More MAX information

[eagl]

One more thing, specifically regarding flying with an inexperienced FO in the 737...

The stab disconnect switches are on the right side of the center console next to the FO's leg.  If the CA is flying, fighting runaway trim (possibly requires 2 hands on the yoke if he didn't figure it out early enough), it might not be possible for the pilot flying to both maintain control AND flip those switches.  Not only that, the switches have a semi-weird guard design (not the typical red guarded switch cover) so many pilots probably can't find those switches by feel alone, flip down the guard, then move the switches without looking at them.  Especially if fighting the controls against runaway trim.

That's one reason why the 737 requires 2 pilots, just like all other planes of similar size/design.  Sometimes you need one pilot flying and another pilot flipping switches.  If the non-flying pilot can't figure it out through inexperience or lack of knowledge, you're well and truly screwed.  The autopilot control buttons on the A320 are like that - if the pilot is busy keeping the plane flying, it's very unlikely he could get to the flight control computer buttons to turn them off (this might be needed to force the airbus into the manual backup flight control mode, for example).  That's not specific to the MAX, many aircraft have critical switches that might not be reachable by a pilot who is busy doing the stick and rudder stuff.

Finally finally, the 737 has 2 gigantic pitch trim wheels attached to the center console.  They physically move when the pitch trim is activated.  All the ones I've flown with have white stripes on them to visually highlight when they rotate so you see flashes of light out of the corner of your eye if you're not looking right at them.  Another way to stop runaway trim (and the way you trim the aircraft when the trim system is disabled) is to simply grab the trim wheel and keep it from moving.  Just reach right out there with your hand, and grab the wheel.  Yes you might sprain your pinky finger, too bad.  That's better than crashing the plane.  Reach right over, grab the wheel and hold it.  Then move it by hand to where it belongs, just like you do in a light private airplane with a manual trim wheel.

This really isn't rocket science and a lot of people are blowing it waaay out of proportion.  It's a trim system malfunction and the corrective action is pretty much the same as it would be in any other similar plane and in any other model of 737.  If you don't have the experience to deal with this basic malfunction then you have no business flying passengers.

[Vulcan]

Does it still work like that is it's fly by wire?

[eagl]

Does it still work like that is it's fly by wire?

It depends on the implementation, but the principle is the same.

In the airbus, if HAL started getting froggy, we had 5 (if I recall correctly) flight control computer buttons.  Push any 2 (again IIRC) and HAL gives up and the plane goes into a manual reversion mode where you can manually trim with the trim wheel.  So yea, it's the same idea, just different switches/buttons to use.

In the BUS it was unlikely to happen (triple redundancy, etc etc) but if/when it actually does happen, you don't have time to dig through the EFB to refresh your memory on which buttons to push.  No different than on any other plane.

Interestingly, the A320 has a fallback mode where if everything else goes to crap, you can use the trim wheel for pitch (manually turns a jackscrew to move the stab) and throttles for roll/yaw.  Nobody wants to trust HAL so while we didn't actually have to fly that mode in the sim during training, the procedure was covered in training as pretty much the lowest possible level of control that could happen if pretty much everything else quit working.  Extremely unlikely, but in a FBW plane you gotta know how to deal with it if the computers are ALL gone.

[Vraciu]

(Image removed from quote.)

From Ethiopian Airlines.

Its the same regulations as in the US prior to 2013 and as far as i know U.S aviation was considered safe before that..

Bull crap.

I couldn't touch even a Regional airliner without 1000 hours back in 1999. 

You have no idea what you're talking about.

[Vraciu]

I've been flying the MAX for a year now.

In this thread, Vraciu is pretty much correct.  Almost all the arguments against him are either deliberately mis-interpreting his posts (like brainiac #1 who equated saying a 200 hour FO probably sucks and all African pilots suck), or the regurgitating of sensationalist prattle about how "the SoFtWaReZ be crashing deh plainz!".

MCAS is a good feature.  The 737 doesn't have a stick pusher, but the new motors on the MAX give it a nose-up pitching tendency when in the stall.  The reasonable answer is to run a little nose-down trim in there.  The implementation could have been done better and Boeing did a truly awful job failing to highlight it in MAX differences training, since a single sensor failure can cause it to activate inappropriately.

HOWEVER, runaway trim is runaway trim.  Any pilot who flies a plane with any sort of power assisted trim should know instinctively how to quickly turn off the damn trim system.  I knew and practiced this when I had less than 40 hours because I received instruction in a plane with electric pitch trim.  The instructor, 30+ years ago when I was a pup, told me you first attempt to trim opposite of the runaway trim, and while doing that you go for the trim disconnect switch or circuit breaker.  That procedure has applied in every single plane I've every flown in, both military and civilian, and it's pretty much the same procedure in all variants of the 737 including the MAX.  This is airmanship 101 type stuff.

Activating the trim switch on the yoke should temporarily halt MCAS inputs.  So a simple press of the trim switch nose-up should temporarily turn off MCAS inputs.  If after the reset period expires the trim starts running nose down again, then trim opposite it with the trim switch again and then also use the stab trim disconnect switches.  Once more, this is piloting 101, something that should be taught and practiced before ever flying any real aircraft with powered trim.

The only real difference in the MAX is that the implementation of MCAS could cause runaway trim with a single AOA sensor failure.  That's not a good design, but the effect of the malfunction is still a runaway trim situation that any pilot flying anything more complicated than a Cessna 172 should be able to deal with in their sleep.

200 hour FO?  Maybe 350 hrs depending on who you ask. Yea.  You get what you pay for and sometimes being cheap kills you.  That's no different than paying a dive master with no wreck or deep diving experience to take you to a wreck 200 ft down. Some endeavors in life are simply not safe unless you have quite a bit of experience, and flying is one of them. The crash is a tragedy but the real story is to use this horrific accident as one more reason why the US experience standards must remain in place in spite of concerted efforts by certain groups to eliminate the 1500 hour ATP requirement.  Zimme you posted about how US standards used to be, but we changed them for a damn good reason and this latest crash further justifies our rules change.

I'd fly the MAX tomorrow if I was scheduled for it.  There's no mystical software bug, the automation isn't overriding the pilot, etc etc.  The MAX has a new system that needs tweaking because as it is, a single sensor failure can cause runaway trim.  The good news is that correcting runaway trim is no different in the MAX than in any other conventional aircraft with powered trim.  You attempt to counter it, and disconnect the trim system.  The fact that 2 crews appear to have utterly failed to perform this basic procedure (yes I know findings aren't released) is a pretty harsh lesson about how much experience and training it takes to safely fly any airline not just the 737.

Damn well said, sir.   

[Toad]

Some endeavors in life are simply not safe unless you have quite a bit of experience, and flying is one of them. The crash is a tragedy but the real story is to use this horrific accident as one more reason why the US experience standards must remain in place in spite of concerted efforts by certain groups to eliminate the 1500 hour ATP requirement. Zimme you posted about how US standards used to be, but we changed them for a damn good reason and this latest crash further justifies our rules change.

Amen.

The only real difference in the MAX is that the implementation of MCAS could cause runaway trim with a single AOA sensor failure.  That's not a good design,

Agree it is not the optimal design. I will point out though that it is not an unusual or perhaps unheard of design. The FAA certified Gulfstream 550s activate the stick pusher when the first AOA reaches 1.00. The JAA cert 550s require both AOA to reach 1.00.

Point being that this single AOA sensor activation design is not coming from way out in left field. It's been used before by various manufacturers.

And, of course, there is a "Stall Barrier Malfunction" abnormal checklist for the Gulfstream. Guess what:

From the FAA Flight standardization Board Report on the GV type:

Gulfstream’s philosophy is to not identify any steps in the GIV-X, GV, and the GV-SP abnormal or emergency procedures as “Memory Items”, yet Gulfstream expects pilots to perform some of the initial and critical steps without reference to any documentation. Gulfstream has advised that the initial, critical pilot responses for the following emergency procedures should be performed promptly without reference to a checklist: Rejected Takeoff, Engine Failure/Fire after V1, Emergency Descent, Rapid Decompression, Autopilot (AP) or Autothrottle (AT) Uncommanded Disconnect, Engine Exceedance, Overspeed, Stall Protection/Stall Warning Activation, Flight Control Jams, Total Loss of Braking, Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) Alert, Windshear Alert, and Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Alert.

As you said Eagl, this is airmanship 101 type stuff.

[Busher]

Thank you Eagl. I have never flown the 737 in any series so your insight is appreciated. I do suspect though that stab misbehaviour leads to the same action throughout the Boeing fleet.
This video just appeared where a United Captain demonstrates in a 737Max simulator, the futility of fighting the airplane and then through proper crew co-ordination and actioning the stab trim cutouts, the recovery is done safely.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-tmcQebeN8

Like others have expressed, the only defense against automation failures is an experienced pair of pilots that know procedure and can confidently manipulate the airplane by hand.

[Puma44]

Thank you Eagl. I have never flown the 737 in any series so your insight is appreciated. I do suspect though that stab misbehaviour leads to the same action throughout the Boeing fleet.
This video just appeared where a United Captain demonstrates in a 737Max simulator, the futility of fighting the airplane and then through proper crew co-ordination and actioning the stab trim cutouts, the recovery is done safely.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-tmcQebeN8

Like others have expressed, the only defense against automation failures is an experienced pair of pilots that know procedure and can confidently manipulate the airplane by hand.

That’s a great video Buster.  It reminded me of my very first 737 sim check as a new hire.  The first event was me doing the takeoff from the right seat, of course.  In the left seat was a retired (quite retired) Captain who was doing seat support for my check ride.  We go through all the start, taxi, etc drills and line up on the runway.  I’m given the aircraft and cleared for takeoff.  Off we go, speed builds, the Captain calls V1...Rotate, and I do so.  I pitch up and call for landing gear UP.  The Captain does so, and no sooner do the gear retract, the check airman gives me nose down run away trim.  I go through the memory item to include disengaging the stab trim cutout switches, all the while, pulling back on the yoke for all I’m worth.   In the very short time it took for me to analyze the situation and take the proper action, the trim had runaway to almost full nose down.  Any further delay in the decision making process would have made it an unrecoverable situation.  It was very difficult to maintain aircraft control but, through crew coordination we accomplished a successful outcome.  What a ”Welcome to the company” event that was.  But, the rest of the sim was relatively easy after that.

Great explanation Eagl!   The bottom line is always “fly the airplane”.

[Puma44]

Its the same regulations as in the US prior to 2013....

Got verifiable proof of that?

[Vraciu]

Got verifiable proof of that?

No.  Just like the rest of his crap. 

Even if regulations would have allowed it, insurance didn’t.   When I was trying to get hired no airline would even INTERVIEW a candidate without 1000 total and 100 multi (many wanted 200 multi).

[Vraciu]

I wonder how an airline management could claim to be a world class safe operation while they allow this.

They can’t.   Not with a straight face.  But Africa is the land of the 419.   It’s a cultural norm. 

I’m proud of my fellow aviators.  Busher, Toad, Eagl, Puma44, etc.    Thanks for providing perspective.   It is an honor to know such fine airmen. 

My hat is off to you all.   

[TyFoo]

Captain Sully's comments from a couple of days ago sum it up best about hours. . . . .

"I feel sure that the Ethiopian crew would have tried to do everything they were able to do to avoid the accident. It has been reported that the first officer on that flight had only 200 hours of flight experience, a small fraction of the minimum in the U.S., and an absurdly low amount for someone in the cockpit of a jet airliner. We do not yet know what challenges the pilots faced or what they were able to do, but everyone who is entrusted with the lives of passengers and crew by being in a pilot seat of an airliner must be armed with the knowledge, skill, experience, and judgment to be able to handle the unexpected and be the absolute master of the aircraft and all its systems, and of the situation."

"A cockpit crew must be a team of experts, not a captain and an apprentice. In extreme emergencies, when there is not time for discussion or for the captain to direct every action of the first officer, pilots must be able to intuitively know what to do to work together. They must be able to collaborate wordlessly. Someone with only 200 hours would not know how to do that or even to do that. Someone with that low amount of time would have only flown in a closely supervised, sterile training environment, not the challenging and often ambiguous real world of operational flying, would likely never have experienced a serious aircraft malfunction, would have seen only one cycle of the seasons of the year as a pilot, one spring with gusty crosswinds, one summer of thunderstorms. If they had learned to fly in a fair-weather clime, they might not even have flown in a cloud."

"Airlines have a corporate obligation not to put pilots in that position of great responsibility before they are able to be fully ready. While we don’t know what role, if any, pilot experience played in this most recent tragedy, it should always remain a top priority at every airline. Everyone who flies depends upon it."

[Vraciu]

Captain Sully's comments from a couple of days ago sum it up best about hours. . . . .

"I feel sure that the Ethiopian crew would have tried to do everything they were able to do to avoid the accident. It has been reported that the first officer on that flight had only 200 hours of flight experience, a small fraction of the minimum in the U.S., and an absurdly low amount for someone in the cockpit of a jet airliner. We do not yet know what challenges the pilots faced or what they were able to do, but everyone who is entrusted with the lives of passengers and crew by being in a pilot seat of an airliner must be armed with the knowledge, skill, experience, and judgment to be able to handle the unexpected and be the absolute master of the aircraft and all its systems, and of the situation."

"A cockpit crew must be a team of experts, not a captain and an apprentice. In extreme emergencies, when there is not time for discussion or for the captain to direct every action of the first officer, pilots must be able to intuitively know what to do to work together. They must be able to collaborate wordlessly. Someone with only 200 hours would not know how to do that or even to do that. Someone with that low amount of time would have only flown in a closely supervised, sterile training environment, not the challenging and often ambiguous real world of operational flying, would likely never have experienced a serious aircraft malfunction, would have seen only one cycle of the seasons of the year as a pilot, one spring with gusty crosswinds, one summer of thunderstorms. If they had learned to fly in a fair-weather clime, they might not even have flown in a cloud."

"Airlines have a corporate obligation not to put pilots in that position of great responsibility before they are able to be fully ready. While we don’t know what role, if any, pilot experience played in this most recent tragedy, it should always remain a top priority at every airline. Everyone who flies depends upon it."

He is clearly an anti-African bigot.  /sarcasm

[Toad]

Got verifiable proof of that?

In a purely regulatory sense, he is correct. Prior to the major changes in July of 2013, a person could theoretically serve as FO for a Part 121 carrier with a commercial ticket and 250 hours.

However, Vraicu is also correct. There was no US major 121 carrier hiring Commercial pilots with 250 hours into the right seat of the big iron. None.

I can't find the original reg but here's a clip from Flying magazine that spells it out. I think we can consider Flying a reputable source of info:

https://www.flyingmag.com/training/getting-your-atp-certificate

Airlines had traditionally been able to hire first officers with as little as 250 hours and a commercial pilot certificate under their belts. But the new mandate, which was put in effect in 2013, requires first officers to have a type rating and an ATP with an absolute minimum of 1,000 hours. How is this possible, you may ask, as the ATP requires 1,500 hours of total flight time.

  Busher, Vraicu, Eagl, Puma44 and the rest of the aviation professionals that have contributed. Better thread than the locked one.


<edit> Busher...thanks for that video. It does a good job of showing the problem, the solution and the short amount of time available to "do some of that pilot stuff, Mav!" </edit>

[Vraciu]

In a purely regulatory sense, he is correct. Prior to the major changes in July of 2013, a person could theoretically serve as FO for a Part 121 carrier with a commercial ticket and 250 hours.

However, Vraicu is also correct. There was no US major 121 carrier hiring Commercial pilots with 250 hours into the right seat of the big iron. None.

I can't find the original reg but here's a clip from Flying magazine that spells it out. I think we can consider Flying a reputable source of info:

  Busher, Vraicu, Eagl, Puma44 and the rest of the aviation professionals that have contributed. Better thread than the locked one.


<edit> Busher...thanks for that video. It does a good job of showing the problem, the solution and the short amount of time available to "do some of that pilot stuff, Mav!" </edit>

Nor the small iron, SAAB 340, ERJ, CRJ, etc.   “1000 and 1 [hundred]” (total, multi) was the mantra to get to a regional INTERVIEW.