From Bergström: An Il-2 Shturmovik myth

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
It also coincides with a major daylight-bombing offensive that started in Jan. 44 with Berlin and culminated in Operation Argument "Big Week" in March.  
Crumpp

Naturally, it coincides, since the heavies had escorts. No more Black Thursday missions. No escorts, No berlin missions.

[ra]

Heavy bombing produced little to no effect on complicated industrial output that is dispersed properly.

German fighter production numbers increased primarily because fighter production was quite low prior to the 1000-bomber raids.   Germany was fighting the allies with much fewer resources, and fighter production had been given a low priority.  Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality.  After assembly, planes had to be thoroughly gone over by LW mechanics to bring them up to unit standards.  

The Luftwaffe did not run out planes. It ran out of qualified men to fly them.

They were low on planes, fuel, and pilots.  The bomber campaign had something to do with that.  If there were surplus fighters at the end of the war it is probably because the factories continued to produce fighters for a few months after flight training had all but ceased.  If pilots had been produced for those fighters, they would have been lost after 2 or 3 sorties, and the numbers of both planes and pilots would have stayed low.  So these surplus fighters only existed because they never saw combat.  But the LW was not able to defend Germany in the last year of the war.

[Crumpp]

They were low on planes, fuel, and pilots.

They had more planes than pilots.  They were catastrophically short of fuel as well due the fact POL is a very "bottlenecked" strategic industry and easy to target.

Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality.

No it did not.  In fact, Speer's same model is used today in many western nations for strategic industrial defense.

 

After assembly, planes had to be thoroughly gone over by LW mechanics to bring them up to unit standards.

Because key strategic industries used slave labor there was huge problem with sabotage.  BMW, Mercedes, and most of the key war materials industry used concentration camp workers.  BMW in Stuttgart received most of it's manual/assembly line workers from Dachau.  The Bayer Company (Aspirin) was one of major contributors to Dr Mengele's "research".

The Allies conducted extensive After Action Reviews of the Air War in Europe.  Those reviews became the foundation of today's strategic doctrine.  


The biggest contribution the bombers made was in drawing the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition it could not afford, thereby destroying it.

Without total Air Supremacy and constant re-attack, industry suffers little.

The actual destruction of the German economy did not really occur until the last months of the war. Exception being the key POL industry.   When the degradation of the German Aircraft production capability occurred in the last months of the war, Germany had no more pilots left anyway and a surplus of planes. By then the war was won anyway.  

Some good reads on the Subject:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0684839156/002-9877541-1789642?v=glance

The War Diaries

http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/caldwell.htm

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0306806045/002-9877541-1789642?v=glance

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1853673277/002-9877541-1789642?v=glance

Here is the USAAF review of the Strategic bombing campaign written in 1945.

Conclusion:

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#c

Entire Report:

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm

This subject is still the topic of much heated debate in professional military circles.  I highly doubt we sill solve it here.

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Detailed production data for this period, as for others, were taken by the Survey, and German air generals, production officials, and leading manufacturers, including Messerschmitt and Tank (of Focke-Wulf) were interrogated at length. Production was not knocked out for long. On the contrary, during the whole year of 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939, or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack. Although it is difficult to determine exact production for any single month, acceptances were higher in March, the month after the heaviest attack, than they were in January, the month before. They continued to rise.

Recovery was improvised almost as quickly as the plants were knocked out. With the shift in priority for strategic attacks -- first to marshalling yards and bridges in France in preparation for invasion, immediately followed by the air campaign against oil -- the continued attacks on the aircraft industry were suspended.

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#tgsp

The seeming paradox of the attack on the aircraft plants is that, although production recovered quickly, the German air force after the attacks  was not again a serious threat to Allied air superiority. The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.  

German fighter production continued to increase during the summer of 1944, and acceptances reached a peak of 3,375 in September. Although it has studied the problem with considerable care, the Survey has no clear answer as to what happened to these planes; the differences of opinion between German air generals, it might be added, are at least as great as between those who have searched for the explanation. Certainly only a minority of the planes appeared in combat. Possibly the remainder were lost in transit from factory to combat bases, destroyed on the fields, or grounded because of a shortage of gasoline or pilots. Conceivably some are part of an inflation of German production figures. The answer is not clear.

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#tgsp

Crumpp

[Simaril]

Originally posted by bozon
Probably very true.

What the americans had going for them, both in ETO and PTO is tactics not individual skills. I am no expert, but from all the reading about WWII air combat I got the impression that the americans we the most flexible and innovative in their tactics - both wingman tactics, and general fighting tactics. When I read american aces stories, I actually get the impression of very dweebish flying. RAF aces tell of twisting and turning at treetops and much ACM. American aces tell about flying fast and diving into clouds out of trouble and banging a bandit in pairs.

just an impression.
Bozon

Don't forget that often technology dictates tactics. American planes were generally high wing loaded, faster, heavier fighters. Turnfighting would be suicidal, so you dont read about them turnfighting. The Brits have the spit .... need I say more?

It isnt dweebish to use what you have to its best advantage but avoid its weaknesses. And if you read about US engagements that extended in to multiple kills, the effects of lower energy do reflect more positioning and "turn" issues -- but still in essentially BnZ craft.

Incidentally, the appropriate effect of aircraft limitations might be worth considering next time one denigrates a 190D flier who zoom climbs and reverses back to you before you can get a clean snapshot (not meaning you, bozon, just a general comment).

[Simaril]

Originally posted by Crumpp

The biggest contribution the bombers made was in drawing the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition it could not afford, thereby destroying it.

-------------

This subject is still the topic of much heated debate in professional military circles.  I highly doubt we sill solve it here.

Crumpp

Strongly concur on both points.

Incidentally, Stalin was at first satisfied with the opening of the heavy daylight bomber offensive as a "third front" for this very reason -- it drew substantial LW resources away from the Eastern Front.

[Angus]

From Crumpp:
"--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No it did not. In fact, Speer's same model is used today in many western nations for strategic industrial defense. "

Well, it works, bombing the manufacture is out of the question if you disperse it. The Brits did it too!

However, it stops working so well when transport facilities get screwed up from bombing.

[Crumpp]

However, it stops working so well when transport facilities get screwed up from bombing.

Yep.  It is much harder to choke a transportation system.  Unless you have absolute Air Supremacy and enough planes to fly multiple sorties on reattack's, some stuff will still get through.

Crumpp

[Angus]

The allies managed that pretty well in WW2.
After all, transport such as by rail is also very hard to defend.

Locomotive hunting, yeahhhhh.

[Crumpp]

The allies managed that pretty well in WW2.

Railroads are vunerable.  So is shipping.

Crumpp

[ra]

Originally posted by Angus
From Crumpp:
"--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dispersing the manufacturing led to greatly reduced efficiency and quality.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No it did not. In fact, Speer's same model is used today in many western nations for strategic industrial defense. "

Well, it works, bombing the manufacture is out of the question if you disperse it. The Brits did it too!

However, it stops working so well when transport facilities get screwed up from bombing.

Dispersing the manufacturing didn't come at a price?  That's the first I've heard of that.  Maybe all industries should move their manufacturing into caves and forests.

I hope no one is using Speer's slave labor model.

[Angus]

How is the Airbus made?
Although, not in order to counter bomb attacks, it still seems to be competitive to other airliners on the market.
Of course, dispersion as a countermeasure will come at a cost, it works brilliantly in a perfect world, but as it just isn't so, the costs are some.
BTW, the Brits "dispersion" was also due to subcontractors, etc.
Now, a dispersion of a final assembly line is rather bad.
The German dispersion was rather costly and seized up all sort of production once their transport system was hit. However, their manufacture output was still stunning in late WW2.
Of course, enslaving millions of people helped them out a bit.
SOB's

[Karnak]

Angus,

Yes, it was still running and absolute production is reported to have gone up through the summer of '44.

However, imagine how much it might have gone up if they hadn't had to disperse the production?  A whole hack of a lot more I'd imagine.

[Angus]

I completely agree Karnak. The attrition of a communications and transport system in shambles was quite severe.

[Crumpp]

I completely agree Karnak. The attrition of a communications and transport system in shambles was quite severe.

Yeah it was definitely much tougher however neither communications nor transportation were totally knocked out until the final months of the war.  When the Allies had total Air Supremacy.

Dispersing the manufacturing didn't come at a price? That's the first I've heard of that. Maybe all industries should move their manufacturing into caves and forests.

Yeah, Like the Computer Industry!  Lot's of Dells in the forest...

I hope no one is using Speer's slave labor model.

Yeah me too.  With the Exception of "Made in China".  My life would be just too inconvenient without their stuff.

Crumpp