Boeing 737 Max

[guncrasher]

not sure if it's semantics but the third pilot didn't know. he figured out the problem first then fixed the situation.  then again, he wasn't busy flying the plane.


semp

[Puma44]

not sure if it's semantics but the third pilot didn't know. he figured out the problem first then fixed the situation.  then again, he wasn't busy flying the plane.


semp

Apparently, the other two pilots weren’t busy flying the plane either.

[UpMaKilt]

How much time in the 737?  What type aircraft was their other time logged in?

lion air; The flight's cockpit crew were captain Bhavye Suneja, a 31 year old Indian national[13] who had flown with the airline for more than seven years and had about 6,028 hours of flight experience (including 5,176 hours on the Boeing 737);[14] and 41 year old Indonesian co-pilot Harvino,[15] who had 5,174 hours of flight experience, 4,286 of them on the Boeing 737

Ethiopia; The captain of the plane was Yared Getachew, 29, who had been flying with the airline for almost nine years[43] and had logged a total of 8,122 flight hours, including 1,417 hours on the Boeing 737.[c] He had been a Boeing 737-800 captain since November 2017, and Boeing 737 MAX since July 2018.[10] At the time of the accident, he was the youngest captain at the airline.[44] The first officer, Ahmed Nur Mohammod Nur, 25, was a recent graduate from the airline's academy with 361 flight hours logged, including 207 hours on the Boeing 737.

[Toad]

not sure if it's semantics but the third pilot didn't know. he figured out the problem first then fixed the situation.  then again, he wasn't busy flying the plane.


semp

The jumpseat pilot didn't "know"? He clearly knew the long standing Boeing procedure for Runaway Stabilizer Trim. So yeah he "knew" the procedure.

What he did can be summed up succinctly as Analysing the Situation and Taking the Proper Action. That's a phrase most professional pilots have heard many times during their careers. The jumpseater analyzed the situation: Runaway Stab Trim. While he didn't actually throw the switches, he informed the PIC and SIC of the correct, proper action which he clearly KNEW. And which the PIC/SIC apparently DID NOT.

Just as an aside as well: the idea that the jumpseater only figured out the problem because "he wasn't busy flying the airplane".

Guess what! When you sew on that fourth stripe, you are expected to be able to simultaneously fly the aircraft, analyze the situation and take the proper action. It's part of the deal, see? That's what Captains DO. Captains are not supposed to have to rely on a knowledgeable jumpseat pilot to save the day.

Or as they say in the biz...."It's why you get paid the big bucks."

[Busher]

lion air; The flight's cockpit crew were captain Bhavye Suneja, a 31 year old Indian national[13] who had flown with the airline for more than seven years and had about 6,028 hours of flight experience (including 5,176 hours on the Boeing 737);[14] and 41 year old Indonesian co-pilot Harvino,[15] who had 5,174 hours of flight experience, 4,286 of them on the Boeing 737

Ethiopia; The captain of the plane was Yared Getachew, 29, who had been flying with the airline for almost nine years[43] and had logged a total of 8,122 flight hours, including 1,417 hours on the Boeing 737.[c] He had been a Boeing 737-800 captain since November 2017, and Boeing 737 MAX since July 2018.[10] At the time of the accident, he was the youngest captain at the airline.[44] The first officer, Ahmed Nur Mohammod Nur, 25, was a recent graduate from the airline's academy with 361 flight hours logged, including 207 hours on the Boeing 737.

I appreciate the numbers game. What is clear with the Ethiopian accident is that in spite of their posted experience, the crew did not know that they were about to attempt to fly a 737 that was not airworthy due a critical air data computer failure.... or worse, their airline management expected pilots to fly when ordered to fly.

[mikeWe9a]

Well this will be locked eventually, but anyway...what makes the MAX so different than previous 737s that would require such heavy training for the type? Is it just new technological systems to get acquainted with?

The MAX, due primarily to different engines and a slightly different weight distribution, had flight characteristics that were slightly different from other 737s (nose pitched differently in response to power changes and was more sensitive at high angles of attack, IIRC).  While this isn't inherently harder to deal with, it was DIFFERENT enough from the previous generation of 737 that normally a separate certification would be required.  The MAX therefore had a system (MCAS) designed to make trim changes in flight that would mimic the characteristics of the earlier aircraft such that no additional certification was required (i.e. it behaved just like an earlier model 737).  This was done so that customers would be able to simply add the MAX to their existing 737 fleets without the expense and complications of having to certify some of their pilots for the "new" aircraft and then keep track of WHICH 737 pilots were needed for a given flight.  The documentation and training for this system was apparently deficient. 

Not that it really mattered for the accidents, however, because the failure of that system essentially created a "runaway trim" failure, which is an emergency that is documented and trained for on pretty much any aircraft with electric trim - the crews failed to recognize or deal with that failure, and the procedure for that failure would have allowed the aircraft to be safely landed.

Mike

[guncrasher]

I appreciate the numbers game. What is clear with the Ethiopian accident is that in spite of their posted experience, the crew did not know that they were about to attempt to fly a 737 that was not airworthy due a critical air data computer failure.... or worse, their airline management expected pilots to fly when ordered to fly.

which the manufacturer failed to install a reduntant system.  insisting they were not needed.   you can argue forever but blame calls on all 3 equally. airline,  pilots and manu.


semp

[Busher]

which the manufacturer failed to install a reduntant system.  insisting they were not needed.   you can argue forever but blame calls on all 3 equally. airline,  pilots and manu.


semp

I never absolved Boeing. Read my other posts.. I said more than once that I felt that the output force of the MCAS likely too strong.
But I hate to blow your theory, the MCAS worked as designed but when you fly a broken airplane, it can kill you. It was built with at least 2 air data computers. It cannot be legally dispatched if one is not working. When one fails (which is really rare), all of the automation fails. The airplane remains flyable with manual control and, it takes two well trained experience pilots to ignore faulty information and to disable systems that may respond incorrectly to faulty information from the failed ADC.
As Toad succinctly pointed out, had the Ethiopian pilots simply returned the flaps to their previous position after their retraction caused the airplane to "act up", they could have simply hand flown the airplane to a safe landing. However given the fact that no effort was ever made to reduce thrust from a takeoff setting, I am not convinced that basic operating skills were present.

[guncrasher]

I never absolved Boeing. Read my other posts.. I said more than once that I felt that the output force of the MCAS likely too strong.
But I hate to blow your theory, the MCAS worked as designed but when you fly a broken airplane, it can kill you. It was built with at least 2 air data computers. It cannot be legally dispatched if one is not working. When one fails (which is really rare), all of the automation fails. The airplane remains flyable with manual control and, it takes two well trained experience pilots to ignore faulty information and to disable systems that may respond incorrectly to faulty information from the failed ADC.
As Toad succinctly pointed out, had the Ethiopian pilots simply returned the flaps to their previous position after their retraction caused the airplane to "act up", they could have simply hand flown the airplane to a safe landing. However given the fact that no effort was ever made to reduce thrust from a takeoff setting, I am not convinced that basic operating skills were present.

I totally agree with you except for the pilots were the only ones responsible and the airlines.  perhaps a single code somewhere where if one fails there's a light that turns on, but that was an option that the manu ofeered for another couple of bucks and said it was not needed.

you know what is the best opinion I ever seen after a crash.  was when an airplane flying thru the andes crashed.  pilots were getting both overspeed and stall warnings.  plane went down.

they asked an expert what he would have done, he said if it was me I would have put the plane in cruise control and wait for another airliner that was coming and wait.  but I wasnt there, I dont know what went thru the pilots head and it's easy for me to say do this or do that because i was not there.

it's easy for another pilot to say this is what I would have done, but you werent there at that time in that situation.  I totally believe the pilots messed up, but you werent there. it's easy for you to type from the comfort of your chair but you werent there.  that's what I think.


semp

[Busher]

it's easy for another pilot to say this is what I would have done, but you werent there at that time in that situation.  I totally believe the pilots messed up, but you werent there. it's easy for you to type from the comfort of your chair but you werent there.  that's what I think.


semp

Well, we'll have to agree to disagree. I appreciate that I was not there but 4 decades of flying and an appreciation of what transpired, tells me that no one needed to die for what should have been an "abnormal" (not emergency) incident.
Furthermore, neither of us will ever know how an airplane that was previously faulted for a "grounding" system failure got in the air.

[guncrasher]

Well, we'll have to agree to disagree. I appreciate that I was not there but 4 decades of flying and an appreciation of what transpired, tells me that no one needed to die for what should have been an "abnormal" (not emergency) incident.
Furthermore, neither of us will ever know how an airplane that was previously faulted for a "grounding" system failure got in the air.

1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp

[Shuffler]

1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp

The aircraft has a lot of safety items built in costing money. All that can't displace two poor pilots in the cabin.

[Puma44]

Looks like the recertification testing is complete.

https://simpleflying.com/boeing-737-max-10-hour-recertification/amp/

[Busher]

1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp

I guess I'll have to keep saying, those that take transport jets into the air with un-rectified "grounding" system failures are grossly negligent. The faulty ADC caused the MCAS to intervene... the MCAS did not jump up and bite them.

[Puma44]

I guess I'll have to keep saying, those that take transport jets into the air with un-rectified "grounding" system failures are grossly negligent. The faulty ADC caused the MCAS to intervene... the MCAS did not jump up and bite them.

Maybe if you make that statement in bold it’ll be easier to comprehend.

1200 bucks, that's what could have saved both airplanes.  except manu didnt think it was needed.


semp

Competent, well trained pilots, that’s what could have saved both airplanes.