Bullpoop. The He177 was designed in 1936 and mocked up in 1937 originally for the "Bomber A" requirement. In Nov 1937 it was given its RLM type number 8-177. Prototypes flew in 1939, when the Do17 was being replaced by the He-111.
You want to know what was to replace the He-111, though not explicitly designed to? The Ju-88. And it did, for the most part. The Ju-188, 288, and 388, were being pursued as the primary successors to all Luftwaffe bombing (with minor exceptions in the jet family, grossly mismanaged by Hitler).
The He177 wasn't designed or intended to "replace" anything.
The He-111 would cease to be produced as the He-177 came into full production since it would occupy Heinkel's production lines. Is that clear enough? The fast bomber role was covered, the He-111 just was a production place holder until the Greif was ready to take its place in the bomber force.
However, in mid 1944, even at the end, the loss rates due to engine problems were still quite present.
Quick wiki copy, but you can find it in several books as well:
"As the war progressed, He 177 operations became increasingly desultory. Fuel and personnel shortages presented difficulties, and He 177s were sitting on airfields all over Europe awaiting new engines or engine related modifications. During Operation Steinbock, of the 14 He 177 sent out, one suffered a burst tire, 8 returned with overheating or burning engines and of the 4 that reached London one was lost to night fighters. These aircraft were brand new [...]"
That's only 13, though. What wiki doesn't say is another turned back before it even left French airspace, due to mechanical difficulties!
8 out of 14? That's over 50% engine loss rates in one mission alone! In Jan-May 1944! With the "fixed" problems! Those are "new" craft in 1944, that means A-5s. Just because they weren't bursting into flames ALL the time doesn't mean they weren't bursting into piles of scrap metal. They had a very complicated gearbox mechanism and designs like this (side by side engines) on any side during the war had a high failure rate.
-1 for quoting from wiki and even then mutilating the quote, I will complete it just so it is clear:
"These aircraft were brand new, delivered a week before the operation and not fully flown-in, as the air unit had moved to a new airfield the day before and lacked sufficient maintenance personnel and material."These are the points you will constantly see highlighted in books on the He-177, maintenance, training and logistical issues ended up being the major issue. It is disappointing to see you resort to a partial in an attempt to score a point.
Oh, btw, those couldnt be A5s since KG 40 was actually pulled form the operation in February to be reequipped with A5s, but lets see why your speculations and mutilated quotes are misleading, from Griehl:
"In many cases, the crews involved were relatively young and inexperienced. The largest number of returnees came From the KG 100 combat group, I/KG 100: no less than 14 of its crews abandoned their mission and returned home early. More than anything else, most of the pilots living He 177s initially had no idea about the bomber's prescribed engine revs and highest permissible climbing speeds. The inevitable resulting powerplant overstressing led to no less than seven crashes and engine fires. Other crews undercut the minimum permissible speed, stalled and crashed. Prior to that, problems had arisen due to the sudden move to a new base at short notice, which had left too little time for comprehensive servicing of the A-3s assigned."A3s are clearly identified, just as the cause of the problems, lack of adequate training and maintenance.
Gixxer comments he has both the J Richard Smith & Eddit J Creeks book and the Manfred Griehl & Joachim Dressel book and both seem to agree that even after the "cure" was established with the A-5, they both talk about fires continuing to plague the aircraft. A different reference to Griehl/Dressel says: "In the Griehl/Dressel book on the He177 for the period March to August 1944 there are some 36 177 losses for KG 1 most down to technical reasons."
Even KG1's efforts against Soviet targets from German airfields yielded well above normal rates of engine failures late in the war, with A-3s and A-5s.
Oh? You mean the unit that has just been formed and received mostly old A1s and barely any maintenance equipment and crews to start training suffered losses? Shocking. The quote I made earlier from Price about KG1 addresses exactly the issue you mention, how once training got up to speed such incidents were reduced dramatically. You either need to read more on the issue or start being more honest in your arguments.
Quick google search for He177 Order of Battle:
"LW OoB May 31 1944 - He 177A
Stab/KG 1 2/1 (on hand/servicable)
I/KG 1 30/11
II/KG 1 29/0
III/KG 1 30/12
II/KG 100 30/0
part I/KG 40 30(20)/21(11)
II/KG 40 30/26
3./KG 40 10/10
That is 181 'on hand' but ONLY 71 'sevicable' > 39%. A good indication that all was not well with the He177."
Even when "fixed" it was still a terrible plane.
See the zeros? Dont they seem odd to you? I will explain then to you since you clearly had no interest in finding out why such thing happened as long as you could claim they serve to prove your point.
II/KG 100 was just transitioning into the type, it was not an operational unit and was still flying Do-217K2s as late as April, they received A3s initially an then all were swapped with new A5s equipped for guided bombs, problem was, the Kehl IV installation was incomplete and therefore the aircraft were not operational. As it was usual with the He-177 the production of spares, replacement parts adn specialized equipment never kept up which further hindered their operation.
This very same Gruppe had a 90% serviceability rate a few months later.
II/KG 40 was refitting with new A5s as well and ran into the same issues which is why you have that odd "0" for these 2 units.
Btw, this was a unit that just before was reporting 80% readiness:
"One positive aspect of the operations was that the operational safety and reliability of the He I77A-3 had been improved, doing away with the need for the usual six- and 12fi-hour control checks. The regular 25-, 50- and 75-hour inspections were now completely sufficient, with special attention being paid to servicing of the coupled powerplants after 50 flying hours.
According to the technicians, the He 177 service-ability rate of II/ KG 40 was frequently in the order of 80 per cent; a great improvement over the 30 per cent or so recorded during the Gruppe's training phase, when flying operations were noticeably affected by moisture in the air which led to frequent accidental earthing of onboard electrical equipment. In contrast to the situation with I/KG 40, only one aircraft assigned to II /KG 40 was lost due to powerplant failure. During operations against Great Britain there had been numerous power-plant problems, caused mainly by the undertrained aircrews overstraining the engines. On the positive side, the Bordeaux-Merignac-based Grippe had carried out the first He 177 long-range flight (lasting 12fi hours) and proposed to increase the aircraft's range still further by using 900-hr (198 Imp gal) underwing auxiliary fuel tanks. Despite this overload, but obviously helped by the even stressing of both powerplants during the long-range flights, it had proved possible to operate engines for up to 115 flying hours without any problems."
See the difference? When maintenance and training were allowed to take place you have a far different result.
Folks see this plane on paper and want it because of the "potentially" high bomb loads. It's misleading. It never flew with the max loads unless you count it carrying 2 or 4 guided glider bombs or missiles, each of which could weigh 2000+ pounds. These were also exclusively anti-shipping. When actual bombs were carried, most flew with 4000kg or less.
(Image removed from quote.)
All aircraft had to make tradeoffs when carrying heavy loads and the Greif was no exception, but during Steinbock the trained crews carried 2x1800Kg and 2x1000Kg bombs, that is 5600Kg and as you own chart shows 7000Kg was an option.
Otherwise they wouldn't have the operational range to reach London (during the black of night) and come back. In the East, they wouldn't use more than 1000kg, because they had to fly at extreme ranges into Soviet territory and back. They flew so high no VVS fighters were there to stop them. Sometimes they set up racetracks and orbited over targets for hours and bombed in waves. That takes a LOT of fuel, which means they were carrying very FEW bombs. In short, people want it added to this game out of reasons of ignorance. They want a "German B17" (quoted because that kind of term is used in most of the requests for the He-177).
Ridicoulous. 1000Kg were used for long range targets and heavier loads for closer ones as Steinbock shows, it all depends on the operational needs and attack profile, it does not mean that they ALWAYS used such loads, that is simply preposterous.
I think it is clear in which side of this argument ignorance has its reign...
