Author Topic: Spitfire IX overmodeled?? (Read 39757 times)

gripen · « **Reply #345 on:** February 03, 2004, 01:56:20 PM »

Crumpp,
I have said right from my first comment that allies were winning air war in spring 1944. The analogy between BoB and spring 1944 is clear; it takes really lot of effort and time to bring an air force down. The allies (specially USAF) had resources and winning strategy to beat LW. Still as statistics show, it was not an instant victory and also losses were high during process.

The case of the BoB, things are quite bit different. The LW did not have resources and strategy has been under discussion some 60 years now. Anyway, we know the outcome and everything else is pure speculation.

gripen

Red Tail 444 · « **Reply #346 on:** February 03, 2004, 04:58:25 PM »

YES!!

The Spit iX IS OVERMODELED IN ACES HIGH.

Atta's dead, stop hijacking the friggin post...

Guppy35 · « **Reply #347 on:** February 03, 2004, 07:09:34 PM »

Quote

Originally posted by Red Tail 444
YES!!

The Spit iX IS OVERMODELED IN ACES HIGH.

Atta's dead, stop hijacking the friggin post...

The Spit IX isn't modeled in Aces High. Something called a Spit IX is, but we haven't quite figured out what

Still looking for a clipped wing Spitfire LFIXe for Aces High

Dan/Slack

Red Tail 444 · « **Reply #348 on:** February 04, 2004, 03:10:48 PM »

Quote

Originally posted by Guppy35
The Spit IX isn't modeled in Aces High. Something called a Spit IX is, but we haven't quite figured out what
Dan/Slack

hehe...punt...

Angus · « **Reply #349 on:** February 04, 2004, 07:23:28 PM »

We have a MK IX HF, late 1942, AH Field mod

Sway · « **Reply #350 on:** February 04, 2004, 08:15:12 PM »

Storch...hows it going bud? haha

Crumpp · « **Reply #351 on:** February 04, 2004, 08:52:53 PM »

Gripen,

The LW did have the resources in 1940 and they used a winning strategy. They changed it to a losing one. Check out that link.

The Allies had to build up the resources and up until Doolittle changed the mission statement of the Allied fighters had a losing strategy. Once the resources were in place and the strategy was changed the LW's downfall was fairly rapid. Within a few months.

Crumpp

gripen · « **Reply #352 on:** February 05, 2004, 04:34:39 AM »

Crumpp,
I quess you will continue forever. I believe you mean "The Battle of Britain - A German Perspective" by E. Lund. Basicly it tells about same story as other sources but some statements there are quite odd like:

"The German concentration on Fighter Command airfields was, as the Luftwaffe had hoped, forcing the RAF fighters into combat. The resultant war of attrition was one that Fighter Command could not hope to win. The higher concentration of fighters in the German raids reduced the edge that Fighter Command had previously enjoyed: the Germans could afford to trade Me109s, one for one, with Spitfires and Hurricanes!"

Based on sources I tend to rate reliable 1:1 exchange rate in fighters favored RAF due to it had more resources (it has been questioned, but so far nobody has come up with reliable data on supposed LW reserves, RAF situation is well known) and in that case the LW lost a plane and a pilot while the RAF lost a plane and around half pilot. The writer constantly argues that attrition was more problem to RAF than for LW, why? Actually the writer tells that (about RAF):

"By using replacement aircraft (from repairs and storage) Fighter Command managed, until 1 September, to keep frontline strength at about the same levels as were available at the end of July."

And following about LW:

"Production of the Me109 (190 per month) was about one-half the British production rate for the Spitfire and Hurricane. Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86 percent."

Basicly the writer does exactly same thing as you with your air superiority statements; statements contradict each other. In addition the writer also states that: "In fact, the Me109 and its pilots had proven superior in most one-on-one air combats with the British fighters." which is a quite questionable claim if compared with test data and statistics.

Overall the title says it all.

Regarding the change on fighter strategy, please check again USAAF statistical digest. There is not too many enemy fighters claimed in ground by USAAF fighters before April 1944 (assuming that Doolittle's strategy means also attacks against air bases).

gripen

Crumpp · « **Reply #353 on:** February 05, 2004, 06:08:03 AM »

Gripen,

Quote

The higher concentration of fighters in the German raids reduced the edge that Fighter Command had previously enjoyed: the Germans could afford to trade Me109s, one for one, with Spitfires and Hurricanes!"

Don't know how else to interpret this for you. It's pretty cut and dry. The LW could afford the lose ratio as long as they kept to the "Airfeld" strategy.

Quote

"Production of the Me109 (190 per month) was about one-half the British production rate for the Spitfire and Hurricane. Reserves were sufficient to keep most fighter units at 80 percent strength and bombers at 86 percent."

You've conviently taken this out of context and changed the authors meaning. What this statement says in fact is that the LW was not straining it's production capacity to keep it's units at full strength. Yes, ask any Military Intelligence Anaylsist, 80 percent is considered a combat effective unit.

Quote

Regarding the change on fighter strategy, please check again USAAF statistical digest. There is not too many enemy fighters claimed in ground by USAAF fighters before April 1944 (assuming that Doolittle's strategy means also attacks against air bases).

The LW "Airfield" strategy and Doolittles change to the USAAF strategy are the same. The fighters were freed to go and destroy the Enemy WHEREVER they were found. They were not tied to visual distance escort of bombers nor did they have any restrictions on them once contact was made. Their orders were the same....DESTROY THE ENEMY. Chase him down and kill him. Leave him no safe haven.

In the case of the LW, Goering took a successful strategy and began to unravel it by placing restrictions on the fighters (visual range escort) AND he completely changed the targets. Both gave the RAF a "safe haven". Fly beyond visual range of the bombers and the 109's would disengage. Then you could reattack or land safely at your field....refit and do it again.

Before Doolittle came along the LW fighters had their own "safe havens". The Allies had an altitude restriction and couldn't chase below it. So LW fighters could dive for the deck and live to fight again. The Allied fighters were tied to close escort of the bombers leaving the airspace around them free for LW fighters to use unmolested. The LW could take off, form up, and attack at their leisure. Doolittle did the exact opposite of Goering. He denied the LW safe haven.

Once that safe haven was removed and the full wieght of a numerically/tactically superior enemy could be brought to bear, it did not take long to push either Air Force to the brink of destruction. In '44 the LW went over the edge and ceased to exist as an effective fighting force. In '41 the RAF was pushed right to that edge.

Crumpp

Angus · « **Reply #354 on:** February 05, 2004, 07:46:13 AM »

tsk tsk,,,Crumpp and Gripen, you must stop meeting like this. Your wifes may get suspicious;)

gripen · « **Reply #355 on:** February 05, 2004, 08:29:43 AM »

Crumpp,
The quotes basicly show that in the end of "2nd Phase" the RAF could keep first line strenght up to about same as in the beginning of the BoB (by using reserves) while the LW had fallen to 80% of what it should be (using unknown reserves). Question is about first line strenght but in long run production capacity is also an important factor. Basicly author proves that the RAF could maintain it's capability better than LW (during that critical period) and actually contradicts his own earlier statements. And very same thing is going on with your spring 44 statements; you started with one week in February and now we are going in April; basicly the thing what I stated in first place couple hunred messages ago.

gripen

Angus · « **Reply #356 on:** February 05, 2004, 09:43:47 AM »

Here is something to add.
Did you know that the LW night bombed London in January 1944 with sometimes as many as 500 planes, and many times.
This was later named "The Baby Blitz"

Crumpp · « **Reply #357 on:** February 05, 2004, 09:54:48 AM »

Your drawing the wrong conclusions about plane production just like the allies did in the begining of their Daylight campaign. The fact is the LW was producing more than enough planes to replace it losses and could keep that pace up. Just like they could in '44.

Planes only matter in so far as there are pilots to man them. Producing more planes than pilots to fly them is a waste of resources. Producing enough to maintain your losses AND provide for new/replacement pilots is the goal. Now the LW did not set a production goal thru wonderful resource managment. The RLM's policy of not entering a wartime footing was sufficient at this point to do what they needed.

The RAF couldn't replace it's pilots fast enough to keep up with their losses. They were losing not only pilots but experience as a fighting force. The LW was increasing the experience edge it already had over the RAF with every RAF pilot killed. As this gap increased the rate of loss for the RAF would also increase in proportion. The LW had a much larger pool of experienced pilots to draw upon.

This is what caused the collapse of the LW in '44. The LW had plenty of planes and bodies to throw in them. It just didn't have many guys with the knowledge to take their high performance fighter to the edge of the envelope and survive. Doolitte had increased the chances the "old hats" would get killed by taking away all their safe havens. When they began to die off it rapidly became a paper tiger and a hollow force.

This is all cover in the "Luftwaffe point of view" link for the the BoB.
Crumpp

Crumpp · « **Reply #358 on:** February 05, 2004, 09:56:53 AM »

Yes they did have a "Baby Blitz",

Did you know that just Three months later they were totally incapable of putting a few bombs on their own coastline??

Seems a fairly rapid demise to me....

Crumpp

Crumpp · « **Reply #359 on:** February 05, 2004, 10:17:23 AM »

Correction,

In three months they lost Air superiority and in 5 months the LW was completely incapable of an effective defense of it's own territory.

Crumpp