Spitfire IX overmodeled??

[Thrawn]

Originally posted by Crumpp
No thrawn I didn't know that.

I thought you might of missed this.


"Anyway. Hope to be able to talk over this with a beer some day. Infanteer to infanteer and talk over your experiances and thank you for your service."

My unit worked pretty closely with some Canadian Forces.  In fact We shared the same shoothouse.  Our Compound was co-located with them, the Germans, and the New Zealanders.  Great group of guys.

If you were serving in in Afghanistan at the start of Afghan war, you were working with his old regiment.

[Crumpp]

I'd love to share a beer and talk about the "stan".

If either of you get down South on the East Coast, drop me a line.
Crumpp

[Hap]

read shiller's "rise and fall of the 3rd reich."  i'll leave it at that.

[Crumpp]

Gripen,

The Point is the LW was using the same strategy that won the Allies Air superiority in '44 in '41 against the RAF.  At least in the begining.  Had the LW continued to use this strategy the popular view amoung historians is that they would have won.  


To Quote Chaz Bowyer, author of "Air War Over Europe 1939-1945" on page 75:

"During the period of August 24 to September 6th the RAF lost more than 100 pilots killed and 128 seriously wounded or injured.  Such figures represent roughly 25 percent of all available RAF pilots at any given date of the battle.
   As the fighting potential of the Fighter Command ground inexorably less, the Luftwaffe-virtually within sight of ultimate victory in their prolonged offensive- was given fresh tactical directives from Goering.

.............  The crass ignorance of both Hitler and Goering of Aerial Strategy robbed the Luftwaffe of any hope of victory."

This is a true statement.  One month before Dowding reported that he would not be able to sustain his present losses in pilots.  Bomber Command, Fleet Air arm, and even civilian agencies were stripped of every available pilot to man a fighter cockpit.  Even this was not enough.  Just like the Luftwaffe in '44 airframes were not the problem, trained pilots were the choke point of victory.

In 12 days the RAF lost 25 percent of its trained pilots.  This was an average figure for the Airfield phase of the Battle and represented figures the RAF could never hope to sustain.  The LW was taking casualties while large in number at the time represented a much smaller and sustainable percentage of their resources.  It is very possible the LW could have won the BoB.  It is probable IMO that it would severly depleted their combat power leaving "Barbarossa" an impossibility without years of reconstitution.  It is also doubtful that the rest of the German Military could have capitalized on their victory and actually put German soldiers on English soil.

Crumpp

[Nashwan]

To Quote Chaz Bowyer, author of "Air War Over Europe 1939-1945" on page 75:

"During the period of August 24 to September 6th the RAF lost more than 100 pilots killed and 128 seriously wounded or injured. Such figures represent roughly 25 percent of all available RAF pilots at any given date of the battle

It's quite simply wrong.

RAF operational fighter pilots in the UK, from "the battle" by Richard Overy:

17th Aug 1,379
31st Aug 1,422
14th Sept 1,492

If you don't believe the figures, look at the RAF roll of honour at http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/roll.html

2,927 pilots (including some Defiant gunners and Blenheim co-pilots) flew operational sorties during the BoB. 544 died, and several hundred were wounded and did not return to combat. It still gives a figure of around 2,000 operational fighter aircrew during the battle.

In contrast, German operational strength:

1st June 906
1st Aug 869
1st Sept 735
1st Nov 673

The LW was taking casualties while large in number at the time represented a much smaller and sustainable percentage of their resources.

No, the simple truth of the BoB is that the RAF suffered unsustainable losses only during the end of Aug/ beginning Sept. The Luftwaffe suffered unsustainable losses throughout August, September, October and into November.

The Luftwaffe needed to shoot down RAF fighters at better than 2:1 ratio, realisticly 3:1. They actually managed less than 1.5:1, and less than 1:1 in overall aircraft losses.

[Crumpp]

Again,

You are saying that the majority of both the academic world is wrong AND that Western Air Forces that study that history and formed the doctrine in use today are wrong.  

YOU have figured it all out and are able to stand up and fly in the face of conventional thinking.  Congratulations....you are obviously much smarter than them.

Your right the LW didn't almost win the BoB.  The RAF was just a little jumpy back then, especially Dowding.

Nashwan please study the History behind those stats.  The LW started it's main effort to destroy the RAF on 13 Aug with Aldertag. Yes the LW was sustaining losses before then and the ratio was in the RAF's favor during the Battle of the barges.  However, the LW was never in short supply of FIGHTER PILOTS.  The RAF was in such short supply that in the begining of August BEFORE the LW even launched Aldetag Dowding recieved EVERY available pilot to man a fighter cockpit from the other services.  The LW maintained it's pre-war fighter pilot training on through '42 including frontline training staffles who took new pilots up into ocmbat under the watchful eye of an instructor.    

Crumpp

[VO101_Isegrim]

So all the German pilots are lying when they say they only had a few minutes combat time over London?

They didn`t lie. The RAF was spanked over London on the 7th of September, by Bf 109s. It appears even those few minutes were enough.

Seriously answering the question, there were two main reason that limited the 109s ability to butcher the Fighter command :

a, Droptanks were not yet standardized (neither were on the Spitfire as far as I know, that`s why Spits had so limited time over Dunkerque)

b, Cooperation between bomber and fighter units were poor, and fighters often had to waste a lot of time cruising over the channel, waiting for the bombers to appear, effectively limiting their time over the land.


We know Spitfires flew combat missions in support of bombers over France and the Low Countries in 1941, a reverse of the situation in 1940. So surely the much longer ranged 109 must have had ample combat time?

Indeed you are right. The much longer ranged 109s could have spent a lot more time than Spitfires over enemy territory. I always wondered why didn the RAF just copy the 109 and scrap the Spit... But it`s really not hard to understand. The Bf 109G had a still air range of 615 mils on internal fuel, the Spit IX 434 miles under the same conditions. You don`t have to be a math genius to get that 615 > 434.. I am not sure about the 109E, it was far worser aerodynamically, and the DB 601s had were thirstier than the more advanced DB 605s. The range given for it on internal tank is 460 miles, however I don`t know if it`s the same conditions.

 It`s easy to understand why it this way, the Spit`s airframe was clean to start with and got progressively worser during the war, why the 109s just improved and improved. The 109 needed less power to obtain equal or even better speeds at the same power output, and as a bonus their DBs needed less fuel to burn HP per HP than the R-Rs... cruising at higher speed, consuming less fuel.. naturally this leads to better range and endurance.


Resupply across the channel is not a problem if you have an operational port, and is less of a problem the smaller the enemy you are fighting.


It could be a problem if you don`t have enough ships for it, and even the "ships" you have are mostly river bargues, unsuited for a stormy channel. The Germans would need to mount an assualt on a defended country, not just flee back on the channel on whatever vessel available, leaving all equipment behind in the haste, and loosing some 250 ships and 10 000 men during the trip like during the Dunkerque.


Haider recorded his meeting with Hitler in his diary. As late as September the 14th, Haider records Hitler's reflections :


"Successful landing means victory, but for this we must obtain complete air superiority.
Bad weather has so far prevented our attaining complete air superiority.
All other factors are in order.
Decision therefore: The operation will not be renounced yet."


Interesting. It appears the German High command is on the same opinion as the British High command : Bad weather in the 2nd week of September is restricting air operations.





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I`d like to see a source for this "2000 claimed by the Jagdwaffe" claim... Don`t really except it to turn up ! :cool
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Tony Wood's site:

http://tonywood.cjb.net/ It's a list of claims from the OKL microfilms.




... and not very surprisingly, the 2000+ claims by the LW don`t turn up anywhere. Thanks Naswan for admitting it.



I believe Groehler`s numbers are far more credible (if I am reading his chart right), given they are taken right from the German archieves. Those 915 German claim from 10th July - 31st October, vs. 934 Spits/Hurris admitted by the British to be lost to enemy action.

Tony Wood actually has the individual claims in the docs on his page. Incidentally, the Jagdwaffe seem to have claimed about 1250 Spitfires and 710 Hurricanes, whereas the RAF actually lost far more Hurricanes than Spitfires.

You refer to Tony Wood, however, NO-WHERE can I see ANYTHING on his site even slightly resambling your statements...


Groehler was a 70s East German "historian" who set out to prove the Luftwaffe lost more planes against the Russians than the west. Not only does that make his conclusions dubious, but the Luftwaffe archives have yielded a lot more information in recent years.

Groehler never claimed such BS (his numbers in the book prove the exact opposite my dear... Of course you haven`t read the book you comment on...), and you have never read anything from him.  Regardless of you unfounded opinion, Groehler did so far the most detailed analysis and research on LW strenght.


quote:
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Well, the Luftwaffe was loosing something like 550 fighters in the whole BoB to all reasons
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No, they lost around 600 on OPERATIONAL missions,

Source?


plus hundreds of 110s, which the Germans did (laughably) call a fighter.

BS again, they never called it a fighter, they called it a Zestorer, or Destroyer, a multi purpose heavy fighter.

As for how laughable it was, ask those 55 000 dead corpses buried under the molten aluminium of Lancesters.

Or this guy :



Oblt. Heinz-W. Schnaufer Staffelkapitän of 12./NJG 1 is showing his 47th victory bar on the rudder of his Bf 110 G, at St. Trond in February 1944.

Another of his Bf 110 college, Major Groth, knocked down 13 of the RAF in the BoB alone in his 110.

What was the highest score among Spitfire aces during BoB, again?



Wood and Dempster in The Narrow Margin give Luftwaffe fighter losses as 912 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.

They give RAF day fighter losses, (which includes Blenheims) as 1140 1st July to 31st Oct, all causes.

Eagle in Flames by Hooton gives Luftwaffe fighter losses as 753 all causes 1st July to 6th Oct. In the same period he gives RAF day fighter losses (again inc Blenheims) as 874, all causes. [/b]

"Fighters?" 110s, 109s included?  Only vs. Britain or in the whole LW ?

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
vs. 1960 British fighters to all reasons (combat, accidents, bombing etc.).
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What's the source for this 1960 claim?

'Fighters' by Deighton, but alternatively you can go through of the Daily reports of the RAF, which lists all causes. Be sure to read what was lost in the hangars, to Stukas and co. British authors seem to "naturally" leave out the Spits that disappeared in a bomb crater, but counting 109s that was lost in a training field in East Germany.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Because the Luftwaffe had no pilot reserves. Even the RAF didn't have "reserves", as such.

Oh, come on, Nashwan, should I remind you that last time you could even tell the difference between a Gruppe and a [/i]Staffel ? You actually believed that the German Gruppe is equivalent of a Squadron, whereas a Gruppe in reality consisted of 3-4 Staffeln (Squadrons).

You have no idea about how German air units are built up. That`s why you fail/refuse to understand that in the British system, the reserve planes/pilots were issued to the firstline Squadron,
whereas in the German system the replacements pilots came to the Jagdgeschwader from different named reserve units, which are of course are not counted in the first line strenght.

You count British Squadrons, which included the reserves in their structure, but only count the German first line units, that don`t include the reserves in their structure.


No. The RAF had the luxury of keeping a large part of their strength away from the battle.  

The RAF even had the luxury to let itself spanked all over Norway, the Low Countries, France, Dunkerque, the German Bay, the Channel and it`s own airfields.
You call it luxury, I call it poor organisation.

"The Germans gave it everything they had in the Battle of Britain. And the Brits stoped them with half of what they had."

Source? Modern British history book for the elementary school classes ?



The RAF could afford to keep a large proportion of it's strength out of the battle at any one time, and new pilots were frequently posted to squadrons in quiet areas to gain experience.

A nice way to put how inflexible the British defense system was. No group was really allowed to interfere with the other group`s actions. Result : the group on the south was decimated, while the others were doing virtually nothing.


The problem with that claim is that a new pilot can only have 5 - 10 hours for a short time, before they begin to gain experience.

The problem with it for you that it is true. The RAF was throwing untrained rookies into the battle by September. Fact. Live with it.



quote:
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Given that both parties are of equal quality, the more numorous should of course. But this wasn`t the case, it was quality vs. quantity again. 1000+ fighters, yes, but only 1/3 of them were equal to the 109s.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Strangely they still managed to win.  

Uhm... win ? Surviving perhaps while being bombed every day and night at will by the LW.




The Luftwaffe were pressuring the RAF with a very high sortie rate and attacks on airfields. They began those tactics in the last week of August, when they flew nearly 4000 fighter sorties. But they couldn't sustain it, flying only 3200 sorties in the first week of September, then dropping to only 1400 in the second week of September.

... and similiarly, the RAF`s fighter sorties also dropped? Why?


They didn't. The RAF flew 5000 sorties the last week of August, 4900 the first week of September.

Sept


8 : 215
9 : 466
10 : 224
11 : 678
12 : 247
13 : 209
14 : 806

Total : 2845


Typical Naswhan`s.

Claim : The LW was breaking. Reason : Their fighter sorties were dropping in the 2nd week of September. (Typical selective thinking, comparing virtually all British - fighter - sorties vs. only a partition of all the German - fighter and bomber - sorties)

Claim : LW`s sorties were dropping, 4000 in last week of August, 3200 in 1st week of Sept, only 1400 in 2nd week of September. (wouldn`t swore on those numbers either).

And The Great Bluff: The magnicent RAF`s number don`t show any similiar.

Facts :

RAF daylight fighter sorties :

last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845


So much for Naswhan`s "RAF sortie numbers were not dropping in the 2nd week of September."

In fact they did. To their half... so, by Naswhan-standards, "the RAF was breaking". (I would merely say that the bad weather in September were preventing sorties, which is acknowledged by both High Commands as could be read above)

From : http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html



quote:
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Well, the weather:

7th September 1940 : Fair with some haze.
8th September 1940 : Fair early morning and evening, cloudy for the remainder of the day
9th September 1940 : Scattered showers, thundery in the east. Channel fair.
10th September 1940 : Generally cloudy, some rain.
11th September 1940 : Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
12th September 1940 : Unsettled, rain in most districts
13th September 1940 : Unsettled.
14th September 1940 : Showers and local thunder. Cloud in the Straits, Channel and Thames Estuary

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Trust me, that's good for a British summer. It also only covers the second week of Sept, not the first week, when the sortie rate was already dropping.

German sortie rate was increasing, not dropping.

German sorties according to the RAF`s 1940 reports:

August :

26 : 400
27 : 75
28 : 400
29 : 360
30 : 600
31 : 800

Sept

1 : 450
2 : 850
3 : 600
4 : 650
5 : 450
6 : 720
7 : 700
8 : 170
9 : 400
10 : 50
11 : 500
12 : 50
13 : 90
14 : 400



So the facts:

1, German sortie rate was increasing in the 1st week of September, not decreasing.

2, Given the sudden drops to almost no offensive sorties on the 10th ("Generally cloudy, some rain."), 12nd ("Unsettled, rain in most districts"), 13rd of September ("Unsettled"), it is clear that the weather was restricting both side`s air activities greatly, which was advantagous to the RAF.



It`s more like a simple case that the Automn was coming, and the weather turned bad, making flying impossible.

But not for the RAF, apparently.

RAF daylight fighter sorties :
last week of August : 5009 sorties
1st week of Sept : 5284
2nd week of Sept : 2845

If weather was not the reason as you say, then only German fighters could have been.



Isegrim, that's the 16th, the third week of September. Find a similar comment for the second week, when the sorties dropped. Let alone the first week of September, wjem they were down from the last week of August. You know, the weeks we are discussing.



No, that`s wrong. If Britain actually though the German front line strenght was 5800 planes, then it was quite correct. The actual German numbers for 11th April 1940 was 5298 planes, including 1356 s-e fighters, 1711 bombers and 414 dive bombers and others.

Those are the three plane types the RAF were refering to as frontline strength. The rest, the transports, recce aircraft etc were not considered front line strength. The RAF actually believed the Luftwaffe possesed 14,000 including transports, training aircraft etc.

Well then I agree with you that British intelligence was damn near useless regarding the LW`s strenght.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As sidenote, to the "Jagdwaffe was breaking in September" fanatics, it`s interesting to note that the German fighter strenght was increasing in Septmber, ie. the 7th state was 831 single engined fighters (increased to 920 by the 28th Sept), of which 658 was servicable (increased to 712 by the 28th). The RAF had 621 fighters servicable on the 7th of September, which fell slightly, to 604 servicable fighters on the 28th.



Source?

Source : Übersicht über Soll, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste und Reserven der fliegenden Verbänden


I think it's possible, however, because the Luftwaffe was suffering more from pilot shortages. Overy gives the following figures for Luftwaffe 109 pilots ready for duty:

1st june 906
1st aug 869
1st sept 735
1st nov 673

Without the pilots available, the mechanics had more time to work on getting planes serviceable.

A rather laughable explanation....  Does Overy also give the number of Spit/Hurri pilots? Strictly counting only those who are considered "Ready For Action", and not counting the actual strenght (just like Overy neglects German actual pilot strenght to arrive at the lowest number possible, not to mention he only counts firstline Jagdwaffe strenght w/o the reserves ("Erganzungseinheiten")? Considering that over 50% of the RAF pilot`s were having flown about 5-15 hours on their planes, "Ready to be Butchered" would be much more appropriate.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Originally posted by gripen
Guppy35,
There were several air combats during June 10th and JG 53 claimed 5 for one loss. But actually that defensive circle thing happened in June 14th (five P-38s lost) and overall the LW and Romanian AF could put up strong resistance in Ploesti during summer until Russians arrived. .

gripen

Uhm, the 1944 June 14th P-38 defensive circle was actually vs. our 109s, not the Rumanian ones, and we kicked the lightnings really in the bellybutton on that day. (one of the very-very rare circumstances we had numerical superiority).

PS: I have the details of it, there was some really wild claiming on the US side.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Originally posted by Nashwan
It's quite simply wrong.

RAF operational fighter pilots in the UK, from "the battle" by Richard Overy:
....

In contrast, German operational strength:

1st June 906
1st Aug 869
1st Sept 735
1st Nov 673

 

Mr. Overy lists the "Ready for Comat" fighter pilots of Bf 109 first line units of the LW.

Which means he didn`t listed pilots :

-pilots present with the first line sqaudrons considered to be fit for limited duty. For example, his 1st June figures show only 906 pilots only.

By comparision, the full picture (for the 29th of June) is 1171 pilots established strenght, of whom 1126 (96%) is present, out of whom 906 is rdy for action. A good way to manipulate figures..

-reserve/replacement pilots, issued to non-first line LW replacement units
-and of course no pilots Bf 110 units, neither first or second line.

Unlike for the RAF, for which he listed all pilots present, first line or reserve, wheter ready for action or not, ie. the highest number possible.

[Nashwan]

Your right the LW didn't almost win the BoB. The RAF was just a little jumpy back then, especially Dowding.

The RAF believed that just before Alder Tag, the Luftwaffe had 5,800 front line combat aircraft. They believed Germany was on course to manufacture 24,000 aircraft in 1940.

They actually manufactured 10,250 airaft in 1940, and their strength in August was just over 3000 front line aircraft.

The RAF believed the Germans were increasing in strength, not declining, and from a far larger starting force than they actually had.

Nashwan please study the History behind those stats. The LW started it's main effort to destroy the RAF on 13 Aug with Aldertag. Yes the LW was sustaining losses before then and the ratio was in the RAF's favor during the Battle of the barges. However, the LW was never in short supply of FIGHTER PILOTS.

I'll repeat the figures. The established strength for the 109 fighter force was 1132. That's how many fighter pilots they were supposed to have. By the 1st of Sept, they actually had 735 fit for duty, which was down 134 from the start of August.

Look at the RAF pilot figures. On the 27th July they had 1,377 fighter pilots. On the 31st Aug they had 1,422. Against the Luftwaffe losses of 135 pilots, the RAF had gained 43 pilots.

By late September, the RAF had double the number of fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe.

The RAF was in such short supply that in the begining of August BEFORE the LW even launched Aldetag Dowding recieved EVERY available pilot to man a fighter cockpit from the other services.

Because the RAF, unlike the Luftwaffe, were preparing for a battle of attrition.

The established strength of fighter pilots in the RAF was:

1,482 30th June
1,456 27th July
1,558 17th Aug
1,558 31st Aug
1,662 14th Sept
1,662 28th Sept
1,714 19th Oct
1,727 2nd Nov

That's the number of pilots they should have had. As you can see, the number expanded during early August. There was also an expansion in the number of front line squadrons. In mid July there were 44 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes. By the end of August, that had expanded to 51 squadrons of Spits and Hurricanes.

The LW maintained it's pre-war fighter pilot training on through '42 including frontline training staffles who took new pilots up into ocmbat under the watchful eye of an instructor.

Which is why they couldn't replace their losses. That's why when they were supposed to have 1,132 109 pilots, they actually had only 735 available for duty at the start of Sept.

The RAF also rotated pilots during the BoB, frequently sending new and tired pilots to quiet areas in the North and West, which saw almost no combat. Luftwaffe fighter pilots remained with their squadrons and flew constant operations throughout the BoB.

There is also the number of operational sorties. Alder Tag was supposed to break the RAF, and in that week the Luftwaffe flew 3000 fighter sorties, up from 1500 the week before. The next attempt, the battle for the airfields, saw the Luftwaffe fly nearly 4000 sorties in the last week of August, but even though they attempted to sustain the pressure on the RAF, they could only manage 3200 sorties in the first week of September.

The RAF managed 5000 sorties in the last week of August, and over 4900 in the first week of Sept.

You are saying that the majority of both the academic world is wrong AND that Western Air Forces that study that history and formed the doctrine in use today are wrong.

I'm saying most popular histories of the RAF use mainly British sources, which isn't suprising given the state of Luftwaffe archives.

From a British perspective, the RAF was losing in the last week of August and first week of September. What wasn't realised at the time is that the Germans were losing more. Their strength was falling faster than the RAF's, and their fighter force was shrinking faster than the RAF's.

Try reading some of the more modern studies of the BoB, ones that have used Luftwaffe sources as well. Try Overy, or The Most Dangerous Enemy, by Stephen Bungay.

YOU have figured it all out and are able to stand up and fly in the face of conventional thinking. Congratulations....you are obviously much smarter than them

The only thing I have figured out is that history books can be wrong. I learnt that when I saw book after book after book tell me that the 109K4 had 15mm MG151 in the cowling, and that it climbed to 5000m in 3 minutes.

Far too many history books simply repeat previous authors research. Take your Chaz Bowyer book, for example. Hwat does he quote as sources for his figures? Does he even give actual pilot figures for the two sides? Overy lists AIR 22/296: Personnel, Casualties, Strength and Establishment of the RAF as his source for the RAF figures, for example.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Originally posted by Nashwan


I'll repeat the figures. The established strength for the 109 fighter force was 1132. That's how many fighter pilots they were supposed to have. By the 1st of Sept, they actually had 735 fit for duty, which was down 134 from the start of August.

Look at the RAF pilot figures. On the 27th July they had 1,377 fighter pilots. On the 31st Aug they had 1,422. Against the Luftwaffe losses of 135 pilots, the RAF had gained 43 pilots.

By late September, the RAF had double the number of fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe.
 

You might as well quit using the same trick Overy does... You keep repeating only the number  "Ready for action" 109 in the first line fighter squadron, and then list every RAF pilot... what a cheap trick, try comparing like with the like, even if you have little experience in that.

Let me put you story into context :

You, like Overy, don`t count German fighter pilots in reserve, but count the British the ones.
You, like Overy, don`t count present but not combat ready German pilots, but count the British ones.

You, like Overy, compare apples and oranges.

I am still waiting for an explanation that if the British were not running out of pilots as most authors state, then why was it neccesary to drain the fighter pilot schools for pupils to fill the battle ranks before they could even finish their training? The Germans did not do that in 1940.

[MiloMorai]

Don't forget Nashwan that Barbi, aka Isegrim, and his bud Huck, claims that late model 109s with the Erla Haube gave better visibilty from the cockpit for the pilot than 'bubble canopy' Spitfires, Tempests, Typhoons, P-47s and P-51s.

Why should anyone believe what he has to say.

[VO101_Isegrim]

Mindless Moron has just added his ouput.

[Crumpp]

Yeah I really like Milo-Moron...I'm sure he wears big floppy shoes and a red rubber nose when he post's.  Nice orange hair, too.

His evaluations at work probably read things like:

"Is depriving a village somewhere of an idiot.."

"Subordinates follow him out of curiosity"


Nashwan you are showing me nothing. Your "stats" are pure manipulations in order to present a fantasy.  Believe it, if you must.  Just stay away from the folks with little cymbols on their fingers in the Airport, trust me!  You don't want to fall for their manipulations of the truth.

Crumpp