It's perfectly valid because it not only captures the tone and intent of BC's strategy, it is backed up by the fact that its what BC actually did...
So it's actually your interpretation of BC strategy, which you try to legitimise by putting quotes around it, and claiming it's from an Air Ministry directive?
Don't be silly, Wotan. The purpose of quotes is to show what a person actually said, not what
you think they meant.
Its not a distortion, it reflects the real policy and strategy implemented by BC and Harris.
Of course it's a distortion. You claimed:
He goes on to state that the Air Ministry's estimates on the effects of area bombing on the German populace were:
quote:a prescription for massacre, nothing more nor less.
What you should have said was:
He goes on to state that the Air Ministry's estimates on the effects of the plan for 5,000 bombers in BC were:
quote:a prescription for massacre, nothing more nor less.
it reflects the real policy and strategy implemented by BC and Harris
No, it reflects a policy BC and Harris didn't implement, for 5 - 6,000 bombers, 1.25 million tons on Germany in 1943.
In fact, the RAF dropped half that on Germany in the entire war. (and they were overestimating the casualties as well)
That quote didn't' originate with me and its 100% accurate in describing the policy and strategy of BC.
So now you're saying you didn't make it up, someone else did?
In that case, a: you should have checked your sources better. I spotted it for a fake immediately becuase I've heard all the arguments before, and something that juicy would have come up before.
And b: you should have admitted the mistake, rather than try to defend it.
Nonsense the British had practiced terror bombing during the inter-war years
Guernica?
That statement is 100% accurate as well. BC strategy was to kill civilians to disrupt war production and de-moralize the populace.
Source please.
Bomber Command's policy was to bomb cities, destroy them, and damage German production. German civilians were not the target.
Perhaps you can find some sources that show BC targeting civilians? Rather than the sources that show them targeting housing etc? (and if you do, check them, they are almost certainly as false as your earlier quote, because no-one else has ever found them either)
Read again the Herschel Johnson letter earlier in this thread, and the view of how effective damage to housing was at reducing production. Nowhere does it say the dead civilians caused problems with production.
That's because there weren't enough dead civilians. The Luftwaffe killed about 0.8 people per ton of bombs dropped on Britain in 1940/41. The RAF did somewhat worse during the war, at about 0.5 people per ton.
That's not an efficient way to wage war, and I don't think anyone thought it was.
Even if we believe your 25% absenteeism claim German war production increased until such a point that the situation on the ground led to a collapse inthe German economy. This collapse wasn't brought on directly by the bombing campaign but was due to the situation on the ground.
No, it was also brought on by the bombing campaign. From the USSBS:
The German experience suggests that even a first class military power -- rugged and resilient as Germany was -- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting -- any effective fighting -- within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.
The bombing campaing never achieved its what it was tasked with and it wasn't until late in the war that the bombers could even come close to its goals.
That's true. The effectiveness of bombing was overestimated, or rather the difficulties of repairing bomb damage were overestimated.
It wasn't until 1944 the bombers had sufficient strength to begin to destroy Germany. But that's true of the western allied armies, too.
Thats what I said not only in this reply but previously. The point at which the bombing campaign began appraoching its potential the situation on the ground had nearly collapsed the Germany economy despite the efforts of the bombers.
Despite? That's just silly.
What's true is that victory in spring 1945 came from both the ground and the air. It's speculation that without the air forces the ground forces would still have achieved victory at the same time. (and there's little to support it)
German production increased through '43 into '44.
Germany only shifted to a total war economy in 1943. Production was bound to increase as they introduced extra shifts, imported slaves from all over Europe, etc.
But production in 1944 was way below target. It was way below what it should have been for Germany's size.
In 1944, Britain, with just over half Germany's population, produced a greater weight of aircraft, and more aero engines, than Germany.
Not much need for 'pin point accuracy' with the Hamburg raids.
No, there wasn't. It was area bombing, pure and simple, and it was also the most devastating bombing attack Germany suffered.
From Middlebrook, The Battle For Hamburg:
"However, for once, here is a clear-cut
Allied success. The raids on Hamburg in July and August 1943 were immediately recognized and have since been confirmed by historians as being an outstanding Allied victory in the bombing war."
Hamburg's most important war industries, particularly her U-boat yards, were not seriously damaged. The RAF bombing had never been directed on to the areas in which such industries were situated, and the Americans were hampered by smoke and had not the numbers of bombers available to achieve the complete destruction of such targets.
Middlebrooks says that atendance at Blohm und Voss shipyards (the main U boat manufacturer) was down heavily. Out of the ormal workforce of 9,400, 300 reported for work on the morning following the heaviest raid. By 1st August, 1,500 were back at work. By 1st September, more than a month after the raids, half were back at work, half still absent.
By 1st November, 3 months after the raids, 20% of the workforce was still not back at work.
Middlebrook also says that production of submarines was dow by 20 - 27 because of the raids, and that attendence in Hamburg's war related factories was down, on average, by 50% for 3 months after the raids.
The whole point of area bombing is that the damage it inflicts on the infrastructure of a city is worse than the damage inflicted on factories. Read the Herschel Johnson letter again.
Read that figure again. Hamburg, the largest armaments centre in Germany, lost 50% of production for 3 months after the raids. Not a particular factory, an entire city's factories.
John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that Hamburg raids:
John Kenneth Galbraith is a left wing economist. That's what he wrote some 40 or 50 years after the end of the war.
At the end of the war, he was a member of the USSBS, and that's not at all what they concluded. I quoted their conclusions above. That's what Galbraith signed his name to shortly after the war, I think that holds more weight than what he wrote in a book decades later.
Galbraith was also heavily against bombing Vietnam, even Kosovo. In fact he predicted that bombing Serbia would lead to a Serbian victory, and the destruction of Nato.
The resources and efforts expended in the bombing campaign could have been better utilized and contributed far more to 'victory' then killing civilians.
Of course they could. Killing civilians would have been hugely inefficient. That's why it was never the aim. That's why destruction of infrastructure was the aim, and that was very efficient.
That's why every air force with a strategic bomber fleet adopted it as a strategy.
