Seeker wrote:
"Did strategic bombing of industry work?
I'd have to say, no it didn't.
Did strategic bombing of resources work?
I think it did."
You're obviously correct on the second part. On the first, it depends on whether "work" means "bring the enemy to his knees" or whether it means "seriously affect Nazi production." It certainly didn't stop the production, but it DID seriously affect it. In January, 1945 Speer and his people decided that the bombing had cut 1944's planned tank production 35%, aircraft production 31% and lorries (must be Euro for "trucks"?) 42%. Production of some/all of those things went up, in an absolute sense, from previous numbers, but not to what it might/should have been.
Seeker continues:
"The real key was to go after strategic resources, such as oil, ore, rubber and similar, and then hammer communications with tactical, not strategic bombing."
True. Note, though, that the transportation targets were hit by the entire 8th AF (as well as those large odd-looking English planes) beginning in May, 1944. It wasn't just the strafing 47s and Typhoons that stopped the Nazis from shipping their coal to their steel mills by war's end.
"That's not to say the Lancs and Forts had no effect - they tied up enormous amounts of German resources in terms of manpower and material, which did have an effect in every other theatre; but it wasn't the direct result the pre war proponants of "the bomber will allways get through" envisaged."
True. Note Speer's point, however, that having 1/3 more 88s and 128s on the Eastern Front might have significantly helped the Nazis out against the Bolsheviks; that 2 million Germans were engaged in air defense and bombing-mess cleanup; and that 20% of all ammo produced went to fight off the bombers.
Seeker stumbles:
"This is further supported by the battle of Britain: The RAF was almost bought to it's knees by the tactical bombing of airfields."
The RAF was almost brought to its knees because it chose that course. There was no military need for Eleven Group to be based where it was. Like the continuance of the channel convoys, it was a noodle-size competition.
"I'd say that in fact, strategic bombing did not, could not work in WWII due to the fact there were no strategic weapons, not until '45, and they were used in Japan with effect."
Did I imagine it? I thought the Survey concluded that, had the Allied ground forces not ended the war quicker, the bombing campaign would have brought Germany down within six more months. And....ummm....why was it that Nagasaki and Hiroshima, of all places, were picked for A-bomb practice?
After one more drink, Seeker concludes:
"Tactical bombing, the disruption of resupply and the denial of resources is the way to go."
Ummm....did you get this from Herman Goering's book?
Heh heh.
- oldman (looks sideways at door, places hands under table in anticipation of quickly turning it over.)