"I was thinking, 'Oh ****! It's the first time in my 12 years that an air defense
role is gonna be played in a situation where we actually had the possibility of
firing a Stinger missile,' " Armstrong recalled. But it was not to be.
Over the battalion radio net, Smith heard Avenger air defense systems ? Humvees
mounted with Stingers ? also being cued to the target. But even though at least one
of the ultralights was in the targets of his gunners, procedures here require that a
higher command, in this case V Corps, gives the approval to shoot. The aircraft
disappeared beyond the horizon while that permission was being sought.
Armstrong and his soldiers were "very frustrated," he said. Smith acknowledged that
the failure to attack it was frustrating.
"If I had authority to shoot it myself, we would have engaged it," he said. But he
added that he understood why he was required to seek approval from a three-star
headquarters before shooting at an enemy aircraft that was virtually overhead. "A lot
of it has to do with cluttered skies," Smith said. "There are a lot of friendly
aircraft in these skies."
The crowd of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft flying through this airspace
probably accounted for the ultralight pilots' ability to fly over such a sensitive
assembly area before being detected, according to Smith. The mass of aircraft showing
up on radar screens makes it difficult for soldiers watching those screens to
distinguish, for instance, an Iraqi ultralight aircraft from a small U.S. Army
helicopter, he said.
"It moves slow, and it has a prop, so it looks to us like a helicopter ? and there's
many, many, many helicopters here," he said.
"There are more aircraft here than I've ever seen on a radar screen in my life,"
Smith said, "98 percent of which we positively know are friendly."
Once the ultralights disappeared over the horizon, the Army units here did not give
up the chase. Smith requested and received permission from 3rd ID to continue the
hunt, and three Linebackers headed out and drove two-and-a-half miles without
catching sight of the aircraft. Two 3rd Infantry Division Apaches were also diverted
to search for the aircraft, Smith said.
About 30 minutes later came a report that OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters of the
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) had seen an ultralight 25 miles south of here,
Smith said. But the 101st helicopters apparently did not follow the ultralight, for
reasons Smith said he could not explain.
The appearance of the ultralight aircraft over this vital rear area did not come as a
complete shock to intelligence and air defense officers here. In December about
"half-a-dozen" ultralight aircraft were also spotted flying over two U.S. military
camps in Kuwait, according to Capt. Jeff Ryals, 3-7 Cav's intelligence officer. U.S.
forces failed to shoot the aircraft down in that instance as well.
That "was a test to see if they could violate our airspace without getting shot
down," Ryals said.
Smith said he had been briefed on the threat posed by the small aircraft, "although
we were told to expect a slightly different type of vehicle, which was a paraglider."
The difference between the two is that a paraglider has a steerable parachute canopy
while an ultralight has a stable framed wing, he added.
Reports briefed to officers here indicate that the Iraqi regime tried to buy at least
100 ultralights from an overseas company. But intelligence indicates that only about
50 have been delivered, Ryals said.
He listed three ways the Iraqis could use the ultralights: strategic reconnaissance
of Allied positions, spreading chemical or biological weapons, or loading the
aircraft with high-explosives and using them in Kamikaze-style suicide attacks. The
aircraft were probably being flown by pilots drawn from one of the paramilitary
forces loyal to the Hussein regime, or by Iraqi special forces, Ryals said.
"All the [Iraqi] special forces missions we've seen in the last 10 years have been
strategic reconnaissance on motorcycles or infiltrators dressed as Bedouins," he
said. "So it would be a new tactic if special forces used these [ultralights] for
strategic reconnaissance."
The flights over this area yesterday were probably for the purpose of strategic
reconnaissance, "scouting out the sexiest targets to strike with surface-to-surface
missiles," Ryals said.
Authorities here have made two key changes in the wake of the yesterday's
overflights. "Something is being worked on right now to help someone looking at a
radar air picture determine which track is the ultralight," Smith said. And if
another ultralight appears overhead, Smith and other air defense commanders now have
the authority to shoot on sight.
Although none could be certain, officers here believe this is the first time an enemy
aircraft has flown over American ground forces since the Korean War.
