Did the Russians plan to invade Germany in 1941/1942

[Angus]

A lot of speculations. And yet none came up with an educated guess why the USSR set-up in mid Poland, facing the Germans, was all stacked up in an offense mode in the summer of 1941. Not just that, - the job was not finished.
Since the BoB has been mentioned much, a lesson can be used from it. Even geographically protected front airfields are vulnerable to attack. There you are talking about a minimum of 30 miles, and once the distance was some 100 miles, the responce time was acceptable. But the USSR put their fields up close to 0.5 to 1.5 miles away from the borders.
Their artillery was more trimmed for offence. Their tanks were more trimmed for offence. And the locations of deployment were absolutely trimmed for offence.
So, - were they thinking....or just being silly?

[Masherbrum]

A lot of speculations. And yet none came up with an educated guess why the USSR set-up in mid Poland, facing the Germans, was all stacked up in an offense mode in the summer of 1941. Not just that, - the job was not finished.
Since the BoB has been mentioned much, a lesson can be used from it. Even geographically protected front airfields are vulnerable to attack. There you are talking about a minimum of 30 miles, and once the distance was some 100 miles, the responce time was acceptable. But the USSR put their fields up close to 0.5 to 1.5 miles away from the borders.
Their artillery was more trimmed for offence. Their tanks were more trimmed for offence. And the locations of deployment were absolutely trimmed for offence.
So, - were they thinking....or just being silly?

No speculation.    The USSR were only concerned with protecting their own "prior-pact" borders.   The "annexed territory" was merely a "no man's land"/buffer zone for them.    But treating it as such caused them chaos than they realized afterwards.    The Germans had the Eastern Front scouted and reconnoitered daily, so the Germans were well aware of the rag tag "defenses" the USSR had in place.    

[Gman]

I know the thread isn't about the BoB, but a book anyone interested in it should read is "The Battle of Britain" by Richard Overy, a Professor in History at the University of Exeter.  I can lend it via email to anyone that requests it, it's fairly short, but gives some well researched information.

Example, on Sept 1, the Germans only had 533 serviceable fighters available.  On Oct 1, this number had dropped to 275.  Near the end of the battle, England had a slight edge in numbers even.  Overy dispels a lot of the notions that it was "just a few" versus many during the battle, while not taking anything away from the RAF.  This book changed a lot of the opinions and ideas I had held as sacrosanct regarding the BoB.

Also, some quick numbers regarding Barbarossa:

German Line of Battle:
830 Single Engine Ftrs
90 Twin Engine Ftrs
310 Stukas
775 Long Range Bombers
710 ish recon A/C

First day casualties for the VVS : 1811 aircraft lost, all but 322 on the ground.  Luftwaffe casualties 32 planes.

The nest four days score for the L/w : 800, 577, 351, 300 respectively.

By October 5th, over 5,000 VVS aircraft destroyed.   FIVE THOUSAND.  

edit: After just reading Karaya's post regarding recon, I think that THIS particular point is extremely important.  Look at the numbers of recon a/c the Luftwaffe had deployed, nearly as many as they had fighters or bombers.  This is a critical point, and like any type of combat, information derived from solid reconnaissance proved to be the deciding factor, at least in my opinion.   The first attacks of the operation were by three crack L/W bomber units, one of He11, one of JU88 and one of DO's.  They had long lines of VVS aircraft parked to target, the cream of the Russian Airforce, and these 40 or so bombers killed hundreds of aircraft on the ground at critical defense points in the opening minutes of Barbarossa.  Their success just mushroomed with other units that came after them.


I think that the effects of the purges cannot be overstated after seeing these numbers, which come from Walter J. Boyne's book "Clash of Wings", another excellent book that encompasses the entire air war of WW2.

Scary numbers to consider.  If Russia was planning an invasion, it sure got caught flatfooted on the defensive end of things with the VVS, considering the whooping they took from the incredibly outnumbered L/W in 1941 and early 1942.

[Angus]

Gman!
Highly interesting, and my email is :
reddari1@simnet.is

I probably have quite some data for you and will send if you like

And Masher....I still don't get it. Plonking down a whole airforce so close to a "prior-pact border" makes no sense at all.
As for the scouting, the Germans were baffled by the stacks of Soviet stock they could torch in a matter of hours. Some sources say the Germans destroyed some 3000 Soviet aircraft on the ground in the first week,- it is not a much debated number, and is more than the total strength of the LW applied at the time!

[Masherbrum]

Gman!
Highly interesting, and my email is :
reddari1@simnet.is

I probably have quite some data for you and will send if you like

And Masher....I still don't get it. Plonking down a whole airforce so close to a "prior-pact border" makes no sense at all.
As for the scouting, the Germans were baffled by the stacks of Soviet stock they could torch in a matter of hours. Some sources say the Germans destroyed some 3000 Soviet aircraft on the ground in the first week,- it is not a much debated number, and is more than the total strength of the LW applied at the time!

You missed my point, in an earlier post.   Stalin was about as "strategically intelligent" as Hitler.    You do realize I have said that the first 10 days, which were the most crucial were ignored by Stalin.   I have never disputing a thing in thread, I have been one of the few who haven't turned this into a BoB thread.    I posted the Map of the USSR May 1941 attack plans, after someone said no such thing existed.  

Poland cost the USSR only a signature from Molotov.   I fail to understand why they would "fight to the hilt" for Poland?   The USSR had rid itself of the most intelligent Generals, who Stalin felt most threatened by.   Just because you're a Dictator doesn't mean you're smart.   I honestly feel that if the Purges never happened, the tune might have been different.    But it wasn't, so it is a moot point.

EDIT:   Also of note, let's not forget the "Tito/Balkan's Campaign" delaying the start of Operation Barbarossa by almost six weeks, for the Germans.   Just imagine if they would have had six more weeks of better weather..............    

[Angus]

I beg to differ Masher, but thank you for your inputs.
As far as I have dug up, the Germans were not particularly delayed because of the Balkans. The offense started (of course) much further north, and just about when the ground allowed. It was a slow spring 1941.
As Hitler, - I'd have gone sooner. And preferably had some naval opportunity into the black sea. But it was not so.
And about the first 10 days, and Stalin's fit of depression, - it has been said that it was because Hitler managed to beat him in the "who's first" game...

[Masherbrum]

I beg to differ Masher, but thank you for your inputs.
As far as I have dug up, the Germans were not particularly delayed because of the Balkans. The offense started (of course) much further north, and just about when the ground allowed. It was a slow spring 1941.
As Hitler, - I'd have gone sooner. And preferably had some naval opportunity into the black sea. But it was not so.
And about the first 10 days, and Stalin's fit of depression, - it has been said that it was because Hitler managed to beat him in the "who's first" game...

Wrong.   Stalin cost Millions of Soldiers, their lives, because he chose to hide, rather than stand up.   Stalin and Hitler were both cut from the same cloth and were no different than those prior/after.   

The Germans were most definitely delayed because of the Balkans campaign.   

"Wenn ich nicht bekommen, das Öl von Maikop und Grosny dann muss ich fertig dieser Krieg." - Adolf Hitler's own words.   "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must finish this war."   They were to the East of Stalingrad.

[Butcher]

No doubt about it. Probably the reason why Adolf abandoned England invasion.

He never formally declared war on england.

[Butcher]

I fail to see the logic in attacking Germany via USSR's standpoint, first Stalin shot all his generals - and secondly 60% of the equipment was no where near the front line.

There were plans for the French to invade Germany - and while Germany was attacking Poland the entire Western flank of Germany through Ruhr was wide open - France couldn't mobilize let alone in force in the time frame they wanted.

[Bruv119]

isn't the Slaughter of the Russian and Eastern air forces  how the German "Aces" managed to rack up such good scores?  

[Butcher]

isn't the Slaughter of the Russian and Eastern air forces  how the German "Aces" managed to rack up such good scores?  

Yep, Russia had extremely poor pilots - and no communication let alone flight tactics - same as France and Britain, Germany used what it learned in Spain then applied it - even into the Battle of France did the tactics not fully develope.

For example, British VIC formation vs German Rotte.

[soda72]

There was one BBC documentary that came out a few years ago called "Behind closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis, and the west" that focused on the political ongoings during that time period which I found interesting.  If you've ever wondered why there was a 'cold war' after WWII this documentary certainly explains why.

[MiloMorai]

I fail to see the logic in attacking Germany via USSR's standpoint, first Stalin shot all his generals - and secondly 60% of the equipment was no where near the front line.

There were plans for the French to invade Germany - and while Germany was attacking Poland the entire Western flank of Germany through Ruhr was wide open - France couldn't mobilize let alone in force in the time frame they wanted.

Agh, the French did attack Germany in 1939.

Operation 'Saar', the plans for which were contained in a French Army Instruction of July 24, 1939. It was directed by General Gaston Prételat, commander of the French 2nd Army Group. The attack went in on September 7, and was a complete fiasco.

Everything was against the French. For a start, the sector of the frontier between the Rhine and the Moselle selected for the French attack had been defined by the victors of Waterloo in 1815 with the express purpose of making French aggression difficult. Thus in 1939 the Germans held all the high ground. German-held salients also extended into French territory, and these would have to be reduced before the Siegfried Line was sufficiently far behind the German front line to compel the French to bring their own artillery (if it was to be within range of the casemates of the Line) within range of German counter-battery fire.

After patrolling operations, Prételat launched his attack on September 7, but it hardly got past its start-lines. A total of 31 divisions had been put at Prételat's disposal, including 14 first-line units, but only nine were used eventually. General Edouard Réquin's 4th Army, with its right flank in the squeake region and its left on the Saar, managed to capture seven and a half miles of German territory, while its neighbour, General Condé's 3rd Army, pinched out the heavily-wooded Warndt Forest salient.

Commanding the German 1st Army General Erwin von Witzleben had 17 division to meet this attack, and ten of these had been recruited only recently. But his troops made skilful use of their advantage in terrain, relying heavily on cleverly-sited anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. The French were unfamiliar with this threat and possessed no mine detectors. Houses booby-trapped with explosives added to the German minefield defences.

What of the Siegfried line itself, which the French had planned to attack after September 17. General Siegfried Westphal has gone on record as describing the Line as a 'gigantic bluff', but it was not. Its defences were sound, and the French artillery could do little damage to them. Major-General Ulrich Liss, head of 'Section West' of Germany Army Intelligence, stated that the French 155-mm shells caused negligible damage. The heavier 220-mm and 280-mm guns were not provided with delayed-action fused shells, which would have enabled the projectiles to penetrate the casemates before exploding. Liss admitted that the French guns maintained a high and accurate rate of fire, but stated that a large number of the French shells failed to explode as they came from stocks dating back to WWI.

Source: Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia.