Author Topic: Spitfire IX overmodeled?? (Read 39011 times)

gripen · « **Reply #180 on:** January 27, 2004, 05:07:37 AM »

Crumpp,
We are not talking about LW's response nor about (supposed) rebuild of the Luftwaffe. The statistics are clear; Luftwaffe was not finished in the June and they could still sustain very heavy losses in Normandy. During April Luftwaffe could still cause heaviest losses of 1944 to 8th AF (absolute and relative). Actually LW lost around 2-3 single engined fighters for one heavy bomber shot down (depending on data) which is very favorable rate to LW in absolute scale. But in relative scale it was a loss because USAF could sustain losses better. It's hard to say if the May was different because the transportation plan reduced amount of deep penetration raids. After June the LW fought hard on several active fronts through out summer. Rebuild started in october when activity in the air decreased, again this can be clearly seen from statistics.

GScholz,
If you mean numerical air superiority then the allies reached it far earlier, say 1941 when Russia joined war. If you mean ability to attack any target with some kind of accuracy in German occupied area (with possibly untolerable losses) then allies reached it say around late summer 1942. If you mean ability to do that with tolerable losses then the allies reached that early 1944. If you mean ability make LW locally ineffective, then they reached it say June 1944. And say June 1945 if you mean completely ineffective

gripen

GScholz · « **Reply #181 on:** January 27, 2004, 07:12:48 AM »

No, I mean air superiority. To have air superiority means having sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and to be free from the danger of significant enemy air incursions.

Crumpp · « **Reply #182 on:** January 27, 2004, 07:29:22 AM »

Gripen,
Again I will cover the facts for you on this.

In March or '44 the Luftwaffe was forced to change tactics against the Heavy bombers. After March of '44 could they inflict casualties? Sure. Could they stop the bombing of their country during daylight? No. Could they influence operations on the ground? No

It's a fact that numerically the Luftwaffe was superior in Jan '45 than in Sept '39.
It's a fact that is due to Galland attempting to rebuild them for his planned "knockout" blow.

It's a fact that Hitler ordered "Operation Bodenplatte" and that the Jagdwaffe suffered it largest single day loss of the entire war.
The LW lost around 300 planes and almost as many pilots. Many of them experten it could not afford to lose. It's a fact that never again could the LW offer any offensive action.

It's a fact too that the Spit is overmodeled, ScJazz

Crumpp

Crumpp · « **Reply #183 on:** January 27, 2004, 07:34:20 AM »

One thing in regard to Bodenplatte...

Many of the LW casualties were from their own Flak units. In order to maintain secrecy no coordination was made with the friendly units the LW overflew. Since the ground units were not used to seeing the LW in the skies they shot at everything in the air. They got it both leaving their lines and reentering them.
Crumpp

Crumpp · « **Reply #184 on:** January 27, 2004, 07:48:15 AM »

Gscholz,

I would say that the Allies had Air Supremacy over Normandy. They were able to conduct unhindered operations in Normandy. Never was the LW a factor in the ground war.

Did they maintain Air Supremacy? That is arguable for sure. I would say NO. The fact is the LW went on the Offensive in Jan '44. Did the Allies regain it? Sure after that Offensive.

The allies gained Air Superiority after "Big Week" and maintained it throughout the war. The LW was never able to stop the AEAF operations. You can argue that it was lost for a few days during "Bodenplatte".

Crumpp

gripen · « **Reply #185 on:** January 27, 2004, 08:59:03 AM »

Crumpp,
I have not argued about luftwaffe tactics nor about their ability to stop day (or night) raids nor about rebuilding of the luftwaffe late 1944 nor about Bodenplatte. All I have said that the allies did not reach real air superiority (this of course depends on definition) over all German occupied area until autumn 1944 and that Luftwaffe was quite far from finished in June 1944.

GScholz,
Well, it all depends on the definition of the air superiority. If we use as strict definition as you mentioned then the allies did not really had it over Normandy (and nearby), LW could still launch around 13800 sorties during first 25 days (vs around 160000 by allies). The loss rate per sortie for LW was about 5 times larger than for allies. IMHO it's better to look if the operations were effective and it that case LW effort over Normandy was quite little.

gripen

GScholz · « **Reply #186 on:** January 27, 2004, 09:44:39 AM »

The Allies never achieved air supremacy over Europe, except perhaps in the final week before the German surrender. The difference of air superiority and supremacy is well defined.

Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”. Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will.

Air superiority is defined as the condition when the conduct of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy. This is a necessary and obligatory condition to attain success in combat and overall victory in a war. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack enemy aviation assets close to their source at maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites.

Local air superiority, which is purely geographic in nature, is characterized by well timed air attacks to coincide with enemy aircraft downtime, re-turning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in sectors across the theater of military operations where the the enemy may not have adequate assets available to ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal.

Air parity is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy targets. Under the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield. Air parity manifests itself to the commander primarily in the amount of fixed-wing aircraft used for direct support of ground forces. More aircraft are dedicated to interdiction and strike missions to gain air superiority.

Crumpp · « **Reply #187 on:** January 27, 2004, 10:11:06 AM »

What definition are you using?

USAAF definition is :

To be superior in the air, to have air superiority, means having sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and be free from the danger of serious enemy air incursions..

Here are some more definitions of these terms recognized by Military professionals:

"Air supremacy is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic “no-fly zone”. Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will."

IMO this condition was achieved by the Allies on a few occasions for a short period of time in a local geographic region. IE Normandy.

"Air superiority is defined as the condition when the conduct of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy. This is a necessary and obligatory condition to attain success in combat and overall victory in a war. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack enemy aviation assets close to their source at maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites."

IMO the Allies got and maintained Air Superiority from Mar '44 til the end of the war.

"Local air superiority, which is purely geographic in nature, is characterized by well timed air attacks to coincide with enemy aircraft downtime, re-turning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in sectors across the theater of military operations where the the enemy may not have adequate assets available to ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal."

IMO This is what the LW was able to do until late in the war over the Eastern Front and in such Operations as Bodenplatte in the West. The LW failed to recognize the threat of the Western Allies Air Power until it was too late. This threat was NOT lost on the pilots of the LW. The Leadership at the highest levels failed to recognize it.

"Air parity is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy targets. Under the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield. Air parity manifests itself to the commander primarily in the amount of fixed-wing aircraft used for direct support of ground forces. More aircraft are dedicated to interdiction and strike missions to gain air superiority. "

IMO This condition did exist for short time periods after Normandy but was a tactical occurance over a specific point on the map and not a strategic one. IMO Strategic Air Parity existed from late '41 til Mar '44. During this time Niether side was able to launch an effective offensive and both sides pretty much equally attempted various offensive measures.

Here is another good article reference Allied Air Superiority over Europe. The Author uses the term Supremacy but I think it should read superiority.

http://www.butler98.freeserve.co.uk/thtrlosses.htm

Crumpp

GScholz · « **Reply #188 on:** January 27, 2004, 10:22:35 AM »

Eh .. you do realize that you posted the exact same quotes as I did, right?

There is no such thing as "local air supremacy" as the term "air supremacy" requires the "complete destruction of the enemy air forces". Air supremacy is an overall strategic situation never a local one.

That the LW offered little opposition at Normandy does not mean they couldn't have offered more if they had chosen to do so.

Angus · « **Reply #189 on:** January 27, 2004, 10:28:47 AM »

Have to disagree there Gunther. It was not about the not choosing to do so at that time, - they were caught off guard and had nothing ready.Hehe, perhaps the LW was expecting Pas-de-Calais to be the spot.

GScholz · « **Reply #190 on:** January 27, 2004, 10:43:57 AM »

They though the Normandy invasion was a diversion for pretty much of the first day.

Had nothing ready? On June 3 1944, three days before D-day the operational strength of the LW in Western Europe for the defense of the Reich was 1098 fighters and Zerstörers. Most of them within operational range of Normandy, however they were tasked with the defense of the Reich and were not used against the invasion area until later.

Furball · « **Reply #191 on:** January 27, 2004, 10:51:28 AM »

Spitfire IX must be overmodelled.. I mean, its not American so it must suck. That Johnnie Johnson killing 38 german fighters in it is just plain fantasy, he was really ben affleck in a P-40.

GScholz · « **Reply #192 on:** January 27, 2004, 10:55:51 AM »

The Spit9 may be the first and only plane to be overmodelled AND undermodelled at the same time! WTG Spit9!

Crumpp · « **Reply #193 on:** January 27, 2004, 11:11:32 AM »

They tried to do something about it. They tried very hard and recognized the importance of stopping the invasion at the beaches. This was the German strategy and intent.

1. They suspended further attacks against the Heavies to divert ALL available fighters to go after Tactical asset's as these could effect the Army the most.

2. They divert as many forces as they could to the invasion area.

3. The flew as many missions as they could. 10061 sorties to be exact.

Nevertheless THEY COMPLETELY FAILED TO REACH THE INVASION beaches much less influence the outcome of the Invasion.

This is Air Supremacy over the Normandy. Fact

How long it lasted is debatable but the LW was unable to influence the Ground war for the rest of WWII. Where were they in the Falaise pocket? That ONE action in Normandy which caused the entire collapse of the German Army in France. Many US Army vets who were there believe the killing grounds of Falaise WAS the destruction of the German Army. After Falaise the battle of France became a race to stop the German retreat to the Siegfreid line. They lost too many of their experienced NCO's and junior officers in the pocket to recover. Ethnic Germans who gained experience throughout the war. After Falaise the German Army was no longer manned primarily by ethnic Germans but by conscripts from conquered nations. Ethnic Germans became the minority in their own army.
Crumpp

GScholz · « **Reply #194 on:** January 27, 2004, 12:20:00 PM »

This is pointless. You are obviously completely ignorant to the meaning of air supremacy, and the operations of the LW, and you are equaly unwilling to understand the realities.