Dago, I believe if you checked into it, you would find the TOGA mode might not be like you think.
As far as your comment about TSRA, pardon me but it's bordeline lame. I do agree that
Private pilots have no business around TSRA, but in the cargo business we are pretty tight on departure/arrival times. Granted we are not going to land in a level 5, but if we kept out of the legendary 20 miles, we would be out of business.
Hey, that's why that several level of thunderstorms hehehe.
Anyway:
ORDER: 8400.10
APPENDIX: 4
BULLETIN TYPE: Flight Standards Information
Bulletin (FSIB) for Air
Transportation (FSAT)
BULLETIN NUMBER: FSAT 95-13
BULLETIN TITLE: Recurrent Training on the Hazard of
Attempting to Counter Autopilot
Commands by Manual Control Forces
when the Airbus A-300/310 Series
Airplane Is Being Flown
with the Autopilot Engaged in the
Land or Go-Around Mode.
EFFECTIVE DATE: 05-15-95
TRACKING NUMBER: NTSB Recommendation A-94-164
------------------------------------------------------
1. BACKGROUND. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) issued a safety recommendation to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) that would require
operators of the Airbus A-300 and A-310 series airplanes
to provide immediate and recurrent training to
flightcrews on the hazard of attempting to counter
autopilot (AP) commands by manual control forces when the
airplane is being flown with the autopilot engaged in the
land or go-around mode.
A. This recommendation was made because of an accident
involving a flightcrew that may have attempted to
override the autopilot while it was engaged in the
COMMAND mode. This may have resulted in a out-of-trim
condition between the trimmable horizontal stabilizer
(THS) and the elevator.
B. After reviewing accident data, the NTSB expressed
concerns regarding certain A-300 autopilot systems, since
the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript indicated the
flightcrew did not understand why the airplane failed to
respond to their control inputs. Apparently, the
flightcrew did not realize their manual control inputs
were causing the autopilot to trim to an out-of-trim
condition in the airplane nose up (ANU) direction.
C. The NTSB believes certain features of some A-300
autopilot/flight directors (AP/FD) may have contributed
to the crew's confusion:
(1) The A-300 operating manual indicates that above
1,500 feet AGL, a force on the control column of about
33 pounds will result in the disengagement of the
autopilot. However, when the airplane is below
1,500 feet AGL and the autopilot/flight director is in
the land or go-around mode, the autopilot cannot be
disengaged by a force on the control column; AND, if a
pilot input force is applied to the control column at
this time, the input may result in the THS moving in a
direction opposite to the input, thereby possibly
creating an out-of-trim condition.
(2) The operating manual for the airplane provides that,
except during the glideslope and localizer capture phase
of the land mode (when the "Supervisory Override
Function" permits the pilots to make control movement
inputs to assist the autopilot to make a smooth capture),
pilots should not attempt to override the autopilot.
(3) The A-300 is not equipped with an out-of-trim
warning light.
(4) During manual flight, use of the control wheel pitch
trim switches result in an audible "whooler" sound; but,
when the autopilot is engaged, autotrim movement of the
trimmable horizontal stabilizer has no such audible
signal.
(5) In most autopilot/flight director modes, activation
of the control wheel pitch trim switches disengages the
autopilot - BUT, in the land or go-around mode, the pitch
trim switches neither disengage the autopilot nor move
the trimmable horizontal stabilizer.
2. INDUSTRY-ISSUED BULLETINS. Airbus Industries issued
Service Bulletin (SB) A-300-22-6021 which provides for a
modification to the flight control computer to change the
software control laws for the A-300-600. This
modification provides for the disengagement of the
autopilot when a force of about 33 pounds is applied to
the control column in the land or go-around modes above
400 feet AGL. Below this altitude, the autopilot cannot
be disengaged by a force on the control column. The
manufacturer provides that below 400 feet, only slight
inputs on the control column would be needed to refine
the approach. Additionally, if a pilot tried to counter
the autopilot inputs, the control forces should not
become very high prior to landing. However, the
possibility for unintended pilot-induced trim movement
and maximum stabilizer up or down trim still exists.
Such a situation could result in a stall or the airplane
landing in a nose-down attitude.
A. The A-300 models affected by the SB are the B4-601,
B4-603, B4-605R, B4-622, B4-622R, and C4-620. A similar
SB has been issued for the A-310.
[B}3. AUTOPILOT DISCONNECT DIFFERENCES. The autopilot
disconnect systems in the Airbus A-300 and A-310 are
significantly different from the disconnect systems
provided in other large transport-category airplanes.
The lack of a stabilizer-in-motion warning appears to be
unique to the Airbus A-300 and A-310. Pilots may not be
aware that under some circumstances the autopilot may
create an out-of-trim condition if they try to manually
control the airplane. The A-300 and A-310 do not have
the autopilot disconnect safety features to alert pilots
that the THS is moving to oppose their manual control
inputs. The accident may have been prevented if the
autopilot had disconnected as the pilot pushed forward on
the control column or if an alert had been provided to
the pilots that the THS was in motion.[/B]
4. POLICY. Principal operations inspectors (POI) whose
carriers operate Airbus A-300 and A-310 series aircraft
should immediately share the information contained in
this FSIB with their carriers.
A. POI's should ensure that the operators of the
affected Airbus A-300 and A-310 series airplanes provide
immediate and recurrent training to flightcrews on the
hazards of attempting to counter autopilot commands by
manual control forces when the aircraft is flying with
the autopilot engaged and in the land or go-around mode.
B. POI's should ensure that their operators' initial,
upgrade, transition, and recurrent training programs
include training on acceptable corrective actions which
include disconnecting the autopilot with the control
wheel disconnect button or through mode control panel.
Training should also emphasize that if the autopilot has
not captured the stabilized approach, the pilot can
disconnect the autopilot and "hand" or manually fly the
approach if recoverable, or can initiate an immediate go-
around.
C. POI's should ensure that their carriers operating the
affected Airbus A-300 and A-310 series aircraft comply
with the requirements of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 94-
21-07, "Airbus Model A310 and A300-600," effective
November 2, 1994.
5. INQUIRIES. This bulletin was developed by AFS-210.
Any questions or comments should be directed to AFS-210
at (202) 267-3718.
6. EXPIRATION. This bulletin will expire on 05-31-96.
David R. Harrington
