The conceptual differences in design philosophy are very very real. The Airbus is engineered to the lowest common denominator with the avionics intent on preventing "bad piloting" and designed to over ride "improper" pilot commands. The Boeing is designed to guide the pilot but will not prevent a pilot from being stupid. Airbus has pioneered cost oriented engineering and dragged Boeing along for the ride. Not all of this is bad, simply different. Where it gets ticklish is that a lot of engineering is balancing safety vs cost (both build and operational).
FBW was originally designed to enable military pilots to fly airplanes that might not be flyable with "normal" controls. The computer "translates" normal control inputs into more complex ones required to fly the aircraft. For many cutting edge planes FBW is the only way to fly. This technology has been utilized by airbus as a sales feature. The simple reality is that its a lie. FBW is not simpler or safer and does not reduce pilot workload....end of story. It will without a doubt eliminate some very real % of pilot induced accidents, at the expense of a greatly complicated work environment when things go "tits up"....
Here is another pprune post from an airbus driver....
I take the liberty of posting my previous message again, if I may...
Although the initial failure report in the automatic message seems to have been about electrical problems (I do not know which) and the "tree" of possibilities of systems degrading from there is a vast one, I have kept in mind since the sad news ot the accident the following facts:
the A330 is a beautiful aircraft but it has shown, again and again , very susceptible to probes icing, with the deicing system on auto (numerous reports). This leads to very rapidly presenting the crew with a very lame aircraft to say the least (I give you a factual example below, recent, on an A330, without comments). This has happened at high cruise altitudes, with no ICE alarm, with the heating on AUTO, and out of clouds in some cases...
"Light tutbulence. The speed indication on the right PFD falls suddenly from 280 to 100 knots in red tape for a few seconds Almost immediately the speed on the left PFD falls to green dot minus 15 knots with a speed trend of minus 50 knots. Red alarm A/P OFF ADR
DISAGREE, IAS DISCREPENCY, ALTN LAW PROT LOST, REAC W/S DET FAULT.
Then amber alarm RUD TRV LIM FAULT.
Then STALL STALL STALL with Toga Lock indication.""
The crew changes flight level, the captain pilots with the stand by instruments,
The speeds become normal again.
The status after that:
amber crosses on PFDs
W/S DET FAULT, ALT LAW PROT LOST, ADR DISAGREE et F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT (2
NOGO).Plane in Alternate law
This shows how an unconfortable event (loss of airspeed indication) that would have been minor in, say , an A300, becomes a major headache in those very sophisticated cockpits. Just for information and not saying that is
a possible explanation...but lose electrics, and apart from dealing with retrieving the generators, you may have that kind of thing loaded on top...
This failure has happened not once but at least four times in the previous year on the fleet.Why do heated pitots ice? In non severe icing conditions, and even out of clouds?I have flown a lot and I would have said that was impossible but the facts are there. It is a documented fact at least on this type of aircraft.We learn from facts and this could very possibly have a direct bearing to this tragic accident.