Is it correct to call this a 'trim runaway' though?
It was an AOA failure that triggered MCAS, a situation that can be easily and safely resolved by the Runaway Stab Trim procedure in the QRH. So, if the Stab Trim is doing something you don't want it to do (or just don't understand:
why is it doing that?)...yes, it's a trim runaway. Or some manufacturer's call it Uncommanded Stab Trim.
So somebody decided that it would be better to require the shutdown of an entire system (electrical trim, which was not at fault) to deal with a software issue caused by a single* sensor failure... instead of giving to the pilots the option to just deactivate the software bit.
Two issues here.
One, single sensor. It is totally normal for a single sensor to trigger a stall warning or stall protective device. In many aircraft, there are two independent sensors and systems and EITHER ONE seeing an abnormally high AOA will trigger stall warning or stall protection. There does NOT need to be correlation and comparison between the two sensors to trigger the warning or protection. This is absolutely NOT uncommon throughout the industry.
Issue two: I have been told there is a circuit breaker that disables MCAS. I haven't confirmed it though and obviously, if it exists, it's not part of any Boeing procedure for
uncommanded MCAS or whatever they would call it.
Maybe the pilots of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines didn't handle the crisis as they should have, but the design of the system doesn't look like it tried to make their flying a little less complicated after throwing a curveball at them.
Funny the Lion Air jumpseat pilot figured it out rather quickly though, isn't it? Maybe experience is a factor? Maybe this overwhelming need to "make their flying a little less complicated" has its roots in the fact that current standards for pilot training are rather low? That maybe the regulatory agencies should take a closer look at their standards?
*According to 60 minutes Australia, the decision to link MCAS to a single sensor instead of both was made to avoid extra level D training (at 35:30)... if this is true =>
As I said above, single sensor activation is not at all unusual.
Think about this: the proposed change to dual sensor confirmation will likely occur; it appears to be in the "fix".
Now suppose there's another bad single sensor situation on a MAX and the MCAS does not trigger because it is not confirmed by the other sensor. However, in this situation the CORRECT sensor is the one sensing the stall. So, the pilots are stalling the aircraft but MCAS does NOT trigger. Assume the incompetent pilots that got it into a stalled condition in the first place fail to recover and crash.
Now where to place the blame? We usually err on the side of safety. Doing the thing that is the safest thing. I think they may be going the other way on this fix.