Once again, where is it I said anyone exceeded .69 Mach? I did not. I said that they could roll over and follow the enemy down. With dive flaps there was no real concern, without you had to be both good and confident.
Sure, Scholtz can post all the anecdotal evidence from whatever book he wants, the fact remains that the P-38's killed 4-6 Luftwaffe planes for every P-38 lost to Luftwaffe aircraft in Europe. And I can quote books that describe incredibly successful units and actions as well.
The two biggest problems with the P-38 is there weren't enough of them, and bad results due to poor tactics and leadership were blamed on the plane instead of 8TH AF staff and leaders.
The air over Europe at 25-30 thousand feet is no colder than it is over the SW Pacific. That tells anyone with good sense that the problem was the people, not the plane.
The P-38 was a plane that required dedication, practice, and confidence. The three went hand in hand. Take one away, the other two are gone. In the hands of John Lowell, Robin Olds, Jack Ilfrey, Larry Blumer, Erv Ethell, or any number of good pilots, it was deadly. They had confidence, talent, and skill.
It was all too easy to blame the poor performance of the 8TH AF FG's on the P-38, but the fact remains, the P-51 had just as much if not more trouble when it did finally arrive. Further, the P-38 outnumbered the P-51 in numbers deployed to the 8TH AF until April 1944, which was after the Luftwaffe was on its last legs.
Doolittle took over the 8TH AF, and only then, in VERY late 1943 and early 1944 did the 8TH AF turn around. It was a major turnaround in leadership and tactics that made the difference. Doolittle even went so far as to pressure his peacetime employer Shell to provide more and better fuel for the fighters. Further, rather than being tied to the bombers and their slow speed, Doolittle released the fighters to do what they did best, hunt the Luftwaffe.
Doolittle made the decision to replace the P-38 because the P-38 was in such short (critically short) supply, and there were plenty of p-51s. The P-38 was in such high demand and short supply throughout the war that Lockheed was forbidden under any circumstances to have production slowed or halted for more than 48 hours.
By the way, when Doolittle flew a fighter to the continent on 6 June 1944, you know what he flew? That's right, a P-38.
Oh, and just a little side note, that first mission the P-38 flew as escorts, the bomber losses dropped by 60%. Hardly an indictment of the P-38's performance as an escort.
The fault for the lack of escorts until late 1943, and the poor performance of the P-38 and escorts in general until early 1944 can and must be laid squarely at the feet of Tooey Spatz and Ira Eaker. Their failure to get escort squadrons into action properly trained and in a timely manner and then their attempts to blame it on the P-38 and the lack of range of the P-47 is their fault and no one else's.
The P-38 was providing escort service to B-24's in Europe for longer missions than the 8TH AF was flying early in 1944, and doing it against the exact same planes of enemy territory with excellent results. And they were doing it in early 1943. With F and G models as well.
If you want to know the truth about what was wrong with the 8TH AF, read Warren Bodie's latest book on the 8TH AF.
The 8TH AF failed to:
Request, acquire, train, and indoctrinate long range escort units (namely p-38 units) until losses of bombers was so overwhelming they could not be sustained for even 30 days. Even when the units arrived, they were rushed into service with no indoctrination, no in theatre training, and no experienced leadership. The men were not trained on how to properly manage the engines or operate the planes at high altitudes.
Take advantage of experienced pilots made available to them for leadership and training positions. These men had successfully fought the Luftwaffe in P-38's for quite some time before the 8TH AF had ANY operational long range escort units. These men were experienced in air to air combat with the Luftwaffe in the P-38 and with long range escort duty. They were either transferred or placed in low ranking positions with no means to pass on their knowledge and experience.
Use proper tactics for fighter escort missions that were already well known in and use in other theatres.
To acquire drop tanks and learn how to make them work until late 1943/ early 1944.
Problems with the P-38.
The electrical system in the early models was slightly overloaded, and if the props weren't properly maintained, they'd short out.
The early models did not have dive flaps, auxillary outer wing tanks, or proper intercoolers.
It had notoriously poor cockpit heat.
It was complex and more difficult to fly. There were two of every engine and prop control, and little of the management was automatic.
It had limited visibility.
If you want to know the truth about the P-38, from some guys who flew it, go here:
http://www.home.att.net/~C.C.Jordan there you'll find several articles on the P-38.
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/6940/20thfg.htmlhere you'll find out about the 20TH FG.
http://www.web-birds.com/8th/55/55th.htmThe 55TH FG, first Allied fighters over Berlin, in P-38s as well.
http://www.web-birds.com/8th/364/364.htmlThe 364TH FG. Flew P-38s to Berlin.
http://www.367thfightergroup.com/The 367TH FG, home of Larry Blumer.
http://usaaf.com/8thaf/fighter/479fg.HTMThe 479TH FG, home of the last P-38 ace Robin Olds.
Plenty more out there if you'll search for those groups.