Originally posted by DamnedRen
Actually it did nothing to stop the advancement of German technology. They were still building/experimenting with improved planes until the end of the war. The German's committing fighters did nothing to lessen the inability of bombers to accurately hitting anything. In fact the Germans made more fighters near the end of the war than in the early years. What stopped the fighters was a lack of fighters and fuel. The factories were all spread out and never really damaged. The Germans went so far as to make synthetic fuel.
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What won the war in the ETO was ground forces taking away land and capturing troops. The Atlantic wall fell immediately on D-Day. What stopped the troops from an end run was the hedgerows. No one ever had planned for them until some Sgt. figured out they needed to put plow blades on the tanks and off they went to the races.
German research may have been individually impressive, but what killed it was the utter lack of prioritizing and integration. Dictatorial control caused resources to be squandered on epochal technologies like the V2, when streamlined production of conventional weapons would have had a better impact. Would the invasion ports have been safe if thousands of cheap, simple V1s with 1000kg payloads had been thrown at them day and night?
The western strategic bombing campaign has been thrashed over ad nauseum, but naysayers miss 2 important facts:
1) Just as the Ardennes offensive ("Battle of the Bulge") pulled German armor out of strong defensive positions and ultimately made it EASIER to win the ground war, the strategic bombing campaign REQUIRED the dictator to aggressively respond with his scarce resources, allowing the defending fighters to decimate both the Axis hardware and especially the pilot supply. Read the book
JG 26, based on primary German sources and interviews, and then try to say that the bombing campaign failed to destroy the fighter arm.....
2) The fact that German industrial output was higher near the end of the war than at the beginning does NOT mean that the campaign was a failure; comparison should properly be made at the unmeasurable (but certainly far higher) output that would have been present had the bombing not occurred.
Lastly, the breakout from Normandy depended on tactical interdiction by Allied Jabos and even strategic bombers. This was possible ONLY because the luftwaffe had been chewed up by years of strategic interceptions.