Interesting Stats on US Fighter Kills by Aircraft and Theater

[Ardy123]

Its important to note that by '43, the number of hours luftwaffe pilots had before entering their first combat mission was down significantly, and well below the number of flight hours the allied pilots had. This number only got worse to the point where luft pilots only got their '109/190 hours in combat and had almost time in them before combat (<4 hours).

The discrepancy in skill alone would account for figures steep climb in 44 and 45.

I believe it was pointed out in a previous conversation that allied fighter pilots had as much as 100 hours before their first combat mission.

Put that in perspective, how many hours has midway logged? remember how he flew before he was putting in 3000 hours a mo?

[drgondog]

You raw statistics are great. The problem is that raw statistics do not show the real story.

What happened did not happen because of the change in aircraft. It happened because of a change in leadership and the attending change in tactics.
I agree

And no, the change in aircraft is not what allowed the change in tactics.I disagree

The 8th AF could have been providing long range escort of deep penetration bombing raids from the beginning. They specifically chose not to.  But they didn't, leading to the crisis in faith August-October 1943

First, they sent their long range fighter to North Africa, and the Mediterranean. They kept the short legged P-47 in Europe, and moved the P-38. They were convinced that heavy bombers did not require escorts. Second, they remained convinced until late 1943. The 8th AF leadership was incompetent at best, myopic and negligent is probably a far more apt description.

Interesing condemnation - Ira Eaker was the 'they' and he did NOT 'send' the P-38s - they were taken from him.

No real effort was made to equip the P-47 with enough fuel capacity to provide long range escort until it was almost too late. Further, the 8th AF did not request a significant number of P-38's, either.

As an aside, if the 8th AF leadership had been competent enough, and influential enough, they probably could have made enough demand for long range fighters that the P-38 would have been properly second sourced. Instead, they only managed to use up B-17's fast enough that Lockheed was using 50% of the Burbank plant to produce B-17's for the 8th AF to get trashed due to their grossly mismanaged efforts. Double the number of long range escorts would have cut the bomber losses enough that the B-17's coming from Burbank would not have been needed.

That is a lot of assertions - that I could believe coming from Arnold or Marshall - do you have a source?

How completely shortsighted was the 8th AF? Well, you mentioned the 20th and 55th Fighter Groups. Those two groups went operational in the weeks after "Black Thursday". Despite their inexperience, both in the air and on the ground, which resulted in 20% of their strength never leaving the ground, and then as much as 40% of those that did being early returns, they cut bomber losses to fighters dramatically. Often with as few as a dozen P-38's making the whole trip. Those two groups went operational in 1/3 the time normally allotted, in October and November of 1943. There should have been, and could have, been a dozen such fighter groups operational as early as the first quarter of 1943, considering that the P-47 could have been fitted with drop tanks, if anyone had been so intelligent as to request it with any authority.

Not so Senor, there was PTO to consider for TRULY long range twin engine requirements, the MTO as well - wrt P-38. As for P-47, 'fitting' drop tanks on wing hardpoints was a complete redesign of wing - no time, no time, no time based on procurement and design and introduction into mfr requirements - ditto Merlin change into P-38

What happened in late 1943 and early 1944 is that the leadership changed, and the tactics, even the reason for the very existence of the 8th AF changed. The 8th AF went from an air force trying to bomb German assets on the ground, to an air force dedicated 100% to taking control of the sky over Europe.

Much too much of a gross simplification - The bombers were merely bait, a reason for fighters to be all over the skies. Sure, they dropped a lot of bombs, about 1/2 of which, or more, missed their targets. But they drew enemy fighters, which, forced to engage the bombers, became vulnerable to fighters.They also destroye dthe German Petro-Chemical industry which is a curious omission on your part regarding the relevance of Strategic bombing. That single fact alone was the most important justification for all the losses.

It wasn't the P-51 itself, which by the way suffered massive teething issues (stick reversal at low speed, fouled plugs, cracked cylinder heads, etc) that were covered by the existence of other fighters in decent numbers. It was the fact that guys like Doolittle decided they were going to cleanse the sky of German aircraft. You could have hung drop tanks on any competent fighter aircraft in decent numbers with decent pilots in the cockpit in place of the "famous" P-51 and done exactly the same thing.

But that simple solution didn't exist in December 1943.  P-38s weren't cutting it in late 1943 through spring of 44, 47 didn't have the legs, B-17s had to go - or go night bombing because of political pressures - what's a fella to do?

The P-51 was given every advantage. They did only segmented escort, they weren't, for the most part, tasked with escorting bombers for an entire mission. They were sent directly to a rally point, where they were handed bombers to loosely escort for certain legs of a mission. The P-51 did not handle the entire missions, nor were they tied to close escort on most of their missions. The replacement P-51 pilots were sent to "clobber college", the forerunner of the "Top Gun" type schools.

What is your point? Evolving tactics to meet the needs and attributes? using P-47s where P-47s could operate and leave the heavy lifting inbound and outbound to the target - you have a problem with that? As far as 'not handling the entire mission? my father flew 8 hours and nearly 2100 miles on the first leg of the last Shuttle Mission from Steeple Morden to Warsaw to Poltava.  You consider that a 'partial mission'??  Last he knew, the P-47s turned back at Dummer lake some 1750 miles behind him and the 355th

It is always amusing to see the P-51 attributed such magical powers as "the first long range escort fighter" and "the fighter that beat the Luftwaffe". It was a complete change of leadership, and the attending change in tactics, that made it possible to completely defeat Germany in the air. Had the P-51 been introduced, and then tied to the same doctrine and tactics that the P-47 and P-38 had been tied to, "Operation Big Week", and more importantly, "Operation Overlord" would never have been possible. The war in Europe might have dragged on another year or more.

But those operations WERE possible, and the results WERE achieved, and the P-47 at that time and place could NOT have achieved those results.  Changing tactics to accomodate long range perfromance attributes seems clever to me - as contasted to letting P-47 pilots all fly one way-one time and lose your entire force? No?

[Seadog36]

as contasted to letting P-47 pilots all fly one way-one time and lose your entire force? No?

So well argued until this point~ The fact is there were not enough P-38s available to supply needs in the PTO, MTO and ETO at the same time that P-47 was coming into full swing. Many pacific squadrons reluctantly converted to P-47s as well as P-38 production was outstripped by demand, where they adapted with ever increased ranges admirably.

Another factor was that P-51s "Spam Cans" were significantly cheaper to produce that than the sturdy well designed and built P-47 and P-38, making it more attractive as a cheap easy to mass produce alternative. P-51s undeniably are and have been giving far to much credit for "winning the air war" eclipsing the contributions of the P-47 entirely which unbelievably often not even mentioned in documentaries and accounts of ETO or PTO fighters.

[drgondog]

So well argued until this point~ The fact is there were not enough P-38s available to supply needs in the PTO, MTO and ETO at the same time that P-47 was coming into full swing. Many pacific squadrons reluctantly converted to P-47s as well as P-38 production was outstripped by demand, where they adapted with ever increased ranges admirably.

My comment was unfogivably sarcastic. But here is the point. Republic knew full well that the 47 had to be modified to dramatically extend the range.  Both the P-47D-25 with a wet wing and wing hardpoints were designed and tooled in December 43 - but deliveries of the wet wing D couldn't happen until Summer 44 and the M was nearing design completion.  The N was just about completed in preliminary design IIRC (and I'm too lazy to check)

The P-38 manuever flap design as a modification was complete, on ready for shipment - but lost in transit - so the H and early J's soldiered on.  The P-51 arrived in-theatre as an integral part of 9th AF deployment for the invasion. It didn't have the fuselage tank but already had the same range as the P-38.  Spaatz and Doolittle decided the primary objective for USAAF ETO was control of the air over Normandy - So the options were a.) request/demand control of P-51 assets while the 364th and 479th (38s) were still in training and not ready for combat ops until March and May respectively, b.) delay Big Week until they were available, c.) go with what they had and take the big losses around Scweinfurt, Regensburg, Hablerstadt (all BTW out of range of even the P-38 at that time except as a 'fly to IP, escort around the Rally Point and head straight for home.).  We know the choice they made and from that point through March the 51 was more or less the only game in town despite the reliability issues, compounded by nagging structural failures in manuevering dives

Another factor was that P-51s "Spam Cans" were significantly cheaper to produce that than the sturdy well designed and built P-47 and P-38, making it more attractive as a cheap easy to mass produce alternative. P-51s undeniably are and have been giving far to much credit for "winning the air war" eclipsing the contributions of the P-47 entirely which unbelievably often not even mentioned in documentaries and accounts of ETO or PTO fighters.

As a 'former' airframe designer/airframe structures guy I would comment to you that contrasting the 51 as a cheap, easy to mass produce Spam Can is taking severe liberty with truth.  All three were 8g Limit Load at original design gross weight.  All three had their limit loads reduced as a function of Gross weight growth.  All three suffered structural failures, the P-38 was limited all its career to .7M or less (placard stipulated .62M?) for dives while the 51 and 47 survived .82-.85M dives in recorded tests.  So back to basics"
1.) the P-51B wasa.) not only 'cheap' (great manufacturing engineers co-ordinating with airframe design), but b.) exceptional with respect to aerodynamics,  and was highly manueverable - Over Berlin, c.) operated at its peak at the altitudes of its prime mission in the ETO. 

Note I did not say it was the 'best fighter' in the world - but it was the Best ALLIED Fighter over Germany where 8th BC roamed to go after Petro Chemical Industry - simply because Spits were loitering over France and Holland, Jugs were languishing over Dummer Lake and Stuttgart, Lightnings were penetrating to Berlin but weren't going to Munich and Scweinfurt - and besides were far too easy to spot, giving the LW opportunities to fight or flee with more time to decide. 

2.) the Jug was legendary for being able to take punishment - a great attribute for CAS and strafing airfields.  But it wasn't strafing airfields near Berlin, Munich, Salzwedel, Augsburg, Brunswick, Leipzig, etc where LuftFlotte Reich lived.  I have heard from some pretty famous LW aces that the 51 was relatively easy to destroy when he had the shot - but also noted that it was tougher to get the shot (and hit on the smaller airframe) than it was on a P-47 or P-38.  A fuel tank with fuel sitting behind the cockpit had a lot to do with that - ditto Me 109 and FW 190 - neither of which was immune to puny 50 cal.

Curiously, while we are dabbling in statistics, the P-47 groups lost more Jugs strafing airfields per LW fighter aircraft destroyed than the P-51 - by a large margin.  The P-38 was even worse.  This is tricky because while I carefully parsed the MACR's it is impossible to precisely pinpoint an actual flak loss when the narrative reads 'last seen strafing ABC airfield'.  My statistics chalk that up as an 'unknown-probably flak' (for P-47, P-51 and P-38) and I throw it in that bucket.  My 'guess' is that P-51s racked up a lot of ground scores in March through June, with proportionate fewer losses (although high) before the LW flooded airfields with 20mm/37mm flak and when the Jug got the range they encountered equally tough flak right away.  I am just now breaking down month by month strafing credits/losses and re-tying back to MACR's - looooooong job.

The P-47 was a great all around fighter and deserves all the credit it hasn't received - but it doesn't deserve as much credit for the destruction of the LW over Germany in ETO as the P-51, or the Japanese Army Air Force by the P-38 in the PTO.  The MTO was more P-38 and then P-51 over the P-47 - but once again the Mustang's contribution was long range escort and in the MTO the P-38 did the heavy lifting until ~ May 1944.

[drgondog]

Its important to note that by '43, the number of hours luftwaffe pilots had before entering their first combat mission was down significantly, and well below the number of flight hours the allied pilots had. This number only got worse to the point where luft pilots only got their '109/190 hours in combat and had almost time in them before combat (<4 hours).

The discrepancy in skill alone would account for figures steep climb in 44 and 45.

I believe it was pointed out in a previous conversation that allied fighter pilots had as much as 100 hours before their first combat mission.

A couple of points. 

Between August 1943 and April 1944, when the Luftwaffe re-organized Mitte into LuftFlotte Reich, over 30 squadrons from Russia, Italy, Greece, etc were transferred With their pilots, aircraft and ground crews into Germany.   These weren't students although all the front line units were getting new pilots with relatively low time in contrast to RAF/USAAF counterparts.

Second, the training hours started taking its toll in 1943 and took a steep dive during and after the Oil Campaign beginning May 12, 1944.

The debate we are having is about a.)which fighter was most responsible for the rapid destruction of the LW defending Germany (mostly based out of range of the P-47), 2.) the constituency of the LW cadres within the LuftFlotte control, and, c.) whether the P47's - which destroyed 402 German a/c in 1943 in the ETO - got all the "old Guys".

I do not know the statistics yet for the distribution of LW losses between LuftFlotte 3 (JG26 and JG2) defending the airspace over North Sea/Holland/France) and Luft Mitte/Flotte defending Germany as they engaged also on the German Border/North Sea.  Nor do I know what the proportion was between 'new guys'/'old guys' KIA in 1943 vs bailed out successfully and returned to combat.  Nor do I know what the actual MIA/KIA loss list looks like per LW records versus our VCB awards for enemy a/c destoyed. AFAIK - nobody does to a great precision but Prien probably is close on the LW side, and by extension Caldwell.

So, my narrative is based on two facts. One the VCM records of the USAF. Two, the timing and the distribution of re-inforcements to the Battle of Germany, based in central and east/south Germany as well as western Poland and Czecoslovakia to protect refineries. 

From the facts I draw the conclusions that a.) a LOT of 'old guys' transferred into Germany, and b.) the Jugs by and large hurt the LW assets in constant engagement over the North Sea, Western Germany and Holland/France - a force 1/3 the size of LuftFlotte Reich, and c.) the 51's and the 38's were hurting the German assets opposing deep penetrations outside the P-47 ranges.

Hence my arguments regarding the importance of the P-51 above the P-47 (and P-38) in the destruction of LW over Germany. 

[Seadog36]

P-38 $97,147
P-47 $85,578
P-51 $51,572

That is a pretty significant price difference ~ 40% less.

The D-15, the first factory hard point/wet wing P-47 was was produced and saw service late '43 early '44, long before the D-25 which incidentally never had a wet wing. No D's ever had wet wings, only modest increases in internal fuel. The N was the only variant with a wing root extension and a wet wing. The M with 130 built was never a serious factor, merely a hot rod version specifically for the famed 56th FG.

By summer 1944 we obviously had mainland airfields making P-47 range a moot point~ They were taken out of the air to air roll, which they were still supremely capable of (and doing at less risk to their pilots) for the far more hazardous air to ground roll. This virtually eliminated the opportunities to hit, the by then, diminishing talent pool of LW fighters, who were hampered by ever reduced critical fuel supplies for combat and more importantly training of new pilots. Enter the sleek P-51D in overwhelming numbers, to steal the show.

[drgondog]

P-38 $97,147
P-47 $85,578
P-51 $51,572

That is a pretty significant price difference ~ 40% less.

It was actually even worse when the Jug was ~ 104K -aug 1943 and the 51 was 58K at same time.

The D-15, the first factory hard point/wet wing P-47 was was produced and saw service late '43 early '44, long before the D-25 which incidentally never had a wet wing. No D's ever had wet wings, only modest increases in internal fuel. The N was the only variant with a wing root extension and a wet wing. The M with 130 built was never a serious factor, merely a hot rod version specifically for the famed 56th FG.

When you are right, you are right on - which will teach me to deal with memory.  Having said this, while the wing racks were installed on -15 and subsequent models for Dec deliveries and all existing C's and D's started a mod/kit program in January, 1944, none of the P-47D's prior to the -25 could go past Hannover area. 

BTW to increase in Internal Fuel for the -25 from 305 gallons to 370 gallons was HUGE even if only 21% on internal fuel, simply because escort range was predicated on how far the Jug could go, then return if forced to drop tanks, relying entirely on internal fuel. The SOP combat operating range near D-Day was now up to ~ 350mile radius.



By summer 1944 we obviously had mainland airfields making P-47 range a moot point~ They were taken out of the air to air roll, which they were still supremely capable of (and doing at less risk to their pilots) for the far more hazardous air to ground roll. This virtually eliminated the opportunities to hit, the by then, diminishing talent pool of LW fighters, who were hampered by ever reduced critical fuel supplies for combat and more importantly training of new pilots. Enter the sleek P-51D in overwhelming numbers, to steal the show.

Well it didn't really make it a moot point as far as escort role because a.) the 9th AF Jugs were pulled back from detached service to 8th during Dec 1943 through May 1944 and devoted to CAS - and the 78th, 353rd, 356th and 56th were still based in East Anglia, and b.) they were still prevented from doing battle over Berlin, Merseburg, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Brux, Posnan which the LW was still desparately trying to protect because of the Refinery complexes in those areas.  Misburg was in range, but the Jugs hardly went there, due to habit I guess.

As to those 'sleek ol P-51D's', they did show up to continue the grinding but it was the P51B and C which did ALL of the carving as long range escorts through May 1944. The very first P-51Ds arrived at 4th and 354th FG in last couple of days in May and had no role in the big battles until really June 20 to Stettin/Magdeburg/Merseburg and thence to Berburg/Leipzig/Merseburg July 7 and then grew increasingly through the summer 1944.

It was the P-51B/C which finally ran the air to air total (cumulative) past all the ETO scores of the P-47C/D (cumulative) for the ETO.  I often wonder what the score would have been for the 56th had Zemke not been stubborn about the Jug.  He sure as hell adapted well to the 51 when he commanded the 479th.

I respect your opinion - it has been good to chat

[Oldman731]

I often wonder what the score would have been for the 56th had Zemke not been stubborn about the Jug.  He sure as hell adapted well to the 51 when he commanded the 479th.

Heh.  Well, you see where that got him.

You raise some good points drgondog and you've plainly done lots of research.

- oldman

[Seadog36]

A cot in the Stalig with Gabby Great contributions drgondog.

[drgondog]

A cot in the Stalig with Gabby Great contributions drgondog.

Yeah - the Mustang didn't outmuscle a T-Storm..

Interesting quotes for you from Zemke on pg 188 Zemke's Wolfpack after a record setting September 29 1944 mission while leading the 479th.

"My enthisiasm for this fighter increased. While not having the firepower of the P-38, or P-47, it was superior on nearly every other count'. The P-51 wouldn't outclimb the Me 109 or perhaps the FW 190 but it could outdive and outrun them at any altitude and could usually out turn them... Best of all with that large built in tankage and moderate thirst, we didn't have to sweat over fuel gauges like the P-47, and to a degree the P-38 also. "

And thus Zemke shed the light and took on the mantle of the Dark Side. Robin Olds 'adored' Zemke if that is the right time, or 'phrasiology' to describe one very hot fighter pilot's admiration for another.

[drgondog]

Heh.  Well, you see where that got him.

You raise some good points drgondog and you've plainly done lots of research.

- oldman

Thank you - I really have devoted a lot of time and work diving into 8th AF ops. 

Along time ago I was discussing with Jeff Ethell either a 65th FW or 8th AF FC project in diary format similar to Escort to Berlin or my own Angels, Bulldogd and Dragons.  Jeff, a longtime friend dating back to our toddler days when my old man was CO of 35FBW in 1948 and Earl Ethell was a squadron CO, had the bad grace to expire when his P-38 stalled out on final.

[Nathan60]

p-39 with 2.5 kills  was it that out classed in the ETO by both German and Italian planes? Would have thought it would be used by the US as atleast a bomber killer.

Edit: Did a search for total us p-39 losses using various terms and really couldnt find and stats on how many were lost in the ETO so I'm guessing not many were there anyway.

[Ardy123]

"My enthisiasm for this fighter increased. While not having the firepower of the P-38, or P-47, it was superior on nearly every other count'. The P-51 wouldn't outclimb the Me 109 or perhaps the FW 190 but it could outdive and outrun them at any altitude and could usually out turn them... Best of all with that large built in tankage and moderate thirst, we didn't have to sweat over fuel gauges like the P-47, and to a degree the P-38 also. "

I've heard that before, but never understood how... maybe at high speed? the 109g6 (what most of the 109 kills were), easily out turns the p51 and p47. It has a lower wing loading too (for the g6 vs p51).
 

[Oldman731]

I've heard that before, but never understood how... maybe at high speed? the 109g6 (what most of the 109 kills were), easily out turns the p51 and p47. It has a lower wing loading too (for the g6 vs p51).

Difference between the game and the Real World.  Put it down to pilot training, situation, whatever, neither US nor German pilots rated the 109G highly in 1944-45.  The one staffel of JG26 that retained them in 1944 got really depressed.  By contrast, the A8 units were fairly successful and were respected by Allied pilots.  You figure it out.

I've posted it before, but this is a pretty good illustration, both of the similarity and the difference between AH and WWII:


From JG 26 - Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, by Donald L. Caldwell (Ivy Books, New York 1991), ISBN 0-8041-1050-6 (First Ballentine Edition, June 1993), at page 276:

[The following occurred on the afternoon of September 17, 1944 - the first day of Operation Market-Garden]:

The Third Gruppe [of JG26] also fought a battle with Mustangs, with ruinous consequences for itself.  In mid-afternoon, Major Mietusch assembled about fifteen Bf 109s of his scattered command and headed for the landing zones, climbing all the way.  The weather had taken a turn for the worse, and there was a continuous layer of thin cloud at 15,000 feet.  The Germans climbed through it, and then, while above the Dutch-German border, Mietusch spotted a squadron of P-51s below them.  He radioed, “Otter Mietusch, I am attacking!” and dove through the cloud.  His first burst of fire destroyed the Number 4 plane of the trailing cover flight.  Oblt. Schild hit the Number 2 Mustang’s drop tank, and it dove away trailing a solid sheet of flame.  The events of the next few minutes are best stated in the words of the leader of that P-51 flight, Lt. William Beyer of the 361st Fighter Group’s 376th Squadron:

*          *          *

I was the flight leader at the tail end of the squadron.  We had flown back and forth between checkpoints for a couple of hours.  My wingmen apparently got tired of looking around for enemy aircraft.  Only by the grace of God did I happen to look behind us at that particular moment, because in no more than a couple of seconds the enemy would have shot the whole flight down.

I saw about fifteen German fighters closing fast with all their guns firing.  I immediately broke 180 degrees and called out the enemy attack.  My Number 4 man went down in flames, and my wingman got hit and spun out.  I headed straight back into the German fighters and went through the whole group, just about in the center of them.  We were separated by only a few feet...

I immediately made another 180-degree turn, picked out one of them, and started to chase it.  The rest of the fighters zoomed back up into the clouds and disappeared.  We made many violent high-G maneuvers with wide open throttle.  When I started to close and fire, I noticed that his plane seemed to have stopped in the air.  I had to decide whether to shoot and run, or to try to stop my plane.  I cut throttle, lowered flaps, and dropped my wheels - I still kept closing.  I had to fishtail and do flat weaves to stay behind him.  This maneuver was repeated three times, and on one occasion I almost cut his tail off, we were so close...

Then we started into steep dives.  The last one was at around 1,000 feet with flaps down.  This last maneuver was deadly and nerve-racking.  He went straight down toward the ground, hoping I couldn’t pull out.  If I pulled out early, he could have come in behind me, so I stayed with him.  If we had had our wheels down when we pulled out, we would have been on the ground.

It was after this pullout that I finally was able to get my sights lined up and fire at him.  I must have hit him with the first burst, because he kept turning and went into the ground and broke up.  Knowing the caliber of this German pilot, I am sure that if I had taken the time to get off some shots when he was slowing down he could have possibly shot me down or made a getaway.  My other combat victories were not nearly as spectacular as this one, and it is with this in mind that I can recall it so vividly.

*          *          *

Lt Beyer’s victim was Klaus Mietusch.  Mietusch was one of the most fascinating individuals in the Geschwader’s history.  He was a career officer, had joined the Geschwader in 1938, and was its senior pilot in length of service when he died at age twenty-five.  His early combat career was marked by a seemingly endless series of failures and frustrations.  A member of the successful 7th Staffel under Muencheberg, he did not come into his own until he succeeded to the command and led it on detached assignment in Russia in 1943.  He was the opposite of the typical extroverted, self-confident fighter pilot.  He compensated for what he believed to be his lack of ability by an act of will.  According to Priller, Mietusch’s combat motto was, “Bore in, until the enemy is as large as a barn door in your sights.”  Again quoting Priller, duty as Mietusch’s wingman was an “unforgettable experience.”  Mietusch was shot down ten times and was wounded at least four times.  He was said never to have turned down a mission, and he had logged an incredible 452 combat sorties at the time of his death.  His seventy-two victories brought the award of the Oak Leaves to his Knights’s Cross, two months after his death.

[drgondog]

I've heard that before, but never understood how... maybe at high speed? the 109g6 (what most of the 109 kills were), easily out turns the p51 and p47. It has a lower wing loading too (for the g6 vs p51).

The 109G-6/G-10 in the hands of a very good pilot will out turn the 51 at speeds below 300mph TAS.  The SOP for all USAAF fighters was keep your speed up above 300 in general.  A 109 was really in its element with respect to climb and turn at speeds in the 200-250 mph range.  Most 51 and 47 pilots that claimed the 109 was easy to out turn were not flying against a pro.