British Night bombing

[Wotan]

Alexander Lohr was tried and executed for his role in ordering the bombing of Belgrade, which had been declared an open city.

The IMT (International Military Tribunal) did not define the killing of civilians during aerial bombardment of population centers as a war-crime. The judgement of the IMT did not include the bombing of civilian targets, even though that would have been an 'easy' charge to lay against Goering as head of the Luftwaffe.

If we accept the judgement of the IMT, then neither the German bombing of Belgrade nor any other bombings of civilian targets by either side is to be considered a war crime. I have said so above.

Eric Mombeck in his Jagdwaffe series talks about the Luftwaffe's bombing of Belgrade.

By the end of the first day, the main targets in Belgrade had been destroyed. In his post-war memoirs, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described the German raids as terror attacks and claimed a greatly inflated figure of 17.000 civilians had been killed by the Luftwaffe bombs, but when Generaloberst Alexander Lohr, the former commanding officer of Luftflotte IV, came before a Titoist court in 1946, the prosecution mentioned a figure of 1,500 Yugoslavs killed. It is believed, however, that the main targets in Belgrade were purely military and as the stukas carried out pinpoint attacks and the twin engined bombers carried a relatively insignificant load, it is certain that the figure of 1,500 was an exaggeration. However the Communist government wanted to conduct its own version of the Nuremberg trials and, consisted of atrocities, Alexander Lohr was hanged on the 26th February 1947

I don't necessarily agree with Mr. Mombeck that 1,500 civilian deaths is an exaggeration. I am more inclined to except Christopher Shores (Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, 1940-41) estimates of 3,500-3,700 (certainly less then 4000).

I will note that Shores disagrees with Mombeck in that (quoting Shores):

Seven hundred and fourteen buildings were totally destroyed, 1888 heavily damaged and 6615 damaged to a less extent - 47% of the total building stock in the city. Only a small proportion of these were military targets of any sort. Some air raid shelters had also been hit, including one in the Church of Alexander Nevsky, where 70 people had died, and another where up to 200 were believed to have lost their lives.

However, Generaloberst Alexander Lohr wasn't charged by the IMT but by a 'Titoist' court. However, there certainly was a justification for those charges in that on 3 April Belgrade was declared an 'open city' even though there were military targets with in the city.

Maybe I should have been more specific in my statement:

No LW person was charged with any crime related to their bombing offensives.

So you are saying the whole programme was simply for hatred?

The v weapons were for hate, to kill and to respond to the area bombing of Germany.

They weren't effective nor did they have any potential to reverse the course of the war etc...

By the end of 1940, less than 1,000 Germans had been killed by British bombing, over 20,000 Britons had been killed by German bombing. What exactly were they retaliating against?

The British should have thought about that before they declared a war they weren't prepared to fight and bombing / targeting German civilians before they were prepared to defend their own.

What did you expect me to say?

And there's me thinking the Germans invaded Poland to start the war. Your sympathies are quite clear, I think.

Britain declared war on Germany, whether the reason was German aggression against Poland or not the British government bares the responsibility for their own actions. Much like America in Iraq '05.

If they weren't prepared to fight or if they weren't prepared to live up to the obligations they made to Poland then they should have moved in a different direction. Are you going to blame the decision of the British government to declare war on Germany? Were the Brits Nazi Puppets?

Britain may have had cause for war (after years of appeasement what did they expect of Hitler?) but Britain thought they could hide behind France.

I have no sympathy for Britain over the last century (even further back for that matter), that's for sure. A quick read of any my posts and you will see that.

Is that what you meant by 'sympathies'?

[Wotan]

Here is what British historian Martin Middlebrook says about Rotterdam:

The German Army units attacking Rotterdam were held back by strong Dutch resistance at a certain point in the city. The Germans issued an ultimatum: if the Dutch did not surrender, bombers would be called in to attack the Dutch positions. As the ultimatum ran out 100 Heinkel 111s took off en route for Rotterdam. During their flight the Dutch finally surrendered and a recall order was sent out to the bombers. Forty-three turned back but fifty seven had already dropped their bombs. Only 250-kilogram [550 pound] high explosive bombs were used and these were dropped accurately but they started fires with which the Dutch fire brigade were unable to cope. It was the resulting blaze which caused most of the damage and casualties. This was not a 'terror raid' but a tactical raid that went wrong. It must also be said, however, that the raid was in support of a completely unprovoked invasion of a country that had been neutral even during the First World War.

Martin Middlebrook, "The Nuremberg Raid," p. 3

 Rotterdam was NOT an example of 'terror bombing' despite British propaganda. Adi Galland stated that the 'Luftwaffe's target was to bomb the defenders' and 'to clear a path for an assault crossing of the river'.

KG 54 were on route as negotiations for surrender were underway. Red flares were to be lit to call off the bombers if a deal was made. Kg 54 were to divert to secondary targets if this signal was observed. Obst Lackner's formation of 57 He111's failed to see the signal and and dropped their bombs on their assigned targets.

The resulting fires and destruction of buildings occurred by accident and was not the intended result. In fact Galland says that if the desired effect was to destroy the City, far more aircraft would have been sortied and incendiaries would have been loaded.

Its quite obvious that the intent was NOT to destroy the city or to target civilians.

Here are a selection of quotes describing the bombing raid found in Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, Ballantine Books pp. 139-148:

At 16.00 hours on May 13th two civilians began waving great white flags at the southern end of the Willem bridge. As the firing ceased, they advanced hesitantly. One was the vicar of Noorder Eiland—the island in the Maas occupied by the Germans—the other a merchant. Von Choltitz bade them take themselves to the Dutch city commandant and emphasized that only by capitulating could Rotterdam be saved from devastation. In the evening the emissaries returned, trembling with fear. Their own countrymen had informed them that their closely populated island would be flattened by artillery that very night. If, Colonel Scharroo had said, the German commander had any proposals to make, he should send officers. He did not treat with civilians.

Destiny then took its course. Undoubtedly the Rotterdam garrison could effectively bar any further German advance to the north. From the strictly military point of view there was no reason why it should yield.

Understandably the German high command could equally press for a swift conclusion of the operation. It wanted Holland "cleaned up" as soon as possible in order to free forces for the main thrust through Belgium into northern France. Furthermore the 18th Army, as it attacked Holland on May 13th, feared that British landings were imminent. Thus at 18.45 General von Kuechler gave the order "to break the resistance at Rotterdam by every means".

The tank attack across the Willems bridge was fixed for 15.30 hours on May 14th, and would be preceded by artillery fire and a pinpoint bombing raid on a limited area at the northern end to paralyze the enemy's power of defense.

Meanwhile, the supreme command of the forces at Rotterdam had passed from Lieutenant-General Student to the general commanding XXXIX Panzer Corps, Rudolf Schmidt.  The latter was instructed by the 18th Army commander, von Kuechler, "to use all means to prevent unnecessary bloodshed amongst the Dutch population" Accordingly, in the evening of May 13th, Schmidt drew up a new demand for Dutch capitulation, and had it translated. Unless resistance was terminated without delay, he wrote to the city commandant, he would have to use all means to break it.

"That," he added, "could result in the complete destruction of the city. I beg you, as a man with a sense of responsibility to take the necessary steps to prevent this."

At 13.50 the Dutch emissary duly crossed the bridge. He was Captain Bakker, the commandant's adjutant. On the Maas island he was met by Lieutenant-Colonel von Choltitz. A despatch-rider went off to the Corps HQ of Major-General Schmidt, just a few hundred yards to the south. Besides him, Lieutenant-General Student of the Air-Landing Corps and Lieutenant General Hubicki of 9th Panzer Division were also waiting there to hear the city commandant's answer to the urgent capitulation demand of the morning. Did the Dutch realise the seriousness of the situation?

Choltitz, waiting with Bakker on the. bridge for the few minutes till Corps was advised, seized the opportunity once
more to emphasize the deadly danger with which Rotterdam was threatened. But the Dutch officer looked about him
sceptically. There was not a shot to be heard. After days of fighting there seemed to be a cease-fire suddenly. As for the German tanks, allegedly all ready to swarm over the bridges into the centre of the city, there was not a sign of them. Perhaps they did not exist? Perhaps the Germans had hurled their imprecations "to save Rotterdam" just to hide their own weakness.

In dismay Choltitz, and soon afterwards the German generals , were forced to recognize the fact that the Dutch
commandant, Colonel Scharroo, saw no immediate necessity to surrender. He still held the major part of the city, with his forces outnumbering the invaders even south of the Maas, while the remnants of the German 22 (Airborne) Division still holding out under Graf Sponeck in the northern outskirts' with a few hundred men were no longer capable of launching any attack. Why then should he capitulate? In any case the Dutch supreme commander, General Winkelmann, had ordered him to answer the German demand evasively.

The previous evening a liaison officer of the Geschwader had flown to meet General Student in Rotterdam, and taken back with him exact details of the operation, above all a map on which the enemy resistance zones had been marked were indicated by a triangle at the northern end of the bridges. Only within this triangle was KG54 permitted drop its bombs.

Now, on his approach, Colonel Lackner in the leading aircraft had this map spread on his knees. Copies had been given to his Gruppen and squadron commanders. the attack was confined to a strictly military target. The powerful Dutch defense force to the north of the two bridges was to be immobilized by a short, sharp blow from the air, to enable the German troops to cross. Every bomber crew had further been instructed that on the north bank was also a small bridgehead of sixty Germans, whose lives must be safeguarded.

"Just before take-off," he reported, "we received information from operations headquarters on the telephone that General Student had radioed that the Dutch had been called upon to surrender Rotterdam. On our approach we were to watch out for red Very lights on the Maas island. Should they appear we had orders to attack not Rotterdam, but the alternative target of two English divisions at Antwerp."

The question was: would they recognize the lights amongst all the haze and dust raised by five days of fighting?

Meanwhile General Schmidt was writing out in his own hand, point by point, the conditions of surrender that an
out-matched opponent could honorably accept. He concluded with the words: "I am compelled to negotiate swiftly,
and must therefore insist that your decision is in my hands within three hours, namely at 18.00 hours. Rotterdam South, 4.5.1940, 14.55 hours, (Signed) Schmidt."

Captain Bakker took the letter from him and returned at once to the city. Von Choltitz escorted him to the Willems bridge, and he hastened over it. Now it was exactly 15.00 hours--the time originally appointed for the air raid. "The
tension was appalling," wrote Choltitz. "Would Rotterdam surrender in time?" At that moment there came from the south the sound of any aero-engines. The bombers were on their way! Soldiers on the island loaded the Very pistols.
"Those of us on the spot," continued Choltitz, "could only hope that the necessary orders had been given, that the communications had not broken down, and that the high command knew what was happening."

But now the high command had no more control over the course of events. For half an hour, since it eventually got Schmidt's signal, Luftflotte 2 had been doing its best to contact KG 54 on the radio and recall it. The command directly responsible for it the "Air Corps for Special Purposes"—had also put out urgent recall messages. As soon as its chief of staff, Colonel Bassenge, received the vital signal in Bremen, he dashed into the signals office in person and rushed out the agreed code-word for the alternative target.

Unfortunately only the Geschwader's own operations room was keyed to the same frequency as the aircraft in the air, and before the orders had been received and handed on much time was lost. At Munster Luftflotte 2's operations officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Rieckhoff, leapt into a Messerschmitt 109 and raced to Rotterdam. He hoped literally to divert the attack in person.

continued in next post due to length restrictions:

[Wotan]

Rieckhoff wouldn't make in time, no radio contact could be established with the He-111's of KG 54. The only chance to call off the raid was the red signal flares but:

"Though there were no clouds in the sky," he reported, "it was unusually misty. Visibility was so bad that I took my column down to 2,300 feet to be sure of hitting the required target and not Lieutenant Kerlin and his sixty men, or the bridges themselves."

At 15.05 he crossed the Maas and reached the city's edge. The altitude was ideal for medium flak, and it duly came up. With the target ahead, no evasive action was possible. All eyes were fastened on the course of the river. In the middle of Rotterdam the New Maas makes a loop to the north, and just west of its vertex are the twin bridges. Even in the prevailing mist and smoke their straight lines were still discernible, as were the outlines of the Maas island.

Yet despite their concentrated attention, neither pilots nor observers spotted any of the red light signals. All they saw were the little red balls of the Dutch flak which came dancing up in strings to meet them. Rotterdam's fate was just a few seconds away—seconds during which Choltitz's men on the island fired Very lights by the dozen.

It was too late...

The starboard column of KG 54 droned over the target and the 100- and 500-lb. bombs went whistling down. They struck precisely in the triangular zone, in the heart of the Old City. After that it was the turn of the port column, with Lieutenant-Colonel Höhne and the staff section at its head.

"Never again," he reported after the war, "did I fly an operation accompanied by such dramatic circumstances. Both my observer, prone in front of me manning the bomb sight, and the radio-operator seated behind knew the signal I would give in the event of the bombing being canceled at the last moment."

From the south-westerly direction of his approach the target was easy to recognize. On the inter-corn. the observer counted out his measurements. Höhne concentrated solely on the island, scanning it for the possible "barrage of red Very lights". But he, too, saw nothing. Finally his observer called out: "I must let go the bombs now or they'll fall away from the target."

Höhne gave the word, then immediately caught his breath. Faintly, and just for a second or two, he had glimpsed "not a barrage but just two paltry little Very lights ascending". Turning round, he shouted to the radio-operator the code-word to turn back.

For his own machine it was too late. The automatic release had already functioned, and the bombs went down. The same thing happened aboard the section's other two planes close behind. But for 1 Squadron the short space interval sufficed. Before the bombardiers could set their levers the radio-operators gave the stop signal. They hesitated, turned questioningly around, then gazed down again on the city.

So it was, that out of KG 54's hundred He 111s, only fifty-seven dropped their bomb-load over Rotterdam, the remaining 43 having been arrested from doing so at literally the last second. Subsequent inquiries elicited that, apart from Lieutenant-Colonel Höhne, not one man had spotted any of the Very lights that in fact had been sent up from the Maas island in an unbroken stream.

Altogether 158 500-lb. and 1,150 100-lb. bombs were dropped on the city—i.e., a total of ninety-seven tons. In accordance with the military nature of the mission, it was all high-explosive.

So its clear to anyone that the LW did not intend to 'area-bomb' Rotterdam in order to to 'de-moralize' the civilains (kill them) so that Holland would give up its defense efforts.

The target of KG 54 was the northern end of the bridges where the defenders were concentrated.

No incendiaries were dropped by the LW, they dropped standard HE bombs. More then 40% of the He-111's didn't even drop their ordnance.

The map below is  from Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries p. 144.:



This photograph is taken from Pictorial History of the Second World War, Wm. H. Wise & Co., New York: 1944, vol. I, p. 109. The large white area north of the Maas river, in the center of the photograph, shows the area which was destroyed in the bombing. There is also a port facility right across the bridge.

[Angus]

And Warshaw?
Shovelling 72 tonnes of incendiaries out of the loading doors of Ju52?s.

[Angus]

Hitler's comment on the London Bombing, 14.september 1940.
"The preconditions for an invasion of Britain are yet not at hand. Nevertheless, the bombing of London would continue. If eight million civilians go crazy, that can lead to a catastrophy"

[Nashwan]

It maybe paraphrased but it's a valid one.

It's invalid because the phrase you enclosed in question marks doesn't appear anywhere in the paper you atributted it to.

It's not just Keegan's opinion either, that opinion is shared by British historian John Terraine:

    quote:Morale, in a bombing directive, means either the threat or the reality of blowing men, women and children to bits.

Actually what he goes on to say, in the very next sentence, is:

"It may be noted - and remembered - that in July 1940, with the Blitz still in the future, this programme did not appeal to the Air Staff."

As I said, British bombing methods followed on directly from German bombing methods. Where the Luftwaffe led, the RAF followed.

He goes on to state that the Air Ministry's estimates on the effects of area bombing on the German populace were:

    quote:a prescription for massacre, nothing more nor less.

Again you are distorting quotes to suit your agenda. Terraine makes this comment in reference to the early war plan to build a 5,000 bomber force, and drop well over 1 million tons of bombs on Germany in 1943, with an estimated death toll of 900,000. (And if only they had, tens of millions of lives could have been saved).

So it's not the Air Ministry's estimates on the effect of area bombing on Germany, it's a comment on a proposal that was never implemented.

So yes my use of that quote was quite deliberate.

So you admit to making up quotes? How do you expect to have credibility when you admit to making up the quotes you claim to be taking from official documents?

You are in fact claiming the Nazi's made BC and Harris do it

Is that you paraphrasing again?

I've said no such thing.

I've said that Britain copied the methods and tactics used by the Luftwaffe. Obviously they had a choice in whether to do so. They could have continued the war denying themselves what they felt was an effective tactic the enemy had already used very widely.

All other nations in war inevitably hit targets in cities and / or embedded with in the civilian population. The only bomber force in WW2 that practically built their entire strategy on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was BC whether it be to de-moralize, de-house' or to outright kill civilians.

Rubbish.

The first country to make morale a target was Germany, which referenced morale as a target in the BoB and Blitz, even if they did not do so earlier, in Poland, Norway, France, Belguim, Holland etc.

And of course to suggest the USAAF did not do is is, frankly, silly.

There is no difference between the methods and targets the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF all ended up attacking. (in that order, too)

All tagetted morale. All targetted enemy cities.

It would be one thing if that strategy lived up its justification or even came close to what it was sold to do.

Did BC succeed in breaking German Morale?

Did the Luftwaffe succeed in breaking British morale?

IT's worth noting that under air attack absenteeism in German factories soared, following Hamburg it ran at about 25% in major German cities, as the populace fled to the countryside (ie at any one time 25% of the workers weren't showing up for work)

Did it succeed in significantly disrupting the Nazi war machine?

Yes, most definately. See Overy for a good modern study of the effects.

This conclusion can be quantified in the 10-volume report, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) released in 1947 and can be found on the web.

Um, not really.

What the USSBS said:

"The city attacks of the RAF prior to the autumn of 1944, did not substantially affect the course of German war production."

"Commencing in the autumn of 1944, the tonnage dropped on city areas, plus spill-overs from attacks on transportation and other specific targets, mounted greatly. In the course of these raids, Germany's steel industry was knocked out, its electric power industry was substantially impaired and industry generally in the areas attacked was disorganized. There were so many forces making for the collapse of production during this period, however, that it is not possible separately to assess the effect of these later area raids on war production. There is no doubt, however, that they were significant."

And on the USAAF:

" Although the Eighth Air Force began operations August 17, 1942, with the bombing of marshalling yards at Rouen and Sotteville in northern France, no operations during 1942 or the first half of 1943 had significant effect. The force was small and its range limited. Much time in this period was devoted to training and testing the force under combat conditions.

In November and December of 1942, the U-boat attack on Allied merchant shipping was in its most successful phase and submarine bases and pens and later construction yards became the chief target and remained so until June 1943. These attacks accomplished little. The submarine pens were protected and bombs did not penetrate the 12-foot concrete roofs. The attack on the construction yards and slipways was not heavy enough to be more than troublesome. "

"When the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan was issued in June of 1943 to implement the Casablanca directive, submarines were dropped from first priority and the German aircraft industry was substituted. The German ball- bearing industry, the supplier of an important component, was selected as a complementary target."

"From examination of the records and personalities in the ball-bearing industry, the user industries and the testimony of war production officials, there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production."

"Nevertheless the attack on the aircraft plants, like the attack on the ball-bearing plants, showed that to knock out a single industry with the weapons available in 1943 and early 1944 was a formidable enterprise demanding continuous attacks to effect complete results. Recovery was improvised almost as quickly as the plants were knocked out. With the shift in priority for strategic attacks -- first to marshalling yards and bridges in France in preparation for invasion, immediately followed by the air campaign against oil -- the continued attacks on the aircraft industry were suspended."

The truth is the bombing offensive did not achieve much prior to 1944, it was too light.

Half the bombs dropped on Germany were dropped in the 5 years up to the end of September 1944, the other half in the 7 months afterwards.

Even Albert Speer who readily admits that the bombing campaign tied up resources and equipment states that area bombing:

    quote:spurred us to do our utmost. Neither did the bombings and the hardships that resulted from them weaken the morale of the populace. On the contrary, from my visits to armaments plants and my contacts with the man on the street, I carried away the impression of growing toughness. It may well be that the estimated loss of 9 percent of our production capacity was amply balanced by increased effort.

Other quotes from Speer:

"The damage to the armaments industry was mostly caused by RAF night attacks"

He also said that RAF night attacks were more damaging because they were of longer duration, used heavier bombs, and displayed extraordinary accuracy.

Speer wrote in Inside the Third Reich:

    quote:I had early recognized [that] the war could largely have been decided in 1943 if, instead of vast but pointless area bombing, the planes had concentrated on the centers of armaments production.

Speer's most famous quote from 1943 is:

"Three days
later I informed Hitler that armaments production was
collapsing and threw in the further warning that a series
of attacks of this sort, extended to six more major
cities, would bring Germany's armaments production
to a total halt."

"Fortunately for us, a series of
Hamburg-type raids was not repeated on such a scale
against other cities.  Thus the enemy once again allowed
us to adjust ourselves to his strategy."

Pity the RAF didn't actually get their 5,000 bomber force in 1943, it might well have ended the war there and then.

Do you not agree that the bombing campaign did not break the morale of the German people or produce a “speedy” victory?

Nothing produced a "speedy" victory.

Bombing was one part of the strategy that produced a victory, which was by far the most important point.

Do you not agree that as new technology, and with the increased concentrations of bombers, and with the control of the air that came later in the war that BC was perfectly capable of re-evaluating and adjusting its strategy of area bombing cities?

Yes. That's also exactly what it did.

The idea that all BC did was area bomb German cities is wrong.

In 1942 and 1943, when area bombing was the only effective thing it could do, more than three quarters of BC's tonnage was dropped on German cities.

In 1944 it was just over a third, and the same for 1945. The rest was going on specific targets, like oil, transport, enemy troop concentrations etc.

[Nashwan]

Why in 1945 did Harris continue the area bombing of cities with little relevance to the German war effort? Especially considering that BC could hit more precise targets with a more immediate impact on Germany’s capacity to wage war.

Why did Spaatz?

This was the USAAF's SOP, as updated in October 1944:

"No towns or cities in Germany will be attacked
as secondary or last resort targets, targets of
opportunity, or otherwise, unless such towns contain
or have immediately adjacent to them, one (1)
or more military objectives. Military objectives
include railway lines; junctions; marshalling yards;
railway or road bridges, or other communications
networks; any industrial plant; and such obvious
military objectives as oil storage tanks, military
camps and barracks, troop concentrations, motor
transport or AFV parks, ordnance or supply
depots, ammunition depots; airfields; etc."

"It has been determined that towns and cities
large enough to produce an identifiable return on
the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion
of the military objectives listed above. These centers,
therefore, may be attacked as secondary or
last resort targets through the overcast bombing technique"

In other words, if it's got a bridge, or a railway line, or a factory, the town is a valid target. If you can see it on radar, bomb it.

It's quoted in American Bombardment Policy Against Germany, by Richard G Davis, who sums up the policy:

"Almost every city or town in Germany with a population
exceeding 50,000, and a few below that
figure, met the foregoing criteria. This policy made
it open season for bombing Germany’s major cities
in any weather."

The USAAF was doing it's share of area bombing cities in Europe in 1944 and 1945, they just didn't like to admit it.

Harris pushed to stay the course even at the expense of his crews.

Harris pushed to end the war as quickly as possible.

He knew that would be hard on his crews, but he also knew that their losses were light in comparison to normal military losses.

You are making the comparisons not me.

I can judge individual acts by themselves. The context in which my judgments and points are presented in this thread aren't wrapped around what the Nazi's, or American's, or Soviet's, or Japanese did.

You have to keep it in context.

Area bombing Argentina over their invasion of the Falklands would not have been right. It would have been disproportionate.

Area bombing Germany was not disproportionate, in fact it was "small potatos" compared to the overall picture.

You are making the moral comparisons.

I'm not making moral comparisons. I see nothing immoral in attacking the enemy, providing the results of such attacks are not disproportionate to the harm the enemy is causing.

[quote I state the deliberate strategy of targeting civilians by BC during WW2 was wrong.[/quote]

I state there was no such policy, any more (or less) than Luftwaffe attacks on British morale (and food supplies) in 1940 were attacks on civilians, or any more (or less) than USAAF attacks on Japanese and German cities were attacks on civilians.

You are making a case that BC and Britain had no other method, tactic or strategy available to them other then 'de-housing'.

Am I? I don't think so.

I am making a case Britain had no more effective method. And to support that claim I pointed out the British followed the same progression the other major strategic forces did, from precision attacks to area bombing.

There must be some reason why the Luftwaffe, RAF and USAAF all ended up doing the same thing, area bombing (amongst others, of course)

There were British folks during the war who were appalled at the methods of BC. After Dresden even Churchill tried to get some space between him and Harris. In previous posts and threads of mine I quoted such folks. In this thread I posted Churchill's memorandum. If need be I can re-post them.

Be aware that Churchill's memorandum was withdrawn, and Churchill actually complains that Germany would be so damaged the allies wouldn't be able to seize anything worthwhile in reparations.

My point is that comparing immoral acts is in no way a useful tool in making your point.

I'm not comparing them. There is no comparison whatsoever between attacking your enemy and rounding up and murdering civilians who have already surrendered to you.

On 24 Aug '40, German planes bombed central London due to a navigational error. This is for the most part is in agreement with a good portion of Historians. During the next 2 nights the Brits launched raids on Berlin.

Not strictly true. On the 24th the Luftwaffe launched extensive bombing raids over Britain, some mistakenly hit London. On the 25th they did the same thing again, as the RAF was bombing select targets in Berlin.

But the entire "escalation" had been underway long before then. The Luftwaffe had killed over a thousand British civilians by the time they "accidentally" dropped their first bombs on London.

Whilst Hitler might have considered only London to be important, I don't think the British viewed those 1,000 dead as any less important because they weren't Londoners.

And the full scale attack on London was simply the German attempt to bomb their way to victory. Planned for weeks by the German staff, something Kesselring had been pinninghis hopes on.

To prepare for invasion they didn't need to go Berlin or into Germany. They just needed to established control over western Europe. In fact leading up to and in support of D-day Bombers were pulled back from Germany to hit targets in the area I just described.

So you would want to throw the entire bombing campaign out of the window?

Yes, the fighter bombers had sufficient range to contest air space over France, and destroy the Luftwaffe that way.

But the allies would be facing a Germany armed with far more tanks, far more artillery, far more fuel, far more soldiers.

Because the fighter bombers wouldn't be destroying German oil refineries, factories, cities, transport, and there wouldn't be a third of German artillery production going on AA weapons over Germany, with all the manpower associated with that.

The Wehrmacht won its 'victories' on the ground with the LW supporting the ground forces.

Right. So what happens against Britain? They couldn't use ground troops, because there was a bit of water in the way.

So they switched to bombing.

I already told you. The LW wasn't tasked with 'victory'. Their roll was to force Britain into a deal.

They were tasked with making sure Britain gave up the war against Germany. That's victory by anyone's definition (apart from yours, it seems).

Hitler had no real plan to win a military victory over Britain by invasion and the best he could hope for was to destroy the RAF and get a deal.

The best he could hope for was to destroy the RAF and bomb Britain into submission. That's what he set out to do.

From their I already answered your claim about the LW shift in strategy to hitting British cities.

Did you? Do you deny they did it, or do you claim they carried on the bombing for some obscure reason, rather than the obvious one fo trying to defeat Britain?

The IMT (International Military Tribunal) did not define the killing of civilians during aerial bombardment of population centers as a war-crime. The judgement of the IMT did not include the bombing of civilian targets, even though that would have been an 'easy' charge to lay against Goering as head of the Luftwaffe.

If we accept the judgement of the IMT, then neither the German bombing of Belgrade nor any other bombings of civilian targets by either side is to be considered a war crime. I have said so above.

Then we're in agreement. I've never claimed there was anything fundamentally different between the RAF, Luftwaffe and USAAF tactics and methods, although there was clearly a difference of scale.

Maybe I should have been more specific in my statement:

    quote:No LW person was charged with any crime related to their bombing offensives.

Yes, you should have.

But the whole point is besides the point. I never made any claims that what the Luftwaffe did was a war crime (in regards to bombing, anyway).

The British should have thought about that before they declared a war they weren't prepared to fight and bombing / targeting German civilians before they were prepared to defend their own.

Well, Britain declared war on Germany after Germany invaded Poland, so I don't really think it was a war Britain wanted.

And Britain didn't target German civilians. I would argue at any point during the war, but if you believe that targetting a city is targetting civilians, then Britain did not do this either until after Germany had, repeatedly.

Again, by the end of 1940 less than 1,000 Germans had been killed by British bombing, 20,000 British had been killed by German bombing.

[Nashwan]

Britain declared war on Germany, whether the reason was German aggression against Poland or not the British government bares the responsibility for their own actions.

Well, you're exact quote was :

"You all started a war with Germany".

It seems to me that they all (Germany) started a war with the allies. After all, Britian made a public guarantee to Poland, and backed it up in no uncertain terms to the Germans in private.

Perhaps it should rather be that Germany shouldn't have started a war they weren't ready for.

If they weren't prepared to fight or if they weren't prepared to live up to the obligations they made to Poland then they should have moved in a different direction.

Well, they clearly were prepared to fight, which is why Britain declared war, rather than backing down.

But going to the aid of someone under attack isn't agression, and I hope that if saw a weaker person under attack by a thug, I'd step in to help as well.

Are you going to blame the decision of the British government to declare war on Germany?

Sorry, you haven't finished that sentence. Am I going to blame the decision of the British government to declare war on Germany on what?

Blame Germany for it? Of course. Germany violated international law and treaty obligations to declare war on Poland, Britain had made it abundantly clear that if Germany did so (again) then Britain would go to war.

Britain may have had cause for war (after years of appeasement what did they expect of Hitler?

Rationality?

After all, millions of Germans voted for him. They must have thought he was rational, surely?

I have no sympathy for Britain over the last century (even further back for that matter), that's for sure.

That's obvious. Equally obvious is your sympathy for Nazi Germany.

Is that what you meant by 'sympathies'?

No, it's more where your sympathies do lie.

Rotterdam was NOT an example of 'terror bombing' despite British propaganda. Adi Galland stated that the 'Luftwaffe's target was to bomb the defenders' and 'to clear a path for an assault crossing of the river'.

Yes, that's what I said. (My "Nonsense" comment was merely in reply to yours) You claimed to have original source material that showed Rotterdam was bombed to restrict allied resupply efforts, though. Was that another "paraphrase"?

So its clear to anyone that the LW did not intend to 'area-bomb' Rotterdam in order to to 'de-moralize' the civilains (kill them) so that Holland would give up its defense efforts.

Never said they did (again, exluding my "nonsense" in reply to your "nonsense")

And Warshaw?
Shovelling 72 tonnes of incendiaries out of the loading doors of Ju52?s.

Exactly. What Wotan is trying to do is argue that every Luftwaffe bombing attack was purely aimed at military targets, until the RAF started bombing German civilians.

What he ignores is that the Luftwaffe bombed cities all over Europe, mostly as military targets, but not only. And they were careless of the civilian casualties they caused in the process.

The RAF didn't even do that until after the bombing of targets in Western Europe, when the RAF were allowed to attack strictly military targets in Germany.

The RAF didn't resort to attacking cities as such, rather than military targets that were sometimes in cities, until 17th December 1940, by which time the Luftwaffe had killed 20,000 British civilians in area attacks on British cities.

The timeline of bombing is:

1939 September - Germany bombs cities, towns, villages in Poland
1939 September - Britain bombs German warships at sea
1939 September - Germany bombs British ships at sea

!940 March - Germany bombs military targets in Scottish islands, killing a civilian
1940 March - Britain bombs a German seaplane base on an island in the North Sea

1940 April - Germany bombs many Norwegian towns and cities, killing hundreds

1940 May - Germany bombs military targets in France, Belguim and the Netherlands, including Paris
1940 May - Britain bombs miltary targets west of the Rhine
1940 May - Germany bombs Rotterdam, killing almost 1,000 people, and continues bombing attacks throughout western Europe
1940 May - Britain bombs military targets in the rest of Germany

1940 August - Germany launches extensive raids on Britain, killing over 1,000 civilians
1940 August - Germany drops first bombs on military targets in and around London
1940 August - Britain drops first bombs on military targets in Berlin

1940 September - Germany launches area bombing attacks on British cities

1940 October - By the 7th October, German bombing has killed 8,500 British civilians

1940 November - Germany intensifies area attacks on Britain

1940 December - Britain launches first area attack on Germany

[FaliFan]

"He did it first!", said Tommy and pointed at Jerry the brownshirt. Then Tommy donned his own brown shirt. "I'll show him!".

Everyone is responsible for his own actions no matter if he flew for the LW, RAF or the USAAF.

[Angus]

The LW demonstrated effective area bombing on the first day in Poland.
They effectively showed the world how to buckle a nation into submission with bombing.
The RAF kept to inaccurate strategical bombing in the beginning, but in Sept 1940 they were commanded to "dump" their cargo on almost anything if they could notfind the target.
(in those times, Göbbels garden was hit)
German losses are estimated somewhere between 300.000 and a million.
That is 5-20% of the dead in their KZ's by the way.

Oh, more from Speer, - after the Hamburg raid.
"Had the RAF repeated an attack of that scale some 2 times in a relatively short period, Germany would have had no option other than to resign"

We are blessed with information that those guys didn't have.

[Kurfürst]

"1940 August - Germany drops first bombs on military targets in and around London
1940 August - Britain drops first bombs on military targets in Berlin "

That`s so typical for Nashwan... little twist here, little twist there, and you`ve got the finest of Nashwan`s lies.

It`s a commonly accepted fact, even by at least 99.9% of British historians, that London was bombed accidently by a handful of Heinkels, who just got lost and jettisoned their load somewhere over the enemy territory. It`s throughly documented like the fact that not a single German bomb would fell on Britain if the latter would not declare war on Germany on the 3rd of September.

Of course, as per Nashwan, Britain declaring the war was actually Germany`s fault, and not the choice of HM`s Goverment.

Also I have seen Nashwan denying the accidental nature of that bombing, and getting into conspiracy theories... now he claims it was against military targets - another twist.

Also according to Nashwan - and only to him - the British started attacking military targets in Berlin. What 'miliatary targets' were these? Just list a few.

Total BS of course, it was on Churchill`s orders, and just like the circumstances of London bombed in August 1940, it`s throughly documented and accepted by British historians just the like.

Of course Nashwan doesn`t like the version. He doesn`t like how it happened.

He doesn`t like to take the responsibility for British acts of terror in ww2. He`d like to blame it all on the Germans, and accuse the Americans on doing similiar *****ty terror attacks like the Bomber Command. 'Come on Yank, lessen our guilt by sharing it'.

But why is it surprising from the same man who denies to existance of death camps? Or who repeatadly made up qoutes in this very thread from Speer and Spaight?

I never cease to be distgusted by the sheer amount of Nashwan`s hypocrat attitude and lies. If I`d be his fellow briton, I`d be ashamed to be British.

[Wotan]

It's invalid because the phrase you enclosed in question marks doesn't appear anywhere in the paper you atributted it to.

It's perfectly valid because it not only captures the tone and intent of BC's strategy, it is backed up by the fact that its what BC actually did...

"the bombers... must in future be used to kill German civilians" - directive No.22 to BC

-War Cabinet policy paper, dated 3rd. November 1942

Again you are distorting quotes to suit your agenda. Terraine makes this comment in reference to the early war plan to build a 5,000 bomber force, and drop well over 1 million tons of bombs on Germany in 1943, with an estimated death toll of 900,000. (And if only they had, tens of millions of lives could have been saved).

So it's not the Air Ministry's estimates on the effect of area bombing on Germany, it's a comment on a proposal that was never implemented.

Its not a distortion, it reflects the real policy and strategy implemented by BC and Harris. Britain could not have produced 5000 bombers but that didn't stop from trying to:

Churchill’s letter to Lord Beaverbrook, on 5th July 1940.

"Nothing else will get the Germans to their minds, and on their knees, than an absolutely devastating extermination campaign against their homeland with heavy bombers."

See: John Colville : Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955. London 1985, pg. 186.

So you admit to making up quotes? How do you expect to have credibility when you admit to making up the quotes you claim to be taking from official documents?

That quote didn't' originate with me and its 100% accurate in describing the policy and strategy of BC.

I've said no such thing.

I've said that Britain copied the methods and tactics used by the Luftwaffe. Obviously they had a choice in whether to do so. They could have continued the war denying themselves what they felt was an effective tactic the enemy had already used very widely.

Nonsense the British had practiced terror bombing during the inter-war years and Harris was a firm believer in BCs ability to terror bomb civilians into submission long before Germany dropped bombs in Britain.

All other nations in war inevitably hit targets in cities and / or embedded with in the civilian population. The only bomber force in WW2 that practically built their entire strategy on the indiscriminate bombing of civilians was BC whether it be to de-moralize, de-house' or to outright kill civilians.

That statement is 100% accurate as well. BC strategy was to kill civilians to disrupt war production and de-moralize the populace. It was a failure because not only did this strategy not achieve its goals it had no hope of doing so. All it did was increase the casualties among civilians.

Did the Luftwaffe succeed in breaking British morale?

IT's worth noting that under air attack absenteeism in German factories soared, following Hamburg it ran at about 25% in major German cities, as the populace fled to the countryside (ie at any one time 25% of the workers weren't showing up for work)

The LW wasn't built to break British morale nor was its overall war strategy built on such a premise.

Even if we believe your 25% absenteeism claim German war production increased until such a point that the situation on the ground led to a collapse inthe German economy. This collapse wasn't brought on directly by the bombing campaign but was due to the situation on the ground.

Yes, most definately. See Overy for a good modern study of the effects.

Overy's 'good modern study' is as flawed as any.

Richard Overy, in his book Why the Allies Won, makes the following statement about the effectiveness of British and American bombing of the Third Reich: "At the end of January 1945 Albert Speer and his ministerial colleagues met in Berlin to sum up what bombing had done to production schedules for 1944. They found that Germany had produced 35 percent fewer tanks than planned, 31 percent fewer aircraft and 42 percent fewer lorries as a result of bombing. The denial of these huge resources to German forces in 1944 fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies."

On the surface, Speer's analysis tells us that the Allied strategic bombing campaign had a decisive impact on the German war effort in 1944. Based on figures found in Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers," the Germans produced in 1944: 17,800 tanks, 39,807 aircraft. So that, on the basis of Speer's statement, they aimed to produce 24,030 tanks and 52,147 aircraft. For comparison, Allied production of tanks and aircraft in 1944 resulted in 51,500 tanks (USSR: 29,000; UK: 5,000; USA: 17,500) and 163,079 aircraft (USSR: 40,300; UK 26,461; USA: 96,318). Therefore, even with the additional production that would have resulted from no bombing at all, the Allies still produce twice as many tanks and more than three times the number of aircraft as the Third Reich.

Such figures do not support Overy's conclusion that bombing Germany had "fatally weakened their response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies." In terms of the kind of war of attrition fought in 1944 the additional German production would not have made a decisive difference. Allied production for 1944 is clearly overwhelming. Looking at the military situation on the ground in 1944 is even more telling of how the war is going.

Overy goes on to say: "The indirect effects were more important still, for the bombing offensive forced the German economy to switch very large resources away from equipment for the fighting fronts, using them instead to combat the bombing threat." At least, an ever-increasing number of Luftwaffe units were devoted to the air defense of the Reich as the war progressed. And, new aircraft production shifted towards fighters and away from bombers. The question remains as to whether this impact of the Allied bombing campaign was decisive to the outcome of the war or had just a marginal effect on it.

Furthermore, the converse of Overy's remark was also true. The production of bomber forces represented a significant resource expenditure for the US and especially Great Britain. Was this a worthwhile military expenditure? The results of the campaign are debatable. Certainly the German capitulation did not come about because of the Allied bombing campaign. That honor must go to the land campaigns fought by the allies. So, could the resources devoted to the bomber force been more effectively employed elsewhere?

Perhaps the greatest oversight in an analysis that focuses on the latter part of the war is that the crucial period to consider is from 1941 to 1943. It is in this period that German power is substantial and the possibility of a German military victory exists. How effective was the Allied bomber campaign during this period? According to a table found in the Penguin Atlas of World History, the Allies dropped about 10,000 tons on Germany in 1940, 30,000 tons in 1941, 40,000 tons in 1942 and 120,000 tons in 1943 while in 1944 they drop 650,000 tons and in 1945, about 500,000 tons are dropped in the first four months (at that rate, 1.5 million tons would be dropped over the course of 1945). Considering that Germany dropped about 37,000 tons on the UK in 1940, another 22,000 tons in 1941, with a few thousand tons every year thereafter with marginal results, there is little reason to believe that the scale of Allied bombing between 1940 and 1943 was substantial enough to alter the military balance in 1941 or 1942 either. Yet those are critical years to consider because that was when Soviet survival hung in the balance and British possessions in the Middle East were threatened by conquest.

There are many 'rebuttals' of the idea that the bombing campaign had 'fatally weakened their [Wehrmact] response to bombing and invasion and eased the path of Allied armies'.

The bombing campaing never achieved its what it was tasked with and it wasn't  until late in the war that the bombers could even come close to its goals. However by that time the situation on the ground had all but decided the out come of the war despite of the efforts of BC and the bombing campaing in general.

The truth is the bombing offensive did not achieve much prior to 1944, it was too light.

Half the bombs dropped on Germany were dropped in the 5 years up to the end of September 1944, the other half in the 7 months afterwards.

Thats what I said not only in this reply but previously. The point at which the bombing campaign began appraoching its potential the situation on the ground had nearly collapsed the Germany economy despite the efforts of the bombers.

Other quotes from Speer:

"The damage to the armaments industry was mostly caused by RAF night attacks"

He also said that RAF night attacks were more damaging because they were of longer duration, used heavier bombs, and displayed extraordinary accuracy.

German production increased through '43 into '44.

[Wotan]

Three days
later I informed Hitler that armaments production was collapsing and threw in the further warning that a series
of attacks of this sort, extended to six more major cities, would bring Germany's armaments production
to a total halt.


"Fortunately for us, a series of
Hamburg-type raids was not repeated on such a scale against other cities. Thus the enemy once again allowed
us to adjust ourselves to his strategy."

Pity the RAF didn't actually get their 5,000 bomber force in 1943, it might well have ended the war there and then.

Martin Middlebrook in his The Battle of Hamburg doesn't seem to agree with Speer.

"Every one of the [targeted] districts was mainly residential. There were no sizeable industrial establishments anywhere in the area that it was hoped to bomb. No part of the attack was planned to fall south of the river [Elbe] where the U-boat yards and other major industries were located. It was pure Area Bombing.

Not much need for 'pin point accuracy' with the Hamburg raids.

More from  Middlebrook:

Rothenburgsort [contained] the largest children's hospital in Hamburg. Billwarder Ausschlag was a densely crowded working-class area which could claim the distinction of having produced the lowest pro-Nazi vote [22.9 percent] in Hamburg in the 1933 elections... But the greatest weight of the attack [fell on the areas of Borgfelde and Hamm where] street after narrow street was comprised of six-storied buildings, each block usually housing eighteen families. There were many children...These areas were predominantly residential...densely populated with families of the middle and lower brackets of Hamburg society.

Middlebrook estimates that in total:

Approximately 45,000 people died. It is probable that 40,000 of those deaths occurred in the firestorm which took place during the second RAF raid. By contrast, less than one percent of the deaths were caused by the two American raids.

It might be assumed that the fatal casualties were divided as follows: women, 22,500; men, 17,100; and children, 5,400. A high proportion of the male dead would have been elderly men, above military age.

Speer might have admitted that the battle of Hamburg had immediate "catastrophic consequences" and had "put the fear of God in me."

However, he also says that it didn't take long before the city's war production "by the determined efforts of those directly concerned, first and foremost the factory workers themselves," had almost fully recovered.

What were the 'war industries' in Hamburg?

Middlebrook again:

Hamburg's most important war industries, particularly her U-boat yards, were not seriously damaged. The RAF bombing had never been directed on to the areas in which such industries were situated, and the Americans were hampered by smoke and had not the numbers of bombers available to achieve the complete destruction of such targets.

More Middlebrook:

If anything, the bombing was often counter-productive in terms of morale. The news of what had happened in Hamburg, taken back to their units by thousands of servicemen who were allowed special leave, certainly increased the will to fight on to the end by the German forces. In Hamburg itself, though its people may have been sick at heart at the destruction of homes and the loss of life, they pulled together as they had never done before.

John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that Hamburg raids:

destroyed restaurants, cabarets, specialty shops, department stores, banks and other civilian enterprises.

and:

the factories and shipyards away from the centre escaped. Before the holocaust these had been short of labor. Now waiters, bank clerks, shopkeepers and entertainers forcibly unemployed by the bombers flocked to the war plants to find work and also to get the ration cards the Nazis distributed to the workers there. The bombers had eased the labor shortage.

Nothing produced a "speedy" victory.

Bombing was one part of the strategy that produced a victory, which was by far the most important point.

The resources and efforts expended in the bombing campaign could have been better utilized and contributed far more to 'victory' then killing civilians.

Yes. That's also exactly what it did.

The idea that all BC did was area bomb German cities is wrong.

In 1942 and 1943, when area bombing was the only effective thing it could do, more than three quarters of BC's tonnage was dropped on German cities.

In 1944 it was just over a third, and the same for 1945. The rest was going on specific targets, like oil, transport, enemy troop concentrations etc.

Harris fought tooth and nail against anything that distracted from his strategy to destroy civilians.

BC may have hit other targets but their main goal and strategy was built around the area bombing of population centers through out the entire war.

As the war progressed the resources available to BC grew. Whether BC flew 1/3rd of their sorties against population centers is irrelevant given the scale of those attacks. 1/3rd may have been 'enough to do the job'. I can't imagine how many more sorties BC could have crowded in over Dresden.

[Tony Williams]

Originally posted by Kurfürst
It`s a commonly accepted fact, even by at least 99.9% of British historians, that London was bombed accidently by a handful of Heinkels, who just got lost and jettisoned their load somewhere over the enemy territory. It`s throughly documented like the fact that not a single German bomb would fell on Britain if the latter would not declare war on Germany on the 3rd of September.

Of course, as per Nashwan, Britain declaring the war was actually Germany`s fault, and not the choice of HM`s Goverment.

Hitler hoped for some time that the UK would give up the fight as he didn't really want war with the British, so he didn't immediately wage the kind of all-out war which would make an agreed settlement less likely.

However, once he realised that the UK was not going to give him the kind of settlement he wanted  -  i.e., to hold onto his Polish conquests and leave him master of France - the gloves soon came off, and military targets often had very little to do with it. Remember the Baedecker raids? The ones in 1942 in which the Luftwaffe launched bombing attacks on historic British cities of no military significance, just to try to terrorise and demoralise the population into surrender?

Kurfürst -  Hitler and his minions started a war of aggression and conquest. He lied repeatedly about his aims, each success leading him to move up to the next target. The British - both the people and the government - were extremely reluctant to get involved and Chamberlain only gave the guarantee to Poland to make it absolutely clear to Hitler that no further aggression would be tolerated. Once the British government had given a public guarantee, they weren't going to back down. Hitler ignored that and took the consequences of his actions.

To give a domestic parallel with the British position: if my neighbour has his house broken into and is attacked by thugs, I hope I have the courage to go and help him. And if so, I certainly wouldn't hold anything back - I'd use whatever weapons I could lay hands on, and wouldn't stop using them until the thugs gave up or could no longer fight.

I recall seeing an interview with an elderly German lady who had survived the Allied bombing of her city. She didn't blame the Allies - she said something like this: in war, terrible things will inevitably happen. That's what war is like. The blame therefore lies with those who start the war - in this case, Hitler and the Nazis.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

[Nashwan]

It`s a commonly accepted fact, even by at least 99.9% of British historians, that London was bombed accidently by a handful of Heinkels, who just got lost and jettisoned their load somewhere over the enemy territory.

Where were the bombers actually going?

They were bombing targets on the outskirts of London, and the crews had orders that they could jettison over London because it was a big industrial target, and something of value might be hit.

It`s throughly documented like the fact that not a single German bomb would fell on Britain if the latter would not declare war on Germany on the 3rd of September.

No, just on our allies.

Britain could have stayed out of WW2 and let lots of other countries be invaded, and their populations exterminated. It chose not to, thankfully.

Of course, as per Nashwan, Britain declaring the war was actually Germany`s fault, and not the choice of HM`s Goverment.

And there's me thinking the treaty Britain had signed with Poland required us to go to war with Germany if they invaded Poland.

Also I have seen Nashwan denying the accidental nature of that bombing, and getting into conspiracy theories... now he claims it was against military targets - another twist.

I have no doubt the brief was to attack military targets around London, I suspect targets as close to the area prohibited by Hitler were being chosen deliberately.

Also according to Nashwan - and only to him - the British started attacking military targets in Berlin. What 'miliatary targets' were these? Just list a few.

The Siemens factory in Siemenstadt, the Klingenberg power station, the Henschel factory at Schoenefeld, the Bucker factory in Rangsdorf, Tempelhof airfield.

81 bombers dispatched, 29 bombed, 27 claimed to have reached Berlin but were unable to locate their targets, of these 21 brought their bombs home, 6 jettisoned into the sea on the return journey (RAF pilots were not allowed to jettison their bombs over Germany at this stage)

Total BS of course, it was on Churchill`s orders, and just like the circumstances of London bombed in August 1940, it`s throughly documented and accepted by British historians just the like.

Of course it is. But far too many assume that Churchill's orders were for an area bombing attack on Berlin, which they weren't. The RAF didn't carry out their first area bombing attack until 16/17th December, on Mannheim (codename Abigail Rachel)

Of course Nashwan doesn`t like the version. He doesn`t like how it happened.

No, I don't like people who make silly assumptions.

He doesn`t like to take the responsibility for British acts of terror in ww2.

What acts of terror? Strategic bombing? Certainly you can argue area bombing is "terror bombing". I just don't like the hypocracy of people who argue Luftwaffe area bombing was fine, USAAF area bombing was fine, RAF area bombing was "terror bombing".

I like to apply the same standards to everybody, based on their actions.

He`d like to blame it all on the Germans,

Blame what on the Germans, exactly? All area bombing? Don't be silly. I'm just holding the Germans to the same standards.

and accuse the Americans on doing similiar *****ty terror attacks like the Bomber Command. 'Come on Yank, lessen our guilt by sharing it'

Well, the Americans did carry out the same sort of attacks. Anyone who thinks they didn't has been taken in by Hollywood too much. (Memphis Belle and the second bombing run to avoid the school)

But why is it surprising from the same man who denies to existance of death camps?

Excuse me?

Or who repeatadly made up qoutes in this very thread from Speer and Spaight?

They're all genuine quotes. Check them if you like.

Unlike Wotan I was not "paraphrasing" (ie making them up)