"Once Britain realised the value of Enigma and how important a part it could play, it was thought that only two commanders in the Royal Air Force, ACM Hugh Dowding and AVM Keith Park knew of its existence other than certain members of the War Office. In actual fact, historian Martin Gilbert has found that because messages were very slow in being deciphered, the information was often 48 hours old before it could have been handed to Fighter Command, and that Fighter Command C-in-C ACM Hugh Dowding did not know of its existence until October 16th 1940 when Dowding was added to the list of people that were made aware of Enigma's existence. In reality, most 'Ultra' decrypts were of limited value during the Battle of Britain, mainly due to the slow deciphering of the machine. The Germans changed the rotors of the machine daily which meant that each day the British had to determine which had been changed so that any codes could continue to be broken."
"So, did Enigma help Dowding on August 15th 1940 as Winterbotham stated in Bickers book. If this is true, then why didn't Enigma help Dowding when Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes were taken by surprise on August 18th 1940. And why didn't Enigma help Dowding when London was attacked on September 7th 1940. If they knew that an attack was to be made on London, why did Dowding ask AVM Keith Park to leave 11 Group HQ and join him in a conference at Fighter Command HQ.
On these theories, we can only be led to believe that the writings of John Ray are the more correct, which in turn means that Dowding did not have access to Enigma, and further to that, Intelligence had still not been able to efficiently interpret and decypher the German codes accurately during the time of the Battle of Britain."
Yet he did not recieve this intelligence that was so essential for the defence of GB during BoB that you claim that he did.
