Maybe that`s Mr. Jones is a bit sorrow, and this is his way to tell Britain didn`t had the scientific capacity to develop such an advanced weapon.
Now you are ascribing your narrow nationalistic views to Jones. If he had been as blindly, fervently "patriotic" (you are Hungarian, not German, right?) as you, he'd have assumed the Germans couldn't build the rocket, or the blind bombing beams, or any of the other things they did build, and he'd have failed utterly at his job. As it was, he did his job rather well, and assesed German technology with a remarkable degree of accuracy.
EDIT : This is also from the site. I wish Mr. Jones would see it. :
"Some feel that this whole operation was as much about convincing the German rocket scientists to come to Great Britain and work for the the British in the development of a rocket programme, as it was about testing the V2 systems. The British and the Americans began fighting over the German scientists even before the wars end. The Americans had agreed to "lending" many of the top German rocket personnel for the Backfire tests. The Americans found that the British were trying to convince the Germans to stay after the tests. It took a considerable amount of prodding by the U.S. War Department to gain the return of many Germans to American custody. "
So dumb, fighting so hard for something they never wanted (as per Nashwan).
See, again your assumptions are leading you astray.
I pointed out that Jones said the V-2 was a waste of resources as a weapon. You first claim that's through blind prejudice, then imply it can't be true because the British tried to get German rocket scientists after the war.
You are overlooking the logical conclusion, that the British admired the rocket itself, without thinking it was a practical means of delivering less than a ton of HE.
In fact, Jones was not blindly prejudiced against the V-2 as you assumed. Here is what he has to say about it in his book, Most Secret War:
upper atmosphere will in itself be a major factor in experimental meteorology, and sooner or later someone will seriously try to reach
the moon—and succeed. Military applications are bound to be made, whatever the limits imposed by treaties, and we should do well to
keep an eye on the possibilities. If we were to allow ourselves more liberty of conjecture, we might consider using atomic fuels to
drive an exhaust of hydrogen molecules, or perhaps lighter particles, giving an entirely different order of performance.
It is an often stated requirement that a weapon of war should have a probable error comparable with its radius of destruction, so that
a few shots would ensure the obliteration of the target. Practical weapons seldom approach this ideal, although in the future it may
be attainable through homing devices. With a very long range rocket we may have to accept errors, and it may be easier to increase the
radius of destruction by the use of new types of explosive based on the fission of the uranium atomic nucleus. If such an explosive
becomes practicable, it will probably have a radius of destruction of the order of miles, and on this account alone it might best be
carried in some unmanned projectile, of which the rocket would be a particularly suitable type by virtue of its relative immunity from
interception and of its potentially better accuracy at long ranges compared with pilotless aircraft. Speculation of this kind is
fascinating, but can well wait for a paper at a later time when it is nearer realization. Reviewing therefore what we have seen to be
reasonable extrapolation from present practice, a two-stage rocket of about 150 tons starting weight could deliver a 1 ton warhead to
nearly 3,000 miles range, with a probable error of 10 miles in range and 3 miles in line. This might be a feasible weapon for
delivering a uranium bomb, should such a bomb become practicable. It would be almost hopeless to counter by attacks on the ground
organization, because the increased range would allow an almost unlimited choice of firing site, while the trajectory could be so
varied that the firing point could not be deduced without sufficient accuracy for countermeasures. Production would probably take
place underground. At the moment such a rocket could not be intercepted, but by the time it becomes a serious possibility it may
itself be a target for smaller defence rockets fitted with predictors and homing devices: but these would depend upon adequate
warning, and the defences might also be saturated by a salvo of long range rockets.
The protagonists for the development of very long range rockets would probably have, in Britain at any rate, to meet the criticism that it would not be worth the effort expended. The A4 has already shown us that our enemies are not restrained by such considerations and have thereby made themselves leaders in a technique which sooner or later will be regarded as one of the masterpieces of human endeavour when it comes to be applied to the exploration of Space. As it is mainly with our enemies that Intelligence is concerned, rather than with our own views on military economics, it suffices that the long range rocket can be developed much further. In the light of this fact, we must watch.
As you can see, Jones was looking very much to the future, to intercontinental missiles, moon landings, space exploration. He saw the V-2 as a hopeless waste of resources for lobbing less than a ton of explosives, and as you can see that wasn't based on a silly attitude that it must be bad because it wasn't invented here.
Jones saw the V-2 for what it was, a brilliant example of technical progress, a huge waste of resources in the use to which it was put.
Not to say the research put into it would pay out very well if the war would last longer, ie. given that the worlds first SAM AA rocket, the Wasserfall, was based on the V-2. With the Wasserfall, it`s not an exagrevation that the large bomber formations would disappear overnight.
Again, the technology was good, the application of it for throwing rather small bombs on London was a waste. Speer banned production of the Wasserfall whilst V-2 production continued, because there weren't enough resources for both projects.
The number I have seen for it is 40 000 Reichsmarks from memory. Hardly 6000 pounds. The V-1 cost from 2500 to 10 000 RM.
EDIT : Looked on the site and it`s states :
"For the V2 , 6967 kg raw materials was needed (without the explosives and devices) of which 3112 kg thin sheet metal (various thickness) e.g. the outer skin. Average price of a V2 was 119600 Reichsmark. "
As well as pure raw materials, you have to look at the electronics (Speer is on record as saying the U-boats and Luftwaffe were starved of electronics because the V-2 took so much of the electronic industry's production), the huge underground factory where they were built (also intended for an underground refinery, but the refinery had to be delayed until the V-2 production facilities were built), the huge consumption of liquid oxygen, the transport and launching costs.
I have yet to see any serious author sugest the V-2 was cost effective )as opposed to the V-1, which was)
