Reading the test report, it does state that if the correct spin recovery procedure is not immediately and correctly applied, then the spin could become unrecoverable. That's not very friendly behavior for any aircraft, but on balance the stall and spin resistant nature of the aircraft and the presence of the ballistic chute recovery system makes up for it. As noted, less than 1% of all mishaps in their sample were low altitude spins where the chute wouldn't work, and a very low percentage of mishaps were high altitude spin entries. So it looks like they targeted the flight characteristics to combat both inadvertent stall/spin scenarios, and stall/spin entries due to abusive flight control inputs, and then took the position that rather than give the idiot pilot who spun the spin-resistant aircraft a procedure that must be immediately applied correctly the first time, that idiot pilot has a big handle to pull. In either case, the airframe is going to be wrecked, but pulling the chute will usually save the occupants where riding the spin into the ground is invariably fatal.
It's hard to fault the manufacturer... I think their line of reasoning in the certification paperwork and mishap analysis is reasonable. Heck, the T-37 spin recovery procedure is almost identical to the SR22 spin recovery procedure, and it takes a whole lot of training to be comfortable entering and exiting spins in a predictable fashion.