Author Topic: Greatest military commanders  (Read 2377 times)

Offline Kweassa

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Greatest military commanders
« Reply #105 on: September 16, 2005, 06:15:12 AM »
Admiral Yi Sun Shin (1545 ~ 1598), of the Chosun Dynasty, of the Korean peninsula.

 If there ever was a "perfect general" in the history of the world, it's him. Too bad he isn't as famous as some of the other great military commanders of history, East and West alike. By all rights, he should be.


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"It is always difficult for Englishmen to admit that Nelson ever had an equal in his profession, but if any man is entitled to be so regarded, it should be this great naval commander of Asiatic race who never knew defeat and died in the presence of the enemy; of whose movements a track-chart might be compiled from the wrecks of hundreds of Japanese ships lying with their valiant crews at the bottom of the sea, off the coasts of the Korean peninsula

  ...and it seems, in truth, no exaggeration to assert that from first to last he never made a mistake, for his work was so complete under each variety of circumstances as to defy criticism...

 His whole career might be summarized by saying that, although he had no lessons from past history to serve as a guide, he waged war on the sea as it should be waged if it is to produce definite results, and ended by making the supreme sacrifice of a defender of his country."

G. A. Ballard, "The Influence of the Sea on The Political History of Japan""
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"You may compare me to Lord Nelson, but do not compare me with Admiral Yi Sun-Shin. He is too remarkable for anyone."

Admiral Heihachiro Togo, after defeating the Russian Navy, 1905[/b][/i]"

Offline Kweassa

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Greatest military commanders
« Reply #106 on: September 16, 2005, 06:42:42 AM »
A brief history of Admiral Yi Sun Shin, and the 7-Year War between Chosun and Japan, for those who do not know who he is.

 Though the article's understanding of the internal politic and economics of the Chosun Dynasty is quite superficial, the accounts of the war, and the story of Admiral Yi is well told and worthwhile. The 7-Year War between Chosun and Japan, was the largest, and bloodiest war of the Korean peninsula before the Korean War of 1950.
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 Fifteenth century Choson's prejudice against foreign trade and commerce contributed to financial problems and the suspension of trade relations with Japan. Oda Nobunaga emerges as the strongest of Japan's daimyo, intent upon unifying the Japanese under a single ruler.

 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the Europeans hotly pursued trade and colonialism in India, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia, the Korean kingdom of Choson lived in relative isolation, deeply embroiled in factionalism and power politics. While Choson's neighbors sought new ways to deal with the changing nature of foreign relations in the Far East, the Yi dynasty faced disastrous economic problems at home. Political factions fought to displace or eliminate their perceived enemies and, in the process, virtually neglected the country's economic health and the people's welfare.

 The rising affluence of Choson's yangban landlords in the countryside compounded the country's existing economic problems as land tenure, tax laws and the military all declined in a state of confusion. Choson royalty, addicted to lives of luxury and pleasure-seeking, contributed a great deal to the massive squandering of Choson's financial resources. Not even the royal court was immune from the capacity to drain the nation's treasury. With each new king on the throne came new appointees to an expanding Merit Subjects roster, and with each new appointee came the obligatory awards and land grants needed to support them.

 The Yi government's attempts to reform Choson's economy, driven largely by an intense desire to increase revenue, led to a further increase in the already steep financial burden borne by the populace. The bureaucrats in Seoul apparently never anticipated the dramatic impact of the almost punitive level of land taxes, tribute taxes and other special levies they imposed on the country. Faced with the sudden rise in taxes, many peasants simply gave up trying to meet the demand for ever more government revenue. In frustration, or because of economic necessity, thousands of peasants unable to make a living simply abandoned their farms and property. The inevitable result was a dramatic reduction in the nation's tax base and the government had few practical alternatives to make up the loss.

 In the realm of foreign relations, the early Yi dynasty maintained a vassal relationship with Ming China, but behaved as an equal partner in its relations with other nations in the region. The Confucian-oriented government in Seoul, which disapproved of private trade, conducted its foreign relations almost exclusively under the guise of tribute and gifts. Their deeply-entrenched Confucian prejudice against commerce and finance contributed much to Choson's economic trouble during this period, since it effectively inhibited the growth of foreign trade and prevented the government from deriving any significant income from a potentially rich resource. The Yi government carefully maintained this fiction of "tribute" and the "exchange of gifts" throughout most of the fifteenth century.

 Despite the government's strict adherence to Confucian philosophy, numerous secret business deals and private agreements existed just beneath the surface that supported a growing volume of covert commercial trade. Japanese vessels sailed into the treaty ports of Pusanp'o(modern Tongnae), Naeip'o (modern Ungch'on) and Yomp'o (modern Ulsan), and carried away large cargos of foodstuffs and dry goods to enrich the daimyo and merchants of western Japan. By 1510, the volume of goods moving through this "underground" market between grew to such an extent that King Chungjong's ministers felt it necessary to impose tight restrictions to stop it. Japanese traders reacted almost immediately to the government's crackdown on trade by staging violent protests in the treaty ports. Many of these demonstrations actually developed into armed uprisings against local Choson garrison commanders and it took the use of military force to suppress them. Choson responded to furor raised by the Japanese over the trade restrictions by closing its trade ports altogether and suspending trade with Japan.

 The head of the So clan on Tsushima Island, who had become quite dependent on Choson imports, voiced his indignance over this action. After numerous entreaties to the Choson government, Tsushima and Choson reached a new trade agreement two years later, in 1512. King Chungjong permitted the resumption of trade under strictly limited terms, permitting only twenty-five ships per year to visit Choson. Nevertheless, one treaty port and two of the permanent Japanese trade missions remained closed. With the lone exception of vessels sent by the Shogun, King Chungjong made no allowances for ships sailing on special missions. Even under the trade restrictions imposed by Choson however, Japan maintained fairly widespread commercial relations in the Far East.

 The So clan daimyo dealt directly with Seoul in part because the Ashikaga Shogunate had been in decline for years. The authority of Japan's central government had virtually disappeared early in the fifteenth century and the former stability and power of the shogunate gradually dissipated to the point where, by mid-century, it had lost all authority and control over the provinces. Neither the shogun nor the emperor had the power to restrict, let alone control, the growth of Japan's feudal houses.

 Toyotomi Hideyoshi continues the unification process in Japan, taking the role of Regent following the death of Oda Nobunaga.  After establishing his own supremacy over Nobunaga's remaining daimyo, Hideyoshi opened contacts with Seoul in preparation for his planned invasion of the peninsula.

 The conqueror of Japan did not simply rest on his laurels. Instead, he fell prey to the Alexandrian desire for more worlds to conquer, and in East Asia at the time that meant China. As early as the spring of 1586, years before he completed the subjugation of all his enemies in Japan, Hideyoshi's fertile imagination led him to lay down plans for a great Oriental Empire ruled by a Japanese sovereign. In expressing his dream to the Jesuit Vice-Provincial Gaspar Coelho, he stated that his sole ambition was to leave behind a great name. His plan was simple and direct. He resolved to cross the sea at the head of a large expeditionary force and form an alliance with Choson's King Sonjo. Japan would then march northward up the Korean peninsula with Choson troops in the vanguard and conquer the Chinese Ming Empire "as easily as a man rolls up a mat."
« Last Edit: September 16, 2005, 07:03:09 AM by Kweassa »

Offline Kweassa

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Greatest military commanders
« Reply #107 on: September 16, 2005, 06:47:41 AM »
(continued)

 The frequent diplomatic missions between Japan and Choson during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were terminated after a particularly vicious pirate attack on the Cholla coast in 1555. The activities of Japanese pirates remained virtually uncontrolled, but the situation gave Hideyoshi a convenient pretext for an attitude of injured dignity. With a firm grip on Japan, Hideyoshi undertook an exercise in international diplomacy in 1587. Using the offices of the So clan of Tsushima, the only daimyo then having formal relations with the Yi court in Seoul, Hideyoshi sent a short note to King Sonjo with a request that the reciprocal exchange of diplomatic envoys be resumed. King Sonjo was reluctant to restart this expensive custom, a matter which had never been approved by the Ming court in Beijing. Hideyoshi sent another mission to Choson the following year to reiterate his demand and not to return until they had the king's agreement. Choson held the Japanese at arm's length for nearly two years while court officials discussed and argued Hideyoshi's proposal. In their closest approach to an actual decision, they replied to Hideyoshi that they would consider his request if he eliminated the problem of pirate raids on the peninsula.

 When Choson finally sent its mission to Kyoto, Hideyoshi's vanity had been so ruffled by the lengthy delays in dealing with Seoul, he kept the Choson envoys waiting for over a year. After treating the envoys unceremoniously, he sent them home along with two Japanese envoys carrying a letter to King Sonjo that went far beyond a mere request to reopen formal relations between the two countries. The envoys were instructed to make it public that the Chinese had refused to receive a Japanese embassy (at best an excuse) and that if Choson gave Hideyoshi free passage through the peninsula to invade China and remained neutral they would be unmolested. Japan's future friendship with Choson depended on the answer. The two Japanese envoys underscored the seriousness of Hideyoshi's proposal with a surreptitious warning, telling the Choson officials who received them that a refusal to cooperate might invite a Japanese invasion. King Sonjo flatly rejected the idea, noting that Choson had been friendly with China for centuries and pointing out the hopeless project was like a bee stinging a tortoise.

 In 1590, still unable to reach a definite conclusion on Hideyoshi's proposal, King Sonjo sent a large diplomatic mission to Kyoto to discover whether or not the Japanese could actually carry out their threat of invasion. The senior member of the Kyoto delegation, a member of the court's So-in (Western) faction, had as his deputy a member of the court's Tong-in (Eastern) faction. To Sonjo's dismay, the mission returned with typically conflicting points of view. While the chief of the embassy presented an alarming report indicating the extent of Japanese military preparations already underway, his deputy stressed the lack of any evidence whatsoever to support Japanese preparations for an attack on Choson. As too often happened, the truth of the matter disappeared in the shuffle as faction members at court closed ranks behind their man to support his judgment, right or wrong.

 Although Choson was militarily weak at this point, it was not as unprepared to defend itself as one might suspect. In response to the resumption of sporadic pirate attacks against Choson during the mid-sixteenth century, the Yi government entrusted the country's defense to its Border Defense Command. Jointly staffed with civil and military officials, this government agency eventually evolved into a kind of executive council that completely reorganized the Choson army. The Border Defense Command reorganized artillery, bowmen and spearmen into specialty units. It also pressed private slaves, once exempt from conscription, into service. In the year 1420, there were about 200,000 government slaves. By 1484 the number had risen to 350,000, and in later years their numbers, as well as the slave population owned by private individuals increased markedly. Desperate for both funds and manpower, the Sonju government pressed many slaves into military service, a move that brought with it an automatic upgrade in status. Frequently, the government had no other option but to free large numbers of slaves for no other reason than it could no longer afford to feed and house them. Korea's new military structure soon became permanent and saw no significant changes for nearly three hundred years.

 Choson's yangban, accustomed as they were to peacetime conditions, could not be easily moved by national issues. Once the matter of Japanese military readiness became seriously enmeshed in factional conflict, a concerted national effort became impossible. As a result, the Choson military took only half-hearted defensive measures. Instead of accelerating troop training, Choson's top generals merely ordered an inventory of all weapons. Armed with few guns of any sort, when warned of Japan¡¯s big advantage in cannons and muskets, one commander said dismissively, ¡°They can¡¯t hit their targets every time they shoot, can they?¡±  Had it not been for the efforts of Chief Minister Yu Songnyong, a member of the Namin (Southerner) faction, Choson would likely have made no defensive preparations at all. Unwilling to let Choson's defense die in the hands of competing factions, Minister Yu insisted after considerable debate that a report be immediately sent to the Ming court in Beijing. By this time the Chinese had already learned of Hideyoshi's intentions through similar reports from its envoys from the Ryukyu Islands. As a result of Yu Songnyong's prodding, a number of cities began repairing and reinforcing their defensive walls. Facing Japan across the Tsushima Straits, a dozen or so towns in Kyongsang Province built new defensive walls. From early in the fifteenth century, as a direct result of pirate raids and the military reorganization of King Sejo, towns in Kyongsang Province took on the appearance of virtually armed camps. By 1591, all the principal towns in Korea and most of its inland towns had defensive walls.

 Choson knew the military uses of gunpowder and had a few firearms, but it lacked the manufacturing technology to produce its own muskets. With no available source to supply these weapons, virtually all Choson's troops carried swords, spears, bows and arrows. Choson also faced a a major problem gathering a defensive army, since most peasants bought an exemption from military service by paying the exemption tax. What soldiers there were had little real military training and spent most of their time employed in public works projects such as building defensive walls. Although a few active military units guarded the northern border region and repelled Japanese pirates, Choson had no full-scale field army. Given the condition of the government and the economy at the time, training and mobilizing such a force would have taken years. Nevertheless, under the guidance of the military district headquarters at Andong, located in the northern interior near the headwaters of the Naktong River, military officers in each town drilled the local peasants in tactics and the use of weapons twice a year. Choson's "citizen soldiers" were no match for any invading army.



The Imjin War

 In May 1592, Hideyoshi's army invaded Choson.  With overwhelming force, the army occupied Seoul within three weeks and took P'yong'yang soon after.  The legendary exploits of Admiral Yi Sun-sin killed any hope that Japan would ever succeed in invading China or hold on to its position in Choson.

 Born in Seoul on April 28, 1545, Yi Sun-sin thoroughly absorbed the tactics and theories of the Seven Military Classics and passed his military examination in 1576. He not only studied the ancient military and literary classics, but actually understood how to apply their principles to contemporary warfare. This gifted naval architect with an unusual talent for mechanical inventiveness became a true soldier-scholar and a great military leader. His broad grasp of the strategic situation facing Choson from Japan and his remarkable, proven skills as a naval tactician rightfully place Admiral Yi Sun-sin among the world's great military commanders, heroic men like England's Admiral Horatio Nelson, and America's generals Robert E. Lee, George S. Patton, and Douglas A. MacArthur.

 Typical fighting ships in sixteenth century Choson and Japan were little different than their merchant ship counterparts. Fighting ships generally had more oars for greater speed and a better hull design for added maneuverability. Japanese fighting ships still used the boarding tactics employed in the Battle of Lepanto. The captains's main goal was to get close enough to the enemy ship to use grappling hooks and pull his ship close aboard so his soldiers could then engage in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. When that wasn't possible, archers and men armed with matchlock rifles targeted the crew of the enemy ship and frequently fired flaming arrows to set the enemy ship ablaze. Even the arquebus, a predecessor to the musket used by the Japanese, required the ships to get close enough for the guns to be effective. Well aware of his navy's current limitations, potential threats, and the need to improve and strengthen Choson's naval forces, Admiral Yi Sun-sin began work in 1588 to develop an entirely new ship design.

Offline Kweassa

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Greatest military commanders
« Reply #108 on: September 16, 2005, 06:49:24 AM »
(continued)

 While diplomatic wrangling continued between Seoul and Kyoto, Admiral Yi was busy creating a genuinely secret weapon, the kobukson, or "turtle ship" (Figure 1). Although Yi Sun-sin is commonly given credit for inventing the "turtle ship," the term kobukson was actually used in historic documents as early as 1414, when King T'aejong first inspected this new warship design. The aggressive use of the kobukson in Koryo's 1419 raid against pirates on Tsushima Island certainly indicates it was originally designed as an attack ship.

 Beginning with a hull design adapted for high speed and maneuverability, Admiral Yi's highly-modified kobukson was essentially a flat-bottomed, oar-powered galley 100 feet in length with a 25 foot beam and two large masts rigged with large rectangular sails. Admiral Yi did not have to defend the open seas of the Tsushima Strait, but faced the constant battlefield constraint of inadequate maneuvering room in the narrow channels and shallow waters among the 400 small islands and uninhabited islets of the Hallyo Waterway. This small inland sea stretches 172 km from Hansan Island in the east, including Ch'ungmu, Samch'onp'o and Namhae Island, Odong Island, to the seaport of Yosu in the west.

 Japanese superiority in both soldiers and firearms made engaging Japanese ships at close quarters a very dangerous tactic. Admiral Yi could not afford to be boarded, so he designed an arched "roof," believed to have been made of iron plate, that covered ship's entire topside structure to ward off enemy arrows and cannon shells. The top of this roof was studded with sharp upright spikes to deter potential boarders. The Yi court had discussed the idea of building ironclad ships as early as 1413, but the world's first ironclad warship was not actually built until Yi Sun-sin took command of the Choson navy.

 Choson had already manufactured some very powerful cannons designed to protect fortresses and they soon figured out how to put them on ships. Yi Sun-sin increased the firepower of his kobukson by mounting thirteen small cannon atop the rowing deck along both flanks of the ship that fired through portholes to allow the vessel to deliver a broadside attack from either side at will. The Choson Navy had four types of cannons;  ch'on (heaven), chi (earth), hyon (black) and hwang (yellow). The heavy 660 pound ch'on cannon, with a 5.5 inch bore, could hurl a cannonball only a few hundred yards. Smaller and shorter in range than contemporary English cannons, Admiral Yi's guns certainly proved adequate to counter the threat posed by the smaller cannons aboard Japanese ships.

 A large dragon head sat above the reinforced ram in the ship's bow and a wood-fired smoke generator was used to spew sulfur smoke through the dragon's grinning mouth. When put to use with the ship underway, the smoke screen enshrouded the entire ship and no doubt intimidated superstitious enemy sailors. The addition of new advanced cannons, archery ports ahead, astern and abeam, iron spikes on the roof, and the smoke generator in the bow made the kobukson a true offensive weapon.

 The primary strength of Choson's professional military resided in its naval forces garrisoned along the southern coast, the direct result of Japanese pirate activity in Korea during the fourteenth century. In 1591, faced with an imposing threat from Japan and with Choson's very existence at stake, Chief Minister Yu Songnyong persuaded the royal court to appoint Admiral Yi Sun-sin to the post of Naval Commander of the Left (western) Cholla Province Naval Station headquartered at the southeastern port city of Yosu. There, in early 1592, Admiral Yi energetically set about training crews for his new warships.

 With Choson enmeshed in factional squabbling, Hideyoshi readied his forces to move into Choson. From his headquarters in Hizen, Hideyoshi mobilized seven fully-equipped divisions, nearly 150,000 men and gathered a fleet of some 700 ships, transport vessels, naval ships and small craft to move his army across the Tsushima Strait. Many of the approximately 9,000 seamen who manned the Hideyoshi's fleet were reportedly former pirates. From their advanced staging area on Tsushima Island, an expeditionary force of three divisions (51,000 men) sailed for the south Choson coast near the end of May 1592 (Figure 2):  11,000 men under General Kuroda Nagamasa, 18,000 men under the leadership of General Konishi Yukinaga, a Christian born of a merchant family from Sakai, and 22,000 men commanded by General Kato Kiyomasa, a Buddhist "mustang" officer who rose from the ranks with Hideyoshi.

 Pusan garrison troops under the command of Chong Pal manned beachhead defensive positions around Pusan  To the north, a few miles inland at the small town of Tongnae, town magistrate Song Sang-hyon commanded a small civil defense force. General Konishi reached the port of Pusan a full five days ahead of generals Kato and Kuroda.The Japanese surprised and quickly overwhelmed the badly outnumbered defenders in both Pusan and Tongnae. Despite bravely defending the beachhead areas to the death, Choson's garrison troops proved no match for Japanese soldiers armed with short-range brass cannon and matchlock muskets. Moreover, they faced an army with extensive combat experience, men already bloodied from the many campaigns of Japan's Warring States period.

 General Konishi had already established a beachhead in Choson by the time Kato and Kuroda's two remaining divisions reached Pusan (Figure 3). The combined Japanese army was too large to advance along a single route, particularly since the troops would have to live off the land. The Japanese left Pusan in three separate columns, opening a three-pronged northward assault toward the capital in Seoul. By messenger and beacon fires, reports of the invasion quickly reached the Yi court in Seoul along with reports of the many towns captured by the Japanese. Stunned by the news, King Sonjo's government panicked. The Border Defense Command quickly issued orders to call up the scattered remnants of the Choson army.

 The government placed its hopes on the talents of General Sin Ip, a tough military fighter who had won earlier fame in successful campaigns against the Jurchen in the northern provinces. General Sin received orders to take all the men he could muster and contain the Japanese in the Naktong River basin by blocking the three mountain passes leading out of Kyongsang Province. Sin mustered a few thousand untrained men armed only with spears, bows and arrows. The leadership of this ragged group was even worse than the condition of the troops. Well before his small force reached the first of the mountain passes, General Sin received disturbing, detailed reports describing the Japanese army's battle prowess. Instead of taking the high ground, where tens of men could defend against thousands, the doughty general decided to wait for the advancing Japanese behind a strong defensive position established on an open plain near the city of Ch'ungju, where he felt his men would fight better than in the mountains.

 General Kuroda's division swept westward through the Sobaek Range over the Ch'up'ungyong Pass and proceeded north through the western provinces toward Seoul. General Konishi's division moved virtually unopposed up the center of Kyongsang Province. Meanwhile, General Kato's division, the third prong of the Japanese assault, drove north from Pusan toward Kyongju, turned northwestward, then linked up with Konishi in the valley near Ch'ungju. After crossing the undefended Oryong Pass, Konishi's soldiers moved into the lower Han River valley, where the Japanese met their first strong resistance from General Sin Ip's rag-tag army. In the bitter and bloody fight that ensued, Japanese troops overran the Ch'ungju defenders and killed General Sin. The two Japanese divisions continued their march toward Seoul along two different routes. The main objective of the assault on Korea was plunder. The Japanese deployed six special units with orders to steal books, maps, paintings, craftsmen (especially potters) and their handicrafts, people to be enslaved, precious metals, national treasures, and domestic animals. Meeting little resistance, the Japanese ravaged the civilian population. Entire villages were swept up in the raids. Japanese merchants sold some to Portuguese merchants anchored offshore and took the rest to Japan.

 If the summer of 1592 exposed fatal weaknesses in the Choson army with brutal thoroughness, it also highlighted the Choson navy's reputation. Admiral Yi Sun-sin proudly launched his kobukson in May 1592, just days before General Konishi's troops landed at Pusan. The admiral selected eight of his most courageous naval officers to act as commandants at various ports. He also called up four government officials from their posts as magistrates of local cities and put them in the forefront of his battle formations as commanders of the Left Wing, Front Forward, Central Forward, and Right Forward commands. Within days of the outbreak of the Imjin War, Admiral Yi Sun-sin sailed into the Hallyo Waterway in search of Japanese shipping intent on engaging and destroying it whenever and wherever it might appear.

 The war was less than ten days old when the Choson Navy had its first major engagement against the Japanese. Sailing from the southwest early one morning, Admiral Yi sighted the supply and troop ships that landed two Japanese divisions near Pusan less than two weeks earlier lying at anchor near Okp'o, off Koje Island. Borrowing a maxim from Sun Tzu's Art of War - "If the soldiers are committed to fight to the death they will live, whereas if they seek to stay alive they will die." - Admiral Yi gathered his captains and repeatedly had them pledge their willingness to fight.

Offline Kweassa

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Greatest military commanders
« Reply #109 on: September 16, 2005, 06:51:03 AM »
(continued)

 Driven by a strong steady wind, Admiral Yi's ship led his ships downwind into the anchorage, firing cannon and arrows from both sides. Skillful maneuvering prevented the Japanese from boarding any of the attacking ships, which soon set a number of Japanese ships ablaze with flaming arrows. In the confusion that followed, Japanese sailors began cutting their anchor lines in a desperate attempt to flee. Few were lucky enough to escape destruction. In its first engagement the Choson Navy sank twenty-six Japanese vessels without a single loss. The only casualty was a sharpshooter who received a slight arm wound. It was the first naval combat action for many of the men in Admiral Yi's command, including many of the local magistrates recruited for military duty.

 Sailing eastward from Okp'o under a steady wind, Admiral Yi ran across and attacked a smaller Japanese patrol squadron later that same afternoon. After annihilating the Japanese to the last ship before dark, he continued eastward for the rest of the night. The following morning, Admiral Yi's ships reached the main shipping lanes between Pusan and Tsushima Island, where he spotted a massive Japanese fleet sailing north. Undeterred by the odds, Admiral Yi plowed into the Japanese like a sledge-hammer. During the day-long battle, the Japanese fought with determined courage, but to no avail. By sundown, the entire Japanese fleet was either captured, ablaze, or on the bottom of the sea.

 After a week of nearly constant action at sea, Admiral Yi wanted to attack Japanese ships at Pusan Harbor. After considering his situation however, with provisions low and his men exhausted and wounded, he wisely decided to avoid overextending his fleet deep into enemy territory and exposing himself to being cut off. With complete dominance of the seas along Choson's south coast and with no fear of a rival, Admiral Yi moved his fleet unobserved further west to the islands off the southern coast.

 The relentless Japanese advance toward Seoul caused turmoil among the local population already gripped by confusion, fear and panic. Thoroughly alarmed and near panic themselves, King Sonjo and his court decided to flee north from Seoul to Kaesong. The government made no attempt to defend Seoul, but Sonjo ordered his two sons into the northern provinces of Hamgyong and Kangwon to raise fresh troops for the army. Neither of Sonjo's sons found anyone who would respond to their pleas to help defend the country against the Japanese. In the end, the Japanese captured both Choson princes.

 King Sonjo made hasty preparations to abandon the city to the advancing Japanese. He gathered his family and with his retinue of high court officers fled through the west gate of the city along the "Beijing Road."  When word of the impending royal evacuation reached the streets of the capital, citizens blocked their exit, hurling insults and stones at them. After fleeing the city to the north, the band of less than courageous aristocrats arrived in Kaesong only to be met again by local citizens armed with anger and masonry. Seven days later, the royal retreat finally crossed the Taedong River and halted in P'yong'yang (Figure 3).

 Infuriated by the government's incompetence and irresponsibility, the people of Seoul erupted in a furious rage. They placed the full blame for Choson's wretched state of affairs squarely on the backs of government officials, men who had failed to concern themselves with the welfare of the people and had permitted the farming villages to fall to ruin. Mobs of people swept through the city looting and burning government storehouses. The city's slave population attacked and burned the offices of the Ministry of Punishments and the hated Ministry of Justice. In their fury, mobs of angry citizens destroyed large numbers of census registers and the archives which held the slave-deeds. The destruction of the census registers and numerous other documents that recorded the status of Choson citizens by the Japanese freed many slaves from their bondage.

 Less than three weeks after departing Tsushima Island, Konishi Yukinaga's division triumphantly marched through the South Gate into the city of Seoul. By late spring, all three of Hideyoshi's vanguard divisions occupied the Choson capital. Hideyoshi landed the remainder of his army on the nearly defenseless southern coast to occupy Kyongsang Province. There the Japanese quickly began to organize feudal land holdings similar to those in Japan for distribution to victorious commanders.

 After leaving a garrison force to maintain order in the city of Seoul, the three vanguard divisions marched north. Konishi and Kato proceeded northwest toward P'yong'yang, where they would halt and await resupply by the Taedong River. In their drive toward the ancient "western capital" of Koguryo, the Japanese encountered a determined defense force at the Imjin River. Choson defenders put up a fierce battle for three full days before the Japanese finally overran their positions. During the brief respite, King Sonjo and his entourage again took flight to the north, this time to the border city of Uiju on the Yalu River. General Kuroda turned his troops westward toward the Yellow Sea. General Kato marched eastward to subjugate the northern provinces of Hamgyong and P'yong'an, eventually crossing the Tumen River into Manchuria. General Konishi's division assaulted and captured P'yong'yang. With no hope of repelling the Japanese alone, the royal court in hiding at Uiju dispatched envoys to Beijing with an urgent plea for help from Ming China.

 In the south, Admiral Yi Sun-sin's second major campaign against the Japanese began off Sach'on, where about four hundred Japanese soldiers were building fortifications to protect twelve pavilion vessels anchored near the wharf below (Figure 2). The Japanese held the high ground, safe among the cliffs facing the bay above Sach'on, well beyond the reach of arrows. Since the ebbing tide made it impossible for Admiral Yi's kobukson to get within shooting range of Japanese ships, he employed a classic maneuver frequently cited in Sun Tzu's Art of War. Breaking his formations and giving every impression of a disorderly retreat, the well-disciplined Choson navy drew the Japanese into open water. Suddenly, Admiral Yi turned on his enemy and, as if riding a charging war chariot, drove right through their midst, firing cannon and flaming arrows into the Japanese ships. The ensuing battle turned into a complete rout as the Japanese broke and ran into the surrounding hills. Admiral Yi wisely spared a few Japanese ships to give the defeated soldiers a way to escape and to prevent them from terrorizing the local population.

 Hideyoshi had the temperament of a land warrior and tended to think of his fleet as little more than transportation for the army. As a result, the Japanese "navy" embarked on the Choson invasion ill-armed and ill-trained for fighting at sea. Yi Sun-sin took full advantage of the mismatch. In several sea battles near Tangp'o and Tanghangp'o during June and July, he cleared the seas of poorly led Japanese ships using line-ahead tactics with rams and flaming arrows. In one battle, Yi Sun-sin caught a convoy with twenty-five escort ships bound for P'yong'yang in open water and sent it to the bottom. Flushed with success, Yi Sun-sin's fleet lingered in the area the peninsula expecting further action.

 A few days later, off Tanghangp'o, Admiral Yi once again sought the advantage of fighting in open water. He broke off his attack in a feigned retreat so the Japanese would not abandon their ships and escape to land. The results were the same as at Sach'on. The Japanese set off in pursuit of the admiral's ships, which then counterattacked from both flanks and destroyed all but one of the Japanese ships. As planned, the next morning one of Admiral Yi's captains caught the lone escaping Japanese ship in open water and sank it.

 Whether Hideyoshi knew of Admiral Yi Sun-sin's stunning naval successes or not, he committed a fatal blunder by holding to his original plan for reinforcing his land army in northern Choson through the western passage. The Japanese advance to P'yong'yang had been so rapid that reserves meant to link up with them had to be embarked aboard ships by the end of June. In early July, hundreds of Japanese transport ships escorted by the majority of Hideyoshi's remaining fighting ships, set sail along the western passage toward the islands off Choson's southern coast and sailed directly into a trap. Anticipating the Japanese would sail a course to sight Choson's southern islands, Admiral Yi Sun-sin stationed his ships near Hansan Island and lay in wait for any Japanese shipping that happened by.

 Anchored near the mouth of the Hansan Strait, a 400 yard-wide channel strewn with submerged rocks and shoals, Admiral Yi's ships were sitting in a position from which they could quickly sail in either direction. At dawn on the morning of July 9, 1592, lookouts sighted a Japanese fleet on the far eastern horizon. Fearing his large kobukson would be unable to maneuver effectively inside the strait, he decided to lure the Japanese into open water south of Hansan Island, where he could take the Japanese in a single strike.

Offline Kweassa

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« Reply #110 on: September 16, 2005, 06:52:10 AM »
(continued)

 The Battle at Hansan Island began when Admiral Yi moved five or six kobukson in a tentative attack against the approaching Japanese. When he was sure he had been sighted, he turned his ships and feigned a retreat under oars. The Japanese admiral, intent on capturing a fleeing enemy, gave immediate chase under full sail. Admiral Yi carefully drew the faster Japanese fighting ships further into open water, outrunning the slower transports. At the critical moment, and with his own ships still under oars, Admiral Yi suddenly turned about. In a spectacular demonstration of precisely-timed maneuvering, he fell hard against the lead Japanese ships, ramming them as they tried to turn away from the approaching attack. One by one, the lead Japanese ships crumbled against the reinforced bows of the kobukson and near continuous cannon fire. Those lucky enough to escape the initial disaster were driven back into the approaching main body of the convoy, which also turned away in panic to escape.

 During the running fight, Admiral Yi's fleet sunk or set fire to some seventy Japanese fighting ships. When a large reinforcing convoy was spotted sailing into the onrushing melee, Japanese admirals made a valiant attempt to halt the retreat with the new arrivals. The two large bodies of ships closed on each other quickly, which added to the building confusion. Nearly fifty more Japanese ships were lost to ramming, cannon fire or flaming arrows. Faced with an apparently unconquerable enemy, for the first and only time while engaged with a foreign enemy, Japanese commanders lost courage, panicked and broke in all directions looking for a way out. The retreat quickly degenerated into a rout, with a mixture of transports, escorts and fighting ships sinking and burning together. The panic was so thorough that the majority of those who managed to escape made for the coast rather than suffer the fates of their comrades. Many ships were driven aground and wrecked with a great loss of life.

 The Battle at Hansan Island not only annihilated the Japanese fleet, it destroyed the vital materiel needed by generals Konishi and Kato in the north. Admiral Yi Sun-sin's systematic application of the principles of Sun Tzu and other Chinese military classics in his four sweeping naval campaigns of 1592, culminated in a single battle which cut off the sea lanes around the southwestern tip of Choson and abruptly ended all prospects of a future Japanese invasion of China.



The Home Front

 While Admiral Yi Sun-sin continued to hamper Hideyoshi's ability to launch fresh attacks in Choson, the people of Choson, faced with a direct threat to their personal wealth and security, formed guerilla bands to fight, not to preserve the government, but to preserve their own way of life.

 Admiral Yi sailed for Pusan in late August 1592, intent on destroying every last remaining Japanese ship, most of which were concentrating in the area of Pusan Bay (Figure 1). After three successive defeats, the Japanese had learned the best way to protect their ships was to anchor them close ashore beneath fortified hills for protection where they could take advantage of their superiority in shore guns and use their troops armed with matchlock rifles. Admiral Yi's fleet of only 166 ships charged into the Pusan anchorage on September 1 to attack some 470 enemy ships defended by thousands of Japanese on the nearby hills. The Japanese unleashed a nearly continuous barrage of arrows, rifle and cannon fire, yet despite the hail of falling projectiles, Admiral Yi pressed the attack.

 The Battle of Pusan Harbor was an assault deep into enemy territory and is eloquent testimony to the bravery and courage of Choson's fighting sailors. Pusan Bay echoed with gunfire from the day-long battle as the Choson fleet repeatedly rowed their ships deep into Pusan Harbor, attacking the Japanese under a barrage of enemy fire and successfully sinking or destroying 133 Japanese ships, many caught at anchor. Admiral Yi Sun-sin understood that if he totally destroyed the Japanese fleet, it would "block the retreating route of the Japanese pouring down from the north, [and] the enemy thus trapped would probably become guerrillas in all provinces. . . ."  Admiral Yi also understood his own navy's capabilities and limitations. Once he reached the point of diminishing returns, he called off the attack. The gallant admiral withdrew from Pusan Bay as night fell without having lost a single ship, unwilling to risk anymore lives or ships needlessly.

 Admiral Yi Sun-sin stands, without exaggeration, as the single greatest hero in Korean history. Compared with other famous naval battles in history, Admiral Yi's exploits and his navy's victories stand in a class with the Spanish defeat of the Turks off the Cyprus coast in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, and the English defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. Each of these great naval engagements resulted in a significant turning point in naval warfare. The Battle of Lepanto marked the end of the era dominated by massive oar-powered war galleys and the defeat of the Spanish Armada marked the beginning of a new era dominated by the use of the heavily-armed, sail-powered man-of-war.

 In 1571, Don Juan de Austria, the half-brother of Spain's Philip II, commanded the massive fleet of the Holy League against the fleet of the Ottoman Turks in the Gulf of Lepanto (Gulf of Corinth). The Battle of Lepanto was the last major naval battle fought by opposing fleets of rowing war galleys utilizing boarding tactics against each other. The Japanese relied on boarding tactics as their primary attack method in naval battles during the Imjin War, but Admiral Yi consistently denied them the opportunity to use them.

 When King Henry VIII ordered new cannon installed on his warships in 1512, the result was the powerful English man-of-war. Powered by large sails and armed with heavy cannon mounted low on the cargo deck that fired through gun ports in the hull, the man-of-war stood in sharp contrast to the lightly armed Spanish galleys which still relied on boarding tactics as their principal fighting technique. The removal of the ornate elevated decks fore and aft made these ships lighter, less bulky and much easier to maneuver, a critical quality if a captain was going to avoid close quarter combat with an opponent. The development of England's man-of-war makes one appreciate Admiral Yi's development of the kobukson and its ultimate impact on Choson's history.

 In the late 16th century, Spain's King Phillip II sent his "Invincible Armada" of 125 ships into the English Channel to ferry the Duke of Parma's army from the Spanish Netherlands across the channel and land them in England. There they would march on London, capture Queen Elizabeth I, and proceed to conquer the entire country. When the heavy Spanish galleys under the command of the Duke of Medina Sedonia arrived off the southwest coast of England in mid-July 1588, an English fleet led by Lord Howard and the privateer Francis Drake sailed into the channel to attack.

 The more maneuverable English ships avoided close-in fighting, but harassed the Spanish galleys as they sailed up the English Channel to Calias. Between July 31 and August 8, individual English ships inflicted considerable damage by continually sailing around the heavier Spanish galleys using "hit and run" tactics. The Spanish, who began the fight in their traditional frontal line formation, reacted to the unorthodox English tactics by breaking their formation to fight individually, thus forfeiting their greatest strength. The resulting chaos caused by separate fights between individual ships turned the battle in England's favor.

 In danger of a total defeat, the Duke of Medina Sedonia made a fateful decision to forego the invasion and return to Spain via the North of Scotland and Ireland. The English fleet pursued the Spanish into the North Sea for three days, breaking off and returning to England only after they ran out of ammunition. The few Spanish ships that managed to survive the violent storms off Scotland and Ireland limped back to Spain totally defeated and demoralized. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 was an English victory only in the sense that its new warships held their own against the might of the Spanish Navy. It was certainly not a victory of English naval tactics, since they had no coordinated battlefield strategy. The free-for-all battle involving one-on-one engagements showed they had no idea how to apply their cannons effectively, but it also marked the beginning of a new era in naval warfare that used sailing men-of-war armed with heavy cannon.

 England was lucky in 1588. Because early cannon were inaccurate, the British didn't understand that the best way to maximize the man-of-war's firepower was to sail in line-ahead column formation, to turn broad-side to their target and unleash all their cannons at once. Admiral Yi Sun-sin understood this principle because he read Sun Tzu. Furthermore, Admiral Yi did not rely on luck to win a fight. Just four years after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, Admiral Yi, who had never heard of Spain or England, consistently applied the right technology and used the right strategy to defeat the Japanese in 1592. Like the English, Admiral Yi had superiority over his enemies with fast, maneuverable warships. Both England and Choson adopted new sea-fighting techniques to thwart an enemy whose strengths lay in its soldiers and boarding tactics. The Defeat of the Spanish Armada ended in a draw. Admiral Yi Sun-sin however, was decisive in his victories and won every battle in 1592 against a far larger number of enemy ships without losing a single warship of his own!  Neither Sir John Hawkins nor Sir Francis Drake could make that claim in 1588.

Offline Kweassa

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« Reply #111 on: September 16, 2005, 06:53:37 AM »
(continued)

 Hideyoshi's armies entrenched well north of Seoul could be supplied only by sea. General Kuroda Nagamasa, holding the region west of P'yong'yang, depended completely on Japanese shipping for resupply, shipping that had to sail northward through waters under the full command of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. The Choson navy's spectacular summer offensive erased all hope of resupply or reinforcement and left the Japanese army to itself and its own resources for survival. Admiral Yi's achievements not only imperiled Japanese supply routes and hampered Hideyoshi's ability to launch fresh attacks in Choson, it had the lasting benefit of keeping the grain-rich Cholla Province out of Japanese hands. Stung more than once by this crafty naval officer, after three months of fighting the Japanese learned to avoid Admiral Yi on the open sea. They changed tactics and began making night raids and avoiding areas patrolled by the Choson Navy.

 Japan soon faced a new set of challenges from the Choson people, who responded in a very interesting way to the presence of Japanese troops on their native soil. Despite the calamitous threat posed by the invasion, the common people's deep disaffection with their own government led many to actually refuse to support the government in defense of the country. Once the threat to their own estates and land holdings became a reality however, when the Japanese presence actually threatened their personal wealth and security, a boiling rage among the people swept the peninsula. People suddenly found the inspiration to fight, not to preserve the government, but to preserve their own way of life. The same population that earlier reacted so indifferently to government efforts to muster fresh troops to defend their country, suddenly took up arms in defense of their own homes.

 In district after district, peasant farmers and slaves coalesced around a single leader, generally a member of the rural aristocracy, to form small fighting units. Literally hundreds of guerilla bands, including bands of Buddhist monks, large and small alike, sprang to life amidst the Japanese. As these guerilla bands gained strength, they expanded their area of operations. Using hit and run tactics, guerrilla fighters often dealt severe and stinging blows to Japanese military operations.

 Once the Choson populace began to fight the Japanese, a number of heroic battles took place that earned a number of people a lasting place in Korean history Cho Hon led a guerilla force that rose from Okch'on in Ch'ungch'ong Province and routed the Japanese from Ch'ongju. Cho died in a later assault on Kumsan. Kwak Chae-u assembled a guerilla force in Uiryong in Kyongsang Province and, in battles along the Naktong River, drove the Japanese out of the Uiryong-Ch'anggyong area. Kim Ch'on-il led a guerilla force that repeatedly harassed the Japanese in the area around Suwon.

 Ming China finally responded to King Sonjo's plea for help in July 1592, by sending a woefully inadequate 5,000 man division into Choson. After crossing the Yalu River near Uiju, the token force bravely marched southeastward toward P'yong'yang. General Konishi led his forces in a single night battle that swiftly decimated the entire Chinese division. Basking in his victory over the Chinese, Konishi eagerly anticipated the arrival of reinforcements sailing up the Taedong River so he could begin the actual invasion of China. He was not strong enough to move north without them. When he finally learned of the crushing defeat of Japanese shipping at sea and that reinforcements would never come, he realized there would be no invasion of China. He sat as far north as the Japanese would ever get. The Japanese army was spread across north-central Choson at the time and held a strong enough position they could wait for further orders. As they waited through the autumn of 1592 with no word from Japan, supplies ran low and their position became more precarious. Worse, the Chinese were concentrating a strong, well-equipped army north of the Yalu River.

 In January 1593, General Li Ju-sung led fifty-thousand battle-hardened Chinese troops, fresh from subduing a Mongol rebellion in Manchuria, across the frozen Yalu River in the dead of winter. This Chinese army, unlike its ill-fated predecessors, marched directly to P'yong'yang and successfully drove General Konishi out of the city. General Konishi withdrew his battle-worn troops south to Seoul, pursued all the way by General Li. Choson's citizen guerrillas constantly harassed the starving Japanese soldiers, who were taxed nearly to the limit of their endurance. The fighting withdrawal halted at Pyokchegwan, just north of Seoul. Though Chinese and Japanese troops fought pitched battles outside the city walls, no large-scale attacks occurred on Seoul itself. Within the city however, Japanese troops killed many people and burned much of the capital, including the Kyongbok Palace, the Ch'angdok Palace, and numerous other structures that dated from the beginning of the Yi dynasty.

 Japanese and Chinese troops fought to a standstill in a fierce battle at Pyokchegwan. Local guerilla forces under Kwon Yul, anticipating a joint attack on Seoul in concert with General Li Ju-sung's army, took up positions at Tohyang-san, the mountain redoubt south of Seoul on the north bank of the Han River near Haengju. The Chinese never arrived. General Li Ju-sung had pulled his army back to P'yong'yang for a rest, leaving the guerrillas isolated. Nevertheless, Kwon Yul's small force successfully held their ground in the bloody fighting that raged around Haengju. The Japanese repeatedly sent out large-scale assaults against Tohyang-san, but failed to dislodge Kwon's guerrillas. When the defenders ran out of arrows, women in the fortress helped gather stones that were thrown against the Japanese troops. Admiral Yi Pin resupplied the Tohyang-san fortress during the fighting by sailing up the Han River in time to deliver more arrows. Kwon Yul's guerilla force successfully held their ground in a campaign that is remembered as one of Korea's three great triumphs against the Japanese during the war.

 The Japanese position gradually went from bad to worse. With no hope of resupply by sea, pinned down in Seoul by continuously mounting pressure from the Chinese army and local guerrillas, with food supplies cut off and his forces now reduced by nearly one third from desertion, disease and death, Konishi was compelled to sue for peace. General Li Ju-sung offered General Konishi a chance to negotiate an end to the hostilities. When negotiations got underway in the spring of 1593, China and Choson agreed to cease hostilities if the Japanese would withdraw from Choson altogether. General Konishi had no option but to accept the terms, but he would have a hard time convincing Hideyoshi he had no other choice.

 Unbroken in spirit, but physically weakened by hunger to the point they were no longer an effective fighting force, the Japanese army departed Seoul in late May 1593, one year from the date of their invasion at Pusan. As the remnants of Konishi's division moved out of Seoul, Chinese troops marched southward from P'yong'yang in a screening formation to cover the Japanese and ensure their departure. The Chinese intended to prevent them from regrouping and again attacking to the north. Choson guerrillas joined in the pursuit by continually harassing and attacking Japanese soldiers throughout their arduous retreat to the port of Pusan and the southeastern coast of Kyongsang Province. Following the recapture of Seoul, the Chinese commander Li Ju-sung observed that,


"...the country all about was lying fallow, and a great famine stared the Koreans in the face....the dead bodies of its victims lay all along the road."


 This should have been the end of the war, and General Li Ju-sung apparently believed it was over, for he marched his army northward, leaving Choson to take care of matters itself, even though the Japanese had yet to sail for home. Before the Japanese began loading aboard ships, orders arrived from Hideyoshi commanding the Japanese army to seize positions on a number of capes or promontories along Choson's south coast that were easily defended on the land side and to build entrenched camps. General Konishi strongly objected to such a plan, which was neither conducting a proper war nor completely withdrawing from Choson. Such sound advice nearly cost Konishi his head, but under specific orders to do so, the Japanese placed a number of strong rearguard detachments at selected points along the south coast to cover their evacuation. The bulk of Hideyoshi's war-weary troops finally sailed for Japan.

 Once peace negotiations between China and Japan finally got underway, for some unknown reason Chinese negotiators gave Ming Emperor Shen Tsung the mistaken impression that he was about to deal with a minor state that had been subdued by war. Furthermore, they conveyed the idea that the Japanese regent, Hideyoshi, was prepared to become his vassal. Under such conditions, the Chinese sought to resolve the issue in their favor by including Japan in their tributary system of foreign relations. They would establish Hideyoshi as king of Japan and grant him the privilege of formal tribute trade relations with the Ming dynasty.

Offline Kweassa

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« Reply #112 on: September 16, 2005, 06:59:33 AM »
(continued)

 In Japan, Hideyoshi's negotiators apparently led him to believe that China was suing for peace and ready to accept him as their emperor. Thus, Hideyoshi issued the demands of a victor;  first, a daughter of the Ming emperor must be sent to become the wife of the Japanese emperor;  second, the southern provinces of Choson must be ceded to Japan;  third, normal trade relations between China and Japan must be restored;  and fourth, a Choson prince and several high-ranking Yi government officials must be sent to Japan as hostages. Bargaining from such fundamentally different perspectives, there was no prospect whatsoever for these talks to succeed.

 Hideyoshi needed time to rebuild his fleet and raise a fresh army before the almost certain protests over the presence of Japanese garrisons along Choson's south coast developed into military action to force them out. A past master of the art of plausible delay, Hideyoshi kept Chinese envoys waiting for months on various pretexts then sent them home with an entirely new set of demands he knew would never be accepted. For nearly three years, both sides engaged in long and drawn out negotiations. Envoys came and went, with constant protests from one side and constant evasions and excuses from the other. The needless misunderstandings between China and Japan proved irreconcilable.

 While the diplomats delayed, Hideyoshi's shipwrights were building a new fleet as quickly as they could hammer the planks together. A new army was being trained and equipped. Large stores of food were being quietly cached in Japanese garrison camps along the south Choson coast. All the while, Choson's former great fleet sat rotting at anchor, with a few ships being used in the coastal trade. Admiral Yi Sun-sin lived the quiet, dull life of isolated retirement. In the summer of 1596, preparations were well underway to mount a second invasion of Choson. Hideyoshi appointed General Konishi Yukinaga commanding officer of his new fleet and quietly slipped a force of 100,000 men into the Choson garrison positions. Realizing that Ming China was adamantly refusing to entertain his demands, let alone submit to them, Hideyoshi suddenly exploded in a carefully affected attitude of rage at the latest Chinese emissaries. Claiming that China was trying to force Japan into submission, he stated in his reply that he intended to punish Choson for impeding good relations between his own country and China (a claim totally without foundation) and broke off all talks with the Chinese.


Song of the Great Peace

 Toyotomi Hideyoshi launched a second major invasion of Choson in 1596, but faced greater opposition from both Choson and Chinese forces.  Unable to expand beyond Kyongsang Province, the Japanese finally withdrew in the winter of 1598.  The final disastrous defeat of the Japanese fleet by Admiral Yi in the Battle of Chinhae Bay ended fleet actions by the Japanese for the next 300 years.

 The pounding suffered by the Japanese navy at the hands of the Choson navy remained an acute embarrassment to Hideyoshi. When Japanese troops left Choson, they did so quite willingly, in large part because so long as Admiral Yi Sun-sin lived, and so long as his ships controlled the seas, Japan had no hope of reinforcing the peninsula. Nearly 180,000 Japanese had already died at his hands and the Japanese greatly feared him. The Japanese confidently believed that removing Admiral Yi Sun-sin would leave the Tsushima Strait virtually undefended. Well-aware of the festering political jealousies that permeated Seoul, the Japanese devised a plan they hoped would take the Choson admiral out of action permanently.

 In late 1596, a spy arrived at the Yi court in Seoul with a tempting piece of totally false, yet totally believable intelligence. He carefully planted the story that a Japanese invasion fleet would be sailing past a coastal point on a certain day. The still frightened and suspicious Yi government took the bait and immediately ordered Yi Sun-sin to sea to intercept the invaders. Yi Sun-sin had an ego as big as his fleet however, and correctly interpreted the situation as nothing more than a great deception. He refused to sail.

 Admiral Yi Sun-sin, the naval hero whose genius ensured Choson's survival during the Japanese invasion, received his appointment from a member of the Namin (Southern) faction and subsequently earned the support of the Tong-in (Eastern) faction as well. Despite the war, factional feuds raged unabated in the Yi court with the So-in (Western) faction holding the dominant position. The bickering between the Tong-in and the So-in factions led to the kind of ironic result that epitomized the senseless nature of factionalism and the Choson court's totally unrealistic attitude toward the Imjin War. Yet another telling example of this attitude is the manner in which King Sonjo issued awards. Eighty-six members of the retinue that followed Sonjo in his earlier retreat to the city of Uiju received status awards granted to merit subjects. Only eighteen men received such awards for meritorious service for combat against the Japanese.

 In the aftermath of the accusations and innuendos that flew about the Yi court, King Sonjo ordered Yi Sun-sin's arrest. The court relieved him of his command, reduced him in rank to a simple soldier, and jailed him in early 1597. The victorious So-in (Western) faction replaced Yi Sun-sin with its own favorite son, Won Kyun, commander of one of the Cholla district naval stations. The So-in won a hollow political victory. Admiral Won Kyun proved to be an utterly incompetent naval commander with little taste for battle, which he carefully avoided whenever he could.

 Hideyoshi made two fatal mistakes in planning his second invasion of the Korean Peninsula. First, he assummed that with Yi Sun-sin out of the picture, even if he should encounter trouble at sea, which he evidently did, he had no reason to fear major interference with his invasion. Second, and more devastating, he completely underestimated the probable opposition on land. He totally misinterpreted the fact that Japan's rapid advanced up the peninsula in 1592 was due more to China's slow response than Choson's weak military defense. He confidently expected an easy occupation, secure from any interference by sea.

 The Chinese realized that in the first war they had moved too slow in sending troops to assist Choson and left too soon, allowing the Japanese to retain a foothold in the south. Suspicious of Hideyoshi's intentions throughout the years of deadlocked diplomatic wrangling, the Chinese poured troops into Choson, helping to defend virtually every city, town, mountain pass, and river ford in depth.

 Japan's second expeditionary force of about 140,000 men safely arrived along the southern coast of Choson and landed unopposed on the south coast of Kyongsang Province in early 1596. Once they established a foothold however, the Japanese found Choson both equipped and ready to deal with an invasion. Even China responded quickly to the renewed threat, sending an additional contingent of 40,000 troops under the command of General Yang Hao directly into Kyongsang Province. The Japanese faced strong, stubborn opposition and could not break out of the southern provinces. Outnumbered at every step of their painfully slow advance, it took the Japanese six months of constant fighting to advance no father than a point which they had reached in only two weeks during the first invasion in 1592.

 The Japanese land army achieved little more than local success in its engagements and remained confined largely to Kyongsang Province. By late 1596, the Japanese dug in and established defensive positions from which they launched numerous short-range attacks that kept the more numerous Chinese and Choson forces off balance. To avoid any chance that the leadership in Kyoto would doubt the fighting prowess of the Japanese commanders in Choson, the officers sent barrels filled with the pickled ears of nearly 38,000 of their victims to the capital as proof. The grisly remains were later given a proper burial a long way from home at Kyoto in the Mimizuka, or "Mound of Ears."

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« Reply #113 on: September 16, 2005, 07:00:10 AM »
(continued)

 The situation at sea was very different. With Yi Sun-sin out of the picture, the Japanese navy operated with unaccustomed aggressiveness. Events quickly overtook the freshly appointed Admiral Won Kyun that again threatened the survival of the Yi dynasty. When news of the approaching invasion fleet reached Choson, Admiral Won received orders to attack. His lack of leadership had reduced the Choson fleet to such a low level state of readiness that it was hardly an effective fighting force. Nevertheless, Admiral Won was obliged to obey. When he finally crossed paths with General Konishi's fleet, purely by chance as it turned out, his inept maneuvering nearly resulted in the elimination of the entire Choson fleet. Admiral Won's captains deserted him at the first contact with the Japanese and the Choson fleet scattered. Admiral Won saved his own skin by fleeing the battle. Konishi completely turned the tables and destroyed nearly all the ships in Admiral Won's weak command, the first great naval victory against a foreign enemy in Japanese history. When word of the disaster reached the Yi court, it was only the influence of the powerful So-in (Western) faction that prevented his execution.

 King Sonjo had no alternative. Having already treated a national hero with insulting ingratitude, he hastily pardoned Yi Sun-sin and reinstated him as Admiral of the Navy and Commander of the Fleet. Yi Sun-sin, always ready to act in the service of his country, accepted his new command;  the twelve surviving ships from Admiral Won Kyun's disgraceful action against the Japanese. It is unclear whether these were all the ships that Won Kyun left him, whether the government feared he might stage the world's first naval coup d'état if he had more, or whether all he needed was twelve ships. Despite its small size, Admiral Yi's ships wasted little time in aggressively harassing the Japanese to great effect.

 General Konishi, unaware of the change of command in the Choson navy, dispatched a squadron of ships to the west from Pusan to assist the garrisons in that area. As Admiral Yi Sun-sin sailed into the area frequented by Japanese shipping along the southern coast, Konishi's squadron sailed headlong into his approaching ships near Hansan Island, the site of his earlier decisive victory over the Japanese. The results were the same as they had always been. The entire Japanese squadron suffered a complete and disastrous defeat. Although it was only the loss of a small squadron and Konishi's fleet remained intact, news of the naval action sent shivers through the Japanese army command. Their past experience with Admiral Yi Sun-sin made them suddenly very cautious about taking any further risks.

 The Japanese held their positions through the winter of 1596, constantly harassed and threatened from the land side, but free from assault by sea. Although Admiral Yi had destroyed one naval squadron, he was too weak in numbers to take on the main Japanese fleet. His reputation still haunted Konishi and his menacing presence on the Japanese western flank kept the Japanese general perpetually apprehensive. Matters remained indecisive well into the summer of 1597, yet Hideyoshi refused to admit he had been beaten. The mounting strain took a terrible toll on troop morale as the Japanese tried to maintain a position from which they had nothing to gain.

 During the winter of 1597, a large Japanese fleet sailed from the southern port of Oranp'o bound for the Yellow Sea. At the time, Admiral Yi's small twelve-ship squadron was stationed in the straits off South Cholla Province that lie between Jin Island and the Hwawon Peninsula, reinforced by a small squadron of Chinese ships under orders to follow his command. It is remarkable testimony to the great respect the Chinese held for the man, since on all other occasions of cooperation with Choson, the Chinese always insisted on taking supreme command. Lying in wait off Myongnyang, near the port of Mokp'o, secure in his knowledge of local high tides and torrential currents that roar through the narrow strait, Yi Sun-sin's twelve ships sat in ambush as the Japanese fleet carefully filed between Jin Island and the peninsula.

 With his flagship anchored at the throat of the narrow channel, Admiral Yi held his position while his other ships sat at the ready to his rear. As the Japanese continued their advance, Admiral Yi's subordinate officers gave him up for dead and started rowing in retreat. At this critical juncture, Admiral Yi "whipped off the neck of a sailor rowing back and hung it up high on the ship's mast, then roared, "Attack!"  With predictable effect, the decapitation galvanized the fighting spirit of his men and they charged into the Japanese ships. Through sheer fighting skill and the spirit of his men, Admiral Yi's twelve fighting ships sank thirty-one Japanese ships, killed their fleet commander and scattered the remaining ships into retreat. The "Miracle of Myongnyang" put the seas once again under Choson's control and sealed the fate of Japan's land army.

 In early 1598, the Chinese engaged the Japanese in a massive battle near the city of Ulsan. Although the fierce engagement did not break the Japanese position, it starkly reinforced the fact that Hideyoshi's army could not break out of its defensive perimeter in Kyongsang Province. Driven back into a shrinking perimeter along the south, central and southeastern coastal regions, the Japanese army found itself hemmed in both by land and sea. Japan's position in Choson became so bad by autumn that the Japanese field commander was on the verge of asking to negotiate an armistice. The stalemate was broken with the sudden arrival of news from the Shogun. Hideyoshi had died suddenly on September 18, 1598 , and his successor had decided to abandon the campaign. The Japanese army in Choson quickly sued for peace and agreed to a complete withdrawal.

 Orders for reembarkation were issued and in early winter the Japanese began the slow process of moving aboard ships for the journey home. Although neither Chinese nor Choson troops made any effort to grasp the opportunity at hand, the Japanese exercised extreme caution during their withdrawal, trying to prevent the sizeable forces nearby from taking tactical advantage of the movement. The withdrawal was successfully completed in due time, and the transport ships set sail for Japan, escorted by the main Japanese fleet under the command of General Konishi, the first to arrive in Choson some six years earlier and now the last to leave.

 The Japanese still faced the challenge of recrossing the Tsushima Strait, a stretch of open water where the implacable warrior Yi Sun-sin still held command. Admiral Yi felt little sympathy for his landbound colleagues, who sat and watched the Japanese leave without striking a farewell blow. He was resolved that on his element at least, they should feel one. Having already been dealt with so unceremoniously by King Sonjo's court, Admiral Yi felt certain that jealous factions would again try to bring him down in disgrace after the war. Before that could happen however, he determined to win one last great victory against the Japanese.

 Carefully watching for his chance, Admiral Yi Sun-sin hurriedly moved northeastward from Ch'ungmu just as the evacuation convoy was fully underway. On December 16, 1598, Admiral Yi led his fleet against some 400 Japanese ships in Chinhae Bay off Noryang Point. The small Choson squadron had no difficulty catching up with great lumbering fleet moving slowly toward the Tsushima Strait. Far outnumbered, Admiral Yi used his ships like sheep dogs to encircle the Japanese and herd their ships into a confused and helpless mass. General Konishi put up a gallant defense during the long and fiercely contested naval engagement that followed.

 Near the height of the battle, under a sky covered by the smoke of burning ships, with arrows and rifle balls flying in all directions, a random bullet fatally wounded the fifty-four-year-old Yi Sun-sin as he proudly stood in the prow of his flagship. Lying mortally wounded on the deck of his ship, enjoying the satisfaction of seeing the last of the Japanese invaders leaving his homeland, Yi Sun-sin ordered his men to keep his death a secret until a decisive victory had been won. Both sides suffered heavy losses in the fighting that ultimately broke the Japanese convoy into a number of smaller groups. As the stragglers broke free of the fighting and made their way to safe ports, the last great naval battle of the Imjin War faded into history. Although Japan did not suffer the complete defeat handed the French and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Trafalgar, the outcome of the winter Battle of Chinhae Bay ended any fleet battle actions by the Japanese for the next 300 years.

Offline Kweassa

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« Reply #114 on: September 16, 2005, 07:01:44 AM »
(continued)

 Few naval commanders ever more thoroughly justified Napoleon's words that, "war is an affair not of men, but of a man."  The fact that Admiral Yi Sun-sin fought aboard a ship of his own design with such superior fighting qualities that nothing else afloat at the time could match it does not lessen the magnitude of his success. If the object of a war is to win, then the nation, or man, that attains that goal by the intelligent production of better weapons is fully entitled to the success achieved. Yi Sun-sin did more than just design a better ship. He never made mistakes. He went to war without the guidance of existing principles of naval strategy and literally improvised and acted on his own initiative as he went along. Not a single instance of any importance in his whole record of service was marred by faulty judgement.

 Admiral Yi Sun-sin realized at the very outset of the Imjin War that he could not make the sea impassable to Japan by splitting his fleet and stationing squadrons along the southern Choson coast. He clearly understood that instead of picking the fruits of victory piecemeal, the best way to reach the fruit was to take a sharp axe and cut down the entire tree. In his first major campaign near Okp'o, he went directly after the troop and supply ships on which all else depended. Having destoyed them, the impact was felt throughout the Japanese command, right down to the soldier in the field.

 The Imjin War cost the Japanese thousands of lives and an untold amount of their national treasure, all without any measurable material gain whatsoever. If Hideyoshi's two wanton and unprovoked invasions in 1592 and 1597 accomplished anything, they virtually devastated Choson and left a broken and desolate landscape. Nearly every one of Choson's eight provinces had been an arena for pillage and slaughter. While the Choson navy sank or destroyed by fire over three hundred Japanese ships in its first four naval campaigns, Admiral Yi's naval actions were the only true bright spot of the Imjin War.

 In 1598, the poet Pak No-gye described the horror of the Japanese invasions in an epic entitled "Song of the Great Peace";


For 10,000 *li the waving battle-flags
darken the sky.
With a great roar the cries of the soldiers
seem to lift heaven and earth.

Higher than mountains, the bones
pile up in the fields.
Vast cities, great towns
become the burrows of wolves and foxes.

(* ' li ', is the traditional measurement of distance. 1 li is approximately 397m)
 


 The Choson economy depended heavily on grain production and Japan's occupation of the southern rice-producing areas and the war demands they placed on the people created vast shortages of food and other supplies. The widespread foraging activities of Chinese and Japanese troops further aggravated an already serious grain shortage. As the grain shortages became more acute, famine and disease spread across Choson along with open banditry and peasant uprisings. The two attacks by Japan scarred the country for years afterward and left a legacy of undying hatred toward the Japanese, a bitter feeling handed down from one generation to the next. In the view of some historians, the country never really recovered.

 One of the most important aspects of the Imjin War was that resistance against the Japanese emerged from among the people of Choson instead of being directed from the Choson government. For the first time in their long history, Choson's united guerilla resistance against an alien invader gave the Koreans a sense of nationalism and self determination.

- fin.

Offline Nilsen

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« Reply #115 on: September 16, 2005, 07:10:41 AM »
I have to complaints Kwaessa

1. Before 1600
2. Far too long. How about a resymè and a couple of pics.

Offline Kweassa

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« Reply #116 on: September 16, 2005, 07:17:48 AM »
1. He lived in the final days of the 16th century :D Died at 1598. Shouldn't that count as 'close enough'?

2. I tried to summarize the article, but I figured it was essential for other people to understand what the other side of the world was like. People lived here, and made wars here too, you know! :)

 But yeah.. it's too long. The first half is all background info. If you don't wanna read all of it, just skip to the "The Imjin War", that's where the war breaks out. Sorry for the long long long long post.

3. A VASTLY summarized version of the whole tale would be the Wiki entry.

 For the lazu guys :) here's the link;

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yi_Sun_Shin

Offline Nilsen

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« Reply #117 on: September 16, 2005, 07:24:49 AM »
Thats better :)

So the conclusion is that the Turtle ships are actually the reason for the whole Ninja Turtle thing in the 90's and Yi Sun-sin was infact the first Ninja Turtle?

Offline Kweassa

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« Reply #118 on: September 16, 2005, 07:34:25 AM »
More like "My General PWNZ URZ!" :D

Offline Edbert

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« Reply #119 on: September 16, 2005, 07:48:55 AM »
Quote
Originally posted by lasersailor184
Btw, MacArthur was one of the worst commanders ever.  Anyone who posts his name again will be banned from the list.

Ditto on Montgomery.