Author Topic: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII  (Read 19140 times)

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #75 on: April 05, 2008, 02:58:39 PM »
Back to strategic bombing...

If the daylight campaign was dubious in its effectiveness, what then explains the fact that fuel was in short supply in late '44 as German fighter production was peaking?  I've read that they had more planes than they had fuel to fly them...

German oil reserves never ran dry in 1944, the problem was getting the fuel to the units that needed it with allied fighter-bombers roaming freely over Germany strafing anything that moved. Oil production was also never significantly impaired until production facilities in the east were overrun by the Soviets in the last few months of 1944. Production facilities were damaged by allied air attacks, but were quickly repaired. It's difficult to estimate exactly how much damage the bombing did, but as Gunther Rall said (paraphrase) "there was always fuel available". September 1944 was in fact the best month of 1944 for aviation fuel production in Germany, and not until November was this production significantly impaired by advancing Soviet forces.


From a post-war British study on the German oil industry:

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Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #76 on: April 05, 2008, 03:21:27 PM »



As this table shows the actual production of crude oil increased from 1943 to 1944 and the difference between the planned production of finished products and the actual production in 1944 is less than 5%.

Edit: I assume the reduction in total production of finished products from 1943 to 1944 is the effect of the 1943 raid on the Ploesti refineries.
« Last Edit: April 05, 2008, 03:27:46 PM by Lumpy »
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

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Offline Stoney

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #77 on: April 05, 2008, 03:25:12 PM »
Pretty sharp drop in lubricants starting in June '44.  Interesting that almost all other types of fuel stayed relatively normal except aviation fuel and fuel oil in Nov-Dec.  I guess all the AvGas refineries were out east?  Perhaps that also accounts for the increase in fuel oil (wasn't refined into AvGas)?
« Last Edit: April 05, 2008, 03:26:58 PM by Stoney »
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Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #78 on: April 05, 2008, 03:31:26 PM »
Not all of them obviously since there still was some production. Russia invaded Germany in October. The 30% drop in total production you see in the summer coincides with the Soviet invasion of Romania and the new strikes on Ploesti.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

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Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #79 on: April 05, 2008, 03:52:29 PM »
In any case, it is pretty clear that any fuel problems the Germans had in 1944 was the result of distribution difficulties probably due to interdiction by tactical aviation, since production held pace to the very last months and stocks lasted well into 1945.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

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Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #80 on: April 05, 2008, 04:12:39 PM »
Another point I forgot: The "million men" sited that were occupied by the defense of the Reich were mostly unfit for front line service. The gun batteries were often led by wounded, partially disabled artillery officers and the guns were crewed by children and the elderly. Like Pope Benedict who was drafted in 1943 at the age of 16 and trained with the infantry, but due to illness was assigned to anti-aircraft duty.



Children training on an optical range finder/gun director.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline Widewing

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #81 on: April 05, 2008, 05:46:19 PM »
I've been following this thread as time permits, and I have but one question.

Is there a point to this debate?


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Widewing
My regards,

Widewing

YGBSM. Retired Member of Aces High Trainer Corps, Past President of the DFC, retired from flying as Tredlite.

Offline humble

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #82 on: April 05, 2008, 05:54:49 PM »
I've been following this thread as time permits, and I have but one question.

Is there a point to this debate?


My regards,

Widewing

At this point probably not, my original point was that after the death of Wever the entire "vision" of the luftwaffe changed and as a result they didnt have the planes, training, tactics, intelligence or neccessary operational understanding to effectively prosecute a true "airwar" vs England in 1940. Further the initial choices for production planes limited future flexibility and were suprisingly "static" leaving them ill prepared for the airwar of 1944 as well.

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Offline humble

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #83 on: April 05, 2008, 06:03:11 PM »
Lumpy I have no clue where your pulling those numbers or who initially compiled them but they are completely at odds with both the Germans own records, correspondance from his ministers to Hitler and results of post war interviews, interrogation and compiled documentation. For just one example your chart shows just under 250 tons/m of aviation spirits mid 1944 German synthetic fuel plants were producing roughly 175 T/M in april of 1944. This number fell to 30 Tons by Sept and 5 tons/m by year end Total german production of aviation fuel in June 1944 was reduced by 92% (this is Speers own written report to Hitler)...as a genral rule much of what your producing is inconsistant with records generally beliefed as factually correct.

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Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #84 on: April 05, 2008, 06:37:02 PM »
USSBS

Virtually complete records of the German oil industry were taken by the Survey. In addition, major plants that were subject to attack and their records were studied in detail.

The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar.

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, the Germans took the most energetic steps to repair and reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar was appointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, and again an overriding priority on men and materials was issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction. The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #85 on: April 05, 2008, 06:37:59 PM »
It's from a 1947 135 page report made by the British Ministry of Fuel and Power detailing German oil production in WWII. It's complete with maps of all the production sites. I can even tell you how deep they drilled.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #86 on: April 05, 2008, 06:40:48 PM »
USSBS

Further Dividends From the Oil Attack

The attack on the synthetic oil plants was also found to have cost Germany its synthetic nitrogen and methanol supply and a considerable part of its rubber supply.

Germany, like other industrial countries, relied on synthesis for its supply of nitrogen and the synthetic oil plants were by far the largest producers. Sixty percent of the nitrogen production and 40 percent of the methanol production came from two synthetic plants. Monthly output of synthetic nitrogen in early 1944, before the synthetic plants were attacked, was about 75,000 tons. It had been reduced by the end of the year to about 20,000 tons.

Nitrogen, besides being indispensable for explosives, is heavily used in German agriculture. Allocation for the 1943-44 crop year was 54 percent of the total supply; allocation for 1944-45 was first planned at 25 percent and later eliminated altogether. Nitrogen for munitions was maintained by reducing the allocation to agriculture, but by the end of 1944 this cushion had been substantially exhausted. The supply of explosives then declined with the reduction in supply of nitrogen. It became necessary to fill shells with a
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mixture of explosives and non-explosive rock salt extender.
There was a general shortage of ammunition on all fronts at the end of the war. There was an equally serious shortage of flak ammunition; units manning flak guns were instructed not to fire on planes unless they were attacking the installations which the guns were specifically designated to protect and unless "they were sure of hitting the planes!"

It is of some interest that a few weeks before the close of hostilities the Germans reallocated nitrogen to agriculture at the expense of ammunition. This was the result, according to Production Minister Speer, of an independent decision of his own that the war was lost and the next year's crop should be protected.

Methanol production, necessary among other things for TNT, hexogen and other high explosives, was as severely affected as nitrogen production. Allocations to the principal consumers was heavily cut, and eventually the production of hexogen was abandoned. The loss of methanol coupled with the reduction in nitrogen was followed by a precipitate decline in production of explosives.

The synthetic rubber industry also suffered from the attack on oil. Official German records on raw material supplies show that stockpiles of rubber were small at the beginning of the war -- at the most sufficient for only two or three months' consumption. Imports through the blockade were unimportant. The supply came from four synthetic plants, one of which was a small pilot plant; and two additional plants were under construction during the war. One of the major plants, located at Huels, was attacked as a primary target by the Eighth Air Force in June 1943 and closed for a month; it required three months to get back to 72 percent of capacity and seven months to get back to full production. However, it operated on gas from synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr; when these were knocked out in the summer of 1944, production was again reduced substantially. Production at Schkopau, the largest of the synthetic rubber plants, was lost because it was dependent on hydrogen from Leuna. Investigation of the two remaining plants revealed that production was largely eliminated because of attacks on oil plants of which they were a part. By the end of 1944 over-all statistics for the industry show that production of synthetic rubber had been reduced to 2,000 tons a month or about one-sixth the wartime peak. Had the war continued, Germany's rubber position would have become critical. No indication was found, however, that the rubber shortage had become a limiting factor on German war production or the movement of the German army before the war ended.

Except for oil and associated nitrogen, methanol, and rubber production, no parts of the German chemical industry were a priority target of the Combined Bomber Offensive.

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #87 on: April 05, 2008, 06:43:10 PM »
The synthetic oil plants were vast complex structures and could not be easily broken up and dispersed. The programs of dispersal and underground construction that were undertaken were incomplete when the war ended.

Actually the underground refineries were operational in October of 1944 and operated until March 1945.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P

Offline MiloMorai

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #88 on: April 05, 2008, 06:44:55 PM »
All of them gSholtz?

Offline Lumpy

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Re: Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII
« Reply #89 on: April 05, 2008, 06:49:17 PM »
It was a continuous effort which was never "completed", new refineries being started on when others were completed.
“I’m an angel. I kill first borns while their mommas watch. I turn cities into salt. I even – when I feel like it – rip the souls from little girls and now until kingdom come the only thing you can count on, in your existence, is never ever understanding why.”

-Archangel Gabriel, The P