And then Bruno, little bits by bits.
"Why don't you research BC's losses and then come back and tell me how 'minimal' they were. The 'whole LW' was never engaged in stopping 'British night bombing'.
Next go research the losses the USAAF suffered during their daylight raids going all through well into '44. Again the 'whole LW' wasn't tasked with stopping the USAAF day light raids"
Firstly, the night raids were small in the beginning, and so were the countermeasures. Most BC in the first rounds fell prey to anything else than the LW.
Then, again, of course the whole LW was never engaged in only stopping British night bombing. The RAF was as well never wholly engaged into bombing Germany at night.
The whole LW was as well not engaged in stopping the USSAF air raids in daytime. Neither was the USSAF solemly engaged in bombing Germany at daytime. Guess it suits to forget about the pacific theatre as well as other ops on their side?
On we go:
"First the term 'Wehrmacht' means the entire German armed forces including the LW.
The massive backbone of the Soviet Union didn't 'hold' it was destroyed. However, the ability of the Soviets to modilize and re-cover from such losses (both in personnel and equipment) allowed them to overcome."
Ok, play with words. I prefer to refer to the German air force as the LW and the German army as the Wehrmacht. Please give me other words if better suitable, but basically I think you know perfectly well what I am referring to.
As for the Russian backbone, I stay with my claim. The USSR was to big a bite for the Germans, and rather tougher to eat with war going on at several fronts. Well, maybe my claim is not that solid. What would have happened if Russia was alone. Hmmmm. Look again at maps and dates,- operation Torch goes off about the same time as the colossal fight for Stalingrad, - the landings at Sicily go off at the same time as the fight for Kursk. In both cases the LW (or the Wehrmacht as you choose) transfer aircraft FROM the eastern front. Well, perhaps the LW could have won the front if not being bothered too much at other fronts. Well, - that happens.
Then here:
"In fact the German 'War Economy' wasn't fully mobilized until '43"
Germany was gradually mobilizing for war from Hitler's takeover. Britain on the contrary was somewhat in a disarming mood.
And don't put a blind on the fact that when Germany was fully mobilized (although being bombed heavily), a stunning amount of workforce, counting millions, were prisoners and slaves. You know, the Todt organization worked brilliantly to compensate for the losses of German workforce and accomodation. Well,- since you brought it up ....
Then this little dingie:
"Germany had no navy to contest the allied landings or shipments of supplies to NA and the Med. Germany didn't have the industrial capacity to match the build up of equipment, Germany didn't have the manpower to build up superior numbers. The Med, Italy and NA were well down on the list of priorities."
Look at a map will you, as well as peeking into some facts.
Firstly, the Allies had to cruise from the UK through Gibraltar, throught the Medeterranian to Malta or N-Africa with all aircraft, manpower and vehicles. With a lot of Supplies they had to go past Africa southwards, up again and through the red sea and Suez. The Axis had to hop from S.Italy.
The Italian Navy was significant, - it alone was AFAIK a bigger part than the RN in the med. The Italian Merchant navy was quite effective, and delivered its designed goods quite effectively. Airbases in N-Africa could be reached from Sicily with single engined fighters (drop tanks)
Recommended reading material about the supply status and such is "Blood Tears and Folly" by Len Deighton, and belive me, it is not a Brit coloured book.
As for Manpower, - in the routing and rounding up of Tunisia, some 300.000 Axis were taken prisoner. No Manpower, eh? No Priorities? Well, the Priorities were being screwed on the eastern front anyway, if that would suit the reference. And for the airwar side, the LW kept loosing roughly the same numbers in aircraft at the N-African theatre as in the whole of the eastern front.
Göring gave Heinz Baer a tough time after this, - loosing the Med front.
About the losses, - I have no exact figures. But I did browse the LW loss records and was stunned how many aircraft they actually lost in the N-African theatre.
And then to my original claim, which I will stick with:
"But none of the above has F'all to do with your original claim:
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well on the eastern front the LW really had success, and LW veterans have often said that it was tougher in the air on the western front.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------"
How comes that the LW presumably lost more aircraft fighting only the RAF in 1940 (May/June to Dec) than on the eastern front in 1944?
If the the LW had 2/3 of their power in the east in 1944, why did they yet loose more to the western allies in the exact same period. Where did the priorities go???
How was it possible to loose so much to an offender that had to cross a conquered country to be able to offer a serious threat?
So, I'll stick with it. The thesis is:
"The LW lost in the air"
