Originally posted by SCDR
If someone would be so kind as to point me to a web site that
talks about IRL HOs. IMO I think HOing takes no skill. I will only
fire when I see the enmy start to shot, cuz I know I'm gonna
die.
I have read accounts of the LW using the HO on 17s, and I'm
trying to figure out why AH has HOs turned on for.
SCDR
Not sure what you mean by HO's being "turned on" in AH. In general, I would say you're taking the wrong approach. When you say, "I will only fire when I see the enmy start to shot, cuz I know I'm gonna die," that to me sounds like you always make the same approach to the merge - barreling straight into the guy hoping that he doesn't take the shot. Once he fires, you decide to return fire, but by that time, you're at a big disadvantage. You need to decide before then whether you'll be taking that shot or not. That should be a tactical decision, not an ethical one. You need to make a split second risk assessment and choose the tactic that best fits the situation. If you always go for the HO or never go for the HO, you're using a sub-optimal strategy.
Generally, in a 1v1 you want the other guy to commit to the HO shot. If he's going to push, you want to pull unless maybe he's a boxer wanting to trade blows with a puncher. The idea is to bait him into a low % HO shot in order to gain angles and position on him. Let him overcommit and set him up for the counter. Going low on the merge is a great way to accomplish this because because he has to really bury his nose to get enough lead for a shot. You pull a lead immelman there and if he also pulls an immelman after the shot, you'll already be in his hind quarter following the initial merge.
IRL I would say that HO's are more effective than in the game even though they probably result in a higher % of shootdowns in the game.
As to anecdotes about head-ons, just grab a book of WWII air combat anecdotes. You won't have to look too hard. An amusing anecdote regarding the tactic can be found in James Howard's "Roar of the Tiger".
"The Fourth had been flying P-47 Thunderbolts since that spring, so Blakeslee came to us as a veteran who could speak with authority based on experience. Don proved very durable. By the end of the war, he had accumulated a thousand hours of combat flying, more than any other American fighter pilot.
"In Blakeslee's briefing that afternoon, he explained we had three tactics to use against the enemy: (1) shoot down the enemy plane (or be shot down), (2) make the enemy fighter break off an attack first, (3) if the enemy fighter fails to break off, continue on a collision course.
"We were stunned. Did he mean we should deliberately ram the enemy head-on?
"Blakeslee hesitated for emphasis and then said, "We never turn away from a head-on attack. If we do, the word will get back to Luftwaffe pilots that the Americans break first in a head-on pass. They will then have a psychological advantage of knowing beforehand what we will do."
"A young pilot in the front row asked what would happen if the German pilot followed the same orders. Blakeslee looked down at the young man with a contemptuous smile and said, "In that case you've earned your flight pay the hard way!"
