RAF 150 octane

[Scherf]

"there`s no real evidence to the widespread operational use of 150 grade, unless you count those anti-diver squadrons that I can count on one hand, and which appearantly operated on the fuel for the months the V-1 raids lasted (3 months)."

Other than the fact there were no V-1s in May '44, or in Cornwall, as Neil will no doubt have to point out again.

[Squire]

Neils list of docs above shows plans in November 44, and conversion by January 45 for 2nd TAF.

Also, other than pure speculation, I have seen nothing indicating a "shortage" of 150 fuel. If you have a source please post it.

At some point this is just becoming silly.

[Neil Stirling1]

It has been decided to change the grade of fuel consummed by the 2nd TAF from 100 octane/130 to 100 octane /150 from 15th December 1944.




Why post the April 1946 edition of the Spitfire XIV pilots notes.

Neil.

[Angus]

Ahemm.
Get some feet on the ground. The number of V-1's (which were fast down low indeed) caught and shot down by RAF fighters was something with 4 digits.
Maybe they got them without 150 grade anyway

[Angus]

Oh so anti-diver squads being counted on one hand would then be responsible for for the destruction of hundreds of those in the air - each, right Scherf?

[Squire]

Scherf was pointing out the same thing Angus. He was responding to the quote, and pointing out that there were no V-1 raids in May 44, yet units were converting to 150 octane in ADGB squadrons anyways.

[Scherf]

edit - Squire said it better.

[milian]

Does anyone realize that by the end of May 1944, there had been less that 70 Spitfire Mk XIV produced?

Total Delivered by end of month - Number delivered that month
1943 : 18 18
01-44 : 30 12
02-44 : 45 15
03-44 : 50 05
04-44 : 56 06
05-44 : 68 12
06-44 : 101 33
07-44 : 129 28
08-44 : 151 22
09-44 : 185 34
10-44 : 245 60
11-44 : 300 55
12-44 : 341 41
01-45 : 399 58
02-45 : 511 112
03-45 : 648 137
04-45 : 743 95
05-45 : 815 72
06-45 : 844 29
07-45 : 873 29
08-45 : 891 18
09-45 : 898 7
10-45 : 904 6
11-45 : 911 7

[Crumpp]

I have seen nothing indicating a "shortage" of 150 fuel.

The shortage occurred in the 8th USAAF when the units went back to 100/130 grade and did not want to use 100/150 grade. It was a shortage of 100/130 grade as I understand it.

Scherf was pointing out the same thing Angus. He was responding to the quote, and pointing out that there were no V-1 raids in May 44, yet units were converting to 150 octane in ADGB squadrons anyways.

So what?  Do you think when the first V1 crashed down on England it was the first the allies had heard of them?

We can rewrite history for Aces High.  I could care less.

If you all are interested in having 100/150 Grade fuel performances from December 1944 on, I will back you.

In August 1943, a huge force of workers commenced construction of almost one hundred launching sites in northern France, and a provisional date of December 1943 was set for the opening of the "reprisal" campaign, with Hitler promising his troubled millions that the British could not continue to rain high explosive from the skies onto Germany's cities with impunity.

 

Unfortunately for Hitler the British had learned that "something" was afoot, and a devastating bombing attack launched in August 1943 against the experimental establishment at Peenemunde on the Baltic coast put back Hitler's plans several months.

http://www.nzfpm.co.nz/theatres/tow_tied.htm

I would say the allies were well aware of the threat and with good reason.  The Diver and Crossbow missions had the highest priority of any allied air mission.  It was a true no holds bar effort to stop the V1 attacks.  

So yes, I very much see the allies pushing forward no matter what to get the extra performance 100/150 grade gave for Operation Diver/Crossbow.

For the general conflict in which they had overwhelming numerical superiority and technical parity, it does not make sense.

http://www.edenbridgetown.com/in_the_past/reference/v1.shtml

The last flying bomb was launched at London on March 29, 1945, only six weeks before Germany surrendered.

While the Germans maintained their launching rate of 100 a day the continuation of Vsite bombing was an essential part of the defence. Towards the end of June, over 40% of the Allied bomber effort from Britain was directed against Crossbow targets- despite objections from some Allied commanders who wanted more strategic air operations to be flown over Germany. Despite the bombing of the V-sites and supply centres, an average of almost 120 flying bombs a day were launched in the first week of July. After the first two weeks of bombing, some 1,769 people had been killed and in the Strand the Air Ministry itself was hit and 198 people killed. On July 1 a flying bomb crashed in Chelsea, killing 124; four days later the total death roll was 2,500. Reprisals against German towns and villages were considered but such reprisals were not likely to ease the situation. Moreover, Eisenhower was opposed to this kind of retaliation.

http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/aircraft/WWII/v1/v1_info/vi_info.htm

This was not some sideshow.  It had priority over the Strategic Bombing Campaign.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Some goodies on the V-1 and V-2 threats.
Firstly as Crumpp pointed out the allies did indeed have some info on it as so many other things through ultra enigma and so on.
Information was misleading and confusing - it was for a while belived that the warhead was some whooping 14.000 lbs and cruising speeds were belived to be higher than the eventual outcome.
BTW had it not been for some successful bombing the Germans actually could have managed to make a missile good enough to bomb the USA!
Anyway, to catch some wind of actual history - some 35000 V-1's were built thereoff 9000 launched to England (1200 or so from He-111 over the north sea if my memory serves me), 4000 were shot down by flak or fighters, numerically more in the latter case.
The rest got bombed or overrun.
Many were launched in darkness and bad visibility - since visibility did not at all affect accuracy.
So, the V-2 - the mean and unstoppable one.
Some 1300 V-2's hit London, which gives a little insight into the "why" part of BC's merciless bombing of Germany in the closing months of the war. The only measure being to hit them before they flew - or buckle the Germans as soon as possible.
The Ugly total war folks.

Anyway, from the gathered data it is pretty obvious that the RAF was able to catch doodlebugs with relative ease be it on the ground or in the air. If there was just a handful of Mk XIV Spits, a few fast fighters squadrons, and scarce supply or clearance of high grade fuel, the performance of those "few" who were responsible for the shooting down is nothing less than outstanding

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Kurfürst
Do you have evidence of shipments of 150 grade fuel to XIV units of the 2nd TAF?

Hmm, interesting, but it doesn`t state they used the boost, ....

Do you have evidence of shipments of 150 grade fuel to XIV units of the 2nd TAF?The question of fuel supply is also there. Doing the modifictions alone means nothing, high boosts would be impossible without continous shipments of 150 grade fuel, which we all know was in limited supply, ....

Do you have any proof that C3 was delivered to the K-4s 4 Gruppen authorized to use 1.98? I see no proof from you that these units used 1.98.

Kurfy always demands proof but continually fails to produce proof when he is asked to.

A report (POWE 33/1363) of British 150, as well as 100 production, was posted on Butch's board. Why you totally ignore this Kurfy and continue your story of a 150 shortage is beyond belief. Oh, I forgot, you think the British were idiots to produce so much and not use it.

British avgas production from that doc:

Feb - 7,749,000 Impgal
Mar - 11,039,000
Apr - 1,533,000
May - 2,499,000
Jun - 7,605,000
Jul - 12,068,000
Aug - 9,761,500
Sep - 11,088,000
Oct - 9,950,500
Nov - 6,030,500
Dec - 10,318,000

Jan - 9,950,500
Feb - 10,430,000
Mar - 7,332,500

Lets use the Nov production. That is enough for 55,325 Spit VIX sorties or 1844 sorties/day or 369 sorties/day per each of the 5 Sqns Kurfy says were equiped with Spit XIVs.

[Squire]

Reply 101 wohoo!

Thats it for me, this is all a retread of a retread re the RAF.

RAF use is well documented, as is the fuel availability,and originally this was a "what fuel did the XIV need for +21 lbs thread", which has been answered fully.  

As for USAAF use,  I would like to get samples of USAAF P-51 combat reports indicating the manifold inches used in WEP. Not just for the 8th, but the 9th and 15th AF as well. That will tell us what they were using better than anything.

Will have to dig around some.

[MiloMorai]

Yes Squire, Kurfy is like a skipping record. He keeps coming back recycling his old topics, ignoring all that he has been told before.

[Crumpp]

RAF use is well documented, as is the fuel availability,and originally this was a "what fuel did the XIV need for +21 lbs thread", which has been answered fully.

I agree it saw much more widespread use in the RAF than the USAAF.  It does not look like the RAF made the grievous mistake adopting "Pep" so they only had fouling/backfire issues at cruising speeds.

However it looks like the technical difficulties were not overcome for long duration missions until very late in the war if at all.

Looks to me like in spite of a desire to get the fuel into general service; it remained a special purpose item.  Kind of reminds me of C3-Einspritzung.

Not surprising either given the difficulties associated with high-octane fuels.  On a side note it is interesting that during the war, the allies did not have an explanation for the high aromatic content of the synthetic fuels.  In Post war NACA studies, a high aromatic content solved many of the problems experienced by high-octane fuels.

Kurfurst, I do not follow you on the shortage issue.  Looks to me, like supply was not the issue.  Technical difficulties and the resulting maintenance logistics are more of an issue IMHO.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kurfürst]

Originally posted by Neil Stirling1
It has been decided to change the grade of fuel consummed by the 2nd TAF from 100 octane/130 to 100 octane /150 from 15th December 1944.

[/B]

You mean it was planned, but my question was again that do you have evidence of shipments to the units themselves so that they

Sorry but fuel in STORAGE . wont fly aircraft in the field 15 000 tons, hmm, enough for less than a month of use for so many aircraft, considering the other documents you brought up showed 20 000 tons of 150 grade being the monthly requirement of the 8th AF alone, while those dozen or less RAF anti-diver squadrons consumed 12 000 alone in July. So hardly I can see being the stuff being in widespread service as you claim, some limited use by priviliged squadrons, yep.

Question is, how many of those 1000 + fighters of the 2nd TAF was actually running on high boost. It seems not many.
You were unable, or unwilling to show us any documentation of shipments to the UNITs themselves, nor any documentation on the number of squadrons that would run on such boost, why is that I ask.

Why post the April 1946 edition of the Spitfire XIV pilots notes.

Neil. [/B]

Quite a good question from you Neil, since I was going by YOUR logic. Not so long ago based on that a mid-42 109E manual lists the use of 1,4ata special WEP, you claimed it was not used before that at all. That was the logic you applied, now I apply the same, and I find you are appling the double standard, and despite the fact the even 1946 Spitfire XIV manual lists the boost as +18 lbs, no higher. By your logic it would mean there were no higher boost used before either.

In fact it would be very easy to post any manual for the XIV which would show +21 lbs being the limit - if there were any, that is.

So the question remains, how many of the 2nd TAFs squadrons were using high boost, from when in 1945. Thats the question you have to answer, Neil. I am asking that because originally you went the same way about the use of high boost in 1944 by the ADGB, ie. claiming it was in widespread use, and it was an exception to the rule for a squadron not to use it. But now we see it was technologically troublesome, which only enabled its use in response to serious threat by a handful of aircraft.