Euro Missle Shield

[sgt203]

Originally posted by babek-
I highly doubt that such a defense system will work properly. It will just be a kind of Maginot Line which costs much money and will be in the case of cases worthless.

Then there are no iranian missiles which could reach Europe.

And why should they?

Iran is not the enemy of Europe and Europe not the enemy of Iran.

In contrary there are still good relation ships with european nations.

Even with the embargo there are still close economical ties.

Some few examples:
France, Italy and Germany have built or are building production centres in Iran which produce copies of Renaults, Fiat and Mercedes.
There is even a discussion to build a Transrapid railway system in Iran - done by a german company.

Also Iran and many european nations have also historical ties reaching hundreds of years back to history and still active today.

The simple "Iran will attack Europe - so we must protect Europe by installing defense missiles in Poland" is like one of these propaganda stories we heared before many wars.

There is no hate between Iranians and europeans. And no danger of an iranian attack.

Yes there is no need to protect France or Europe since they gave them nuclear reactors..  "We are friends". And we all know that Muslim extremists would never attack european targets.

I seem to remember there was a  non aggression pact between Germany and Russia at the outbreak of WWII... They were "officially friends" and we all know how well that woprked out between the two "friends"..

Somebody needs a pinch to wake up and see this for what it really is..

[Tango]

Originally posted by Boroda
We will be always against NATO/US (enemy) activities near our borders. We withdrew from Eastern Europe, refrained from arms race - and you keep pressing on us, immediately forgetting about all promises you made, like NATO non-spreading eastwards.

So you blame the US for eastern block nations joining NATO? Perhaps if your country hadn't invaded them and made them slaves they wouldn't be so eager to defend themselves by joining NATO.

[Vad]

Originally posted by CFYA

Yes inorder to be effective the radar has to be as close to launch point as possible in order to give the most warning.

Great. I don't completely agree with that, but it's irrelevant to this discussion, and I take your arguments completely.

Yes this system would be in place to stop incoming threats to Europe.

(On that note, the US is not saying this particular site is designed to stop North Korean threats. It is more or less grouping threats together in attemp to explain why the system was desgned in the first place. The sight in Poland is for protection from Iran. Other sights near Korea would be for defending local assets from Korean missiles. North Korea and Iran have nothing in common other than using the same system at both locations. Neither location is capable or intended to protect anyone from both threats. Make sense?)

Sorry, it doesn't make sense.

Threats to Europe from where? From North Korea? As you said it is not against North Korea, it's too far from there. The US, according to your words, said the same but I didn't see that in public sources. Bush has been telling about threat from North Korea.

From Iran? But why didn't you try to set this system near Iranean borders? Turkey, Greece, Iraq, Israel (much closer, at least), Pakistan. Don't tell me that they hate you and wouldn't allow you to set up this stuff on their soil.
And, by the way, you contradict your President, he said that a lot of times - this defence is against Iran and North Korea, period. I don't think I have to search Google to prove that.

One more thing. Iran doesn't have and in near future won't have missiles capable to hit Europe. There is no sense for Iran to attack  Europe, Europe is the biggest Iran's trade partner. Actually, they even don't have any problems in their relationships. Why? North Korea doesn't even know that there is something named "Europe", they are too far on East.

The US has a spaced base launch detection system. We do not absolutly have to have a EW radar anywhere on the ground. In fact I am not sure if the DEW lines are still operational. Your arguement is that the detection of Russian ICBM launch (which is what your saying this is used for) is the biggest threat to Russia correct?

My counter to that is we already have had sateilites in the air for some time specificly to detect Russian attacks.This negates your whole arguement. What is your reponse?

ok But why do you need this system in Eastern Europe? If you can detect even Russian missiles  you for sure can detect North Korean and Iranian missiles. To shoot them down is much easy to have anti-missiles near their boards not in Poland. You know, it will be too late to shoot them down there, they will explode anyway. Poor Poland....

This missile system is a threat to any nation launching ballistic vehicles.

Greate!!!  Wonderful!!! You've  said that!
Yes, Russia can launch ballistic vehicles, and this is threat for Russia. Russia is acting accordingly.
From this point, I don't see anything where we are not agree.

Poland is seperated from mainland Russia by hundreds of miles and  6 countries. IMO this is not the borders of Russia.

Did I miss any questions?

CFYA

Hundreds of miles is nothing for missiles. About six countries... ok, I've always known that geography is not strong sute of Americans but 6 is really too much

[CFYA]

From memory there is Ukraine, Belarus, Lithunia, Latvia, Estonia, and Little Russia so I count 6. If you want to get technical....its 5. I count the that little bit a Russia on the Poland border as a rogue state. Incorrect or not.....

Further more this system shoots missiles down as they reenter. This is not a boost phase interceptor. Its reentery kill vehicle. That is why its not on the Iranian border. It is simply not capable of chasing a boosted ICBM down. The reason we are concerned with Iran is Korea as sold them the technology to build vehicle reaching Europe. By there very nature nuclear weapons are designed not to blow up with out being triggered. If impacted there would be a fallout but doubtfully an explosion.

Iran.....In short they do not have the capability to strike Europe today but the technology is in there hands.


CFYA

[Vad]

Originally posted by CFYA
From memory there is Ukraine, Belarus, Lithunia, Latvia, Estonia, and Little Russia so I count 6. If you want to get technical....its 5. I count the that little bit a Russia on the Poland border as a rogue state. Incorrect or not.....

Ok, but they are not like this

P(Poland) - U -B- L -L -E - and finally Russia.

They are like this:

   E-R
P-R
P-L-L-R
P-B-R
P-U-R

Sorry, but there is no 6 countries between Poland and Russia.

Further more this system shoots missiles down as they reenter. This is not a boost phase interceptor. Its reentery kill vehicle. That is why its not on the Iranian border. It is simply not capable of chasing a boosted ICBM down.

Ok, it's something new. I've  never seen that anybody anywhere disclosed details about that system.
I have no intention to say that you are wrong. I just kindly ask you to give me a link to reliable sources.  Otherwise it will be some kind of problem where we are not to say being completely disagree but we have some ground to be not completely agree.

The reason we are concerned with Iran is Korea as sold them the technology to build vehicle reaching Europe.

Right now North Korea has missiles which theoretically can hit something not far from Japan, and in practice can't hit anything far from 200 meters from the point of launching. If Iran bought that rockets I don't understand why did you even think about them? There are lot of idiots on this planet, are you worrying about all of them?

Sorry, it was joke. I  don't know North Korenean technology, but I think you don't know too.

By there very nature nuclear weapons are designed not to blow up with out being triggered. If impacted there would be a fallout but doubtfully an explosion.

It's not true. Yes, destroyed warhead can't blow up. But all warheads being damaged will self-destructed, and all that AMS at the best can damage warhead and force self-destruction.

Sorry, I was trained as guidance officer of C-125 (NATO classification "Goa")
Among others we can work against tactical missiles on the end part of the trajectory. We were told too many times that it will be our last shot...

I'm very glad to hear that our officers were wrong, and American warheads are designed another way.

But Russins are designed that way.

Iran.....In short they do not have the capability to strike Europe today but the technology is in there hands.
CFYA

This world is changing so fast that before Iran will get technology Russia and USA will destroy this f...g world. Just to be the first.

Really, it's a little bit offensive, you know. The USA and the USSR spent a lot of time, money and lives to create that weapons, and what? Iran came and got that all glory! No, we (Russia and USA) were the first, its our right and privilege to powder this little planet!
Nice...

[Wolfala]

Vad,

I'll attempt to answer your questions about THAAD since I did much of my thesis work on it during college, and take my A&P with one of the guidence system designers in Palo Alto from Lockheed. Basically i'm gonna dump one of the THAAD whitepapers I did during university on you.

Theater Missile Defense: A technical and historical evaluation of TMD Systems and the proposed Theater Missile Defense.

Alexander Wolf
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign


                            Executive Summary
   

Former President Ronald Regan’s March 1983 speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) rekindled the flames of a major policy debate.  This policy shift came complete with its own acronym—GPALS for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes.  
   However, with the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, only a few months passed when the threat of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM) to deployed U.S. forces was fully realized.  This was a devastating indictment to the U.S. theater missile defense capabilities or lack there of.  The Department of Defense (DOD) spelled out the essence of TBMs and the political and military incentives for acquiring them in the final report to Congress on the Gulf War:
   The Gulf War was not the first time in which ballistic missiles were used, and there is no reason to think that it will be the last.  Ballistic missiles offered Saddam Hussein some of his few, limited successes and were the only means by which he had a plausible opportunity (via attacks on Israel) to achieve a strategic objective.  While the Patriot did help to counter Saddam Hussein’s use of conventionally armed Scud missiles, more advanced types of ballistic missiles, some armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads, will likely exist in the inventories of a number of third world nations.  
The planned US TMD system is designed to intercept incoming warheads after their release by the missile, and before reentry into the atmosphere.  This system would be a mid-course defense, being land based and exo-atmospheric with no explosive warhead, but instead relying on the kinetic energy of the interceptor to destroy the reentry vehicles.  In this paper I will outline how the human operator analyzes attack information, and his options to that information.  




Section 1: Introduction
The concept of “Theater Missile Defense” or TMD has been a question in the minds of U.S. leaders and the military since the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991.  While a consensus may be emerging on the need for some kind of Theater Missile Defense, there is currently no agreement on the technical feasibility of such hit-to-kill systems.
   While National Missile Defense is still in its planning stage, plagued by cost overruns and political wrangling, TMD is an evolving concept that is beginning to look more appealing to many people.  
   TMD, as presently defined, consists of lower tier and upper tier defense systems.  Those systems for the lower tier are Patriot Advance Capability-2 (PAC-2) and (PAC-3).
The upper tier utilizes the Theater High Altitude Area Defense missile system (THAAD).  This paper will discuss the following:
•   Section 1:  Introduction
•   Section 2:  A Brief Historical Perspective on TBM Defenses
•   Section 3:  The Patriot’s History and Field Performance  
•   Section 4:  PAC-3  and Lower Tier Development
•   Section 5:  THAAD and Upper Tier Development
•   Section 6:  Will Technology Work?
•   Section 7:  What should be done?
•   Section 8:  Human Factors Considerations

Section 2: A Brief Historical Perspective of TBM Defenses
TMD is not a new concept.  Its origin, as with many other rocket and guided missile concepts, can be traced to the 1950s at the Army’s Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama.  At that time, ballistic missile defense was an outgrowth of air defense, specifically the Nike family of air defense missiles, which began in the 1953-1955 timeframe.  
The Nike Zeus is aerodynamically very similar to the Nike Hercules, just scaled up.  However, the Nike Zeus was designed for a very different mission - it was designed to perform an interception of ballistic missile reentry vehicles (RV) at high altitude. Like Nike Hercules, it was a two stage missile but instead of using the Nike Ajax booster, a new booster was used which was the largest single chamber solid rocket motor produced in the U.S. at that time delivering over 450,000 lbs. of thrust.
The Nike Zeus had a very short life as it only had a small number of launchers before being replaced by the Nike Zeus B.
The capability of the missile was constrained by a 200-mile range restriction that was issued by Secretary of Defense Wilson in 28 November 1956.  This restriction was rescinded 12 months later once Sputnik 1 had orbited the earth.  This then allowed the U.S. Army to develop the Nike Zeus B that overcame some of the limitations already present and known in the Nike Zeus A.
It was not until January 1963 that development started on a redesigned Nike Zeus system called Nike X.  Compared to Nike Zeus, this system consisted of two missiles, phased array radars and higher capacity data processing.  The Nike EX missile, which was a longer and heavier version of the Nike Zeus B missile, performed an exo-atmospheric interception of the RV. Another shorter range missile also was required, which was called Sprint, which provided a last ditch defense against warheads that had either evaded the Nike EX or which had been let through.  Through the use of phased array radars and high performance computers, the system was able to track and intercept multiple targets at once.
By October 1965 the design for Nike X had been completed and contracts were let. The Prime contractor for Nike EX was Western Electric Company, which was under direction of Huntsville Alabama.  Bell Telephone Laboratories had research and development responsibility while McDonnell Douglas Astronautics, under direction from Bell, was responsible for missile development.
This system was essentially the system that went operational despite numerous changes in the name of the program.  With each change of program name came a change in deployment, rather than a change in hardware.
For Patriot, the concept for an all weather non-nuclear air defense missile began in the early 60’s by the U.S. Army Missile Command.  The Patriot’s first test launch was in 1970, with full-scale development work completed by 1981.  The first production examples were then delivered in 1982, however a number of hardware and training problems arose.  In order to keep the Patriot in line with future technological developments, the missile has undergone several improvements to increase its capabilities.  PAC-1 capability was achieved in 1986 with the successful interception of a LANCE target TBM.  The PAC-2 modification involved software changes in the Fire Control Radar, as well as a new missile warhead casing, with enhanced explosives and a fusing system with a second set of forward-angled beams designed to optimize warhead detonation against targets with a very high rate of closure.    The deployment of PAC-2 during Operation Desert Storm marked the first use of TMD in a combat situation.

Section 3: The Patriot’s History and Field Performance
   The Patriot missile system was not the spectacular success in the Persian Gulf War that the American public was led to believe.  There is little evidence to prove that the Patriot hit more than a few Scud missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, and there are some doubts about even those engagements.  

The public and Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by the administration in Washington and by the Raytheon representatives during and after the war.  It is probable that many of the individuals giving such statements, including the President of the United States and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, were not aware at the time that the claims of PAC-2’s success were false.
The speed of the Scuds, the limitations of the Patriot missile system, and the confusion with targeting difficulties caused by the breakup of the Scud missile as it reentered the atmosphere seem to have contributed to the high failure rate.

   Regarding video footage taken during the Gulf War, a panel of expert witnesses disagreed over the reliability of video footage of Patriot engagements that seemed to show Patriots consistently missing the Scuds at which they were aimed.  Dr. Theodore Postol of MIT explained:
The Patriot can be thought of as a platform which carries a shotgun that sprays pellets at the target it is to destroy....if the Patriot fires its pellets at a range much greater than 5 to 10 meters from its target, it will be increasingly unlikely that even one pellet will hit the target.  Thus, a 30 meter miss distance is nine times less likely to damage the target than a 10 meter miss and a 100 meter miss is 100 times less likely to damage the target.  This means that if miss distances much larger than 100 meters are observed, the result will be a near zero probability that even one pellet from the interceptor will have hit the target.

[Wolfala]

The Patriot was not designed to explode upon impact with its target, thus, the explosions in the sky were a misleading indicator of success for both troops and the public.  The system also cannot determine if the Patriot missile actually hit its intended target.  It can only determine that it detonated near a point in space where it calculated the target should be, sending back a "probable kill" indicator, or that the missile missed and, therefore, detonated to self-destruct.   At least 45 percent of the 158 Patriots launched in the war were launched against debris or false targets.

Even for those warheads correctly targeted, the Patriot must detonate within a few meters of the Scud to have a high probability of destroying the warhead, according to the Army.  However, the Patriot's fuse could detonate at up to six times the required miss distance, resulting in an extremely low or no probability of kill, yet the computer would still record the engagement as a probable kill.


In addition to the probable kill indicator and other tracking data, the Army assessment relies heavily on reports of ground damage.  In every case a warhead kill was claimed, the absence of ground damage is cited as evidence of Patriot success.   However, intelligence officials that collected many of these reports from military personnel in the war say that they are unverified, contradictory, erroneous and misleading.   Many of the Scuds claimed as warhead kills landed in the desert, the sea or sparsely populated areas.
Finally, some Scuds that were not engaged by Patriots exhibited characteristics identical to those cited as evidence of Patriot interceptions.  Such characteristics are pitting in the Scud’s airframe, scorch marks, missing missile debris, or unexploded warheads.  


The Gulf War illuminated the troublesome reality that rogue states increasingly have access to missile technology and weapons of mass destruction that could threaten U.S. troops abroad.  With the limited success of PAC-2 in Operation Desert Storm, this promoted a broad reassessment of the importance of BMD from defense against strategic missiles to defense against the more technically manageable Theater missile threat.  As a result of these reevaluations, this led to the expansion and planned improvement of existing anti-TBM weapons systems.  

Section 4: PAC-3 and Lower Tier Development
   PAC-3 (formerly ERINT) began in 1983 but came of age in 1994 when the ERINT was chosen for PAC-3.  The PAC-3 uses hit-to-kill as its prime kill mechanism, as opposed to PAC-2 with a proximity warhead detonation.  The PAC-3 is designed to use the Patriot launcher unit, as well as the existing Fire Control Radar.  The actual missile is 5.2 meters in length weighing about 315kg.  Its PAC-2 brother weighs in at nearly 900kg for the same length.  As a result of this weight reduction, the PAC-3 can engage TBMs at twice the altitude and protect 16 times the ground area of PAC-2 missiles deployed during Operation Desert Storm.  
It is important to recognize that PAC-3 was specifically designed to intercept short-range TBMs and cruise missiles over a wide range of closure speeds and altitudes.  PAC-2 was rolled into Saudi Arabia and Israel as it was conceived as a system for use against high altitude aircraft and fast movers.  It was later rolled in through SDI as a last ditch ballistic missile defense.  PAC-2 and PAC-3 will comprise the lower tier of any theater missile defense.  

Section 5: THAAD and Upper Tier Development
   The THAAD system is envisioned as an easily transportable battery of weapons capable of hit-to-kill intercepts of incoming tactical and theater ballistic missiles at heights as much as 20 to 150 times greater then those defended by Patriot.
This would then allow the current air defense systems to preserve their primary mission of anti aircraft defense, while being backed up by the PAC-2 and PAC-3 lower tier defensive architecture.  Current U.S. Army predictions indicate that THAAD is capable of addressing 80 % of the current TBM threats.  
The THAAD system, with launchers and fire control units, is based on air transportable trucks.  It is capable of being cued to fire by either space-based sensor satellites such as Brilliant Eyes or the 9.2m2 I/J-band Ground-Based Radar.  The radar in question is capable of acquiring targets upwards of 1000km distant.  
The actual missile is 6.2 meters long, weighing in at 900kg.  The missile is a single-stage, solid-fueled weapon capable of both exo and endo-atmospheric intercepts.  What is unique about THAAD is that it employs thrust vectoring technology for maneuvering and a high performance liquid-fueled Divert-and-Attitude-Control System (DACS) for terminal seeking in the forward nosecone, which separates from the missile body before impact.  

Section 6: Will Technology Work?

   There’s a common perception that the U.S. missile defense programs have yet to prove that hit-to-kill capability can be achieved with sufficient reliability under plausible real world circumstances.  The TMD and NMD development programs are intended to prove the viability of hit-to-kill by the time the systems are to be deployed in the 2005-2008 timeframe.  There have now been six successful intercepts by hit-to-kill systems.  The much-publicized failure experienced by missile defense proponents doesn’t impute the technological development.  Instead they have been attributed to quality-control problems, schedule issues, and lack of adequate resources.  

   A serious issue facing TMD deployment is that of countermeasures.  Webster defines countermeasure as an action or device designed to negate or offset another; especially: a military system or device intended to thwart a sensing mechanism (as radar).  

   It is a well-known fact that with any new weapons platform a countermeasure to it will be developed given enough effort.  With this in mind, the attacker has a strong advantage because the defense must commit to a specific technology and architecture before the attacker does.

   Because the defender would not know what countermeasures are likely to be used in a possible attack, the defense must thereby commit oneself to a test program for all plausible threats within the weapons system that is being developed.

   The countermeasure threat is very complicated, but is present with every weapons system in existence.  For TMD, one can overwhelm the defense by producing too many false targets, or decoys for the THAAD or PAC-2 or 3 to target.  There are several classes of decoys:  (1) replica decoys, which replicate the warhead as closely as possible; (2) decoys using anti-simulation, in which the warhead itself is disguised to mimic a decoy.   By using anti-simulation, the attacker can disguise the warhead in several ways; by using radar reflective materials such as a balloon; by using electronic decoys, or by using infrared (IR) flares.  

   Reducing the radar cross section of the warhead reduces the range at which the THADD or PAC-3 can effectively detect and intercept it.  
   To counter any developments in IR seeker technology, a nitrogen shroud could cool the actual RV, reducing the range at which IR sensors could detect the warhead.  

Decoys are particularly suited for THAAD, which operates in the exo -atmospheric envelope of space.  Decoys would then travel at the same speed of the actual reentry vehicle until being separated by atmospheric drag.  

   Replica decoys look the same as the warhead to sensors, but are much lighter in weight.  If successful, the use of replicas would leave the defense with the choice of firing at either every possible target, or letting the warhead penetrate to the lower tier engagement zone of PAC.  

   An attack using replica decoys might consider capitalizing on the small differences between the warhead and decoys to the engagement sensors.  One way to address this problem would be to make the warhead look as strange as any other decoy, all being dissimilar from each other.  Each decoy would have a different Radar cross-section (RCS), some with smaller weights, others with heavier weights then the actual RV.  

   With anti-simulation, the attacker takes the ruse one step further by modifying the appearance of the warhead.   The attacker simulates the decoy in place of the warhead, which greatly complicates the defense designed.  The attacker can either use decoys to disguise the warhead, or exploit the advantages of signature diversity by using decoys that vary in appearance, differing from the warhead and each other.  

   One possible anti-simulation strategy would be to enclose the warhead in a metal Mylar balloon.  This would be released with a large number of empty balloons.   Because radar cannot penetrate the metal, the warhead is in effect hidden from view, covering its approach until hitting the outer atmosphere, leaving it to be engaged by late fired upper tier or lower tier elements.  

   Chaff is the oldest trick in the book, but an effective one at that.  Rather than hiding the warhead within a balloon, you can hide it within a cloud of radar reflective metal strips for less then $1.99.  Since radar can’t penetrate each chaff cloud, each cloud would in effect act as a solitary decoy, thereby hiding the approaching RV.  Of course, the THAAD could be equipped with an IR seeker in lieu of the primary radar for terminal guidance.

[Wolfala]

Another method at defeating the upper tier is to use electronic decoys to drown out the reflected radar signals.  Since the inception of electronic counter measures (ECM), the objective of jamming has been to disrupt, degrade and deny the threats kill chain — the sequence of events that must occur for a threat to successfully engage and kill a target.  This involves the identification of the threat system’s kill chain elements, followed by the exploitation of the kill chain’s vulnerabilities. The weakest link or links of the kill chain are usually threat-system dependent.  Robustness is achieved by not relying on the disruption of one element of the chain, but rather by disrupting or degrading multiple kill-chain elements. It should also be noted that disrupting or degrading the kill chain can begin days before the missile launch, in the context of information warfare or information dominance.  

   "Once radar was established as an important means of detecting and locating enemy ships, aircraft and missiles, it could be only a matter of time before somebody thought of jamming it."   Jamming systems designed to defeat radars were developed nearly simultaneously with the first radar tests and deployments.  If radar designs were constant, defeating the radar system would be simple.  Unfortunately, radar improvement and countermeasure response involve a continual cycle of response and counter-response. As radar-system lethality improves, platform survivability and mission success degrades, and an improved countermeasure response is necessitated.

Section 7: What Should Be Done?
   The emerging ballistic missile capability of potential adversaries could pose a serious threat to the national security strategy, military operations abroad, and, territorial interests to the United States.  It is in my opinion that development of PAC-3 and THADD into an operations capable TMD system should be pursued, with regard to the technologies, systems, and architectures with which to meet the security challenge posed by TBMs.  
   On the basis of the above discussion, it is clear that the United States requires missile defenses considerably more capable then those provided by any previous administration in the past.  The defenses deployed must be capable of defeating a threat that cannot be fully defended at this moment but that appears to be growing at an appreciable rate by renegade states abroad.  To deter pursuit of ballistic missile options, if possible, and defeat those threats that cannot be deterred, such defenses need to have a demonstrated capability, as early as feasible, to engage a technologically sophisticated TBM threat.  
   Emerging ballistic missile capabilities could provide as many surprises in the next 7 years as they have in the past 12.  Planning now to address the expected evolution of the ballistic missile threat as well as the likelihood for any surprises requires focusing R&D on follow-on defenses to THAAD and PAC.
   The United States requires a theater missile defense program with maximum flexibility in research, development and testing.  This will allow for the best chances that deployed defensive capabilities could maintain pace with an evolving threat and might help dissuade nations hostile to the United States and its allies from pursuing ballistic missile options.  At present, the United States faces an emerging threat that will be relatively limited in both numbers and technical sophistication.  But there is no reason to believe that, left unopposed, the current threat to U.S. forces abroad will remain small and simple.  

Section 8:  Human Factors Considerations

To intercept and destroy incoming RV’s, the system must first detect the launch of the ballistic missile and determine the general direction the missile is traveling.  The United States currently operates a system of early warning satellites in geo-synchronous orbit that us infrared sensors to detect the hot plume of a missile booster.  

   The data from the early warning satellites would be fed to the battle management center, located at the THADD launch vehicle BMC.  Based on the length of time the booster burns, the launch location, and the rough trajectory information provided by the early warning satellites, the battle management center would determine whether the missile poses a possible threat to the US forces an whether the THADD system might have the intercept it.  

   The job of the defense us technically more complex and thus, more difficult then the offense.  Any defense must be active, and thereby respond to any outside stimulus.  In contrast, the offense can be entirely passive, its actions independent of what the defense does.  Compounding the problem is the availability of time.  With ICBM’s, the human element in the loop has roughly 30 minutes with which to make a decision.  With theater ballistic missiles, since the range is roughly 1/8 that of the ICBM, time is cut to a short 3-5 minutes.  If that wasn’t enough, the confusion that would almost certainly accompany an actual attack would complicate the job of defense.  

   Not only must the defense be effective to be useful, but in most cases the defense must also know with a high level of confidence how effective the system is.  Effectiveness and confidence level are two very different things, but both are needed to describe a system.  Effectiveness is the property of the system, and testing is used to determine what the effectiveness is.  Confidence level describes how well the systems effectiveness is known as a result of testing.  

Indeed, consistent with its mission of intercepting nuclear warheads, THADD has a design requirement of 95 percent effectiveness with 95 percent confidence against a small scale missile attack.  Yet, an effectiveness of 95 percent is rarely—if ever—achieved by a complex military weapons system that faces countermeasures, even after years of use.

   As illustrated previously, there are significant time restraints with TBM’s and ICBM’s given their deadly payload.  The problems with Human Operator Limits in Tracking (Chapter 10 – Manual Control) are immense.  These are:  processing time, information transmission rate, predictive capabilities, and processing resources.

   When a missile launch is detected by an early warning DSP satellite, when dealing with processing time and human response, there is a lag which is extremely harmful.  This lag could be caused by shock of the launch, in essence human nature taking over.  Often this could lead the defensive operators to lose track of what is required of them:  launch location, target discrimination, determine if the missile poses a threat, and if so, how to engage the threat.  

   The amount of bandwidth in this system is a function of how many targets are being tracked by the operator.  If the system is saturated, the operators predictive capabilities will be lessened and a missile might breech the protective cover of the defense.  One possible way to mitigate this would be to have many operators controlling increasingly smaller sectors of responsibility so their decision making is clearer when deciding to launch or remain in yellow hold.  

   While humans are rarely put into real world environments where they must track inputs at bandwidths so high that processing limits become an issue, this is the reality for any battle management commander dealing with incoming missiles.  Here, Prediction and Anticipation come to the forefront of the problem.  The BMC must predict where the missile will be in a point in space, and if they determine the missile is a threat, the interceptor sent up to try and attack the incoming missile.  Because of the immense speeds involved with an intercept, upwards of 5 km/sec – the system and system operator are required to make a decision based on information which may not be completely reliable depending on the sensors used and circumstances under which the launch was detected.  

For example, although Russia’s arsenal of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles has decreased since the end of the Cold War, its overall destructive potential hasn’t diminished.  Given the desperate situation of the Russian economy, this deterioration is thought to be as far spread as the nuclear command and control systems.   This has, in turn led to the United States concern of an accidental or unauthorized launch (by operator error or equipment failure), or by a few individuals acting without authorization, or due to a false indication of a missile launch.  Such was the case back in 1998 with a Norwegian Rocket, which was fitted with parts of a Trident DII stage.  This stage set off alarms to Russian early warning outposts of an inbound missile, and Russia was within 10 minutes of launching its missile volley in response to this error.  What makes this error even more egregious is that the Command and Control was informed of this Satellite launch, but the information had never reached the field commanders.  

Ways of improving the current decision making system are complex given the many parameters taking place during a suspected missile attack.  Some of those are the current political situation, if the missile is a satellite carrying booster, or an actual missile meant for attacking.  One way to reduce the reaction time of the missile defense would be to automate the launch decision process.  That is, to launch on warning.  The tradeoff is of course false alarms, but depending on the location of the launch unit, especially if it is located in a theater of battle, you have two choices.  A little bit of fratricide, or a nuclear detonation.  Both are poor choices, but when faced with the latter, I choose fratricide.  Sadly, it is the world in which we have created for ourselves to live within.

[Wolfala]

References:



 
Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act 1991, DOD, April 1992, Pg 11

  USGAO, Feb 92, IMTEC-92-26, Patriot Missile Defense, Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Pg. 15

  Janes Land-Based Air Defense Systems:  1999-2000, Pg. 73

  Foundation For the Future – The ABM Treaty And National Security

  Janes Land Based Air Defense Systems:  1999-2000, Pg. 79

  House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security April 7, 1992

  One Hundred Second Congress First and Second Sessions, 1991 – 1992, Pg. 31

  Janes Land Based Air Defense Systems 1999-2000, Pg. 67

  Countermeasures A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Pg. 133

  The MX ICBM and National Security, Pg. 54

  Countermeasures A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Pg. 135

  Countermeasures A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Pg. 136

  Thomas Wright, USMC; NSA, Fort Meade, Maryland (Verbal Conversation on phone)  

  Price, Alfred. The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare., Pg. 55

                     
                      References

Janes Land-Based Air Defense; Tony Cullen and Christopher F. Foss; 1999-2000.  

Countermeasures; A technical evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US NMD, Union of Concerned Scientists, MIT Security Studies Program, April 2000

Boost Phase Intercept: Implications for Theater Missile Defense; Lt. Col. Wolson Guilbeaux, Jr; University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, ACDIS, 1996

Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies; OTA Assessment, 99th Congress.  September 1985

Regional Security and Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles; William A. David, Jr, 1986

Missile Defense and American Security; A Sensible National Policy; Peter D. Zimmerman, May 1996

Foundation For the Future:  The ABM Treaty And National Security; 1990

CW5 Thomas J. Wright (Uncle); National Security Agency/Central Security Service
9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

Defense against Ballistic Missiles:  Dept. Of Defense OTA Report, April 1984

SDI and The Alternatives:  Simon P. Worden, 1991

The MX ICBM and National Security, Colin S. Gray, 1981

The Ballistic Missile Threat Handbook, Jack Spencer, The Heritage Foundation, 2000

USGAO – United States General Accounting Office, Sept 92, NSIAD-92-340; Data Does Not Exist To Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed

USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, Jan 94, NSIAD-94-107BR, Ballistic Missile Defense; Information on Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, Feb 92, IMTEC-92-26, Patriot Missile Defense, Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, Feb 92, IMTECH-92-18; Strategic Defense Initiative; Changing Design and Technological Uncertainties Create Significant Risk

USGAO - United States General Accounting Office, June 97, NSIAD-97-134; Operation Desert Storm; Evaluation of the Air Campaign

Price, Alfred. The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare. Westford, Massachusetts: The Murray Printing Company, September 24, 1984.

Engineering Psychology And Human Performance:  Christopher D. Wickens, Justin G. Hollands

[Elfie]

This radar will be one the first target for our nuke missiles. And it's right, because it's real threat for Russian security.

Just curious.....why would Russia waste a nuke on a radar site? That would be major overkill wouldn't it? Wouldn't it also incur the wrath of the entire world if Russia used a nuke?

To much risk for to little gain imo.

[Wolfala]

Originally posted by Elfie
Just curious.....why would Russia waste a nuke on a radar site? That would be major overkill wouldn't it? Wouldn't it also incur the wrath of the entire world if Russia used a nuke?

To much risk for to little gain imo.

Wouldn't be a nuke, but an SS-21 or a SS-26 with a conventional warhead depending how closely they were fired.

Both were designed for taking out Patriot sites.

[Vad]

Thank you, Wolfala.
Ot, let say that your answer is removing some of my concerns:.
1. It's not EW radar
2. This system can protect Europe only, it's not designed to defend the USA.
3. By design it should destroy warheads completely not damage them, so it should prevent nuclear blow. Never believe in possibility of such precision but ok, I'm not a specialist, and world has done long way since "Goa"


Looks like that's all.

But we still have one question you didn't answer.

Why now?!

As it comes from the name this is theater defence system, it should be very mobile by design. I remind that I read somewhere you are going  to deploy this system at the end of this year. I may be incorrect but anyway, it shouldn't take years for deployment this system on positions. We have at least several years before Iranian missiles will be real threat if any. So, the question is: why are you going to deploy this system right now?
There is no Iranian TBMs yet but there is Russian. Could you tell me being on Russian position wouldn't you consider this American action as provocation? Wouldn't you ask yourself: why do they do that? They want to see our reaction?
Ask yourself what would be American reaction if Russia deploys similar system somewhere on Cuba or Venezuela. Just to protect them against threat from Iran, just in case.
Russia is seeing this as uprovoked act of increasing military forces near our boards. And Russia has to act, you just didn't leave them a choice.
Question: why did you do that? You didn't anticipate the reaction? I don't think so.

Me as well as the most of Russians including Putin see this act as unprovoked unfriendly action against Russia. And I tried to explain you that we have some grounds to believe in that. And I absolutely agree with decision to set up some targets in Europe for our missiles. Any provocation should have some responce.

Nothing personal, just politics.

[Wolfala]

Originally posted by Vad
Thank you, Wolfala.
Ot, let say that your answer is removing some of my concerns:.
1. It's not EW radar
2. This system can protect Europe only, it's not designed to defend the USA.
3. By design it should destroy warheads completely not damage them, so it should prevent nuclear blow. Never believe in possibility of such precision but ok, I'm not a specialist, and world has done long way since "Goa"



Why now?!

As it comes from the name this is theater defence system, it should be very mobile by design. I remind that I read somewhere you are going  to deploy this system at the end of this year. I may be incorrect but anyway, it shouldn't take years for deployment this system on positions. We have at least several years before Iranian missiles will be real threat if any. So, the question is: why are you going to deploy this system right now?
Ask yourself what would be American reaction if Russia deploys similar system somewhere on Cuba or Venezuela. Just to protect them against threat from Iran, just in case.
 

Reason for why now is, who knows - its the jack-off president on our end who came up with this brainstorm.

Reason for its positioning, if you positioned it in Turkey, a launch from say, Iran - the missiles would still be in their Boost Phase. Since the system is not designed as a Boost Phase Intercept, as you know, from reading the 400 page APS study I posted - the problem with Boost Phase Intercept is lack of time available in the decision making process. Lets look at the graph below.

 

With a Boost Phase System, you need an interceptor with a fly-out velocity that actually exceeds the fly-out velocity of the ICBM it is intercepting. That makes the interceptor twice as massive as the ICBM - the physics are mind boggling and it does not scale well.





As THAAD is designed to get the re-entry vehicles in the end-game, that is - when they are exo-atmospheric, your decision time isn't as much of an issue. DSP Satellites detect the launch, and you wait until you are in the intercept envelope. There is no risk of accidentally shooting down a rocket that is launching a satellite.

Either way, the timing is ****ed. Missile defense has been a money pit since the 1950s, nuclear tipped interceptors work the first time with the obvious caviet of you blind your radars after the first intercept. The moscow system in-place since the mid 80s with an upper tier Gorgon interceptor with a 1MT warhead does the intercept out of the atmosphere. Set that off, you EMP 1/2 of Russia and Europe and your back in the 18th century.

The lower tier component of that, the Gazelle was similar in function to the Sprint missiles located in North Dakota composing the lower tier of the system. They only had a 10Kt warhead, but detonating those in the lower atmosphere was found would contaminate upwards of 70 miles of area, which would make moscow largely unlivable. So in 1998, the RF Strategic Rocket Forces switched over to conventional warheads - which would make it as effective or less effective then the Patriot PAC-2 during Gulf War 1. As you know, they didn't work too well.

[Ripsnort]

Originally posted by OdinGrunherze
I believe the point is to have the interceptor missiles, hit the enemy missiles while they are in the boost phase... Before they can reach escape velocity, and before their warheads separate and go completely ballistic...
After that they are almost impossible to hit...

Vlad Putie, and his ex soviet cronies, are having problems at home.... So they need something, to distract their people, from their nefarius activity at home...

Also It's alittle like France, sour grapes, because the world really doesn't give a ratsass about what they say anymore...

OG

I won't pretend to understand the technology, but yesterday Air Force officials and contractor Boeing IDS launched a missile in California, and it intercepted a simulated missile launched in Alaska, that dummy warhead would have hardly been in the boost phase by the time the California-based intercept missile reached it. That distance was 3200 miles, roughly the distance from the East coast of the US to the West coast.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070928/ap_on_re_us/missile_defense_1