Author Topic: Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.  (Read 1380 times)

Offline SFRT - Frenchy

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #45 on: July 11, 2006, 12:23:22 AM »
Dago, I believe if you checked into it, you would find the TOGA mode might not be like you think.

As far as your comment about TSRA, pardon me but it's bordeline lame. I do agree that Private pilots have no business around TSRA, but in the cargo business we are pretty tight on departure/arrival times. Granted we are not going to land in a level 5, but if we kept out of the legendary 20 miles, we would be out of business.:D Hey, that's why that several level of thunderstorms hehehe.

Anyway:

ORDER:               8400.10

APPENDIX:            4

BULLETIN TYPE:       Flight Standards Information
                     Bulletin (FSIB) for Air
                     Transportation (FSAT)

BULLETIN NUMBER:     FSAT 95-13

BULLETIN TITLE:      Recurrent Training on the Hazard of
                     Attempting to Counter Autopilot
                     Commands by Manual Control Forces
                     when the Airbus A-300/310 Series
                     Airplane Is Being Flown
                     with the Autopilot Engaged in the
                     Land or Go-Around Mode.

EFFECTIVE DATE:      05-15-95

TRACKING NUMBER:     NTSB Recommendation A-94-164
------------------------------------------------------

1.  BACKGROUND.  The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) issued a safety recommendation to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) that would require
operators of the Airbus A-300 and A-310 series airplanes
to provide immediate and recurrent training to
flightcrews on the hazard of attempting to counter
autopilot (AP) commands by manual control forces when the
airplane is being flown with the autopilot engaged in the
land or go-around mode.

A.  This recommendation was made because of an accident
involving a flightcrew that may have attempted to
override the autopilot while it was engaged in the
COMMAND mode.  This may have resulted in a out-of-trim
condition between the trimmable horizontal stabilizer
(THS) and the elevator.

B.  After reviewing accident data, the NTSB expressed
concerns regarding certain A-300 autopilot systems, since
the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript indicated the
flightcrew did not understand why the airplane failed to
respond to their control inputs.  Apparently, the
flightcrew did not realize their manual control inputs
were causing the autopilot to trim to an out-of-trim
condition in the airplane nose up (ANU) direction.

C.  The NTSB believes certain features of some A-300
autopilot/flight directors (AP/FD) may have contributed
to the crew's confusion:

(1)  The A-300 operating manual indicates that above
1,500 feet AGL, a force on the control column of about
33 pounds will result in the disengagement of the
autopilot.  However, when the airplane is below
1,500 feet AGL and the autopilot/flight director is in
the land or go-around  mode, the autopilot cannot be
disengaged by a force on the control column; AND, if a
pilot input force is applied to the control column at
this time, the input may result in the THS moving in a
direction opposite to the input, thereby possibly
creating an out-of-trim condition.

(2)  The operating manual for the airplane provides that,
except during the glideslope and localizer capture phase
of the land mode (when the "Supervisory Override
Function" permits the pilots to make control movement
inputs to assist the autopilot to make a smooth capture),
pilots should not attempt to override the autopilot.

(3)  The A-300 is not equipped with an out-of-trim
warning light.

(4)  During manual flight, use of the control wheel pitch
trim switches result in an audible "whooler" sound; but,
when the autopilot is engaged, autotrim movement of the
trimmable horizontal stabilizer has no such audible
signal.

(5)  In most autopilot/flight director modes, activation
of the control wheel pitch trim switches disengages the
autopilot - BUT, in the land or go-around mode, the pitch
trim switches neither disengage the autopilot nor move
the trimmable horizontal stabilizer.

2.  INDUSTRY-ISSUED BULLETINS.  Airbus Industries issued
Service Bulletin (SB) A-300-22-6021 which provides for a
modification to the flight control computer to change the
software control laws for the A-300-600.  This
modification provides for the disengagement of the
autopilot when a force of about 33 pounds is applied to
the control column in the land or go-around modes above
400 feet AGL.  Below this altitude, the autopilot cannot
be disengaged by a force on the control column.  The
manufacturer provides that below 400 feet, only slight
inputs on the control column would be needed to refine
the approach.  Additionally, if a pilot tried to counter
the autopilot inputs, the control forces should not
become very high prior to landing.  However, the
possibility for unintended pilot-induced trim movement
and maximum stabilizer up or down trim still exists.  
Such a situation could result in a stall or the airplane
landing in a nose-down attitude.

A.  The A-300 models affected by the SB are the B4-601,
B4-603, B4-605R, B4-622, B4-622R, and C4-620.  A similar
SB has been issued for the A-310.

[B}3.  AUTOPILOT DISCONNECT DIFFERENCES.  The autopilot
disconnect systems in the Airbus A-300 and A-310 are
significantly different from the disconnect systems
provided in other large transport-category airplanes.  
The lack of a stabilizer-in-motion warning appears to be
unique to the Airbus A-300 and A-310.  Pilots may not be
aware that under some circumstances the autopilot may
create an out-of-trim condition if they try to manually
control the airplane.  The A-300 and A-310 do not have
the autopilot disconnect safety features to alert pilots
that the THS is moving to oppose their manual control
inputs.  The accident may have been prevented if the
autopilot had disconnected as the pilot pushed forward on
the control column or if an alert had been provided to
the pilots that the THS was in motion.[/B]

4.  POLICY.  Principal operations inspectors (POI) whose
carriers operate Airbus A-300 and A-310 series aircraft
should immediately share the information contained in
this FSIB with their carriers.

A.  POI's should ensure that the operators of the
affected Airbus A-300 and A-310 series airplanes provide
immediate and recurrent training to flightcrews on the
hazards of attempting to counter autopilot commands by
manual control forces when the aircraft is flying with
the autopilot engaged and in the land or go-around mode.

B.  POI's should ensure that their operators' initial,
upgrade, transition, and recurrent training programs
include training on acceptable corrective actions which
include disconnecting the autopilot with the control
wheel disconnect button or through mode control panel.  
Training should also emphasize that if the autopilot has
not captured the stabilized approach, the pilot can
disconnect the autopilot and "hand" or manually fly the
approach if recoverable, or can initiate an immediate go-
around.

C.  POI's should ensure that their carriers operating the
affected Airbus A-300 and A-310 series aircraft comply
with the requirements of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 94-
21-07, "Airbus Model A310 and A300-600," effective
November 2, 1994.

5.  INQUIRIES.  This bulletin was developed by AFS-210.  
Any questions or comments should be directed to AFS-210
at (202) 267-3718.

6.  EXPIRATION.  This bulletin will expire on 05-31-96.




David R. Harrington

Dat jugs bro.

Terror flieger since 1941.
------------------------

Offline SFRT - Frenchy

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #46 on: July 11, 2006, 01:21:33 AM »
Toad, they do call it the "instinctive disconect":)

 

Disconnect A/THR:

 

Ø      Press instinctive disconnect pb on thrust levers

 

Ø      Place both levers to idle detent

 

Ø      Press off the A/THR pb on FCU when system active (green light goes out)

 

Ø      Set one thrust lever beyond MCT or both beyond CL detent when RA is below 100’


US Airways training notes , check auto flight system
Dat jugs bro.

Terror flieger since 1941.
------------------------

Offline Dago

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #47 on: July 11, 2006, 04:44:58 AM »
Quote
Originally posted by SFRT - Frenchy
Dago, I believe if you checked into it, you would find the TOGA mode might not be like you think.

As far as your comment about TSRA, pardon me but it's bordeline lame. I do agree that Private pilots have no business around TSRA, but in the cargo business we are pretty tight on departure/arrival times. Granted we are not going to land in a level 5, but if we kept out of the legendary 20 miles, we would be out of business.:D Hey, that's why that several level of thunderstorms hehehe.

Anyway:

ORDER:               8400.10

APPENDIX:            4

BULLETIN TYPE:       Flight Standards Information
                     Bulletin (FSIB) for Air
                     Transportation (FSAT)

BULLETIN NUMBER:     FSAT 95-13

BULLETIN TITLE:      Recurrent Training on the Hazard of
                     Attempting to Counter Autopilot
                     Commands by Manual Control Forces
                     when the Airbus A-300/310 Series
                     Airplane Is Being Flown
                     with the Autopilot Engaged in the
                     Land or Go-Around Mode.





All well and nice cut and paste, but how is this relevant to the discussion?

They weren't flying in the TOGA condition, they were on the ground in rollout.  The discussion started about whether they might have inadvertantly pushed the TOGA button and caused the aircraft to go to full thrust.   I still dont know if the 310 has a TOGA button, or if TOGA is selected by throttle advancement as on later model Airbus models.  I doubt if selecting TOGA on a 310 would cause full thrust response.
"Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, chocolate in one hand, martini in the other, body thoroughly used up, totally worn out and screaming "WOO HOO what a ride!"

Offline mora

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #48 on: July 11, 2006, 05:19:34 AM »
According to this accident report the A300/310 does have a TOGA mode which causes throttle response, the details of the system might be there:

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19940426-0&lang=en
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/Nagoya/nagoyarep/nagoya-top.html
« Last Edit: July 11, 2006, 05:23:50 AM by mora »

Offline Toad

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #49 on: July 11, 2006, 06:54:38 AM »
To wrap up though, if you activate the Go Around mode what the airplane does is dependent on the autopilot mode in conjunction with the autothrottle/autothrust mode.

Which is what I said way up thread.
If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude than the animated contest of freedom, go from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains sit lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen!

Offline Dago

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« Reply #50 on: July 11, 2006, 04:15:09 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by Toad
So when you're flying a coupled approach and push the throttles to the TOGA position, what does the autopilot do? Nothing? Or fly a G/A profile?


The couple approach is disengaged, and if a G/A profile or heading had been put in during the approach, it will be followed. (as I remember it anyway).
"Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, chocolate in one hand, martini in the other, body thoroughly used up, totally worn out and screaming "WOO HOO what a ride!"

Offline Toad

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #51 on: July 11, 2006, 06:14:02 PM »
Exactly.

If the G/A profile is in the Flight Management Computer...or whatever name it has on the Airbus side...  and you're fully coupled throughout, the aircraft will fly that profile and make the necessary thrust changes.

The names may be different but the systems have to do the same things in order to comply with the regs. If you activate the Go Around mode what the airplane does is dependent on the autopilot mode in conjunction with the autothrottle/autothrust mode
If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude than the animated contest of freedom, go from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains sit lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen!

Offline Dago

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #52 on: July 11, 2006, 10:00:38 PM »
Quote
Originally posted by Toad
Exactly.

If the G/A profile is in the Flight Management Computer...or whatever name it has on the Airbus side...  and you're fully coupled throughout, the aircraft will fly that profile and make the necessary thrust changes.

The names may be different but the systems have to do the same things in order to comply with the regs. If you activate the Go Around mode what the airplane does is dependent on the autopilot mode in conjunction with the autothrottle/autothrust mode


Don't lose track of the fact that the aircraft I am discussing drops the coupled approach and thrust is added because you have pushed the throttles to full power (TOGA detent position), it isn't like hitting a button.  Thrust management and flight profile are then controlled by the Flight Management Guidance Envelope Computers (FMGECs).

Someday I may explain to golfer the differance between autothrottles and autothrust.  :D
"Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, chocolate in one hand, martini in the other, body thoroughly used up, totally worn out and screaming "WOO HOO what a ride!"

Offline Golfer

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #53 on: July 11, 2006, 11:13:28 PM »
Quote
Someday I may explain to golfer the differance between autothrottles and autothrust


Oh thank heavens...now I'll finally know what those little bumps are when you move the throttles in an XLS and what they do.

Offline Toad

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #54 on: July 12, 2006, 07:12:18 AM »
Quote
Originally posted by Dago
Don't lose track of the fact that the aircraft I am discussing drops the coupled approach and thrust is added because you have pushed the throttles to full power (TOGA detent position), it isn't like hitting a button.  Thrust management and flight profile are then controlled by the Flight Management Guidance Envelope Computers (FMGECs).


In the end it sounds exactly like pushing a button, only the "button" is the throttles.

Flight management comes from a computer and thrust setting comes from a computer. There may be some differences in the sourcing and execution but the end result is the same. The aircraft flies the missed approach profile.
If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude than the animated contest of freedom, go from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains sit lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen!

Offline Fishu

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Irkutsk, A-310, board ¹ 778.
« Reply #55 on: July 12, 2006, 10:19:47 AM »
Yngh.. A320 and A310 are quite different in regards of flight management computer and how it acts with autopilot. Let alone that this issue doesn't have anything to do with the crash - unless it was a pilot error and the pilot DID NOT disengage autopilot on rollout, which is rather unlikely. Or if the pilot (again a pilot failure) executed missed approach too late and the downwards momentum nicely brought down the plane on the runway, but with full throttle instead, which again would lead to an another pilot error.

So what's the point of this GA discussion again?
« Last Edit: July 12, 2006, 10:21:57 AM by Fishu »

Offline Toad

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« Reply #56 on: July 12, 2006, 05:46:10 PM »
The point is that what the aircraft does..either the 310 or the 320... is dependent on the level of automation in use and what modes are selected at the time of G/A activation.

It's really true of any of the Cat III capable aircraft regardless of brand. The methodologies may be slightly different but the end result has to be the same to meet Cat III regs.
If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude than the animated contest of freedom, go from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains sit lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen!