Spitfire Vb: Did it carry 120 rnds OR 240 rnds of Cannons?

[Crumpp]

Look at the deployment of the alleged equal number of single engined fighters.

No I don't.  Difference though being the RAF Groups worked together defensively.  The Luftflottes worked independantly as I stated earlier.

Just counting 11 Group's strength is not correct.  It does not show the RAF defensive strength.

Showing total numbers for either side does not complete the picture but it does give relative strengths and capabilities.

In my opinion if bombing results in fewer aircaft replacements, destroyed airfields, destroyed maintenance areas, thus hindering my ability to put a larger fighter force in the air, that directly affects me. IMO.

Yes it does hinder their ability until the damage is repaired and loss made up.  If the effect only last's a day and is made up the following day, then it is not hindering the strategic ability of the force.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

But a large number of them didn't have the range to be involved in the early stages of the BoB.
In fact 13 Group only ever was used as a rest and re-coup area or to counter Northern raids. Yet they still had Spits/Hurris based up there (164 Spits/Hurri on July 1st)

A closer approxiamtion for the early stages would be 11 Group strength vs Airfleet 2/3.

Mid stages you could begin to include 12 Group.

Late stages all three, 10/11/12.

Northern raids was 13 Group v Airfleet 5 (yes RAF had advantage there)

[Crumpp]

Serviceability - Problem wasn't serviceable aircraft, but finding pilots to fly them. No point having 100 serviceable aircraft and 10 pilots.

They had pilots, Kev.  

Fighter Command's losses were begining to exceed their ability to replace them during the attacks on the airfields.

It was estimated their system would have collapsed in a few weeks if they had continued to sustain losses at that rate.  At the tip of the spear they had pilots but mathmatically they could not have replaced them as fast they were losing them.

It was not longer an issue when the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London.  This freed up the Group securing airfields and allowed them to go after the Luftwaffe raids.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

Yes but until the switch to London they were running out of them.

As I said the problem was never replacing aircraft losses, but finding people to put in the cockpit.

[Angus]

"Did unescorted bombers directly threaten the Luftwaffe in 1943 or win air superiority over Europe?"

Oranges and Apples Crumpp - again, look at geography. 30 miles of a neutral water does not equal cruising over HUNDREDS of miles of hostile territory while the territory, as such, remains an Ally!
Shame on you, you should really not enter something that naive!!!
(I rather tend to belive that already in 1940 the RAF alone could have reduced Calais to absolute rubble if you see what I mean)

As for the Pilot aspect - Kev, again has this absolutely right. However partially this was a bit of a RAF screwup. There were many well trained pilots available within coastal command the RN, and Bomber command, - they just needed to be converted. The LW did this exact mistake in the late war and converted many a pilot through a "crash course" to fly a 109 and/or 190. By that time, the RAF and USSAF had many many pilots. You know this part.

[Crumpp]

Oranges and Apples Crumpp

Only in your mind, Angus.  To Military planners is the same thing.

The Luftwaffe was flying to the extent of it's range over hostile territory in 1940 just as the USAAF was doing in 1943.

So please tell us the big differences?

And drop the drama.

Angus says:

As for the Pilot aspect - Kev, again has this absolutely right.

These were desperate times for the RAF, which was also taking many casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft but replacement pilots were barely keeping place with losses, and novice flyers were being shot down in droves. Most replacements had as little as nine hours flying time and no combat training. The Luftwaffe referred to these pilots as "cannon fodder". At this point the multinational nature of the RAF came to the fore. With many pilots from the Dominions already serving in Fighter Command — Australians, South Africans, New Zealanders and Canadians — they were bolstered by the arrival of fresh Czechoslovakian and Polish squadrons. In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian and even a Palestinian pilot serving amongst the squadrons.

The RAF at least had the advantage of fighting over home territory. Pilots who bailed out of their shot-down aircraft could be back at their airfields within hours. For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bail out over England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer and kanalkrankheit or 'Channel Sickness' — a form of combat fatigue — began to appear amongst the German pilots. The replacement problem was even worse than the British.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain

All the best,

Crumpp

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
Please find where I claim this did not happen?

It was not the intention of small wing tactics.  While some attacks did occur piecemeal, most did not.  

To claim otherwise is simply wrong.

Sure if you say so.

Deighton, pg216 Sept 15

S/L Kent of #303 sent 9 of his Hurries to the attack bombers and led the remaining 2 to take on the 50 escorting 109s when he could not contact the Contoller to have #229, which was heading away from the Germans, to assist him.

This happened more than you think. On another day only 2/3 of the units engaged.

Deighton, pg212 for Sept 7

"It has been suggested that the intercepted Enigma signals that British intelligence supplied to Dowding and Park (althiugh not to the other commanders) warned them of the German intentions, but on the English side of the Channel Park had no idea that London was the target of this daylight raid."

So much for Crumpp's claim about Ultra. This the biggest raid so far and the Brits were totally in the dark about it. This raid was ~1000 a/c, split 1/3 bombers, 2/3 fighters.

The RAF Groups were much more operationally flexible than the Luftflotte's. They constantly worked in each others "areas" and were sent where needed. The "area" was more a place to land than a boundry they must operate in.

Sure it was. That is why there was a crisp note from the 12 Group commander, Leigh-Mallory, that complained of an 11Group a/c shooting down an a/c in the 12 Group area.

Deighton pg 206

"In the 20 minutes it took a Spitfire to climb to 20,00ft, even the slow German bombers could travel 80 mi. Added to this was the imperfection of the radar, which was now suffering from regular jamming. Few Controllers commited the bulk of their forces if the weather was good enough to wait for a confirmed visual."


I wunder how the 109s of JG53 made it home to the Cherbourg area after escorting KG51 to Ventnor and Portsmouth on Aug 12?

Deighton, pg 202, Aug 31

"1300 fighter sortie flown to protect 150 bombers"

Kev/Angus, the use of total numbers is an excuse the LW fanatics use to justify the LW loosing BoB.

[Angus]

Crumpp: About the distance!!!!! AGAIN!!!!!
"Only in your mind, Angus. To Military planners is the same thing."

Milo just pointed out the numbers from scramble to 20K and how much the inbound raid would travel in the meantime. The difference in the late war USSAF raids on Germany is VAST. Absolute oranges and apples.
It compares rather well to the LW trying to cruise in daylight over the whole of England up to Newcastle (from the south) while the south would typically be a British occupied area with flak, radar and some airfields, however rather not any targets.

With all the time gone on this thread, did you ever ponder a little over an atlas, - even with a ruler in your hand.

Absolute oranges and apples!

[Kev367th]

Ultra -
While useful only gave a limited view.
It provided the LW OOB but not things like serviceable aircraft or total strengths.
It could on rare occassions give clues to the LW 'likely' level of activity, good example is 'Eagle Day'. They knew something was going on, but not exactly what the LW was up to.

Theres also another account, as I said earlier of 249 Sqn losing 6 of their Hurricanes after being bounced by 60 109's.

Old book but by Sept 7 -
LF2 could still field 519 109's
LF3 a further 90 109's

Even allowing for only 50% that still puts approx 300 109s against a total combined force (10,11,12 Groups) on Sep 15 of 170 Spits/Hurris.
I know its an assumption but as it would have considered a "max effort" 50% is probably even a little on the low side.

[Crumpp]

The difference in the late war USSAF raids on Germany is VAST.

Well educate us on the difference Angus instead of posturing about it.

Other than relative distances there is none.  The Luftwaffe in the West was even smaller than the RAF in 1939.

So much for Crumpp's claim about Ultra.

Not my claim.

Then there were the vital contributions of Ultra to air warfare in the winning of the Battle of Britain, and in permitting the British to mount such an effective (if vain) defense of Crete against the German paratroop and glider forces that Hitler lost faith in airborne warfare and used these specially trained troops as infantry in future operations. All of this is presented in engrossing detail.

http://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v20i1a04p_0002.htm

The British had been making use of radio intercept information since early 1940 when "The Bomb" was put into operation at Bletchley Park. This first useful result was related to the Luftwaffe.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/ultra/navy-1.html

I saw Deighton's book in Barnes and Noble's.  I did not purchase it as it seemed more fandom than a History.

Kind of like those Civil War buffs that try and justify a battle's conclusion based on the number of nails in the confederate boots.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

I know its an assumption

Yes it is and one that does not jive with the documented facts.

Kev/Angus, the use of total numbers is an excuse the LW fanatics use to justify the LW loosing BoB.

So the theory being the RAF produced all those planes but did not use them in their most desperate hour....

 

Do we really think the British are that stupid? What were they saving them for?  To be used after the occupation by the resistance?

That is even more laughable than "Super Spitfires and Hurricanes" theory!!


All the best,

Crumpp

[Kev367th]

On the "Eve of the battle" - July 1

Combat ready
RAF - 507 Spits/Hurris split between 10/11/12/13 Groups, some 300 at 11 Group alone (90+ Spitfires).
LW - 656 Bf109 between LF 2 and 3 (not at full strength till few weeks later then possibly 750 Bf109's)

Considering 11 Group bore the brunt of the battle 2:1 odds look about right.

I have no idea where 1,100 comes from, even including Defiants and Blenheims total serviceable strength still only = 591 aircraft.

If you include all serviceable aircraft types in LF 2 and 3 the total = 1935.

[Edit]
Yes I do
Total aircraft is approx 1000 for RAF, but in that case total aircraft for LF 2 and 3 = 2651
These figures are total strengths, not serviceable, and you still have to allow for the RAF being split into 4 Groups of which 1 bore the main attacks.

[Crumpp]

RAF - 507 Spits/Hurris split between 10/11/12/13 Groups, some 300 at 11 Group alone (90+ Spitfires).

You guys keep insisting that 11 Group fought alone.  It very much did not.  Although the battle took place primarily in 11 Group's area, it is quite clear that both 10 Group and 12 Group were regular participants.

In the first phase maybe.  During this phase large scale action did not occur from either side.

In this stage of the battle, the Luftwaffe was in effect probing the British defences - looking for weaknesses before a major assault could be launched to exploit them.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/phase1.html

In Phase II when the Luftwaffe begins large scale actions we see the RAF responed with combined Group defenses.  This is when 10 Group becomes responsible for protecting 11 Group airfields while 11 Group intercepts incoming Luftwaffe raids.

I have no idea where 1,100 comes from,

It comes from this document:

PRO AIR 20/2307

http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=1762649&CATLN=6&Highlight=&FullDetails=True&j=1

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Crumpp:
"You guys keep insisting that 11 Group fought alone. It very much did not"

Yes it did.

That's why they also had about as many kills as all the other groups put together.

That applies to claims, and presumably better to confirmed kills verified to LW losses, - for 12th group rather tended to overclaim more than others.

[Kev367th]

As that doc is down as listing RAF aircrew strength, does it list numbers of pilots, or number of aircraft?