whether the invasion will take place this year or not; his decision will depend largely on the outcome of the air offensive ...
Haider recorded his meeting with Hitler in his diary. As late as September the 14th, Haider records Hitler's reflections
"Successful landing means victory, but for this we must obtain complete air superiority.
Bad weather has so far prevented our attaining complete air superiority.
All other factors are in order.
Decision therefore: The operation will not be renounced yet."
And the directive issued on 14th Sept:
"The start of Operation Sea Lion is again postponed. A new order follows September 17. All preparations are to be continued.
The air attacks against London are to be continued and the target area expanded against military and other vital installations (e.g., railway stations).
Terror attacks against purely residential areas are reserved for use as an ultimate means of pressure."
Then from the naval war diary, 17th Sept:
"The enemy Air Force is still by no means defeated. On the contrary, it shows increasing activity. The weather situation as a whole does not permit us to expect a period of calm ... The Fuehrer therefore decides to postpone "Sea Lion" indefinitely"
On the 12th October they finally called the invasion off:
"The Fuehrer has decided that from now on until the spring, preparations for "Sea Lion"
shall be continued solely for the purpose of maintaining political and military pressure on England.Should the invasion be reconsidered in the spring or early summer of 1941, orders for a renewal of operational readiness will be issued later "
This is the first mention of preperations being a bluff, and came after the failure of the Luftwaffe in the BoB. All the paperwork and recolections of the men around Hitler at the time show that until late September the invasion was a viable plan, to be carried out if Britain failed to seek peace.
I`d like to see a source for this "2000 claimed by the Jagdwaffe" claim... Don`t really except it to turn up ! :cool
Tony Wood's site:
http://tonywood.cjb.net/ It's a list of claims from the OKL microfilms.
I believe Groehler`s numbers are far more credible (if I am reading his chart right), given they are taken right from the German archieves! Those 915 German claim from 10th July - 31st October, vs. 934 Spits/Hurris admitted by the British to be lost to enemy action.
Tony Wood actually has the individual claims in the docs on his page. Incidentally, the Jagdwaffe seem to have claimed about 1250 Spitfires and 710 Hurricanes, whereas the RAF actually lost far more Hurricanes than Spitfires.
Groehler was a 70s East German "historian" who set out to prove the Luftwaffe lost more planes against the Russians than the west. Not only does that make his conclusions dubious, but the Luftwaffe archives have yielded a lot more information in recent years.
Well, the Luftwaffe was loosing something like 550 fighters in the whole BoB to all reasons
No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions, plus hundreds of 110s, which the Germans did (laughably) call a fighter.
Wood and Dempster in The Narrow Margin give Luftwaffe fighter losses as 912 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.
They give RAF day fighter losses, (which includes Blenheims) as 1140 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.
Eagle in Flames by Hooton gives Luftwaffe fighter losses as 753 all causes 1st July to 6th Oct. In the same period he gives RAF day fighter losses (again inc Blenheims) as 874, all causes.
vs. 1960 British fighters to all reasons (combat, accidents, bombing etc.).
What's the source for this 1960 claim? Considering the RAF lost about 520 pilots to all causes in the BoB, 4 lost planes per pilot seems way out of line with any other air campaign, especially considering some 100+ of those losses were 2 crew aircraft.
