https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2019/march/14/faa-grounds-boeing-737-max-fleet?utm_source=epilot&utm_medium=email&utm_content=tts&utm_campaign=190314epilot
Some details that those of us who aren't 737 pilots should find interesting. Heck of a thing to have happen just after takeoff.
- oldman
Once the FACTS are know, a procedural and/or physical equipment change will most likely fix the issue. My guess is a procedural change, since Boeing initially chose to keep the MCAS a secret. Once the politicians and internet experts get out of the way, the MCAS issue can get resolved.
There are quite a lol of similarities between the crashes. The flight profile is one and They have also found parts at the crash site suggesting that the elevator was trimmed in a nose down position at the crash. Boeing have already been working on a fix so they are apparently aware of that there are issues with the MCAS.
MCAS is supposed to handle pitch up tendencies at high AOA caused by the engines on the MAX and from what ive read Aviation authorities, for ex the Chinese, didnt like the idea that the fix was to disable the MCAS by switching auto trim off since MCAS was crucial to allow the MAX to be flown by NG certified pilots without a new type rating. (short version)
Whats also an issue is the reports of pitch down tendencies with AP engaged. The MCAS isnt active with AP on so there might be more issues that arent known yet.
From an engineering standpoint the MCAS seems to be a horribly bad design. It relies on a single sensor so it has a single point of failure and it cannot identify a sensor failure. And to make it worse a sensor failure causes the plane to behave erratic and there is no limit to how much it can trim the nose down.
But what bothers me most is the fact that runaway trims arent that unheard of. And The Ethiopian pilots for sure where aware of the issue. If the only thing needed to fix the issue is flipping a switch then i doubt that they would have crashed since thats how pretty much all airliners handle runaway trims. At this point its mostly speculations but it feels that its more into this than just a faulty AOA sensor.
The selling point is that no additional training is needed for a NG pilot to fly a MAX so its natural that pilots expect it to be like the NG.
Fact is, there is additional training for the MAX, just like there was for the NG. There are differences but, within the scope of the 737 Type Rating.
No professional, logically thinking pilot would expect it to fly like an NG. Opinion and conjecture doesn’t equal fact.
And at least the Ethiopian pilots had additional training on the MAX including MCAS but apparently it didnt save them.
Are you saying other MAX pilots worldwide didn’t have additional MAX training? A you saying the MCAS was the cause of the Ethiopian crash? If so, how did you gain access to the black box and CVR data?
And at least the Ethiopian pilots had additional training on the MAX including MCAS but apparently it didnt save them.
I did not say THEY were inferior I said their TRAINING is inferior, troll.
As for substance, you lack it completely. Among the professionals on this board your ill-informed “analysis” has become a source of laughter and head shaking.
Why do I get the feeling some folks in this thread didn't read the Rob Graves blog piece that Oldman put up?
Still, I enjoy the humorous aspect of some posts here similar to what Graves got in his comment section.
Never turn down a good chuckle.
The United States and the FAA made the correct decision regardless if you like it or not.
(GRAVES) So the FAA bowed to international and media pressure and grounded all Max aircraft, which is proving to be a minor inconvenience to most operators of the aircraft. I was personally walking out to a Max to fly to Phoenix when the announcement came. Someone somewhere had done some preparations and an -800 was towed to the gate by maintenance about 10 minutes later for a slightly delayed departure.
We of course are now treated to the circular logic of all the "I told you so" stories. The process starts as media sensationalism whips up a gullible and credulous public followed by outraged calls for the aircraft to be grounded. After weather-vaning politicians cave into public pressure, preening media talking heads then get to state that something must have been really been wrong. And so it goes.
Make no mistake: this grounding has more to do with public relations and marketing than safety. As of yet, there is very little evidence that the two Max crashes are in any way related other than the most superficial of circumstances. But the tsunami of media scare stories and sensationalism showed no signs of abatement, so this was the correct decision.
Lives are being spared as we speak and for that we should be thankful. Your complete disregard of human life is rather shocking to say the least.
One commenter offered, based on no information other than two 737s had crashed, that all of them should be grounded. I pointed out that by that logic, it would be even more beneficial to ground all airplanes everywhere as it would be safer still. The response was "I didn't say all airplanes should be grounded" displaying an ironclad grip on logical fallacies.
Clearly, I think this, from Rob Graves' bit posted by Oldman, applies here. Perhaps some missed it.
Again, from Graves:
:D
I’m just more on the let’s stop potential casualties and fix the issue before it happenes again.
from Rob Graves' bit posted by Oldman
um, just to keep things straight, that was Puma who posted the Graves blog. Mine was the AOPA thing, apparently by a different pilot. I just thought his/her comments on the MAX handling issues were interesting.
Given that grounding the MAX isn't as economically drastic as cancelling all, or even a lot of airline flights, I'm unsure why people would not want to err on the side of caution. May be the plane, may be the pilots, may be the maintenance people (my own guess), but there are enough issues out there to raise some questions.
- oldman
The cost is in the billions before all is said and done.
Three stalls in the same basic aircraft type, A320/321. Two of those fatal/hull loss accidents. In two of those the programming appears faulty, in the other the crew did not use procedural knowledge to apply the correct procedure.
Anyone remember the A-320 family of aircraft getting grounded for these > seemingly < related accidents/incident? I don't.
After the last one, there was an AD and a change to the AFM for the A321 that was expanded to the A330/340. Software issue anyone? Any groundings? The AirAsia and the Lufthansa were mere days apart.
FAA has some evidence that connects the two crashes. Like everyone else is saying, the software kept trying to put the plane nose down. See attached YouTube link for the CNN interview.
My apologies to Puma for failing to correctly attribute the Graves comments to him as original poster.
Here's some interesting stalled aircraft data (admittedly from WIKI. Oh...and I'm not picking on Airbus, it's just one example):
"On 27 November 2008, XL Airways Germany Flight 888T, a test flight of an A320-232 stalled in a low speed test and control could not be regained, causing the aircraft to crash into the sea off the southern French coast. The aircraft was on lease by XL Airways and scheduled to be returned to Air New Zealand. All seven people aboard died."
"On 28 December 2014, Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501, using an Airbus A320-216, from Juanda International Airport, Surabaya to Changi International Airport, Singapore, crashed into the Java Sea between the islands of Belitung and Borneo, killing all 162 on board. The cause was initially a malfunction in two of the plane's rudder travel limiter units which caused the plane to stall while encountering a thunderstorm. The crew ignored the recommended procedure to deal with the problem and disengaged the autopilot which contributed to the subsequent loss of control."
"On 5 November 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829, an Airbus A321 was flying from Bilbao to Munich when the aircraft, while on autopilot, lowered the nose into a descent reaching 4000 fpm. The uncommanded pitch-down was caused by two angle of attack sensors that were jammed in their positions, causing the fly by wire protection to believe the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated, forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full stick input. The crew disconnected the related Air Data Units and were able to recover the aircraft.[41] The event was also reported in the German press several days before the Germanwings crash.[42] The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) reported on the incident on 17 March 2015 in a Bulletin publishing the flight data recorder and pitch control data in English and German. As a result of this incident an Airworthiness Directive made mandatory the Aircraft Flight Manual amended by the procedure the manufacturer had described in the FOT and the OEB and a subsequent information of flight crews prior to the next flight. EASA issued a similar Airworthiness Directive for the aircraft types A330/340."
Three stalls in the same basic aircraft type, A320/321. Two of those fatal/hull loss accidents. In two of those the programming appears faulty, in the other the crew did not use procedural knowledge to apply the correct procedure.
Anyone remember the A-320 family of aircraft getting grounded for these > seemingly < related accidents/incident? I don't.
After the last one, there was an AD and a change to the AFM for the A321 that was expanded to the A330/340. Software issue anyone? Any groundings? The AirAsia and the Lufthansa were mere days apart.
Worthwhile to note that Boeing issued a similar type Flight Crew Ops Bulletin the day after the Lion Air crash.
From Boeing: "Boeing’s 737 MAX Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) already outlines an existing procedure to safely handle the unlikely event of erroneous data coming from an angle of attack (AOA) sensor. The pilot will always be able to override the flight control law using electric trim or manual trim. In addition, it can be controlled through the use of the existing runaway stabilizer procedure as reinforced in the Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) issued on Nov. 6, 2018."
What do we know? Well, we know there have been about 350 (total) Boeing MAX deliveries, starting in 2017. We can guesstimate those aircraft are put into service almost immediately and given the type routes they fly, they probably fly 6 or more legs (cycles) a day. So maybe in the last 12 months a huge number of cycles have been flown, maybe 700,00 or 800,000 cycles. (350 aircraft, 6 cycles per day, 365 days per year). A guesstimate but you get the idea. Since introduced there have probably been well over a million cycles of this aircraft type.
Then you have two accidents and suddenly the aircraft is totally unsafe. Uh...yeah.
As mentioned there are a very large number of potential causal factors. Assume for one moment (and I'm not saying it is true or pointing fingers at these two crews) that it WAS the failure of the crew to apply appropriate procedural knowledge. Are we going to blame Boeing and the aircraft for a crew failure to act correctly? Is there no "pilot error" anymore? (I realize "pilot error" is the go-to in just about every investigation.) Should we ground the fleet for pilot error? As pointed out in the Lufthansa AOA problem, there was just an AFM change and the fleet kept flying. Again, Boeing has already put out a FCOB that reinforces crew knowledge of an already existing procedure to counter the runaway MCAS problem.
FAA has some evidence that connects the two crashes. Like everyone else is saying, the software kept trying to put the plane nose down. See attached YouTube link for the CNN interview.
My apologies to Puma for failing to correctly attribute the Graves comments to him as original poster.
Here's some interesting stalled aircraft data (admittedly from WIKI. Oh...and I'm not picking on Airbus, it's just one example):
"On 27 November 2008, XL Airways Germany Flight 888T, a test flight of an A320-232 stalled in a low speed test and control could not be regained, causing the aircraft to crash into the sea off the southern French coast. The aircraft was on lease by XL Airways and scheduled to be returned to Air New Zealand. All seven people aboard died."
"On 28 December 2014, Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501, using an Airbus A320-216, from Juanda International Airport, Surabaya to Changi International Airport, Singapore, crashed into the Java Sea between the islands of Belitung and Borneo, killing all 162 on board. The cause was initially a malfunction in two of the plane's rudder travel limiter units which caused the plane to stall while encountering a thunderstorm. The crew ignored the recommended procedure to deal with the problem and disengaged the autopilot which contributed to the subsequent loss of control."
"On 5 November 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829, an Airbus A321 was flying from Bilbao to Munich when the aircraft, while on autopilot, lowered the nose into a descent reaching 4000 fpm. The uncommanded pitch-down was caused by two angle of attack sensors that were jammed in their positions, causing the fly by wire protection to believe the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated, forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full stick input. The crew disconnected the related Air Data Units and were able to recover the aircraft.[41] The event was also reported in the German press several days before the Germanwings crash.[42] The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) reported on the incident on 17 March 2015 in a Bulletin publishing the flight data recorder and pitch control data in English and German. As a result of this incident an Airworthiness Directive made mandatory the Aircraft Flight Manual amended by the procedure the manufacturer had described in the FOT and the OEB and a subsequent information of flight crews prior to the next flight. EASA issued a similar Airworthiness Directive for the aircraft types A330/340."
Three stalls in the same basic aircraft type, A320/321. Two of those fatal/hull loss accidents. In two of those the programming appears faulty, in the other the crew did not use procedural knowledge to apply the correct procedure.
Anyone remember the A-320 family of aircraft getting grounded for these > seemingly < related accidents/incident? I don't.
After the last one, there was an AD and a change to the AFM for the A321 that was expanded to the A330/340. Software issue anyone? Any groundings? The AirAsia and the Lufthansa were mere days apart.
Worthwhile to note that Boeing issued a similar type Flight Crew Ops Bulletin the day after the Lion Air crash.
From Boeing: "Boeing’s 737 MAX Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) already outlines an existing procedure to safely handle the unlikely event of erroneous data coming from an angle of attack (AOA) sensor. The pilot will always be able to override the flight control law using electric trim or manual trim. In addition, it can be controlled through the use of the existing runaway stabilizer procedure as reinforced in the Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) issued on Nov. 6, 2018."
I was speaking to my sister-in-law yesterday. She’s a FA with WestJet which has 14 MAX 737’s. She was talking to a couple of her pilot friends and mentioned that they never use the AP for takeoff in the MAX because sometimes it gets a bit ‘wonky’. (Her words, not mine) and that they were just waiting for Boeing to fix the issue. They thought grounding them was kinda stupid as other aircraft had serious issues (before mentioned Airbus) and were never grounded and were flabbergasted why Europe was quick to join on the ban Boeing MAX and thought perhaps it was a political jab rather than a common sense approach.
Just food for thought - WestJet only hires x-military pilots or experienced civil with over 1000 commercial hours.
Anyone who believes anything on the news is a retard :old:
Fat is the new thin
I rest my case
If US planes are like their cars i rather not :old:
Anyone who believes anything on the news is a retard :old:
Fat is the new thin
I rest my case
If US planes are like their cars i rather not :old:
fly the jet.
Has it been verified that the First Officer only had 200 hours of total flying time? That is too ridiculous to believe.
Has it been verified that the First Officer only had 200 hours of total flying time? That is too ridiculous to believe.
The pilot was named as Senior Captain Yared Getachew who had a "commendable performance" with more than 8,000 hours in the air, the airline said.
The plane's First Officer Ahmed Nur Mohammod Nur had 200 flight hours, it added.
Well, if you can trust the Beeb, apparently the CEO gave a press conference with some details and the airline made statements about the crew.
It would seem the 200 hours thing is correct.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47513508
200 hours? Things that make you scratch your head and wonder why.
It IS beyond belief that ANY airline management would do that.
Well, if you can trust the Beeb, apparently the CEO gave a press conference with some details and the airline made statements about the crew.
It would seem the 200 hours thing is correct.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47513508
200 hours? Things that make you scratch your head and wonder why.
Requirements for airline first officers (SICs)
The FAA changed the rules for first officers - announcing new requirements on July 10, 2013. In short, on August 1, 2013, the FAA requires SIC's to hold an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate (ATP), but the certificate may have restricted privileges. An ATP with restricted privileges requires you to:
Be 21 years old
Hold a Commercial Pilot Certificate with an Instrument Rating
Complete an Airline Transport Pilot Certification Training Program (ATP CTP)
Pass the ATP knowledge and practical test
And meet the flight time requirements of FAR 61.160 - roughly 1,500 hours
Military pilots need only 750 hours total flight time and 200 hours cross-country time
Graduates from approved four-year universities with a Bachelor's degree and an aviation major need only 1000 hours total flight time and 200 hours cross-country time if they:
Complete at least 60 credit hours of aviation related coursework, and
Hold a Commercial Pilot Certificate that was earned through the university's part 141 training program
If they complete less than 60 credit hours, but at least 30 credit hours, they need 1250 hours total flight time and 200 hours cross-country time
Graduates from approved two-year colleges with an Associate's degree and an aviation major need only 1250 hours total flight time and 200 hours cross-country time if they:
Complete at least 30 credit hours of aviation related coursework, and
Hold a Commercial Pilot Certificate that was earned through the school's part 141 training program.
Other pilots need 1500 hours total time and 200 hours cross-country time
Given the context, that would be total flight time.
Note what they said about the Captain, "with more than 8,000 hours in the air,".
Granted, that is an inference and not necessarily the case. However, they (the airline) are presenting times as time in the air without any type reference or other specificity.
Just one more thing to wait for while they come up with a Preliminary and later Final.
Does it still work like that is it's fly by wire?
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D132hLMWwAYp6Ht.png)
From Ethiopian Airlines.
Its the same regulations as in the US prior to 2013 and as far as i know U.S aviation was considered safe before that..
I've been flying the MAX for a year now.
In this thread, Vraciu is pretty much correct. Almost all the arguments against him are either deliberately mis-interpreting his posts (like brainiac #1 who equated saying a 200 hour FO probably sucks and all African pilots suck), or the regurgitating of sensationalist prattle about how "the SoFtWaReZ be crashing deh plainz!".
MCAS is a good feature. The 737 doesn't have a stick pusher, but the new motors on the MAX give it a nose-up pitching tendency when in the stall. The reasonable answer is to run a little nose-down trim in there. The implementation could have been done better and Boeing did a truly awful job failing to highlight it in MAX differences training, since a single sensor failure can cause it to activate inappropriately.
HOWEVER, runaway trim is runaway trim. Any pilot who flies a plane with any sort of power assisted trim should know instinctively how to quickly turn off the damn trim system. I knew and practiced this when I had less than 40 hours because I received instruction in a plane with electric pitch trim. The instructor, 30+ years ago when I was a pup, told me you first attempt to trim opposite of the runaway trim, and while doing that you go for the trim disconnect switch or circuit breaker. That procedure has applied in every single plane I've every flown in, both military and civilian, and it's pretty much the same procedure in all variants of the 737 including the MAX. This is airmanship 101 type stuff.
Activating the trim switch on the yoke should temporarily halt MCAS inputs. So a simple press of the trim switch nose-up should temporarily turn off MCAS inputs. If after the reset period expires the trim starts running nose down again, then trim opposite it with the trim switch again and then also use the stab trim disconnect switches. Once more, this is piloting 101, something that should be taught and practiced before ever flying any real aircraft with powered trim.
The only real difference in the MAX is that the implementation of MCAS could cause runaway trim with a single AOA sensor failure. That's not a good design, but the effect of the malfunction is still a runaway trim situation that any pilot flying anything more complicated than a Cessna 172 should be able to deal with in their sleep.
200 hour FO? Maybe 350 hrs depending on who you ask. Yea. You get what you pay for and sometimes being cheap kills you. That's no different than paying a dive master with no wreck or deep diving experience to take you to a wreck 200 ft down. Some endeavors in life are simply not safe unless you have quite a bit of experience, and flying is one of them. The crash is a tragedy but the real story is to use this horrific accident as one more reason why the US experience standards must remain in place in spite of concerted efforts by certain groups to eliminate the 1500 hour ATP requirement. Zimme you posted about how US standards used to be, but we changed them for a damn good reason and this latest crash further justifies our rules change.
I'd fly the MAX tomorrow if I was scheduled for it. There's no mystical software bug, the automation isn't overriding the pilot, etc etc. The MAX has a new system that needs tweaking because as it is, a single sensor failure can cause runaway trim. The good news is that correcting runaway trim is no different in the MAX than in any other conventional aircraft with powered trim. You attempt to counter it, and disconnect the trim system. The fact that 2 crews appear to have utterly failed to perform this basic procedure (yes I know findings aren't released) is a pretty harsh lesson about how much experience and training it takes to safely fly any airline not just the 737.
Some endeavors in life are simply not safe unless you have quite a bit of experience, and flying is one of them. The crash is a tragedy but the real story is to use this horrific accident as one more reason why the US experience standards must remain in place in spite of concerted efforts by certain groups to eliminate the 1500 hour ATP requirement. Zimme you posted about how US standards used to be, but we changed them for a damn good reason and this latest crash further justifies our rules change.
The only real difference in the MAX is that the implementation of MCAS could cause runaway trim with a single AOA sensor failure. That's not a good design,
From the FAA Flight standardization Board Report on the GV type:
Gulfstream’s philosophy is to not identify any steps in the GIV-X, GV, and the GV-SP abnormal or emergency procedures as “Memory Items”, yet Gulfstream expects pilots to perform some of the initial and critical steps without reference to any documentation. Gulfstream has advised that the initial, critical pilot responses for the following emergency procedures should be performed promptly without reference to a checklist: Rejected Takeoff, Engine Failure/Fire after V1, Emergency Descent, Rapid Decompression, Autopilot (AP) or Autothrottle (AT) Uncommanded Disconnect, Engine Exceedance, Overspeed, Stall Protection/Stall Warning Activation, Flight Control Jams, Total Loss of Braking, Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) Alert, Windshear Alert, and Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Alert.
Thank you Eagl. I have never flown the 737 in any series so your insight is appreciated. I do suspect though that stab misbehaviour leads to the same action throughout the Boeing fleet.
This video just appeared where a United Captain demonstrates in a 737Max simulator, the futility of fighting the airplane and then through proper crew co-ordination and actioning the stab trim cutouts, the recovery is done safely.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-tmcQebeN8
Like others have expressed, the only defense against automation failures is an experienced pair of pilots that know procedure and can confidently manipulate the airplane by hand.
Its the same regulations as in the US prior to 2013....
Got verifiable proof of that?
I wonder how an airline management could claim to be a world class safe operation while they allow this.
Captain Sully's comments from a couple of days ago sum it up best about hours. . . . .
"I feel sure that the Ethiopian crew would have tried to do everything they were able to do to avoid the accident. It has been reported that the first officer on that flight had only 200 hours of flight experience, a small fraction of the minimum in the U.S., and an absurdly low amount for someone in the cockpit of a jet airliner. We do not yet know what challenges the pilots faced or what they were able to do, but everyone who is entrusted with the lives of passengers and crew by being in a pilot seat of an airliner must be armed with the knowledge, skill, experience, and judgment to be able to handle the unexpected and be the absolute master of the aircraft and all its systems, and of the situation."
"A cockpit crew must be a team of experts, not a captain and an apprentice. In extreme emergencies, when there is not time for discussion or for the captain to direct every action of the first officer, pilots must be able to intuitively know what to do to work together. They must be able to collaborate wordlessly. Someone with only 200 hours would not know how to do that or even to do that. Someone with that low amount of time would have only flown in a closely supervised, sterile training environment, not the challenging and often ambiguous real world of operational flying, would likely never have experienced a serious aircraft malfunction, would have seen only one cycle of the seasons of the year as a pilot, one spring with gusty crosswinds, one summer of thunderstorms. If they had learned to fly in a fair-weather clime, they might not even have flown in a cloud."
"Airlines have a corporate obligation not to put pilots in that position of great responsibility before they are able to be fully ready. While we don’t know what role, if any, pilot experience played in this most recent tragedy, it should always remain a top priority at every airline. Everyone who flies depends upon it."
Got verifiable proof of that?
https://www.flyingmag.com/training/getting-your-atp-certificate
Airlines had traditionally been able to hire first officers with as little as 250 hours and a commercial pilot certificate under their belts. But the new mandate, which was put in effect in 2013, requires first officers to have a type rating and an ATP with an absolute minimum of 1,000 hours. How is this possible, you may ask, as the ATP requires 1,500 hours of total flight time.
In a purely regulatory sense, he is correct. Prior to the major changes in July of 2013, a person could theoretically serve as FO for a Part 121 carrier with a commercial ticket and 250 hours.
However, Vraicu is also correct. There was no US major 121 carrier hiring Commercial pilots with 250 hours into the right seat of the big iron. None.
I can't find the original reg but here's a clip from Flying magazine that spells it out. I think we can consider Flying a reputable source of info:
:salute Busher, Vraicu, Eagl, Puma44 and the rest of the aviation professionals that have contributed. Better thread than the locked one.
<edit> Busher...thanks for that video. It does a good job of showing the problem, the solution and the short amount of time available to "do some of that pilot stuff, Mav!" </edit>
In a purely regulatory sense, he is correct. Prior to the major changes in July of 2013, a person could theoretically serve as FO for a Part 121 carrier with a commercial ticket and 250 hours.
However, Vraicu is also correct. There was no US major 121 carrier hiring Commercial pilots with 250 hours into the right seat of the big iron. None.
I can't find the original reg but here's a clip from Flying magazine that spells it out. I think we can consider Flying a reputable source of info:
:salute Busher, Vraicu, Eagl, Puma44 and the rest of the aviation professionals that have contributed. Better thread than the locked one.
<edit> Busher...thanks for that video. It does a good job of showing the problem, the solution and the short amount of time available to "do some of that pilot stuff, Mav!" </edit>
Ruh-roh.
"Federal prosecutors and Department of Transportation officials are scrutinizing the development of Boeing Co.’s 737 MAX jetliners, according to people familiar with the matter, unusual inquiries that come amid probes of regulators’ safety approvals of the new plane.
A grand jury in Washington, D.C., issued a broad subpoena dated March 11 to at least one person involved in the 737 MAX’s development, seeking related documents, including correspondence, emails and other messages, one of these people said. The subpoena, with a prosecutor from the Justice Department’s criminal division listed as a contact, sought documents to be handed over later this month."
https://www.wsj.com/articles/faas-737-max-approval-is-probed-11552868400?mod=hp_lead_pos1
- oldman
...Lion Air did not install the AOA DISAGREE alert, which warns pilots when the “angle of attack” (AOA) readings do not match, because it is optional and not required by regulators, Managing Director Daniel Putut told Reuters....
...Several carriers, including American Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Canada’s WestJet, Singapore Airlines offshoot SilkAir and Dubai’s flydubai, said the AOA DISAGREE alert was installed on their 737 MAX jets before the Lion Air crash.
Some airlines have also installed a separate optional gauge that gives pilots a direct AOA reading in the cockpit.
American Airlines and SilkAir already have the gauge, while Southwest said it decided after the Lion Air crash to install the gauge on future 737 MAX deliveries to provide “supplemental visual feedback for identifying erroneous AOA data”....
...The alert light turns on when the AOA indications disagree by more than 10 degrees for 10 continuous seconds, according to an American Airlines 737 MAX flight manual obtained by Reuters.
Just tying in with what Puma said. I am wondering if some high time pilots might have just gotten to the point where they have forgotten how to "fly" the plane rather than the instrument package and auto pilot? I am not trying to be snarkey, just mentioning that a newer pilot with fewer hours might be a tad more closer to his / her training in actual hand flying than an old head who has spent years twisting nobs on the autopilot. In short I think there can be good points to both sides. The high time pilot has the experience if they recall the basics as well. The newer pilot is less jaded / complacent perhaps and more into hands on. Just a thought.
Good point Maverick. In twenty years flying the 737, I’ve seen both sides of what you discussed. Some very senior pilots ran the gamut from lazy, dependent on the technology, to hand fly the jet as much as possible. Younger and/or new pilots to the jet tended to still have their hand flying skills intact, especially those from recent commuter jobs (Beech 1900, Embraer, Saab were the best in my experience) and were open and teachable. Military F-teen guys were sometimes a different story and quite challenging. Everyone, without any previous 737 experience had the same problem in the early months flying the jet: Energy Management. Even with good hand flying skills, low time pilots in the jet were slow reacting to this aspect, in combination with the new systems of the jet. This experience leads me to wonder if slow pilot reaction (lack of experience) led to both of these recent tragic incidents, regardless of what mechanical issue occurred.
Can you spell Scapegoat?
Anyone else think this might be premature when considering the cause of these accidents has not yet been published? Furthermore, when did air safety become the jurisdiction of the Justice Department?
Good point Maverick. In twenty years flying the 737, I’ve seen both sides of what you discussed. Some very senior pilots ran the gamut from lazy, dependent on the technology, to hand fly the jet as much as possible. Younger and/or new pilots to the jet tended to still have their hand flying skills intact, especially those from recent commuter jobs (Beech 1900, Embraer, Saab were the best in my experience) and were open and teachable. Military F-teen guys were sometimes a different story and quite challenging. Everyone, without any previous 737 experience had the same problem in the early months flying the jet: Energy Management. Even with good hand flying skills, low time pilots in the jet were slow reacting to this aspect, in combination with the new systems of the jet. This experience leads me to wonder if slow pilot reaction (lack of experience) led to both of these recent tragic incidents, regardless of what mechanical issue occurred.
Ya but do you remember how to arm the genie??? :noid :devil
:salute
Yep! Will never forget that level of responsibility.
Would the light have made a difference? There's going to be discussion on whether or not this should be optional. I think one of the mandated changes may well be to install this option on every one of the MAX aircraft.
I saw another article where Southwest is putting the AOA display into the PFD. Picture in the article linked below. It's already in the HUD of every MAX apparently. ( https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines-is-adding-new-angle-of-attack-indicators-to-its-737-max-fleet/ )
The crew reacted to the situation as they did right or wrong (and I am not bashing these guys). I personally do not think with regards to this particular incident that adding another indication would have helped.So you are saying they were not capable of flying the aircraft?
They were in VMC conditions. In the absence of an AOA gauge, CAS message, light, aural warning, chime, ring a ding a ding, etc they still had outside visual cues. Inside they had all of the air data needed to keep the blue sky above and the brown/ green ground below.
When things start going wrong and you add limited altitude, time, and physical input it would not take long for the crew involved, to be overwhelmed trying to assess all the information coming at them. Flying the aircraft is the most important issue, which they obviously were trying to do.
“If" they were unable to work through the information already coming at them, and control the aircraft in VMC conditions what would the added gadgetry fix?
“If" they were unable to work through the information already coming at them, and control the aircraft in VMC conditions what would the added gadgetry fix?
So you are saying they were not capable of flying the aircraft?
So you are saying they were not capable of flying the aircraft?
It would be a major step in fulfilling the demand from the media that Boeing "DO SOMETHING!!!!" Whether or not it fixed the problem is immaterial to the media.
:D
They are capable of flying the aircraft or they wouldn’t be in the seat. It comes down to experience, judgement, and reaction time. A new pilot just isn’t going have the experience and situational awareness to make a decision and react to a perfect storm type of event in a timely manner, in most cases. The learning curve as a new pilot in the 737 was, for me, nearly vertical for the first few months.
Just tying in with what Puma said. I am wondering if some high time pilots might have just gotten to the point where they have forgotten how to "fly" the plane rather than the instrument package and auto pilot? I am not trying to be snarkey, just mentioning that a newer pilot with fewer hours might be a tad more closer to his / her training in actual hand flying than an old head who has spent years twisting nobs on the autopilot. In short I think there can be good points to both sides. The high time pilot has the experience if they recall the basics as well. The newer pilot is less jaded / complacent perhaps and more into hands on. Just a thought.I found this comment quite interesting but keep in mind, when I welcomed new First Officers to my "office" the least experienced typically had been flying high performance turboprops in a regional or freight carrier for a year or more. There's an ocean of room between that background and 200 hours.
So you are saying they were not capable of flying the aircraft?
Puma said "The learning curve as a new pilot in the 737 was, for me, nearly vertical for the first few months."
With all respect Sir I have to call you on this one. I spent some time as a line check airman and former jet fighter pilots were a joy to line indoc. You had long developed the feel for a jet wing and jet engine behaviour. I bet the 737 felt like a gutless slug after the phantom. I never flew military jets but would have loved to try one. But sadly an airforce pilot's job in Canada is 4 to 5 years of flying followed by 20 more on a desk; hence I never applied.
No, I said they were obviously trying to fly the aircraft. Toad, Ciaphas and Puma basically expanded on what I was trying to convey.
I was commenting more on the idea what Toad wrote about - with regards to the media. The media says just about anything to reach the reader/ watcher and come off sounding like experts or at the least acting like they have insider information. Unfortunately too many people form opinions based more on emotion than fact pressuring politicians and officials to “react” to a problem yet to be identified. Was it the Plane? Or was it the Crew? Or was it a combination of both? I don’t know. However, like everybody else I would like to know.
There is a lot going on - on a flight deck. Especially after takeoff. All while going 287.5 mph. It takes two good crew members to manage that kind of mass moving that fast. When an “Uh Oh” happens it takes two well trained, cognizant, understanding, intelligent crew members to work through a problem and get the aircraft safely back. Put a crimp into any of this on a good day and it takes away from the best possible outcome you can ask for.
Despite all the conjecture, and a true lack of any “Official” published data, I wouldn’t comment on the crews performance until all the facts are in. Yes I have my opinion, and for the most part align with others in the business here. But I'll wait as I would like to know what happened and take away any lesson that can be learned.
Having said that. . . . And not to Hijack the thread......
This is a link from the NTSB on the Learjet crash last year at Teterboro. If you want to listen and watch something that will make you question a persons thought process, a companies hiring practice and work policy, training, lack of situational awareness, procedure, and a lack of piloting then this is it.
I want to say that you should be amazed that something like this could happen, but unfortunately there are many more out there like this and companies that think its ok to hire people that act this way.
And No, the final report has not been released on this particular accident, but the video speaks volumes.
https://youtu.be/67Yw87l3Atw
I want to say that you should be amazed that something like this could happen, but unfortunately there are many more out there like this and companies that think its ok to hire people that act this way.
So will the authorities shake the faith of the world's airline passengers by suggesting that cockpits are not always adequately crewed. I have some doubt.
Toad:The authorities are in a tough spot; not enough qualified aviators and a public not ready to accept RPV B-737s and A-320s. Couple that with technology that at present cannot fully substitute for a qualified aviator in all situations.
As to that horrific lear crash, I am familiar with it; I also have some time in lears. I don't believe we will ever know if this crash was complacency or incompetence. Toad: Probably both.
WOW! That hits about every >DO NOT< on the CRM checklist.
Tough to watch.
Hey, at least they passed their ISBAO audit.)
No, I said they were obviously trying to fly the aircraft. Toad, Ciaphas and Puma basically expanded on what I was trying to convey.
I was commenting more on the idea what Toad wrote about - with regards to the media. The media says just about anything to reach the reader/ watcher and come off sounding like experts or at the least acting like they have insider information. Unfortunately too many people form opinions based more on emotion than fact pressuring politicians and officials to “react” to a problem yet to be identified. Was it the Plane? Or was it the Crew? Or was it a combination of both? I don’t know. However, like everybody else I would like to know.
There is a lot going on - on a flight deck. Especially after takeoff. All while going 287.5 mph. It takes two good crew members to manage that kind of mass moving that fast. When an “Uh Oh” happens it takes two well trained, cognizant, understanding, intelligent crew members to work through a problem and get the aircraft safely back. Put a crimp into any of this on a good day and it takes away from the best possible outcome you can ask for.
Despite all the conjecture, and a true lack of any “Official” published data, I wouldn’t comment on the crews performance until all the facts are in. Yes I have my opinion, and for the most part align with others in the business here. But I'll wait as I would like to know what happened and take away any lesson that can be learned.
Having said that. . . . And not to Hijack the thread......
This is a link from the NTSB on the Learjet crash last year at Teterboro. If you want to listen and watch something that will make you question a persons thought process, a companies hiring practice and work policy, training, lack of situational awareness, procedure, and a lack of piloting then this is it.
I want to say that you should be amazed that something like this could happen, but unfortunately there are many more out there like this and companies that think its ok to hire people that act this way.
And No, the final report has not been released on this particular accident, but the video speaks volumes.
https://youtu.be/67Yw87l3Atw
Out of curiosity, how many revolutions of manual trim do you need from full down trim to full up on a 737 ?
Yup. The G-IV outfit that crashed at Hanscom had gotten IS-BAO Stage 2 recognition. That was another cluster.
Puma said "The learning curve as a new pilot in the 737 was, for me, nearly vertical for the first few months."
With all respect Sir I have to call you on this one. I spent some time as a line check airman and former jet fighter pilots were a joy to line indoc. You had long developed the feel for a jet wing and jet engine behaviour. I bet the 737 felt like a gutless slug after the phantom. I never flew military jets but would have loved to try one. But sadly an airforce pilot's job in Canada is 4 to 5 years of flying followed by 20 more on a desk; hence I never applied.
learning to be a chameleon with a wide variety of Captains and “techniques”,
To expand on my “near vertical learning curve” comment, even after a year and half in the 1900, I was still learning the intricacies of the airline industry, flight attendants, and learning to be a chameleon with a wide variety of Captains and “techniques”, some of which came no where near company procedures or flight manual procedures. Personality adaption with some was quite interesting. I agree with your assessment of fighter pilots and ability to fly swept wing jets. At my crew base for nearly twenty years we had a unique source of new hires from nearby Luke AFB. At first it was a steady stream of F-15 guys, then F-16 guys; affectionately referred to as the “Luke Mafia”. The very common issue with some of these single seat guys was to integrate them into a crew concept. They were so hard wired to doing it all without someone else in the jet, there were challenges with being receptive to input from the other pilot up front. Yeah, they could all fly the jet but, in the 737, 9 Gs and 500 knots wasn’t available to fix and an energy management issue.
Interesting observation, Navy F-18 guys all seemed to be very receptive and open to critique.
I assume you’re Canadian, eh? Spent many days flying the T-bird and Six in Canada. We were always treated like royalty and it was greatly appreciated.
250
Boeing believes that the flight crew should have the ability to manually alter trim should a number of cascading failures occur.
Whatever the reason for Boeing continuing with this older style technology, many flight crews have learnt to “hate “ the spinning trim wheels. They are noisy and distracting, not to mention dangerous if a flight crew accidently leaves the handle in the extended position; there is a reason that they are called “knee knockers”.
250, where did you find that info? Almost sounds like one of those bored days waiting at the gate for a release and looking for something to explore. 😊
Yeah, the knee knocker was a painful first time lesson for everyone. I managed to only do it once, luckily.
Out of interest, in manual trim, 250 revolutions of the trim wheels are necessary to move the trim tab indicators from full up to full down.
Your knee all better? :D
I don't know why I remember it was 250 on the 727.. that was eons ago. I should not have been so definite, I assumed it was likely the same number for the 737. I'll do some research with former FO's that now fly for WestJet to see if I can confirm or correct the number.
Your knee all better? :Dok, this is weird. Where do you live Busher? I know several WestJet pilots as well. I can also ask my bud who flys for Canada North.
I don't know why I remember it was 250 on the 727.. that was eons ago. I should not have been so definite, I assumed it was likely the same number for the 737. I'll do some research with former FO's that now fly for WestJet to see if I can confirm or correct the number.
ok, this is weird. Where do you live Busher? I know several WestJet pilots as well. I can also ask my bud who flys for Canada North.Is being in Canada weird Mr. Fork? I am well east of you near Toronto.<S>
Fork in Calgary
Is being in Canada weird Mr. Fork? I am well east of you near Toronto.<S>
New reports came out today about pilots fighting the MCAS system the day before one of the crashes. One of the jump seat passengers was a pilot and saved the aircraft. Unfortunately the fatal flight was the next day.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/03/20/boeing-max-pilot-reportedly-saved-jet-one-day-before-lion-air-crash/3220891002/
Yes... the next day they did not have a "trained" pilot on board.
New reports came out today about pilots fighting the MCAS system the day before one of the crashes. One of the jump seat passengers was a pilot and saved the aircraft. Unfortunately the fatal flight was the next day.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/03/20/boeing-max-pilot-reportedly-saved-jet-one-day-before-lion-air-crash/3220891002/
The news reports don’t know for a fact they were fighting MCAS.
A pilot was sitting on the jump seat, not a passenger. Anyone sitting on the cockpit jumpseat is considered an additional crew member.
Lion Air is going to take some serious heat for not taking the jet out of service until the issue was resolved, and doing a test flight BEFORE carrying passengers.
For reference, here’s a 737 QRH procedure that could have been used in both recent incidents.(https://i.postimg.cc/Y97DMZ1R/A7-F2-D090-1051-40-BB-9-CE2-F1-AFBCB44-DD9.jpg) (https://postimages.org/)
Thank you for posting this page of the QRH. In the airline I flew for, this action was one of very few memory items. I am not certain that Boeing mandates this item to be a memory action, but I am certain that things would get creative if the pilot not flying was slow to find and action the checklist.
Interesting reading early this morning an ill informed article about the pilot not getting Max 8 sim training. A simulator isn’t required to inform pilots about new software configurations, not to mention the cost of a sim session.
My last gig didn’t have -800 sims when we transitioned. We did online differences training. It was the same when the 700 NGs came on line.
Nothing like another fake news article void of fact. Yeah, he didn’t get Max 8 sim training on the MCAS, but........
The Runaway Stabilizer checklist below has been there for every model of the 737.
Interesting article here regarding the pilots actions. https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2019/march/20/congressman-concerned-about-foreign-pilot-training?utm_source=Editorial+737+Sam+Graves&utm_medium=Faebook&fbclid=IwAR2qr5j9rDjL4hBioody6meCKzxSIATBs166TUq8Zx68OGbz2-y5CX4zwqc
I read in another forum, US and European pilots normally fly their 737 (regardless of model) manually to 10k feet, whereas this procedure is not so common elsewhere.
2 incidents that might be, or nor might be referred to similar problems that have been reported in US, but at 10k you can work out and fix problems, a luxury you don't have if things go wrong when you are low on autopilot, and inadequate training does not help.
the Indonesian pilots did not know anything about the problems, in fact a 3rd pilot from another airline in the previous flight before the accident flew with the crew in cockpit,and told them how to fix the same problem.
Apparently they did not pass that information to the next set of pilots, something I think is almost criminal.
I read in another forum, US and European pilots normally fly their 737 (regardless of model) manually to 10k feet, whereas this procedure is not so common elsewhere.
2 incidents that might be, or nor might be referred to similar problems that have been reported in US, but at 10k you can work out and fix problems, a luxury you don't have if things go wrong when you are low on autopilot, and inadequate training does not help.
the Indonesian pilots did not know anything about the problems, in fact a 3rd pilot from another airline in the previous flight before the accident flew with them in cockpit,and told them how to fix the problem they experienced.
Apparently they did not pass the information to the next set of pilots, something I think is almost criminal.
I read in another forum, US and European pilots normally fly their 737 (regardless of model) manually to 10k feet, whereas this procedure is not so common elsewhere.
I guess I was one of those weirdos that hand flew a lot. Not every single flight but more often than not on climb out. Fairly often on descent out of 10k too.I so agree.. I did too. As the senior First Officer's got promoted to Captain and the newer FO's joined the team, I laughed quietly at their very regular but polite suggestions that they were ready to engage the autopilot for me.
Good way to maintain proficiency IMO.
I guess I was one of those weirdos that hand flew a lot. Not every single flight but more often than not on climb out. Fairly often on descent out of 10k too.
Good way to maintain proficiency IMO.
I so agree.. I did too. As the senior First Officer's got promoted to Captain and the newer FO's joined the team, I laughed quietly at their very regular but polite suggestions that they were ready to engage the autopilot for me.
So I am sure you have all heard the one about the modern cockpit with the crew requirement of one pilot and a German Shepherd. The dog is there to bite the pilot if he touches anything.
I think pretty much the design of the airplane is headed in the direction of having a meat robot on board just so you have a scapegoat when the automation screws up.
It is sort of like an abusive parent: "Hand fly? What are you thinking Rogers!? We categorically only hand fly when absolutely necessary!" followed by "You incompetent idiot! Even a child knows Pitch Plus Power equals Performance. I don't care if the MFD is triggering brain seizures, and the autopilot is has decided it doesn't want to live anymore, why do you think we pay you so much?"
So I am sure you have all heard the one about the modern cockpit with the crew requirement of one pilot and a German Shepherd. The dog is there to bite the pilot if he touches anything.
I think pretty much the design of the airplane is headed in the direction of having a meat robot on board just so you have a scapegoat when the automation screws up.
It is sort of like an abusive parent: "Hand fly? What are you thinking Rogers!? We categorically only hand fly when absolutely necessary!" followed by "You incompetent idiot! Even a child knows Pitch Plus Power equals Performance. I don't care if the MFD is triggering brain seizures, and the autopilot is has decided it doesn't want to live anymore, why do you think we pay you so much?"
This statement more than likely comes from someone who has never been an airline pilot and flown the 737, because it’s not the case. Use of the autopilot and automation is an effective tool in reducing pilot fatigue during those long days that often occur three or four in a row. Hand fly to 10,000 feet? Yeah, occasionally, but not “normally”.(cough WestJet pilots who were flying the MAX /cough)
(cough WestJet pilots who were flying the MAX /cough)
(cough WestJet pilots who were flying the MAX /cough)
Boeing, the FAA and worldwide aviation agencies track not only accidents, but also INCIDENTS…crap that was going sideways but didn't result in a crash. The number of unqualified pilots ... was plain to see in the number of errors being committed daily.
Airbus saw this eventuality decades ago and implemented automatic safety systems in anticipation of unqualified aircrews.
In an earlier post I alluded to an e-mail I got from an aviator friend and mentor. It had a screed that had some pretty inflammatory statements in it. I didn't post it because I couldn't verify or even justify throwing that bomb. ;)
It did have one bit that I find interesting.
I had never really thought of the Boeing/Airbus competition in that way before. I do remember when Airbus first came on the scene with their automation and all knowing computers, there was much discussion in the pilot lounge about the difference in philosophy. Boeing always giving the pilot the ultimate authority to control the aircraft and Airbus having the HAL 9000 to override poor Dave if he tried something which the control laws did not allow.
Back then nearly everyone preferred the Boeing philosophy. We were pilots, dammmit, and it was our aircraft!
Maybe I have to reshape my opinion. Maybe the marketing wizards of Airbus saw this vast expansion of the airline industry world wide. Maybe they understood there would never be enough highly skilled pilots to fill the need this expansion created. Maybe they built a family of aircraft that could in most cases be operated by data input managers. Maybe instead of laughing at them, I need to tip my hat to them for their foresight.
I'm on autopilot so far, in this whole thread.
Yeah, but that being said even you guys segregated the -200 from the rest of the fleet at the end.
I don’t see differences as sufficient to go from a -200 to a -8, but that’s just me. Eagl flies the MAX, perhaps he can provide some perspective.
That’s why I said “in most cases”.
When the SHTF Airbus’s HAL 9000 sometimes isn’t up to the task at hand
They’re betting that most of the time HAL can handle it with data input managers. When HAL fails it’s acceptable losses.
Risk evaluation just like an insurance company or Boeing for that matter.
I think SWA is the worlds largest user of the 737. Right now SWA's fleet has been simplified to NG -700 and -800, and MAX 8. SWA and SWAPA (our union) were happy to continue flying the MAX. SWA does not have a MAX sim yet. The 40+ year old checklist for runaway trim is effective against inadvertent MCAS activation, and in the MAX the switches are in the same location so differences training in a sim hasn't been seen as necessary at SWA even after MCAS was highlighted.
At this point Boeing could slap a big sticker on the glareshield that reads "in the event of runwaway trim, do that pilot $hXt" and it would be all good, as far as I'm concerned, and people who place their lives in the hands of a 200 hr pilot are gonna get what they get because to put it mildly, it's an unforgiving environment. But nobody asked me to make the rules so I'm gonna do whatever the company and the FAA tells me.
Did these last two crashes happen becasue the AOA was not updated to the visual screen?
Did these last two crashes happen becasue the AOA was not updated to the visual screen?
They’re betting that most of the time HAL can handle it with data input managers. When HAL fails it’s acceptable losses.
40 seconds? Sheesh. Try an aileron or rudder hardover.
40 seconds is a lifetime comparatively speaking.
The press is detestable.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/business/boeing-simulation-error.html
It's whether or not the pilots can
1. Maintain aircraft control - Counter runaway with electric trim
2. Analyse the situation - Stabilizer runaway
3. Take the proper action. - Turn off trim
Which is pretty much the exact same Boeing Runaway Stab procedure that's been around since the B-707.
If this experienced body of pilots and professionals are able to deduce the general series of events and subsequent solutions to the recent MAX accidents. Then worldwide a larger body of pilots and professionals have also. So I would assume a fix is already in place while the rest is a global circus of CYA to make news copy, make bones off executives humiliation, and find a fall guy to pin this on. Otherwise is there really anything wrong with the MAX itself?
Otherwise is there really anything wrong with the MAX itself?
It was found that this new positioning of the engines caused the 737 MAX to pitch up slightly during certain maneuvers, especially when the aircraft was already at a high angle-of-attack (AoA). In other words, when the nose of the aircraft was raised to gain altitude, the plane would start to climb higher than the pilot intended. If left unchecked, this tendency could potentially lead to a disastrous stall condition; where the aircraft has pitched up so far that it’s no longer able to produce lift. To counteract this quirk of the design, the MCAS system was introduced.
https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/2781863-post30.html
Hmmmmmmmm.
One would think the Captain would have learned/trained/practiced the Runaway Stab procedure while he was coming up through the ranks as SIC.
I have no idea what “wings that slow the plane faster” is supposed to mean.
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/75/Examples_of_Airfoils.svg/700px-Examples_of_Airfoils.svg.png)
That’s not the answer.
The 727 had a high speed wing with a high degree of sweepback.
If they’re talking about the flap system inducing drag quicker than previous jets that might make sense. But the author of that article is not even a layman. His word salad wasn’t remotely understandable.
I found an airfoil graphic, which, to me, perfectly illustrated "“wings that slow the plane faster." Didn't read the article you don't understand. :D
Again. How does a 727 have “a wing that slows the airplane faster” than previous jets as the author implies?
Makes no sense.
Listen, my guess was airfoil design. If you don't find satisfaction in that then you'll hafta ask an expert. :D
I am an expert.
I also know how to write fairly well. This author... “Wings that slow the airplane faster.”
That’s not even a criteria for landing on a short runway in a jet. You expect to be stabilized at 1000’ for instrument, 500’ for a visual. If you have to “slow the airplane faster” you’re behind. Go around.
It’s probably those giant flaps on the 727 he was attempting to reference. The Cessna 150 was bad that way, too, at flaps 40. Thing would drop like a brick.
Well....my hair is totally gray now. What's left of it anyway!
<edit> You got me to thinking though. I think my company left the 40 notch open quite a while. I'm thinking they blocked it off in the late 90s when the Stage 3 noise limit was otw. Not real sure though as my remembering isn't what it used to be.</edit>
My hair too. All I can tell you is my company had it blocked by 1982 when I got on it. Some of the senior guys said there had been some "firm arrivals" before they did it. Nothing serious.. just embarrassing.
Experience.
Again. How does a 727 have “a wing that slows the airplane faster” than previous jets as the author implies?
Makes no sense.
I can see how a complacent know-it-all pilot or a new guy relying on someone else's rule of thumb might get caught by this.
I think you're picking nits :)
edit - I see Mr. Toad has beaten this horse to death. But here is my reply anyhow.
If you're not... It sounds like they added high lift design features to the wing that also bumped up the drag curve, so that with the power at idle the airspeed bleed rate with the new wing features was higher than the pilots had gotten used to. A pilot used to ripping throttles to idle 5nm prior to the FAF and then casually dropping gear and flaps prior to bumping up the throttles to catch his 600ish fpm descent rate at the FAF might find himself getting VERY slow if he relied on his old pacing and habit patterns. "Slowing down faster" = higher airspeed bleed rate as the aircraft is configured.
Also, a pilot used to pulling the throttles back to idle at 50 ft prior to the roundout/flare in order to slow from approach speed to touchdown speed might find the increased airspeed bleed rate surprising, with the plane slowing below touchdown speed significantly higher than before. That would require a completely different power reduction profile when transitioning from approach to landing.
I can see how a complacent know-it-all pilot or a new guy relying on someone else's rule of thumb might get caught by this.
and brake like there's no tomorrow with full reversers, and there's usually plenty of room even with a wet runway.
In my stint in my squadron as a ground handler (there were no TAR ABs and we all rotated duty in this when we were newly arrived airmen), hot brake issues were a safety hazard (day or, especially night). :(
It's still an issue in some circumstances, however the 737 brakes are sized so that with normal landing weights, there is almost no chance of hot brakes being a significant enough problem to warrant any precautions or extra measures for cooling. We do need to run a brake cooling calculator and checklist in the event of a rejected takeoff or abnormal landing (landing with less than full flaps or without reversers, for example). Then the calculator tells us if we have to wait before going to the gate and how long we have to wait before the next takeoff.
It's still an issue in some circumstances, however the 737 brakes are sized so that with normal landing weights, there is almost no chance of hot brakes being a significant enough problem to warrant any precautions or extra measures for cooling. We do need to run a brake cooling calculator and checklist in the event of a rejected takeoff or abnormal landing (landing with less than full flaps or without reversers, for example). Then the calculator tells us if we have to wait before going to the gate and how long we have to wait before the next takeoff.
Well, I reckon the "new" P-8 has an advantage over the P-3. :)
It was not immediately clear whether the crew had chosen to re-deploy the system, which pushes the nose of the Boeing 737 MAX downwards, but one person with knowledge of the matter said investigators were studying the possibility that the software had kicked in again without human intervention.
It was not immediately clear whether the Ethiopian crew chose to re-deploy the system, which pushes the Boeing 737 MAX downwards to avoid stalling...
...The Wall Street Journal reported earlier that the pilots had initially followed Boeing’s emergency procedures but later deviated from them as they tried to regain control of the plane...
I love the Embraer. We have temp sensors. In the green at line up we are good to reject.
Toad, is that in case a take off has to be aborted?
The G450/550 won't display V speeds if the brakes are too hot for the takeoff conditions. Also, it will give you a cooling time so you know when you will have the necessary brake energy for T/0.Toad, do you have any pictures of the rotors on these jets? I’m assuming after one landing you’d want the plan to relax and cool the brakes off right?
Toad, do you have any pictures of the rotors on these jets? I’m assuming after one landing you’d want the plan to relax and cool the brakes off right?
I haven't followed this too closely, so you may have already seen this.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/pilots-followed-boeings-emergency-steps-before-737-max-crash-report.html (https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/pilots-followed-boeings-emergency-steps-before-737-max-crash-report.html)
Seems everything points to faulty engaging of the MCAS. Maybe the pilots could have done more to disable it? But why does it have to faulty engage?
Seems everything points to faulty engaging of the MCAS. Maybe the pilots could have done more to disable it? But why does it have to faulty engage?
From what I've read there is a bypass switch on the yoke that doesn't work the same way as turning MCAS off on the console. This may have been the critical pilot mistake.
From what I've read there is a bypass switch on the yoke that doesn't work the same way as turning MCAS off on the console. This may have been the critical pilot mistake.
In subsequent discussions with MentourPilot, a YouTube channel with millions of viewers, I was informed this would probably not be true for higher speeds. MentourPilot’s experience when examining hundreds of pilots as Type Rating Examiner for the 737 was the elevator got exceedingly heavy at higher speeds and manual trimming at the slightest miss-trim of the Stabilator from neutral Yoke forces was very difficult.
He also pointed out the high speeds observed in ET302’s FlightRadar24 trace (Figure 1) were logical. It’s a consequence of following the Emergency checklist for “IAS disagree” (IAS is Indicated Airspeed, i.e. the dynamic air pressure experienced by the aircraft) after takeoff.
The combination of the preceding checklist followed by an MCAS Trim Runaway checklist could create a situation where manual trimming after a Trim Cut-Out would be difficult to impossible and would require non-checklist actions.
Ive seen nothing that suggest that they didnt use the correct cutoff switch. ...
Flight path.
Good point. Still, the MCAS was faulty. Granted there are measures in place to by pass it. It has *probably* caused two crashes. It should be adjusted or reengineered. In my world of fixing equipment nothing has just 1 sensor that’s just bad design. Everything has backups. It seems there’s an underlying issue with the MCAS fix it first.
does not suggest that. Especially if the system was reactivated..
The pilot is the backup. Works in the US.
If you're fighting the trim you turn the trimmer off and trim manually. Like our 'combat trim' in AH.
Bypassing the trim so it automatically re-engages is the wrong reaction.
BTW if you ever turned on auto climb in AH when too slow to climb you quickly notice a problem.
Was it reactivated manually or automatically?
MentourPilot’s experience when examining hundreds of pilots as Type Rating Examiner for the 737 was the elevator got exceedingly heavy at higher speeds and manual trimming at the slightest miss-trim of the Stabilator from neutral Yoke forces was very difficult.
You missed some vital info... If your auto trim is messing with you, you disable it and finds out that you cannot trim manually. What are you doing then?
Ethiopian btw owns one of the 4 MAX simulators currently in operation, so in theory they could have practiced the procedure in the sim - too bad its not featured in the MAX-simulator...
Zimme and Ace, may I presume to ask how much experience each of you have accumulated flying transport category or military jet aircraft? Your assuredness would suggest thousands of hours.
Thanks.
I have about 30 mins of flying time in a Cessna. To be fair busher, I don’t have to have a PHD in aeronautics. I don’t have to have thousands of hours to form an opinion based on information gathered. Arguing from authority never is a good argument busher. There’s a couple things that 100% happened. The MCAS system is known to be faulty. Why not fix it? The pilots where not trained well. Why not fix it?
I’m all for grounding the airplane until the MCAS is fixed. Why fly something, even if it can be simply shut off with a few steps, that is total fubar? I put people over profits. Why can’t we just fix the MCAS and ship out orders to immidately train the pilots further? Obviously the USA pilots have either more training, or simply been lucky with it not total screwing them on take off or final.
I just want the MCAS fixed. No need to really argue about that we all know it’s a ongoing issue. Why risk lives?
Thank you. That's what I suspected. Your entire argument is founded in "I just want the MCAS fixed" which presumes in its very content that it was broken to start with. The media certainly believes that.
One level of safety does not exist within the airlines of the United States let alone throughout the world.
Pilot candidate experience levels are dropping worldwide but airlines still need to crew their fleet and they will do so with lowest financial commitment possible.
I suggest to you that what needs fixing is the requirement to place highly trained and experienced pilots in the cockpit of all airliners without regard to the cost of assuring they have that experience. It is that experience that leads aircrews to react calmly and correctly in stressful situations when they do arise.
And Self Preservation as you are the first to the scene of the crash.
Arguing from authority never is a good argument busher.
In my world of fixing equipment nothing has just 1 sensor that’s just bad design. Everything has backups. It seems there’s an underlying issue with the MCAS fix it first.
http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm#aoa
The AoA source
Since MCAS is an FCC function, the AoA source for MCAS is that of the FCC in use; ie FCC 1 uses the Captains AoA probe and FCC 2 uses the F/Os AoA probe. When the 737 is powered up the FCC used is FCC 1 for that flight, this changes for each subsequent flight until the aircraft is powered down. Therefore the AOA sensor that is used for MCAS changes with each flight post power-up.
If the actual problem is inexperienced pilots, because some countries choose to have lower standards, then you can certainly avoid responsibility if you have higher standards that avoid the problem.
If you flew a Max 8 and heard about a crash caused by the MCAS would you get in the jet and make the same mistake a couple of weeks later?
And if you did whose fault would that be? The pilot is responsible for the safe handling of the aircraft.
OT nitpick. Begging the question doesn't mean what you think it means. It's the fallacy of assuming the conclusion. It's often misused to mean suggesting a question or leading to a question. Assuming the conclusion is a staple of forum posts so there's plenty of opportunity to use it properly. :aok
He's arguing from vast experience. Big difference.
Ace, what information have YOU gathered? Share some links? As many as you have would be welcome.
I also mentioned this. But facts don’t register with these noobs.
Who said it was caused by MCAS?
I did edit that post Vraciu. I finally found something definitive on which AOA triggered MCAS. I think the Boeing changes are more than adequate
I did, in my hypothetical question for Pemquist.
I did edit that post Vraciu. I finally found something definitive on which AOA triggered MCAS. I think the Boeing changes are more than adequate.
I wouldn't hesitate to fly it the way it is right now. I've got a lot of time in different Boeings and Runaway Stab is well....Runaway Stab. Procedure hasn't changed really.
Here's where we differ: I DON'T think it's a significant problem.You say it isn’t a significant problem. We will just have to agree to disagree. I respectfully disagree with that.
Yes, the crews need to be aware of MCAS. The purpose, the "how" of what it does, what triggers it and, of course, knowing what to do if it malfunctions. The what to do is the standard, decades old Boeing Runaway Stab procedure.
Again, just about EVERY aircraft with electrical trim has just such a procedure. Potential Runaway Stab problems are not exclusive to Boeing.
However, I do think that they are going to 'have to make changes' to reassure the public due to all the misinformation spread around by pundits that don't know an aileron from spoiler panel. IMO, the MAX is not a 'dangerous' aircraft. It went through Part 25 certification and the FAA didn't find any problem with Boeing design during that process. Likely because of....wait for it...the decades old Runaway Stabilizer NNC.
As many here have pointed out, even after these changes there will continue to be 737 MAX crashes. And Airbus 320 crashes. And Embraer crashes. Crashes of all sorts of aircraft.
Because the REAL problem afflicting the airline industry world wide is a deepening shortage of highly qualified, well experienced aircrews. There's no easy fix for that so it will not be addressed. All IMO.
2I N I T I A L F I N D I N G SOn the basis of the initial information gathered during the course of the investigation, the following facts have been determined:
The Aircraft possessed a valid certificate of airworthiness;
The crew obtained the license and qualifications to conduct the flight;
The takeoff roll appeared normal, including normal values of left and right angle-of-attack (AOA).
Shortly after liftoff, the value of the left angle of attack sensor deviated from the right one and reached 74.5 degrees while the right angle of attack sensor value was 15.3 degrees;then after; the stick shaker activated and remained active until near the end of the flight.
After autopilot engagement, there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes; these oscillations also continued after the autopilot disengaged.
After the autopilot disengaged, the DFDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) trim command four times without pilot’s input. As a result, three motions of the stabilizer trim wrere corded.The FDR data also indicated that the crew utilized the electric manual trim to counter the automatic AND input.
The crew performed runaway stabilizer checklist and put the stab trim cutout switch to cutout position and confirmed that the manual trim operation was not working.
http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C%28ET-AVJ%29.pdf/4c65422d-5e4f-4689-9c58-d7af1ee17f3e initial report.
How do two data sensors sensing for the same conditions show two different conditions of such extremes? In that scenario which one is the MCAS supposed to take as valid, and did the MCAS never accept the pilot input to disengage? Can they tell if the MCAS itself was faulty as a system and no system diagnostic was in place to signal that to the crew?
The preliminary report says the MCAS was disengaged and the pilots were unable to manually trim.
If they were unable to trim because the yoke wasn't neutral isn't that a training issue?
One sensor showed an AOA of ~70 degrees so it was without a doubt faulty...
You mean exercise issue i guess since, as discussed yesterday, is the load too high on the control surfaces you wont be able to move the trim wheels if you are not superman.
Begging the question doesn't mean what you think it means. It's the fallacy of assuming the conclusion. It's often misused to mean suggesting a question or leading to a question. Assuming the conclusion is a staple of forum posts so there's plenty of opportunity to use it properly. :aok
We build items for chemical plants, NASA, Military, Public..... we do not control how they install or use what we build.
...
You mean exercise issue i guess since, as discussed yesterday, is the load too high on the control surfaces you wont be able to move the trim wheels if you are not superman.
For the love of god man don't be a pedant it is unseemly. :) I speka da engrish good and I know full well the "appropriate use" of the phrase is but I find the vernacular usage actually useful as opposed to the slightly obscure meaning with regard to sophistry.
However to protect your delicate ears I have fixed it for you, all I ask is that you punch the next person that says irregardless full in the face and if somebody raises the issue of how something impacted something else or starts to explain how they architected the solution I want you to shoot them dead without compuction. :salute
No I don't mean exercise. I read the comment. It said the trim is hard to turn when the yoke isn't trim neutral. That means when you hold the yoke back the trim is harder to turn, release the yoke and the trim is easier to turn. That matches the preliminary report.
But releasing the yoke will drop the nose. So it assumes that you have enough altitude to work with and it doesnt really seems like they had that much to work with.
But releasing the yoke will drop the nose. So it assumes that you have enough altitude to work with and it doesnt really seems like they had that much to work with.
I just read the report and having seen too many of these over my career there are a few things that do jump off the pages.
The first is the snag (pilot reported system issues logged when they occur) list on page 20. It sadly does not say if these were all the complaints associated with this airplane. And let me be clear; all airplanes new and old, have snags.
For those who are not in the industry or do not have an aviation background, all of the noted rectifications basically read "system ground tested and no fault found". These four snags are such that an experienced airline pilot would clearly see them to be related. The accident airplane as noted in the report, demonstrated airspeed differences between the Captain's and the First Officer's instruments. One thing I should add... the snag history of an airplane and the associated rectifications, are in the aircraft journey logbook and available to review by each crew when they take over the airplane.
While the rectifications entered in the logbook do return the aircraft state to "serviceable", I can say without doubt that none of the pilots in my peer group would have flown it. Four serious possibly pitot/static issues demanded a far deeper maintenance investigation with test flights performed by management pilots to duplicate the problem.
The second notable item from page 9 is that engine power at 94% N1 (a typical takeoff setting) did not change during the short flight. I could find no explanation as to why power was not reduced but that power setting would have lead to a rapid overspeed. For those without jet experience, 250 knots indicated at 6000 to 10000 feet in level flight requires roughly 65% N1.
The last notable item that I saw from page 11, was the suggestion that the pilots were unable to trim the airplane manually. The 737/727 manual trim wheels require a lot of turning to change the trim loading a small amount. To make changes quickly, a hand crank pops out but as some questioned, it is not more difficult to move the trim wheel when control inputs are applied.. aggressively or not. How the manual trim system could possibly fail, I have no idea and it is not addressed.
All of this it would seem is academic. As I typed this while watching the news, the Chairman of Boeing apologized to the world and fell on his sword.
250 knots below 10,000’ is not universal so are you talking an aerodynamic overspeed?
Yes. I had little care about the 250 knot speed limit in North America. I used 250 and about 65% N1 as an example of speed related to power.
But 94% N1 in a 737 will overspeed the airframe (I suspect Vne is likely 340ish) on one engine let alone both.
You can go buy a car or a bus with no license. It is not the manufacturer that requires a license.
Is Boeing responsible for licensing pilots or is it the airlines/end user?
Boeing (CEO) has publicly accepted blame and apologizes for the 2 MAX accidents and loss of life.
Video with taped statement by the CEO: https://www.yahoo.com/news/preliminary-report-says-pilots-ethiopian-093005543.html
The chairman of Boeing acknowledged Thursday for the first time that a new maneuvering system was responsible for two plane crashes that killed almost 350 people, and he apologized to the families and friends of the victims.
"We at Boeing are sorry for the lives lost in the recent 737 accidents and are relentlessly focused on safety to ensure tragedies like this never happen again," CEO Dennis Muilenburg said in a videotaped statement posted on Twitter.
You hate to see it.You really do, chat.
Meanwhile. These two had 159 hours COMBINED on the 737. That's a Green-On-Green that is generally prohibited by USA carriers.
Outcome 2 seems the more common sense approach. Obviously there’s an issue with the plane. Thankfully they are fixing it!
Issue with the plane? Or the pilots? Or both?
Recall Lion Air. Same aircraft had same malfunction on previous day. Jumpseat rider saved airplane and passengers because he knew to turn off Stab Trim Cutouts. Next day, same malfunction (Maintenance: CND. Go fly it :confused:) and no jumpseat rider and total loss of aircraft and passengers. Airplane or crew? Bad AOA not fixed by Maintenance. Airplane or Maintenance?
Now the Ethiopian. Looks like another bad AOA. No jumpseat rider. Preliminary doesn't definitively state Stab Trim Cutout was left in the OFF position. It indicates Stab Trim Cutout was re-engaged. Airplane or crew? Still a lot of questions. I for one am not taking the Prelim as the last word. There needs to be a lot more detail. Minute by minute and side by side comparison of Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder. That is how you see how it actually went down.
At the moment, given the first Lion Air experience, I am of the opinion that the aircraft was flyable in both accidents. YMMV.
Wonder how big the lawsuit will be against Boeing. Being as they are responsible for the faulty parts on their planes.Only Boeing's and the airline's liability insurance company will care.
Issue with the plane? Or the pilots? Or both?
Recall Lion Air. Same aircraft had same malfunction on previous day. Jumpseat rider saved airplane and passengers because he knew to turn off Stab Trim Cutouts. Next day, same malfunction (Maintenance: CND. Go fly it :confused:) and no jumpseat rider and total loss of aircraft and passengers. Airplane or crew? Bad AOA not fixed by Maintenance. Airplane or Maintenance?
Now the Ethiopian. Looks like another bad AOA. No jumpseat rider. Preliminary doesn't definitively state Stab Trim Cutout was left in the OFF position. It indicates Stab Trim Cutout was re-engaged. Airplane or crew? Still a lot of questions. I for one am not taking the Prelim as the last word. There needs to be a lot more detail. Minute by minute and side by side comparison of Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder. That is how you see how it actually went down.
Sadly Toad, I suspect expediency will shadow the truth on this one for all time. And after all the hype, try to find anyone who would believe the truth even if it was published.
At the moment, given the first Lion Air experience, I am of the opinion that the aircraft was flyable in both accidents. YMMV.
Only Boeing's and the airline's liability insurance company will care.
Still looks like pilot error. People would question a Boeing report but Ethiopia is supposed to be unbiased?
still waiting for the final reports
Ace don’t be an idiotNever would be. You can downplay it all you want toad. The plane has issues. Life threating issues. Just because it hasn’t happened here doesn’t mean it can’t, god forbid.
Zimme said "Sully could have made it to the runway if he had made perfect decisions, but noone does that in an emergency."
Now I know your a complete moron who has never flown an airplane.
Zimme said "Sully could have made it to the runway if he had made perfect decisions, but noone does that in an emergency."
Now I know your a complete moron who has never flown an airplane and who did not read the NTSB report of Sully's accident in detail.
Sadly opinions like yours combined with media hype almost guarantees that the truth of what happened here will never come to light.
You are a poster boy for the Dunning-Kruger effect. Look it up and learn at least something.
Zimme said "Sully could have made it to the runway if he had made perfect decisions, but noone does that in an emergency."
Now I know your a complete moron who has never flown an airplane and who did not read the NTSB report of Sully's accident in detail.
Sadly opinions like yours combined with media hype almost guarantees that the truth of what happened here will never come to light.
You are a poster boy for the Dunning-Kruger effect. Look it up and learn at least something.
How long does anyone think it will be before the investigations can determine if it was the MCAS, hardware, or low time pilot inexperience caused these accidents?
Never would be. You can downplay it all you want toad. The plane has issues. Life threating issues. Just because it hasn’t happened here doesn’t mean it can’t, god forbid.
Some of you guys have issues with people having opinions on your profession, it’s weird really. It’s not like we are coming for boeings head they just need to fix the issue which they are CLEARLY doing because it’s grounded and being worked on..
There is nothing suggesting anything about crew training being an issue at this point so its more part of a broader debate on pilot proficiency.
Zimme said "And you are also wrong: i have flown an aircraft... "
I apologise for my error. May I ask what jet transports you have flown?
You may ask.
Nothing except the two crashes.
This thread is rapidly becoming INflamed. Another one about to bite the dust, Stab Cutout Switches or not.
True. Remarkable that it stayed polite for so many pages, though.
- oldman
Never would be.
https://www.mro-network.com/airlines/preliminary-report-points-lion-air-safety-mro-shortcomings
A preliminary report on the Oct. 29 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610) confirms that the accident aircraft was not airworthy on at least its last two flights, spotlighting gaps in the airline's maintenance practices and safety culture.
Much of the probe's focus has been on how the JT610 flight crew responded to flight-control issues during an 11-min. flight that ended when the Boeing 737 MAX8 dove into the Java Sea, killing all 189 onboard. But early findings by Indonesia National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) confirm that mechanics with Lion Air subsidiary Bantam Aero Technic tasked with correcting problems on the aircraft failed to do so. As a result, both the JT610 pilots and the crew that flew the aircraft's previous flight, an Oct. 28 leg from Denpasar to Jakarta, were assigned aircraft that never should have flown.
True. I guessing it’ll be pretty hefty considering they didn’t fix the issue the first go around.
There never ever would have been a "first go around" had Bantam Aero Technic done their job. Probably the key link in the accident chain.
Maybe you understand that, maybe you don't. I guarantee you that the people in this industry fully understand that.
Really?
Well, I'm going to make an assumption that you've heard of and understand the concept of accident chain. If not, let me know.
Let's take the Lion Air.
So....all Boeing's fault right? Boeing's fault that Lion Air scheduled an aircraft that was not airworthy? Not once but TWICE.
The above information is why I replied the way I did to this statement by you:
https://abcnews.go.com/International/damaged-sensor-ethiopian-airlines-737-max-triggered-fatal/story?id=62139860
Two aviation sources familiar with the probe told ABC News that the Ethiopian Airlines flight suffered a damaged angle-of-attack sensor upon takeoff from a bird or foreign object, triggering erroneous data and the activation an anti-stall system -- called MCAS -- sending the pitch of the plane downward and ultimately crashing into the ground.
According to the sources, the pilots did not try to electronically pull the nose of the plane up before following Boeing's emergency procedures of disengaging power to the horizontal stabilizer on the rear of the aircraft. One source told ABC News they manually attempted to bring the nose of the plane back up by using the trim wheel. Soon after, the pilots restored power to the horizontal stabilizer.
With power restored, the MCAS was re-engaged, the sources said, and the pilots were unable to regain control before the crash.
There is a possibility that auto throttle where disengaged at some point. But such details will probably not be revealed until the final report. They where at 1000ft AGL when MCAS kicked in and got several GPWS alarms so its not surprising if they didnt want to reduce the throttles at that point.
Based on the FDR it seems like the cutoff switches where cut after the 2nd engagement of MCAS and it seems like they reengaged them towards the end of the flight. The most plausible theory is that since they couldnt use the trim wheels and probably felt that they couldnt hold the nose up for that much longer they decided to start all over. Reengage the switches, use the electric trim to get the plane under control and then cut them again. They probably thought that they would be able to counter the MCAS but once it kicked in they where just passengers. when they landed in their seats again the speed was so high that they couldnt move the elevators. FDR shows that they pulled the stick back pretty much all they way but that it didnt have any affect on the pitch.
Pretty solid view point here.
I heard nothing but speculation.That’s all anyone here is doing, Busher.
That’s all anyone here is doing, Busher.No that's not true. I have seen no speculation from any professional aviator. But I'll defend your First Amendment rights.
No that's not true. I have seen no speculation from any professional aviator. But I'll defend your First Amendment rights.
Really?
Well, I'm going to make an assumption that you've heard of and understand the concept of accident chain. If not, let me know.
Let's take the Lion Air.
So....all Boeing's fault right? Boeing's fault that Lion Air scheduled an aircraft that was not airworthy? Not once but TWICE.
The above information is why I replied the way I did to this statement by you:
Here is, again, a pretty good analysis:
https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/05/bjorns-corner-et302-crash-report-the-first-analysis/
4: I am not endorsed on 737's but he suggests that the manual trim wheel jams at high speed and I have to question that. Could our 737 pilot please chime in. It functioned at any speed in the 727.
I don't disagree. They key comments in Bjorn's analysis are
The throttles are left at 94% thrust for the whole flight. This is higher than normal but this is a high takeoff. At 7,600ft it is a full 2,200ft higher than Denver, which is the US Benchmark for high takeoffs. And with Stick Shaker and IAS disagree you keep high thrust and fly a slow climb (the IAS disagree is present in the traces but not mentioned in the report specifically. We don’t have all the Crew callouts and discussions present in the report is my conclusion).
The high speed of 340kts indicated airspeed and the trim at 2.3 units causes the Stabilator manual trim to jam, one can’t move it by hand. The crew is busy trying to hand trim the next two minutes but no trim change is achieved.
It presents more questions than it answers:
1: The IAS disagree suggests as I mentioned in a previous post that there was more to this accident than MCAS. The snag list I mentioned showed no resolution to apparently recurring pitot-static issues.
2: It leads me to question how well the crew were trained to use the standby airspeed indicator to determine whether the Captain's or the FO's indicator was faulty.
3: Why there was no attempt to reduce thrust. I appreciate that a pilot who thinks he maybe stalling wants power but 340kias is extreme and as Bjorn suggested, trim adjustments at that speed need to be "gentle".
4: I am not endorsed on 737's but he suggests that the manual trim wheel jams at high speed and I have to question that. Could our 737 pilot please chime in. It functioned at any speed in the 727.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE(you can read the rest in the document)
The aisle stand trim switches can be used to trim the airplane throughout the flight envelope and fully complies with the reference regulation Simulation has demonstrated that the thumb switch trim does not have enough authority to completely trim the aircraft longitudinally in certain corners of the flight envelope, e.g. gear up/flaps up, aft center of gravity, near Vmo/Mmo corner, and gear down/flaps up, at speeds above 230 kts.
In those cases, longitudinal trim is achieved by using the manual stabilizer trim wheel to position the stabilizer. The trim wheel can be used to trim the airplane throughout the entire flight envelope.
In addition, the autopilot has the authority to trim the airplane in these conditions.
The reference regulation and policy do not specify the method of trim, nor do they state that when multiple pilot trim control paths exist that they must each independently be able to trim the airplane throughout the flight envelope.
Boeing did not initially consider this to be a compliance issue because trim could always be achieved, even during the conditions where use of the aisle stand trim switch was required.
Subsequent to flight testing, the FAA-TAD expressed concern with compliance to the reference regulation based on an interpretation of the intent behind “trim”. The main issue being that longitudinal trim cannot be achieved throughout the flight envelope using thumb switch trim only.
There are btw a risk that the MAX might be in even bigger trouble. EASA have had concerns regarding the authority of the electrical trim in certain corners of the flight envelope.
https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/IM.A.120%20Boeing737%20TCDS%20APPENDIX%20ISS%2010.pdf (page 15)
(you can read the rest in the document)
So basically the crew have to rely on the trim wheels when in those areas of the envelope. But if turns out that the trim wheel cannot be used either then the MAX probably wont fly for quite some time. Im not suggesting that it is the case but im not surprised if they are going to dig into it.
There are btw a risk that the MAX might be in even bigger trouble. EASA have had concerns regarding the authority of the electrical trim in certain corners of the flight envelope.
https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/IM.A.120%20Boeing737%20TCDS%20APPENDIX%20ISS%2010.pdf (page 15)
(you can read the rest in the document)
So basically the crew have to rely on the trim wheels when in those areas of the envelope. But if turns out that the trim wheel cannot be used either then the MAX probably wont fly for quite some time. Im not suggesting that it is the case but im not surprised if they are going to dig into it.
Another good read. Wow it’s almost like the plane has issues making it ground worthy.
I don't disagree. They key comments in Bjorn's analysis are
The throttles are left at 94% thrust for the whole flight. This is higher than normal but this is a high takeoff. At 7,600ft it is a full 2,200ft higher than Denver, which is the US Benchmark for high takeoffs. And with Stick Shaker and IAS disagree you keep high thrust and fly a slow climb (the IAS disagree is present in the traces but not mentioned in the report specifically. We don’t have all the Crew callouts and discussions present in the report is my conclusion).
The high speed of 340kts indicated airspeed and the trim at 2.3 units causes the Stabilator manual trim to jam, one can’t move it by hand. The crew is busy trying to hand trim the next two minutes but no trim change is achieved.
It presents more questions than it answers:
1: The IAS disagree suggests as I mentioned in a previous post that there was more to this accident than MCAS. The snag list I mentioned showed no resolution to apparently recurring pitot-static issues.
2: It leads me to question how well the crew were trained to use the standby airspeed indicator to determine whether the Captain's or the FO's indicator was faulty.
3: Why there was no attempt to reduce thrust. I appreciate that a pilot who thinks he maybe stalling wants power but 340kias is extreme and as Bjorn suggested, trim adjustments at that speed need to be "gentle".
4: I am not endorsed on 737's but he suggests that the manual trim wheel jams at high speed and I have to question that. Could our 737 pilot please chime in. It functioned at any speed in the 727.
Regarding the rest:
Everything is probably related. The stick shaker and unreliable airspeed occured when the AOA sensor failed. But yes- they where having some issues to handle even before MCAS kicked in. Most of the excessive speed buildup happened when the MCAS was active.
It started less than 15 seconds after rotation and MCAS kicked in at 1000ft and also caused some GPWS alarms so its understandable that reducing the throttles wasnt their main concern at the time. It is also quite possible that they in the stressful and confusion situation had too much to do and simply failed to keep an eye on the instruments. This is something often seen in stressful situations, the brain becomes saturated and cannot deal with new inputs.
And reducing the speed with no trim can be a problem since the plane becomes more nose heavy when it slows down.
Well Sir, with respect, this brings us back to one of the original discussions of experience in the cockpit.
Terms you used such as "confusion" "failed to keep an eye on" "saturated" etc just don't happen with experienced airline pilots. Any experienced airline pilot knows if he flies a known body angle at a known thrust value, that his airplane might feel like crap but it will fly. 94% N1 all the way to a crash is unconscionable.
Furthermore an experienced 737 pilot has confirmed as I suspected, that manual trim is available though the full flight envelope... it has to be fail safe.. it is the only backup for a critical flight control.
While I believe this airplane like the Lion Air 737 had uncorrected mechanical issues that should have grounded it, I still believe that experienced professional pilots would have prevented a catastrophic result.
You should read that again. Your quote says "The aisle stand trim switches can be used to trim the airplane throughout the flight envelope and fully complies with the reference regulation." The yoke trim is the problem. That's why it looks like pilot error.No I think you should.
You read it and still got it wrong?
No I think you should.
Is “The aisle stand trim switches” referring to the center console stab trim cutout switches? If so, it would be helpful to use the correct nomenclature to avoid confusion.
That's quoted from the report Zimme83 posted a link to.
Which is still inaccurate nomenclature.
Which makes one think journalist, not pilot.
The report is from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency.
Which does not necessarily mean it was written by a pilot.
Curious as to whether either trim handle (knee knocker) was extended. Without one or both of the handles extended, it may have been much more difficult to get the desired trim response rolling the trim wheel by hand at high airspeed.
There are btw a risk that the MAX might be in even bigger trouble. EASA have had concerns regarding the authority of the electrical trim in certain corners of the flight envelope.As part of the Acceptance/ Certification process Aircraft manufacturers address EASA questions and explain their design. EASA will then State their position and approve, disapprove or request further information.
https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/IM.A.120%20Boeing737%20TCDS%20APPENDIX%20ISS%2010.pdf (page 15)
(you can read the rest in the document)
So basically the crew have to rely on the trim wheels when in those areas of the envelope. But if turns out that the trim wheel cannot be used either then the MAX probably wont fly for quite some time. I'm not suggesting that it is the case but im not surprised if they are going to dig into it.
There's no excuse for 94% in this situation. None. Pitch + Power = Performance. Argue all you like. If you disagree with that, you are just wrong.
Mr. Bjorn says "And with Stick Shaker and IAS disagree you keep high thrust and fly a slow climb ". Actually, he's almost getting it. You use a KNOWN pitch and power setting that essentially emulates cruise pitch/power. Here's a clue: 94% is WAY too much power. WAY.
BTW, this works for flight with unreliable airspeed as well as a malfunctioning AOA. IIRC the 737-800 was about 2 degrees of pitch and 60% N1 for lower altitudes.
As for not being able to trim the stab manually, yeah, when you have the stick touching your spine, you can't trim manually too well. There's a procedure for that though. I recall Runaway Trim /manual trim demos in the RC-135 (B707-720) simulator. Both pilots pull back hard to get the nose up a bit then release back pressure and trim nose up like a madman using the trim handle (knee knocker). When the nose dropped again, both pull back hard, raise nose a bit, release back pressure, trim up like a madman, rinse, repeat, rinse, repeat. This resulted in a bit of an up and down rodeo but you would be surprised how fast you could get the aircraft back under control.
I'd bet money all the Boeings with the manual trim wheel/handle work the same way. I think I did this in the 727-200 and 737-200 sims a s well. I don't recall doing it in the -800 though. Too busy playing with the new HUD.
Oh...one other thing.... the pull back, trim madly procedure would not of course work if you left the engines at takeoff power while you rodeoed up and down.
That method haven been in the manuals for the 737 for a very long time afaik and isnt anything pilots are trained on today.
10- 15 seconds after take off the normal power setting isnt 60%. You have to remember that they where very low, <1000 ft of the ground with mountains around them. 60% thrust and 2 degree pitch would have killed them even faster...
I have no idea what you are saying in the first sentence.
But allowing the airplane to get to 340KIAS certainly did kill them faster.
As for not being able to trim the stab manually, yeah, when you have the stick touching your spine, you can't trim manually too well. There's a procedure for that though. I recall Runaway Trim /manual trim demos in the RC-135 (B707-720) simulator. Both pilots pull back hard to get the nose up a bit then release back pressure and trim nose up like a madman using the trim handle (knee knocker). When the nose dropped again, both pull back hard, raise nose a bit, release back pressure, trim up like a madman, rinse, repeat, rinse, repeat. This resulted in a bit of an up and down rodeo but you would be surprised how fast you could get the aircraft back under control.
I'd bet money all the Boeings with the manual trim wheel/handle work the same way. I think I did this in the 727-200 and 737-200 sims a s well. I don't recall doing it in the -800 though. Too busy playing with the new HUD.
......and isnt anything pilots are trained on today.
Extract from the Boeing 737-200 Pilot Training Manual February 1982 page 04.80.31. Edited for brevity. Runaway and Manual Stabiliser - Recovery from Severe Out-of-Trim
"In an extreme nose-up out-of-trim condition, requiring almost full forward control column, decelerate, extend the flaps and/or reduce thrust to a minimum practical setting consistent with flight conditions until elevator control is established. Do not decrease airspeed below the minimum maneuvering speed for the flap configuration. A bank of 30 degrees or more will relieve some force on the control column. This, combined with flap extension and reduced speed should permit easier manual trimming.
If other methods fail to relieve the elevator load and control column force, use the "roller coaster" technique. If nose-up trim is required, raise the nose well above the horizon with elevator control. Then slowly relax the control column pressure and manually trim nose-up. Allow the nose to drop below the horizon while trimming. Repeat this sequence until the airplane is trim.
Manual Stabilizer Trim
If manual stabilizer trim is necessary, ensure both stabilizer trim cutout switches are in CUTOUT prior to extending the manual trim wheel handles.Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach. Configure the airplane early in the approach. When reaching the landing configuration, maintain as constant a trim setting as possible. If a go-around is required, anticipate the trim changes as airspeed increases.
One other thing to consider. . . . .
On page 11 of the Preliminary Report issued by Ethiopia it states;
At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.
8 seconds passed between the time the Captain asked a question, got a reply and then the F.O. asked a question and got a reply and then stated the trim was not working. To talk through those questions takes me 4 seconds. If the F.O. deployed the handle on the trim wheel, and made an attempt to turn the wheel, how many turns could he have possibly made in 4-5 seconds even 8 seconds?
Can anybody definitively say that the trim wheel did not work with the information provided?
Not knowing how they are supposed to do pre-start checklists and flows, it’s hard to say exactly what the Captain was actually getting at. In my 737 experience, the Captain did a trim check involving the stab trim cutout switches as part of his/her pre start setup flow. The stabilizer trim handles were not extended as a part of this check. As an FO, I never had a Captain ask if the trim was functional.
So, this begs questions. Did the Captain see something in the aircraft logbook that motivated his question? In their airline, who is procedural responsible for the trim check? Is the trim check part of the airline pre start checklist procedure? Did the FO know how to do the trim check?
That method haven been in the manuals for the 737 for a very long time afaik and isnt anything pilots are trained on today.
10- 15 seconds after take off the normal power setting isnt 60%. You have to remember that they where very low, <1000 ft of the ground with mountains around them. 60% thrust and 2 degree pitch would have killed them even faster...
This is obviously not helpful in the case of ET302
If you have a graph of stick position throughout the flight of ET302, I'd love to see it.
Do you actually know where the stick was when they were trying to manually trim? Was it full aft? Was it mid position? Was it forward?
To people that do this stuff for a living those printouts raise more questions about the crew than the aircraft.
Exactly! Appears the jet was flying the crew.
Haven’t looked at the graph yet but, did climb power ever get called for and set?
From the Prelim:
During takeoff roll, the engines stabilized at about 94% N1, which matched the N1 Reference recorded on the DFDR. From this point for most of the flight, the N1 Reference remained about 94% and the throttles did not move.
From the Prelim:
At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds.
Nope.
But takeoff power, 340kts +, overspeed clacker clacking and a ~1600 fpm climb rate is all normal procedure right?
Another thing on the graph:
That would be the re-engagement of the Stab Trim Cutout switches. Funny the Prelim doesn't mention that.
Looking at the graph, 05:43:30 is where the terminal dive begins. It would suggest that the re-engagement of the Stab Trim Cutouts, an action step in total disagreement with the Runaway Stab NNC, was pretty much the last link in the accident chain.
Pages 10 and 11 of the report outlining the time line of the accident, make at least 2 references to significant airspeed differences between the Captain and the FO. One reference mentions a huge altimeter difference at the time of the crash.
I don't have any idea why their investigation seems not to care about these disagreements but its clear to me that there was a lot more going on than just an aggressive MCAS.
I may be beating a dead horse but the Pitot-Static issues on this airplane could affect all the other systems which are seen as the primary cause.
Has anyone heard if Boeing or any other interested party is looking into whether this type may have a propensity to Pitot-Static faults? (much like the A330)
This is looking more and more like a relatively simple mechanical malfunction that surprised the crew so much, and with their relatively low time in the 737, caused them to get so far behind the situation, there was no chance of recovery.
Agree. Seems the malfunction(s) caused enough confusion to distract the crew away from the primary goal of maintaining aircraft control.
Then sadly have we not come full circle? That a terribly inexperienced crew were presented with series of failures that they were not equipped to handle.
...sources close to the probe say flight data recorder (FDR) data firmly supports the supposition that the aircraft’s left angle-of-attack (AOA) sensor vane detached seconds after take-off and that, contrary to statements from the airline, suggests the crew did not follow all the steps for the correct procedure for a runaway stabilizer....
...This is indicated by approximately 8-sec of nose-down stabilizer movement, which was followed by the use of manual trim on the control column. However, with the MCAS having moved the stabilizer trim by 2.5 units,the amount of manual nose-up trim applied to counteract the movement was around 0.5 units, or roughly only 20% of the amount required to correctly re-trim the aircraft
Because of the way the aircraft’s flight control computer P11.1 software worked, the use of manual trim also reset the MCAS timer, and 5 sec. later, its logic having not sensed any correction to an appropriate AOA, the MCAS activated again. The second input was enough to put in the full nose-down trim amount. The crew again manually counteracted with nose-up trim, this time offsetting the full amount of mis-trim applied by the latest MCAS activation.
By then, some 80% of the initial MCAS-applied nose down trim was still in place, leaving the aircraft incorrectly trimmed. The crew then activated the stabilizer trim cutoff switches, a fact the flight data recorder indicates by showing that, despite the MCAS issuing a further command, there was no corresponding stabilizer motion. The aircraft was flying at about 2,000 ft. above ground level, and climbing.
The crew apparently attempted to manually trim the aircraft, using the center-console mounted control trim wheels, but could not. The cut-out switches were then turned back on, and manual trim briefly applied twice in quick succession. This reset the MCAS and resulted in the triggering of a third nose-down trim activation lasting around 6 sec.
The source says the residual forces from the mis-trim would be locked into the control system when the stabilizer cut-off switches were thrown. This would have resulted in column forces of up to around 50 lb. when the system was switched back on.
Although this could have been reduced by manually trimming the aircraft, this did not occur, and the third MCAS activation placed the aircraft in a steep nose-down attitude. This occurred with the aircraft near its peak altitude on the flight—about 6,000 ft. The engines remained at full take-off power throughout the flight, imposing high aerodynamic loads on the elevators as the crew attempted to pull back on the columns. [/b]
You did.
I firmly believe both the Lion Air and Ethiopian situations could have been resolved and the aircraft landed safely.
You did.
I firmly believe both the Lion Air and Ethiopian situations could have been resolved and the aircraft landed safely.
Totally agree. And always have! But why fly something that for sure has a problem. This incident you can’t blame just one person. There’s a lot of things that went wrong imo. For sure a case of profits over people.
Totally agree. And always have! But why fly something that for sure has a problem. This incident you can’t blame just one person. There’s a lot of things that went wrong imo.
For sure a case of profits over people.
Yes. There was an accident chain. There are multiple factors. The point is the chain could have been easily broken by the crews.
Remember what I posted earlier? Don't be.
Also could be broken by the faulty MCAS.
Boeing ADDED MCAS to the Max to INCREASE the level of safety. This undoubtedly cost them MORE money. I think every aircraft manufacturer intuitively understands their future depends entirely upon building aircraft to the highest level of safety.
My understanding is that MCAS was added to make the airplane certifiable with the new engines. It saved them a lot of money when compared to what it would have cost to change the air-frame. Nothing wrong with that, but the way you describe it they went out of their way to make the airplane safer despite additional cost which is definitely not what I am seeing.
Yep. It was more of a hurry up and get it going so we don’t lose money kind of thing to me. Obviously someone in the industry will argue against that until they are blue in the face. It’s all about money at the end of the day.
Do you read what you type before posting?
Yep. It was more of a hurry up and get it going so we don’t lose money kind of thing to me. Obviously someone in the industry will argue against that until they are blue in the face. It’s all about money at the end of the day.
Do you read what you type before posting?
My understanding is that MCAS was added to make the airplane certifiable with the new engines. It saved them a lot of money when compared to what it would have cost to change the air-frame. Nothing wrong with that, but the way you describe it they went out of their way to make the airplane safer despite additional cost which is definitely not what I am seeing.
There is nothing unusual about this.
Who said there was?
My understanding is that MCAS was added to make the airplane certifiable with the new engines.
The MCAS is a new flight-control-computer (FCC) function added to the MAX to enable it to meet longitudinal stability requirements for certification.
However, the system is only needed to enhance stability with slats and flaps retracted at very light weights and full aft center of gravity (CG). The aircraft exhibits sufficient natural longitudinal stability in all other parts of the flight envelope without the MCAS to meet the rules. Boeing emphasizes that the MCAS is not an anti-stall or stall-prevention system, as it often has been portrayed in news reports.
But why fly something that for sure has a problem. This incident you can’t blame just one person. There’s a lot of things that went wrong imo. For sure a case of profits over people.
So what's your analysis of AF 447? 228 people dead.
There was no AOA indicator in the cockpit displays. Much like a MAX where the AOA gauge was an option. They probably should have grounded all A330s, right?
How about the A330 pitot tubes? The clogging of that particular probe design was a known issue on the A330. Airbus probably chose that design to save money, right? Because they had used it before on other Airbus aircraft.
What about the design of the side-stick controllers with no feedback between the two sides? The pilot’s and co-pilot’s side-sticks are not linked and do not move in unison. When the Pilot Flying deflects his stick, the other stick remains stationary, in the neutral position. What a BAD design, eh? Yet there's a bunch of Airbus models flying around that still use this system. Probably should ground every Airbus, right? I mean...that's an idiot design.
So...why aren't A330s grounded? Why aren't all Airbus aircraft with no-feedback side sticks grounded?
Again, for emphasis, both the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes were not the result of MCAS. In the case of Lion Air it was a non-airworthy aircraft with an AOA problem. In the case of the Ethiopian aircraft, it was most probably a bird strike causing an AOA problem. The solution was pretty simple, as the OTHER Lion Air crew demonstrated the day before.
.........I really doubt that the truth will ever be officially published.
Yep. Ya don’t have to agree with me. But it’s obvious.
Also could be broken by the faulty MCAS.
There is no indication that the MCAS itself was faulty. All published info indicates that it performed exactly as it was supposed to given the sensor inputs. The sensors malfunctioned, for one reason or another, with various effects. One of those effects was the repeated activation of the MCAS system.
Mike
For what ever reason the title of the news stories are making you think it is a jet belonging to Amazon. Amazon has nothing to do with this crash, they have carrier contracts for their goods and one recently crashed. The media is pre testing the waters with their tag lines. Busher is correct in his warning.
Here is the operator:
The Boeing 767 operated by Atlas Air was a scheduled cargo flight for Amazon from Miami to Houston on Saturday when it nosedived into a swampy area about 30 miles from George Bush Intercontinental Airport.
Any info about the Amazon crash? They are surely keeping that one under wraps.
Any info about the Amazon crash? They are surely keeping that one under wraps.
That one isn’t creating the required level of hysteria.
Of course... only the pilots died.
Any info about the Amazon crash? They are surely keeping that one under wraps.
Of course... only the pilots died.
https://youtu.be/H2tuKiiznsY
It's so painfully obvious it was all about money. Even in my industry we hold our manufactures accountable.
Well damn :rolleyes: Now youtube has all the answers, how could we have not known that this level of knowledge was out there?
Do us all a favor Ace; book yourself a few flights on Air Koryo and if you survive, give us a write up on the one level of safety that exists in the world's airlines.
Oh and by the way, lets not forget to throw out due process all together. Then we can let the press and other experts like you determine what really happened in all the world's tragedies.
https://youtu.be/H2tuKiiznsY
It's so painfully obvious it was all about money. Even in my industry we hold our manufactures accountable.
https://youtu.be/H2tuKiiznsY
It's so painfully obvious it was all about money. Even in my industry we hold our manufactures accountable.
Oh and by the way, lets not forget to throw out due process all together. Then we can let the press and other experts like you determine what really happened in all the world's tragedies.
:salute Busher
You were right.
I was wrong. There are WAY more people out there that reason like a 12 year old than I ever imagined.
At least no Hollywood actors who played Boeing test pilots have testified in hearings before Congress about this issue.
I just learned today in the Ethiopian crash that the flight crew had to switch the MCAS system back on multiple times in order for the electric trim to work. When it was off, they couldn't trim the stabilizer for some reason. They followed procedure and shut it off, but for some reason they couldn't get the horizontal stabilizer to trim.
I just learned today in the Ethiopian crash that the flight crew had to switch the MCAS system back on multiple times in order for the electric trim to work. When it was off, they couldn't trim the stabilizer for some reason. They followed procedure and shut it off, but for some reason they couldn't get the horizontal stabilizer to trim.
I just learned today in the Ethiopian crash that the flight crew had to switch the MCAS system back on multiple times in order for the electric trim to work. When it was off, they couldn't trim the stabilizer for some reason. They followed procedure and shut it off, but for some reason they couldn't get the horizontal stabilizer to trim.
Today you can learn about manual trim and going too fast because you left the throttle setting too high.
Pretty much Private Pilot 101 stuff....and both forgot the #1 pilot rule when crap goes downhill...
...and both forgot the #1 pilot rule when crap goes downhill...
FLY THE PLANE
Dunno...
Dunno...
-Isn't it true that the 737 type rating covers all the models from the -300 to the MAX? What about the differences trainings? Is there an exam evaluated by an independent examiner at the end?
-2 other interesting points IMO:
- software is usually written by people with much less of an aeronautical 'culture' than e.g. mechanical engineers
- software certification would not be on the same level as certification of 'nuts, bolts and wires' components
Just curious - who here is an actual pilot either x-military or commercial/civil?
I’ll go first. I am not a pilot.
Just curious - who here is an actual pilot either x-military or commercial/civil?
I’ll go first. I am not a pilot.
I read the article at a financial web site that embedded the text of the article so I didn't have to create an account to read it. And the comments section there look like there is a following of BOTS trying to make people fear Boeing. All the BOTS just happen to be ex-military and "programmers" with one saying 747 instead of 737. The article is incredibly biased while being presented by an untouchable expert. He is a commercial jet pilot and a "programmer" which is supposed to make him an unassailable expert becasue he has credentials, while presenting information anyone can get on the WEB to write a compelling article. I'm very sure part of the pilot training for the MAX was about the extra lift the new engine nacelles produced on their own. Pretty standard fair to begin a whisper campaign to damage a corporation by claiming the whole plane design killed those people thus Boeing is who killed those people knowingly producing a bad design. And this is why Trump grounded the fleet for awhile.
So what does Boeing do to resolve future issues with the MAX before this BOT and unassailable expert whisper campaign can do any real damage?
So what does Boeing do to resolve future issues with the MAX before this BOT and unassailable expert whisper campaign can do any real damage?
Get it flying again ASAP. Accept the fact that there will be cancelled orders, particularly in less developed countries. The US airlines haven't had any problems with the MAX and have not indicated that they will cancel. Take a hit and offer them unused production capacity from cancellations at a lower price. Get as many MAX airplanes out there as fast as possible and get them flying. The aircraft will have as good a safety record as any other jet. This event will eventually be ancient history and the truth will out. In both accidents, the aircraft was flyable as evidenced by the FIRST Lion Air incident where they just turned off the Stab Trim Cutout and left it off.
Also of interest would be how many runaway trim incidents there have been in, let’s say, the last five years worldwide in 737s? Most likely, no one has died in those incidents because the Non Normal Checklist was properly accomplished, along with well trained, skilled/experienced pilots.
Just curious - who here is an actual pilot either x-military or commercial/civil?
I’ll go first. I am not a pilot.
Article said he's a software developer who flies a Cessna. No indication he's ever seen a commercial cockpit.
This exactly. Quite interested to see the maintenance history on both jets, along with all four pilots actual flying time totals and in what, before stepping into the Max 8.
Also of interest would be how many runaway trim incidents there have been in, let’s say, the last five years worldwide in 737s? Most likely, no one has died in those incidents because the Non Normal Checklist was properly accomplished, along with well trained, skilled/experienced pilots.
We have doubts about the pilots' overall abilities. Is there any reason to think that their maintenance is front line?
In addition, I saw enough unresolved pitot/static issues in the report on the Ethiopian jet that I would have refused to fly it. I have to wonder if Captain's authority in Ethiopia has any teeth or if its just lip-service.
We have doubts about the pilots' overall abilities. Is there any reason to think that their maintenance is front line?
In addition, I saw enough unresolved pitot/static issues in the report on the Ethiopian jet that I would have refused to fly it. I have to wonder if Captain's authority in Ethiopia has any teeth or if its just lip-service.
Is there a publicly accessible database of incidents where you might find this information?
Africa is where airplanes go to die. Maintenance there is infamously poor—which is why any airplane registered as, say, 5N (Nigeria) immediately loses 80% of its value.
Unknown. Surely there’s a google aviation expert who can come up with the info.
I found this list of accidents and incidents at Lion Air. The airline commenced operations in 2000.
1: On 14 January 2002, Lion Air Flight 386, a Boeing 737-200 crashed after trying to take-off with an incorrect flap configuration at Sultan Syarif Kasim II International Airport. Everyone on board survived but the aircraft was written off.
2:On 30 November 2004, Lion Air Flight 583, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, crashed in Surakarta with registration PK-LMN (c/n 49189); 25 people died.
3: On 4 March 2006, Lion Air Flight 8987, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, crashed after landing at Juanda International Airport Reverse thrust was used during landing, although the left thrust reverser was stated to be out of service. This caused the aircraft to veer to the right and skid off the runway, coming to rest about 7,000 feet (2,100 m) from the approach end of the runway. There were no fatalities, but the aircraft was badly damaged and later written off.
4: On 24 December 2006, Lion Air Flight 792, a Boeing 737-400, landed with an incorrect flap configuration and was not aligned with the runway. The aircraft landed hard and skidded along the runway causing the right main landing gear to detach, the left gear to protrude through the wing and some of the aircraft fuselage to be wrinkled. There were no fatalities, but the aircraft was written off.
5: On 9 March 2009, Lion Air Flight 793, a McDonnell Douglas MD-90-30 (registration PK-LIL) ran off the runway at Soekarno–Hatta International Airport. No-one was injured.
6: On 2 November 2010, Lion Air Flight 712, a Boeing 737-400 (registration PK-LIQ) overran the runway on landing at Supadio Airport, Pontianak, coming to rest on its belly and sustaining damage to its nose gear. All 174 passengers and crew evacuated by the emergency slides, with few injuries.
7: On 13 April 2013, Lion Air Flight 904, a Boeing 737-800 (registration PK-LKS; c/n 38728) from Bandung to Denpasar with 108 people on board, crashed into the water near Ngurah Rai International Airport while attempting to land. The aircraft's fuselage broke into two parts. While Indonesian officials reported the aircraft crashed short of the runway, reporters and photographers from Reuters and the Associated Press indicated that the aircraft overshot the runway. All passengers and crew were evacuated from the aircraft and there were no fatalities.
8: On 6 August 2013, Lion Air Flight 892, a Boeing 737-800 (registration PK-LKH; c/n 37297) from Makassar to Gorontalo with 117 passengers and crew on board, hit a cow while landing at Jalaluddin Airport and veered off the runway. There were no injuries.
9: On 1 February 2014, Lion Air Flight 361, a Boeing 737-900ER (registration PK-LFH; c/n 35710), from Balikpapan Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman Airport to Ngurah Rai International Airport in Denpasar via Juanda International Airport in Surabaya, with 222 passengers and crew on board, landed hard and bounced four times on the runway, causing a tail strike and substantial damage to the aircraft. There were no fatalities, but two passengers were seriously injured and three others had minor injuries.
10: On 20 February 2016, Lion Air Flight 263 from Balikpapan Sultan Aji Muhammad Sulaiman Airport to Juanda International Airport in Surabaya overran the runway on landing, with no injuries. The National Transportation Safety Committee investigation into the incident found that failures in crew resource management led to improper landing procedures, and recommended that Indonesian airlines improve pilot training.
11: On 29 April 2018, Lion Air Flight 892, a 737-800 (registration PK-LOO), made a runway excursion at Jalaluddin Airport after landing under heavy rain conditions, resulting in the main nose gear to collapse. There were no fatalities.
12: On 29 October 2018, Lion Air Flight 610, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, crashed in the Java Sea 12 minutes after takeoff from Jakarta, killing all 189 people on board.
I wonder why the airplanes weren't to blame in the first 11.
What a terrible flight record.
Africa is where airplanes go to die. Maintenance there is infamously poor—which is why any airplane registered as, say, 5N (Nigeria) immediately loses 80% of its value.
What are you a racisssssss? /sarc
Would a plane be considered airworthy in the US if a thrust reverser was inoperative?
Would a plane be considered airworthy in the US if a thrust reverser was inoperative?
Would a plane be considered airworthy in the US if a thrust reverser was inoperative?
I think SWA has picked up a handful of gently used 737s "over there" :) Dunno about factory warranty but refurb 737s can be HOT if they can be converted to SWA standard.
V's just jonesing for attention. ;)
That's a lot of software issues. My favorite is #8.
Cows on the runway. It happens
At the time it was jokingly called “the Big Mac Attack”
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19770428-2
Probably called hamburger 😁
Ham is pork, so why do they call it a hamburger?