Most Surprising Fighter Fact?

[Dowding]

There wasn't much in it, then: 608,000 to 640,000. Shows just how much more tonnage the Lanc could carry.

[Nashwan]

Only 1 bomb (dropped by British) in 50 fell within 5 miles miles of the target.

1 bomb in 50 is 2%. The Butt report, from mid 1941, concluded acuracy at night up until mid 41 was around 33% within 5 miles. Of course, this was before the introduction of any nav aids, and before the pathfinder force was formed.

By December 1944, the figure had risen to 90% within 5 miles.

During the war, B-17s dropped 640,036 tons of bombs on European targets in daylight raids. This compares with 452,508 tons dropped by Liberators and 464,544 tons dropped by all other U.S. aircraft. The B-17s downed 23 enemy planes per 1,000 raid as compared with 11 by Liberators, 11 by fighters, and three by all U.S. medium and light bombers.
source:http://www.91stbombgroup.com/91history.html


During the war Lancasters carried out a total of 156,000 missions and dropped 608,612 tons of bombs.
Source: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWavro.htm

No, the USAAF used short tons, the RAF long tons.

1 short ton = 2000 lbs, 1 long ton = 2240 lbs.

That means the B-17 dropped 640,036 short tons, 571,460 long tons, the Lancaster 681,645 short tons, 608,612 long tons.

[Angus]

My figures go as this:
The US 8th dropped 693.000 tonnes. The RAF Bomber Command dropped 955 THOUSAND TONS, The US 15th AF dropped 312 000 tonnes.
Regarding accuracy, many of the British raid were remarkably accurate, and I belive that research after the war revealed the incredible outcome that the night raids were just as accurate as the day raids. Much due to the Pathfinders I guess. Anyway, would be interesting to know more about that.

[Red Tail 444]

Originally posted by F4UDOA
Another factoid is that when the P-39Q was raced in 1946 against Mustangs, P-38s and an F4U-1 it won at 370+MPH lap
A6M2 flight test

Why is an F4U-1 competing against such later modeled aircraft? At that time, the F4U-4  or F2G would have been a more acceptable entry.

gainsie

[Crumpp]

Hey Gscholz,

Yes they were trained, equipped, and led.  From the begining of the war OSS operatives were in Norway involved in the UWO.  

UWO are a very misunderstood area even most in Military circles.  YOU have to BE in the country to conduct them.

England had plenty of Norwegians who fled the Nazi's.  They make great guides for Direct Action Operations NOT for sustained UWO.  You think perhaps they are now wanted men in their occupied country?  There is alot more to it than just having "G's" in the woods with rifles.  Many aspects of UWO even in WWII are still classified today.

People that REMAIN in the country and are willing to cooperate are much more valuable.  The US had plenty of Norwegian born citizens who had estabilished families that WERE NOT on a NAZI hit list for fleeing/fighting them to begin to estabilish an organized resistance that can be an effective fighting force.  This is an asset the SOE simply didn't have in great supply.

Again there were NINE seperate missions launched.  Your reading about one of them that has just been recently declassified and making a blanket assumption that is just flat out WRONG.  Why?  Because some misguided "Euro-pride" wants to rewrite history.  
Crumpp

[Westy]

" took a wrong term and would never have produced a bomb with the path they were on. "

 Exactly.  But it wasn't "later on" in thwe war and it certainly had nothing to do with OSS ops anywhere.  The Germans made R&D choices that caused them to  go down the wrong path - fortunately.   In the end they didn't have a prayer of making one not only because they weren't close but they couldn't have afforded the means to have really developed one.
 And fter VE day (at the Farm) the Germans there were in utter disbelief that the Allies (US) had done what the could not. Even more so when they found out how.  Thier recorded conversations revealed just how far off a viable path to an A-bomb that they had been.

 And I do agree that the Germans made the first chemical fission discovery but sorry,  the first nuclear fission reactor was not finished till 1942 and it was done by the scientists on the Manhattan project.

 But I do agree it would not have happened if the warnings by Szilad, via Einstien, that Germany may try and develop one lit a fire under Roosevelts butt and he directed the right people to put the best team together.  Even then, with more resources and backing than the Germans had the US made a few at a phenominal cost.

 However I do not believe Heisenberg "sabotaged" the German effort.  IMO many post war Nazi's took on the same "air" and uttered similar alibies to save thier skin and careers.

[F4UDOA]

Redtail,

Why is an F4U-1 competing against such later modeled aircraft? At that time, the F4U-4 or F2G would have been a more acceptable entry.

A couple of reasons.

1. It was 1946 so no F4U-4's or F2G's had been sold into surplus for use in civilian Air Racing as of yet.

2. Much of the Air Racing at the time was being sponsered by big money for reasons other than the joy of racing. For instance the modified P-38L being flown was being sponsered fully by Lockheed and was flown by Tony LeVier. The AAF had it's backing from Jackie Cocherane(sp) in the P-51 entries flown by various AAF pilots and Jackie herself.

In 1946 Cook Cleland (Naval Reserve Pilot) had the only F4U entry with his surplus F4U-1. He felt he did not have enough HP to compete with the AAF for bragging rights so he compained to the Navy brass for the F2G to be released into surplus. It was and his crew dominated the Cleveland Air Race until 1949 and the Korean war and the crash of a P-51 Mustang into a house killing a mother and child pretty much ended the Cleveland Air Races. And in 1950 Cleland went back to serve in the F4U in combat in Korea.

Here is "lucky gallon". The first F4U racer.

[Ecliptik]

I keep seeing "tons" and "tonnes" used interchangeably in the same posts.

1 Ton (imperial unit) = 2000 lbs

1 Tonne (metric unit) = 1000 kg,  ~2200 lbs.

Stay consistent.

[GScholz]

Crumpp, I'm afraid it is you who are trying to "rewrite history" here, and it is most unwelcome.

After Norway was occupied by the Germans on April 1940, small resistance groups grew up in the country. At the beginning of 1941 these groups were brought into MILORG (Military Organization) to support the Allies in case of invasion. MILORG was under the command of the Norwegian Military in London and later joined to SOE. Radio communication was established between Great Britain and MILORG. In this way SOE could give orders about actions, while MILORG would be able to send reports around enemy activities.


http://www.ncl.ac.uk/~nhistory/xread/Moland.htm

[Crumpp]

Your right Westy.... WITH the benefit of Hindsight.  

Things were certainly not that clear in 1940.  The Germans were ahead of the Allies in 1941.  Just bother to read the links I posted.


Gosh maybe those "not needed" guys in the SOE/OSS should have just stayed at home and hoped someone did something about it.  Instead of going out and putting all of their tommorrows at risk so your's could be a little better.

Crumpp

[Nashwan]

I keep seeing "tons" and "tonnes" used interchangeably in the same posts.

1 Ton (imperial unit) = 2000 lbs

1 Tonne (metric unit) = 1000 kg, ~2200 lbs.

Stay consistent.

There are 3 different tons.

The US "short" ton = 2000 lbs

The British "long" ton = 2240 lbs

The Metric tonne = 2204.63 lbs

Both the British long ton and US short ton derive their measurement from 20 hundredweight. In the US, a hundredweight is 100 lbs, in the UK it's 112 lbs.

The metric tons is derived from 1000 kg, each kilo weighing 2.205 lbs.

The USAAF measured their tonnages in short tons, 2000 lbs each. The RAF measured theirs in long tons, 2240 lbs each.

That's why the Lanc dropped a greater weight of bombs than th B-17.

[Westy]

" Just bother to read the links I posted. "

 Yes.  And I've read a LOT more than just those few above on this very subject. My opinion on how close the Nasties were to the developing an A-bomb just doesn't coincide with yours.  The scenario that would have the Germans having build a deliverable a-Bomb is just full of fantasy conjecture ala "what if's" and "had they only..."

 As for the OSS?  Of course they were needed.  They just weren't a reason that the Germans never got close to building an A-bomb.

[Crumpp]

Gscholtz,

Just a short quote from the Group Historian's office:

Unconventional War Plans for Norway

"Early in World War Two, the United States recognized a need for special units with the cultural and linguistic background needed to conduct unconventional warfare operations in countries occupied by Germany or Japan.

Norway was one of those countries. It was hoped that at least four objectives could be accomplished in Norway through the use of unconventional warfare: (1) eliminate Norway as an economic asset for Germany; (2) force Germany to keep large numbers of troops on occupation duty in Norway and away from other active fronts; (3) limit the ability of German troops in Norway to attack allied convoys transporting supplies to the Russian port of Murmansk; and (4) prepare for the future occupation of Norway, and create a link through Norway to Russia.

Plans for the Norwegian operation developed under the code name “PLOUGH.”  Initially the primary objective would be to destroy electrical plants. Before operations could be conducted troops had to be identified and trained, and a winter operations support vehicle had to be developed.  

The first unit tasked with the Norwegian mission was the 1st Special Service Force. It was activated on 2 July 1942 and was to be trained as infantry with special skills as paratroopers, skiers, and mountain climbers. The T-15 Weasel tracked vehicle was developed to support their winter operations."


The 1st SSF never made it to Norway but many OSS operatives did.  

As Forest says...."That's all I got to say 'bout that."  

Crumpp

[GScholz]

This is what you claimed:

Originally posted by Crumpp
Flag Waving!!  

More like noodle envy on your part.  Sorry to offend your OHHH SOO Sensitive feelings.





But, your wrong.  The OSS was conducting Unconventional Warfare Operations (UWO) in Norway from '41 til the end of the war.  In fact the OSS was the main effort with UWO in Norway due to the large Norwegian-American population.  We simply had more contacts in the country than the SOE.  Hence many Operations after the US entry into the war were joint.  Additionally the SOE had the loin's share of actual operational knowledge.  They had been fighting Hitler for longer than the US.  The OSS sent operatives on as many SOE missions in the begining as they could to gain experience.  With regard to the Heavy Water plants the OSS/SOE worked together.  We had the Norwegian contacts/UWO assets, the SOE had the experience in Direct Action.  9 seperate missions were launched before one was successful.

As for the Enigma..I guess that big display at the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry is BS.  Naw, the US didn't help in that either.  Another Joint effort....Maybe???

 

 Crumpp

"In fact the OSS was the main effort with UWO in Norway due to the large Norwegian-American population.  We simply had more contacts in the country than the SOE."

By 1942 Norway had been occupied, and resisting, for two years while the US had just entered the war. By 1945 MilOrg had 40,000 men, all of them Norwegians living in Norway.

I see you now only talk about plans. What nine operations were launched by the OSS in Norway? What targets?

Did you even read the link I provided?

The usual pattern was for Linge soldiers to be dropped in the vicinity of the target, or even sometimes in Sweden. They would then launch the attack, often helped by local Milorg men. Three groups of targets were hit: ships, industry and railways. It is impossible to go into detail about these operations here. The most famous, Operation Gunnerside against the heavy water plant at Vemork in February 1943, is, however a good example of thorough Anglo-Norwegian planning, the use of Norwegian agents who knew the area like the back of their hand, and, in the sinking of the Hydro ferry carrying semi-finished heavy water, in cooperation with the local Milorg group. It is also an example of the effectiveness of coup-de-main operations as compared with heavy bombing, in terms of both casualties and accuracy, a theme that was often on the agenda in Anglo-Norwegian meetings and in which SOE, FO and Milorg took a unanimous view in favour of the former.

From the turn of the year 1943, the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied European Forces (SHAEF) decided the lines of policy to be followed in Norway. In other words, the joint British-Norwegian resistance had to adjust itself to the framework of SHAEF. Because of the plans SHAEF had at that time for the invasion of the Continent, no commitment in Norway was wanted, and Milorg was strongly warned that it should not encourage any rising in Norway. Ironically, the old Milorg slogan 'lie low, go slow' now had a renaissance. The idea was to grow in strength and wait for the day to come. Any untimely rising, like that of the French maquis in the Vercors, would not be supported.
Nevertheless, the more than 30,000 men in Milorg waited eagerly to do something more than mere training, and after the Allied invasion on the Continent they were allowed to attack and sabotage German shipping, lines of communication, industries etc. This was quite important as the restlessness amongst the rank and file increased. The sabotage of the offices for labour conscription in the spring of 1944 represented a little outlet of steam. However, when the above mentioned directive came in June, the opportunities for action increased. Regular clashes with the Germans were still to be avoided. Usually, the attacks were planned and launched by combined groups of Milorg and SOE personnel. But even before this new directive, Milorg's role in these joint British-Norwegian operations had been steadily increasing. In fact, Feather II, which crossed the border from Sweden on 22 April 22 1944 to attack the Thamshavn railway, was the last British operation planned outside Norway. Henceforward, it was the Central Leadership of Milorg that decided on these issues. Meanwhile, Milorg grew in strength and numbers. Supplies, equipment, instruction and training were provided by SOE and FO in London. This was no easy task considering Norway's topography and climate.
All in all, Allied aircraft flew 717 successful sorties out of a total of 1241, dropping 208 agents, 9662 containers and 2762 packages with arms, munition, explosives, radio equipment, uniforms, medicine etc. In addition, supplies were sailed from the Shetlands: in 194 trips, 190 agents and 385 tons of arms and equipment were landed in Norway and 345 agents were brought back to England. Instructors were sent to train members of Milorg, together with W/T operators. It was mainly in the last year of cooperation between SOE and Milorg that the figures grew to such proportions and thus gradually increased Milorg's striking power.

The SHAEF directive of June 1944 was based on the assumption that it would be easier to let the Germans retreat from Norway and defeat them in central Europe. However, as the situation in this part of Europe changed towards the end of 1944, SHAEF changed its strategy. In a directive of 5 December 1944, Milorg was told to attack the railways in Norway on a large scale to prevent the Germans from withdrawing their fresh troops from Norway and sending them to the central European theatre for use against the Allies. Milorg was naturally very pleased to get this opportunity. After the surrender in Finland, an enormous number of troops were withdrawn into Finnmark in northern Norway and thence southwards. In close cooperation with SOE parties which had been held in readiness, Milorg attacked railways and bridges on a large scale. So well did Milorg carry out its task that, according to the head of SOE, Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins, 'From Norway, there was a reduction in rate of movement from four divisions to less than one division a month'. However, German documents such as the Kriegstagebuch, do not support such an unreserved conclusion. Eleven divisions were withdrawn from June 1944 until the end of the war, seven of these in the first four months of 1945.
Despite sabotage activity, the main objective for Milorg in the last year of the war was protection against German destruction of communications, transport, industries,
ports etc., in case of a German withdrawal accompanied by the scorched earth policy practised in Finnmark in the autumn of 1944. The detailed plans were made in London and a total of 110 officers were sent in from Great Britain to lead this work. In addition, a considerable number of Linge officers already in Norway on various other missions were directed to such tasks in the last phase of the war. Milorg also established a few bases - groups of specially handpicked men placed in camps far away in the forest and up in the mountains - ready to strike if the signal was given. The leaders and instructors were SOE personnel.
At this stage, in the spring of 1945, approximately 40,000 Milorg men, equipped, trained and well disciplined were prepared for the worst alternative, a German last stand in Norway. The equipment as well as the training and partly, I should say, the discipline, could be attributed to the fruitful cooperation with SOE which in turn had at its disposal some of the best specimens of Norwegian youth. Milorg obeyed SHAEF's order not to provoke the Germans but could not avoid a few clashes as the Germans attacked. On these occasions, Milorg proved their capability to defend themselves and even strike back. Their losses were small compared with German casualties.

As we all know, the German Commander in Norway, General Boehme, signed the German surrender in Norway on 8 May 1945. Milorg did not have to fight at all. Their role in this rather risky period of transition was to stand guard, protect buildings, arrest traitors etc. They were finally demobilised in July 1945.

Yes, you are "flag waving", either out of sheer ignorance or nationalistic zeal. Either way it is despicable.

[Crumpp]

Here's a link to work Gscholtz's!

Sorry bud but I trust the Unit Historian much more so than you or some internet source.  

You don't have a clue between Direct Action, UWO, FID, or any other type of Special Operations, do you?

Here is the schoolhouse....

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/jfksws.htm

Crumpp