Hi Hogenbor,
>Indeed, the P-39 doesn't seem so bad at all in this test and disproves anecdotal evidence that Zero pilots feared the F4F the most of all American early war fighters.
Actually, the F4F had the advantage of having a two-speed supercharger, which made it competitive at high altitude where the USAAF fighters lost out. I believe it's quite plausible that the A6M pilots would fear the F4F more than the P-39 or P-40.
>I think it is also a matter of tactics, unwary P-39 pilots may have engaged the Zero without realising its maneuverability and being slaughtered as a result.
Well, I've only once heard MF Kirby praise anything about the P-400 he flew, and that was that the big doors made it easy to bail out of it. (As far as I know, he didn't actually have to.)
From his descriptions, normal tactics for his unit seem to have been to fly one attack on the Zeros, then run home as fast as possible no matter what.
After the conversion to the P-38, his unit became a lot more aggressive, employing high speed climbs and wingman tactics including "drags" to successfully deal with the Japanese fighters.
The P-40, which MF Kirby and Clay Tice (who flew P-40 in New Guinea) agreed to be slightly superior to the P-39, was considered obsolete and inferior to the Japanese fighters as well. Clay Tice' unit was constantly refitted with overhauled P-40s from other units, much to their frustration as they hoped to get rid of the type completely and transfer to a better aircraft like the P-38.
Apparently, the memory of the early losses against the Zeros was still fresh, so noone ever tried to turn with them. However, Kirby and Clay both pointed out that pre-war USAAF doctrine was Lufberry-style turnfighting, assuming that with similar aircraft, the better pilot would win. Cooperation was limited to what today is called "welded wing" tactics - the wing man just stuck with his leader without contributing much to the fight.
With regard to the intelligence report on the A6M, it apparently didn't make it to New Guinea, leaving the pilots there without the (highly useful) information on the Zero's weaknesses.
It's my impression that Chennault was far ahead of the USAAF with regard to tactics as well with regard to intelligence, so the Flying Tigers were much better prepared for the fight against the Japanese than the regular Air Force was.
On the other hand, Clay Tice' comments on the RAAF experience in the defense of Australia seem to suggest that the P-40 fared better than the Spitfire (with tropical filters, to be fair), mainly because the RAAF tried to apply the lessons learned in the Battle of Britain without recognizing that the situation in Australia was a bit different.
With regard to the technical capabilities, I haven't seen a speed over altitude graph for the P-39 yet, but the low-altitude advantage it enjoyed didn't help it much over New Guinea. Under tropical conditions, the "low altitude" band might actually be smaller than indicated by a "standard day" graph anyway. And as the fight often took place over mountainous terrain, going low could actually be impossible.
The point about extremely high boost pressures on the P-39 seems to be reinforced by Kirby's and Clay's recollections - apparently, it was standard practice to disregard engine limitations and run at full (probably military) power from take-off to peel-off into the landing pattern, except for going even beyond that power setting in actual air combat.
(These high power settings were used as result of the pressure the - perceivedly - superior Zero was exerting on the USAAF fighters.)
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
