Author Topic: Cypriot 737 Crash- First indications (Read 845 times)

Hawklore · « **Reply #15 on:** September 08, 2005, 06:15:55 PM »

It's like asking a FDB to gun for a BOP...

Just inconceviable!

CyranoAH · « **Reply #16 on:** September 09, 2005, 01:41:36 AM »

Heh, my response to hypoxia was stubborness... they gave us 3 and a half minutes at 20k to do the test (some simple questions, some operations, some more questions "do you need oxygen right now?").

Since I hadn't finished it, I wouldn't let it go when they told us to.

It took about 3 or 4 times telling me to let go that I finally did it.

Other reactions in the group ranged from histerical laughter to plain dumbness.

At 14k the hypoxia set in would be veeery slow. Been flying at 12-13k in an unpressurized airplane wearing an O2 concentration indicator in my finger (very useful gadgets, not very expensive) and it never fell much.

20k, that's another story.

Daniel

Xargos · « **Reply #17 on:** September 09, 2005, 04:29:59 AM »

Well, the USA is overpopulated so I feel the schools need to teach Ebonics and not require people of this country to learn a common language. That way when the next disaster occurs it will kill more people. I find it funny that people in other countries know English better then people that where born here in the US.

How sad it is when people die from lack of communication.

cpxxx · « **Reply #18 on:** September 11, 2005, 06:05:31 PM »

As I mentioned in a previous thread on the subject a very similar incident happened to an Aer Lingus 737 in 2000. The aircraft failed to pressurise but with several other distractions the crew failed to notice. It was only after a period of confusion and persistent visits to the flight deck by a cabin crew member and the deployment of the pax oxygen for the Captain to take any serious action. He was clearly hypoxic and even went on the PA to advise pax that they really didn't require oxygen.

Here's the report. It's makes sobering reading and I think would have ended the same way as the Helios flight if it wasn't for the persistence of the senior cabin crew member as mentioned in text.

http://www.aaiu.ie/AAIUviewitem.asp?id=3504&lang=ENG&loc=1280

There full report is on a PDF file. It also contains an interesting description of the effects of hypoxia.

I believe the language aspect mentioned in the Helios report is a red herring. Hypoxia is insidious and any difficulty in communication may very well have simply been an effect of lack of oxygen. Otherwise there are strong similarities in both incidents.

I think the final Helios report will strongly resemble the Aer Lingus one only with a fatal conclusion.

Toad · « **Reply #19 on:** September 11, 2005, 07:48:29 PM »

Quote

Originally posted by Xargos
How sad it is when people die from lack of communication.

Even sadder when they die because "professionals" fail to run a checklist correctly.

MrRiplEy[H] · « **Reply #20 on:** September 12, 2005, 01:47:47 AM »

And the whole ordeal would have been avoided with a simple 'low cabin pressure' voice alarm instead of playing a damn buzzer for 10 different alarms.

Hell even a distinctive alarm sound would've probably been enough.

The aircraft was 60's tech.

Wolfala · « **Reply #21 on:** September 12, 2005, 02:45:03 AM »

Quote

Originally posted by MrRiplEy[H]
And the whole ordeal would have been avoided with a simple 'low cabin pressure' voice alarm instead of playing a damn buzzer for 10 different alarms.

Hell even a distinctive alarm sound would've probably been enough.

The aircraft was 60's tech.

The annunciators havn't changed in the new models. If they followed PROCEDURE - they, and everyone else would be alive. Don't blame the plane for the human ****up - it did precisely what it was designed to do - including dropping masks, if that wasn't a more obvious hint to everyone around, I don't know how much more blatent you can get.

MrRiplEy[H] · « **Reply #22 on:** September 12, 2005, 03:37:49 AM »

Just a simple question:

Would the crew have been able to take countermeasures against hypoxia if they had been given an audible 'low cabin pressure' warning in the cockpit?

Thanks in advance.

Edbert · « **Reply #23 on:** September 12, 2005, 09:01:23 AM »

Quote

Originally posted by MrRiplEy[H]
Just a simple question:

Would the crew have been able to take countermeasures against hypoxia if they had been given an audible 'low cabin pressure' warning in the cockpit?

Thanks in advance.

If it were in English, aparrently not.

MrRiplEy[H] · « **Reply #24 on:** September 12, 2005, 09:49:40 AM »

Apparently they could both speak english enough to understand that. Apparently they got confused with multiple buzzers and horns screaming simultaneously and had to spend critical time identifying the source of the warnings. Apparently due to the fact that the same buzzer was used for a more common warning it was falsely read as something else than it really was.

Apparently that got them killed.

Toad · « **Reply #25 on:** September 12, 2005, 11:05:15 AM »

Quote

Originally posted by MrRiplEy[H]
And the whole ordeal would have been avoided with a simple 'low cabin pressure' voice alarm instead of playing a damn buzzer for 10 different alarms.

Hell even a distinctive alarm sound would've probably been enough.

The aircraft was 60's tech.

Guess it depends on the basic intelligence level of the crews you hire. I suppose if you hire folks with absolutely no common sense you had better have a voice nanny the explains the problem in detail and reads them the appropriate emergency checklist. Better yet, computerize all the responses to emergencies and just have the crew sit on thier hands.

The altitude warning horn can't be confused for the takeoff warning horn by anyone who's gone through a decent training program and has even a modicum of experience, as any Captain should.

If they had a Takeoff configuration warning it would have occured on....suprise... takeoff.

Now, if you manage to takeoff and climb to 10,000 feet without a warning there's no way for anyone with experience to confuse that warning for a takeoff configuration warning should it occur right at 10,000 feet.

Anyone with any systems knowledge and sim training will immediately recognize that horn as a cabin pressurization warning when it sounds going through 10k.

Now what sort of whiz-bang modern technology do you suggest that will ensure the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Not Flying always correctly accomplish the Pre-Flight checklist and do a correct challenge and response reading of the checklist before they start engines?

Chairboy · « **Reply #26 on:** September 12, 2005, 11:11:55 AM »

Cockpit Resource Management.

It's a dragon that aviation safety organizations have been fighting for decades.

Dinger · « **Reply #27 on:** September 12, 2005, 11:16:09 AM »

Hehe, you haven't seen boeing's latest Toad (stolen from a post on pprune.org):

Quote

Boeing have changed the procedures to get them in line with the rest of the Boeing family, that is what we have been told. This to ease transition training between the different Boeing models.

So, who reads what?

Preflight: Read by FO, respond according to area of responsibility.

Before start: Same as above.

Before taxi: Same as above.

Before take off: Read by pilot monitoring, response by PF. This checklist only contains Flaps.

After takeoff: Read by PM, response by PM.

So the FO is both reading and responding for that item.

GreenCloud · « **Reply #28 on:** September 12, 2005, 11:40:44 AM »

as a beginer pilot..im glad to read the mistakes form others.

Glad they found out what happened..that is nastttyy

thank god my only failure on checklists so far was failing to turn on fuel pumps while taxing back from fuel up....sat at pumps for 3 min ....figuring out why my plane wasnt starting...thought id.."skip th echecklist"..as i was "just " taxing back to my parking spot..

i felt really dumb..and rellly upset taht i failed to do my checklists..and it could of been my life ..and others...kik my self good..

as far as the checklist go...

You guys ever listen to the CVR box of the flight that ran into tht Patomic river?....where the FO says...."De Icing off"...and Co pilot says ..yes...and it was snowing outside?....

Toad · « **Reply #29 on:** September 12, 2005, 11:49:41 AM »

The "Preflight: Read by FO, respond according to area of responsibility." means that depending on the item either the Captain or the F/O must respond.

On our checklists, the pilot designated will "visually verify switch postion or status, and then make the response to the pilot challenging."

"Reverse Print" items are critical to flight safety. "These require a response from both pilots. The first response will be made by the pilot being challenged. The challenger will then confirm with an echo response." In other words, both pilots verify and respond.

"Each checklist item will have a designator indicating the pilot(s) responsible for verifying accomplishment of that item. This designator also indicates the pilot(s) who will respond aloud to that time, it the item is either a challenge and response item, or critical item."

On my most recent (2003) B-757/767 checklist, the Captain is designated as responsible for verifying that the Cabin Altitude Control is SET and the Air Conditioning panel is SET and responding with those words. IIRC, it was the same on all the 737 models I flew.

Doesn't seem like the Helios Captain verified that the panels were set correctly.

I'm not sure what sort of warning system you install to make sure someone runs a checklist professionally.