Ok, admittedly an area where I'm just a dabbler. What I know about modern NAval surface warfare could be safely engraved on an iron filing with room to spare.
But here is the FAQ page offering a summary of the counter-arguments for reactivating the BBs:
BBG facts and figures Here are two interesting paragraphs related to cost and force projection:
"Costs: The Navy’s comparing a capital ship like the battleship with far smaller and far less capable ships, like CGs and DDGs, is misleading, to say the least. Battleships can only fairly be compared with that other capital ship, the carrier. In 1999, the Navy estimated that it would cost $431 million to reactivated both Iowa and Wisconsin. Our shipbuilding experts estimate that it will take about an additional $500 million to extensively modernize both ships. (Converting them to BBGs). (Their present power plants are in good shape and adequate spare parts are on-hand.) Thus, for the original cost of the ill-fated USS Cole, we get two mighty BBGs. In 1999, the Navy also estimated annual battleship operation and maintenance costs (O&M) at $70.8 million for FY 2002. The carrier’s annual O&M costs are five to six times greater than for a BBG (not counting aircraft costs); moreover, they require at least twice as many expensive escort ships. These two BBGs, needed by the Navy, Marine Corps and the Army, should best be separately funded as joint “national assets”, outside the Navy’s budget and manpower ceilings, thus meeting a key Navy objection to bringing back these ships..
Manpower Demands: A BBG will require a full complement of about 1300 (achieved through automation and modern 5-inch guns with smaller crews). The carrier needs 5,600, including aircrew. For three of the Navy’s most essential missions, however, the highly survivable BBG would be clearly superior: providing extreme range Tomahawk strikes, fire support in littoral regions and a forward visible intimidating presence in high threat areas closed to the more vulnerable carrier. (We believe, however, that large carriers will long remain indispensable for, inter alia, maintaining local air superiority, long-range strikes and staging platforms for long-range missions [as demonstrated in Afghanistan]. BBGs will complement and take the pressure off carriers.) Within the present range of its 16-inch guns (adequate for supporting forced entry and other littoral operations up to 25 miles inland which will meet Marines’ present, pre-OMFTS requirements) one BBG could, in 24 hours, accurately, rapidly, around-the-clock and in all weather lay down a weight of ordnance equal to that delivered from our entire 12-ship carrier fleet. With the advent of more of the more capable F/A 18 E/F on carriers, one BBG loading 60% extended range (out to over 100 miles and later with scramjet projectiles possibly out to 1000 miles) and 40% conventional projectiles will still be the equal of 4.5 carriers. (The large dollar and manpower costs of a carrier are, however, entirely justified, as would be those [much smaller] of a BBG.) In laying down 5-inch fire only, one BBG could equal 15 destroyers (DDG) that would have a combined manpower complement of 4,875 (vs 1300 on a BBG) and total O&M costs of $600 million (vs $70.8 million). If the BBG also used its nine 16-inch guns, the comparison would be off the chart. In the highly unlikely chance that the DD(X) could have a crew of only 95, the crews of 14 DD(X)s would equal that of one BBG, but all 14 together would have only a small fraction of a BBG’s tactical firepower, indispensable for NSFS, and would have far less mission versatility. This math clearly validates Chairman Stump’s above statement (page 1)."
One major point is that I think you will have less difficulty getting Congress to recommission and fund two existing BBs for less than develop and build new ships for far, far, more. I think the Navy expended a lot more capital (no pun intended) than it had in that area saving the Seawolf program. Now just getting upgrades to existing systems is a major hurdle.
- SEAGOON
