Super vrs Uber

[Bruno]

Originally posted by Captain Virgil Hilts
Exactly what theater of operations was it where the Luftwaffe did not surrender AIR SUPERIORITY, with air superiority defined as the ability to have control over the skies and prevent the enemy from being able to launch successful major operations?

That's the result of attrition and limited industrial capacity. Allied Air superiority didn't materialize overnight in any theater, it had to be won. There was a lot fighting and dieing that did that over time. Look at the quote I provide above (posted again just as an example):

Figures for the air war over Normandy in June 1944

Here are the aircraft loss figures for the air war over France during the period 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944:

2nd TAF: 322 aircraft (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 170)

9th AF: 302 aircraft (Rust, "The 9th Air Force in World War II", p. 90)

8th AF: 359 aircraft (137 bombers, 222 fighters) (Freeman, "The Mighty Eighth War Diary", pp. 259 - 283 - only losses in France included)

Total losses by 2nd TAF, 9th AF and 8th AF in France 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944: 983.

Since losses sustained by ADGB, RAF Bomber Command (which alone lost over 300 bombers in June 1944, many of them over France), and other commands must be added to the figures above, the total number of Allied aircraft lost over France during the period 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944 definitely exceeds one thousand, I would say approximately 1,200 Allied aircraft were lost over France during this period.

During the same period, the Luftwaffe lost 646 fighters, fighter-bombers and medium bombers in France. (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 170)

Thus, while almost two Allied aircraft were lost for every German aircraft loss, these losses should be compared with each side's numerical strength. During this period, the Allied air forces performed 99,000 sorties over France (Clark, p. 98 ), while the Luftwaffe only flew 13,315 sorties over France (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 1051). Thus, the Allied loss rate was only around 1 % while the German loss rate was almost 5 %.

Out of a total of 13,000 Allied aircraft on 6 June 1944, less than 10 % were lost over France between 6 and 30 June 1944. Out of 1,300 Luftwaffe aircraft in France (the peak number, reached on 10 June), around 50 % were lost between 6 and 30 June 1944.

As you can see Allied losses exceeded the LW. However, LW losses per sortie and overall % of losses were higher. While the Allies could sustain and replace their losses in material and men the LW couldn't. With the loss of well trained pilots and with limited industrial capacity (to include fuel production for training new pilots) 'air superiority' was just a matter of time.

[Allied]... air superiority was based on both a qualitative superiority and a numerical superiority

Qualitative superiority meaning the allies had time to train better pilots as replacements and material superiority, not only in terms of raw materials (alloys, fuel etc...), but in industrial output. Not only could they sustain and replace losses they could do it while further building up their forces.

Numerical Superiority speaks for itself. See the article I linked above.

When Germany failed to defeat the Soviets by late '42 early '43 it was all downhill from there. However, there are many issues that contributed to defeat. As I said above the LW didn't loose anything on its own. Wars are won and lost on the ground and WW2 was no different.

[MiloMorai]

How many of those Allied a/c  losses are due to German AA Wotan?

[Bruno]

How many of those Allied a/c losses are due to German AA

Most I presume... You would need to cross check claims and losses. However, for the point I making it doesn't really matter does it?

A loss, is a loss. You still need to build a new airplane and train someone to fly it...

[OttoJespersen]

Originally posted by Meyer
Well, I just did a fast calculation with the Lw OOB of may 31 of 1944, and even taken Scandinavia and the Balcans as the "east", the west units had more planes (something like 2700 west vs 2200 east)

The difference is even bigger if we only calculate the combat types.

I don't doubt your numbers Meyer, but there is a flaw in your calculations. You're including the LW assets deployed on the southern front (Africa/Italy) in the western front numbers. The Northern front (Norway/Finland) assets also do not belong in his comparison. The only assets that belong in the west front category are those in France and the lowlands plus Reichverteidigung-West. The assets deployed on the eastern front would include those belonging to the three army groups in Russia plus Reichverteidigung-Ost and those of any Axis-ally fighting under Luftwaffe command. I believe the numbers will favor the eastern front.

Originally posted by Angus
Can't blame that one on the Wehrmacht can you

Sure he can. The Luftwaffe was part of the Wehrmacht.

Originally posted by Angus
And for theaters, well, Where did the LW win? Blimey, I sort of get the feeling that they lost most ..... or all.
The Eastern front.
The desert war
The western front with the bombing campaign

Originally posted by Angus
So, again which theatre or campaign was won by the LW?

The Luftwaffe won the airwar over France and held air superiority (i.e. they won) from 1940 to early 1944. Four years where the Luftwaffe won and the allies were the underdog in almost every battle.

The Luftwaffe won the airwar over North Africa against the RAF, and held air superiority until the arrival of American forces in late 1942. Two years where the Luftwaffe won and the allies were the underdog in almost every battle.

The Luftwaffe won the airwar on the eastern front, and held air superiority until mid/late 1944, and air parity almost to the end of the war. Three years where the Luftwaffe won and the allies were the underdog in almost every battle.

The war was lost on the ground, in the east.

[Angus]

It seems to be somewhat forgotten that for the RAF to get at the heart of Germany they had to cross some hundreds of miles of hostile airspace, while for the LW to get at the heart of Britain including the capital the distance was mere 100 - 150 miles. Maybe somewhat of selective forgetfulness, but it would also be nice for some people to have a look at a map. Fact remains about the BoB though, that the first and perhaps only LW objective of total Victory (plan was either to bend Britain to surrender or prepare for a victory-bringing assault) failed.
Now as for the airwar over France in 1941 1942 and 1943 mostly this was IMO a rather daft plan from the RAF site, - trying to get the LW to come up and play, and the LW, brilliantly controlled, would come and play on their own initiative.
Yet, regarding daylight ops, the LW was already the underdog as soon as 1941. I.E. they could not bomb the brits with any weights in daylight, while the brits were gaining guts and harassing the LW over their own turf.

As for the Med, the same things get emphasized even better.
Axis can go through Italy and hop straight over the med, Allies have to sail their aircraft, troops and gear some THOUSANDS of miles before being able to get into action.
Don't know so much of scores over there, except from Marseille and Munchenberger of course, but the bottom line remained, Axis lost the arm wrestle steadily, also in the air. Beginning with superiority the end was a total mess with squadrons drawn from the eastern front to patch-up a bit.

On to the eastern front then. Well, it was a big shooting gallery in the beginning, but the massive backbone of the USSR held, and in the end the Germans were on the run. The airwar was titanic, but the LW losses were yet amazingly low compared to their kills. Russians however kept using their airforce with increasing weight to batter the Wehrmacht, and the LW could not stop that - only cause attrition.

The bombing campaign then. Ok Brits could not bomb unescorted, neither could the Amis. So the Brits bombed the Germans all over the place at night, with appalling accuracy and minimal losses turning into cracking effectiveness with appalling losses. Bottom line: campaign was not stopped.
The US started their campaign effectively when they had long range escorts, they bombed the Germans all over the place in daylight - Bottom line, - the LW could not stop them.

The whole success was attrition, and while the LW excelled at that, it was simply not enough.

They won by points and lost the fight.

Happy Bruno?

[Bruno]

The bombing campaign then. Ok Brits could not bomb unescorted, neither could the Amis. So the Brits bombed the Germans all over the place at night, with appalling accuracy and minimal losses turning into cracking effectiveness with appalling losses. Bottom line: campaign was not stopped.
The US started their campaign effectively when they had long range escorts, they bombed the Germans all over the place in daylight - Bottom line, - the LW could not stop them.

Why don't you research BC's losses and then come back and tell me how 'minimal' they were. The 'whole LW' was never engaged in stopping 'British night bombing'.

Next go research the losses the USAAF suffered during their daylight raids going all through well into '44. Again the 'whole LW' wasn't tasked with stopping the USAAF day light raids.

On to the eastern front then. Well, it was a big shooting gallery in the beginning, but the massive backbone of the USSR held, and in the end the Germans were on the run. The air war was titanic, but the LW losses were yet amazingly low compared to their kills. Russians however kept using their airforce with increasing weight to batter the Wehrmacht, and the LW could not stop that - only cause attrition.

 First the term 'Wehrmacht' means the entire German armed forces including the LW.

The massive backbone of the Soviet Union didn't 'hold' it was destroyed. However, the ability of the Soviets to modilize and re-cover from such losses (both in personnel and equipment) allowed them to overcome.

The air war in the East was nothing compared to the ground war. While there are plenty of examples of epic air battles they still pale in comparison to the fight on the ground.

As for the Med, the same things get emphasized even better.
Axis can go through Italy and hop straight over the med, Allies have to sail their aircraft, troops and gear some THOUSANDS of miles before being able to get into action.
Don't know so much of scores over there, except from Marseille and Munchenberger of course, but the bottom line remained, Axis lost the arm wrestle steadily, also in the air. Beginning with superiority the end was a total mess with squadrons drawn from the eastern front to patch-up a bit.

Germany had no navy to contest the allied landings or shipments of supplies to NA and the Med. Germany didn't have the industrial capacity to match the build up of equipment, Germany didn't have the manpower to build up superior numbers. The Med, Italy and NA were well down on the list of priorities.

A couple of book suggestions:

If you can find and/or afford the book:
Fighters over the Desert:
The Air Battles in the Western Desert, June 1940 to December 1942
By Christopher Shores and Hans Ring

Also

Focke-Wulf 190 in North Africa
by Morten Jessen & Andrew Arthy (fyi Andrew's web page: Bookies FW 190 Page)

Now as for the air war over France in 1941 1942 and 1943 mostly this was IMO a rather daft plan from the RAF site, - trying to get the LW to come up and play, and the LW, brilliantly controlled, would come and play on their own initiative.
Yet, regarding daylight ops, the LW was already the underdog as soon as 1941. I.E. they could not bomb the Brits with any weights in daylight, while the Brits were gaining guts and harassing the LW over their own turf.

I already explained that to you:

While all this was going on the LW only kept 2 Geschwaders in the west to face the Western Allies going into mid '44, only 1 defending the Reich until late '43. The LW's only goal in the west was to hold the line until the situation in the East could be resolved.

It seems to be somewhat forgotten that for the RAF to get at the heart of Germany they had to cross some hundreds of miles of hostile airspace, while for the LW to get at the heart of Britain including the capital the distance was mere 100 - 150 miles. Maybe somewhat of selective forgetfulness, but it would also be nice for some people to have a look at a map. Fact remains about the BoB though, that the first and perhaps only LW objective of total Victory (plan was either to bend Britain to surrender or prepare for a victory-bringing assault) failed.

No one has forgotten that. I have already said that German industrial capacity, especially after the fall of France (Hitler ordered what little war production there was halted), was inadequate. The LW bomber force was designed for a completely different type of war. In fact the German 'War Economy' wasn't fully mobilized until '43.

Even if the LW had 'won BoB' there's was no way they could have pulled off a massive cross channel invasion. Everyone knew that. Try searching Ultra reports of German preparedness during that time frame. The Wehrmacht didn't come close to having the equipment it needed to pull off Sealowe.

But none of the above has F'all to do with your original claim:

Well on the eastern front the LW really had success, and LW veterans have often said that it was tougher in the air on the western front.

[Angus]

Hehe, expect a reply.
There are some golden points from you that I have to reply.
As for the book from Hans Ring and C.Shores, I'd love to get my hands on it. If you know where, or an ISBN, let me know.
Well, the fun is going on

[Angus]

A wee of a read-up material for you Bruno, especially since you seem to think I haven't been reading up :

Dass waren die Deutchen Jagdflieger Asse (Toliver/Constable)
Mein Flugbuch (Gunher Rall)
Full Circle (Johnny Johnsson)
Duel for the sky (C.Shores)

[Angus]

And then Bruno, little bits by bits.
"Why don't you research BC's losses and then come back and tell me how 'minimal' they were. The 'whole LW' was never engaged in stopping 'British night bombing'.

Next go research the losses the USAAF suffered during their daylight raids going all through well into '44. Again the 'whole LW' wasn't tasked with stopping the USAAF day light raids"

Firstly, the night raids were small in the beginning, and so were the countermeasures. Most BC in the first rounds fell prey to anything else than the LW.
Then, again, of course the whole LW was never engaged in only stopping British night bombing. The RAF was as well never wholly engaged into bombing Germany at night.
The whole LW was as well not engaged in stopping the USSAF air raids in daytime. Neither was the USSAF solemly engaged in bombing Germany at daytime. Guess it suits to forget about the pacific theatre as well as other ops on their side?

On we go:
"First the term 'Wehrmacht' means the entire German armed forces including the LW.

The massive backbone of the Soviet Union didn't 'hold' it was destroyed. However, the ability of the Soviets to modilize and re-cover from such losses (both in personnel and equipment) allowed them to overcome."

Ok, play with words. I prefer to refer to the German air force as the LW and the German army as the Wehrmacht. Please give me other words if better suitable, but basically I think you know perfectly well what I am referring to.
As for the Russian backbone, I stay with my claim. The USSR was to big a bite for the Germans, and rather tougher to eat with war going on at several fronts. Well, maybe my claim is not that solid. What would have happened if Russia was alone. Hmmmm.  Look again at maps and dates,- operation Torch goes off about the same time as the colossal fight for Stalingrad, - the landings at Sicily go off at the same time as the fight for Kursk. In both cases the LW (or the Wehrmacht as you choose) transfer aircraft FROM the eastern front. Well, perhaps the LW could have won the front if not being bothered too much at other fronts. Well, - that happens.

Then here:
"In fact the German 'War Economy' wasn't fully mobilized until '43"

Germany was gradually mobilizing for war from Hitler's takeover. Britain on the contrary was somewhat in a disarming mood.
And don't put a blind on the fact that when Germany was fully mobilized (although being bombed heavily), a stunning amount of workforce, counting millions, were prisoners and slaves. You know, the Todt organization worked brilliantly to compensate for the losses of German workforce and accomodation. Well,- since you brought it up ....



Then this little dingie:
"Germany had no navy to contest the allied landings or shipments of supplies to NA and the Med. Germany didn't have the industrial capacity to match the build up of equipment, Germany didn't have the manpower to build up superior numbers. The Med, Italy and NA were well down on the list of priorities."

Look at a map will you, as well as peeking into some facts.
Firstly, the Allies had to cruise from the UK through Gibraltar, throught the Medeterranian to Malta or N-Africa with all aircraft, manpower and vehicles. With a lot of Supplies they had to go past Africa southwards, up again and through the red sea and Suez. The Axis had to hop from S.Italy.
The Italian Navy was significant, - it alone was AFAIK a bigger part than the RN in the med. The Italian Merchant navy was quite effective, and delivered its designed goods quite effectively. Airbases in N-Africa could be reached from Sicily with single engined fighters (drop tanks)
Recommended reading material about the supply status and such is "Blood Tears and Folly" by Len Deighton, and belive me, it is not a Brit coloured book.
As for Manpower, - in the routing and rounding up of Tunisia, some 300.000 Axis were taken prisoner. No Manpower, eh? No Priorities? Well, the Priorities were being screwed on the eastern front anyway, if that would suit the reference. And for the airwar side, the LW kept loosing roughly the same numbers in aircraft at the N-African theatre as in the whole of the eastern front.
Göring gave Heinz Baer a tough time after this, - loosing the Med front.
About the losses, - I have no exact figures. But I did browse the LW loss records and was stunned how many aircraft they actually lost in the N-African theatre.

And then to my original claim, which I will stick with:
"But none of the above has F'all to do with your original claim:


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well on the eastern front the LW really had success, and LW veterans have often said that it was tougher in the air on the western front.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------"

How comes that the LW presumably lost more aircraft fighting only the RAF in 1940 (May/June to Dec) than on the eastern front in 1944?
If the the LW had 2/3 of their power in the east in 1944, why did they yet loose more to the western allies in the exact same period. Where did the priorities go???
How was it possible to loose so much to an offender that had to cross a conquered country to be able to offer a serious threat?

So, I'll stick with it. The thesis is:
"The LW lost in the air"

[Karnak]

Had the Italians used their navy even semi-competently they could easily have kicked the RN out of the Med.  Churchill was urged to withdraw from the Med. for that very reason, instead the British fought and demolished the Italian naval strength.  Italy had several fine and modern battleships and the RN had global commitments, leaving the Med. mostly covered by lighter units and old refit WWI dreadnoughts.

[Bruno]

Firstly, the night raids were small in the beginning, and so were the countermeasures. Most BC in the first rounds fell prey to anything else than the LW.
Then, again, of course the whole LW was never engaged in only stopping British night bombing. The RAF was as well never wholly engaged into bombing Germany at night.
The whole LW was as well not engaged in stopping the USSAF air raids in daytime. Neither was the USSAF solemly engaged in bombing Germany at daytime. Guess it suits to forget about the pacific theatre as well as other ops on their side?

What are you talking about?

It is you who said things like:

So the Brits bombed the Germans all over the place at night, with appalling accuracy and minimal losses

The USAAF and British bomber campaigns took far more resources to carry out then it took for the LW to defend against them. All of BC was involved in night bombing. Multiple US Air forces were involved in daylight raids. Both BC and the USAAF suffered severe losses. It wasn't until late '44 the Western Allied air power was able to achieve any of the things it set out to do. By then the war had already been decided on the ground.

What does the Pacific have to do with this discussion? More strawman?

Ok, play with words. I prefer to refer to the German air force as the LW and the German army as the Wehrmacht. Please give me other words if better suitable, but basically I think you know perfectly well what I am referring to.

Wehrmacht=entire German Armed Forces.
LW=Air force
Heer=Army
Kriegsmarine=Navy

There's no play on words...

As for the Russian backbone, I stay with my claim. The USSR was to big a bite for the Germans, and rather tougher to eat with war going on at several fronts. Well, maybe my claim is not that solid. What would have happened if Russia was alone. Hmmmm. Look again at maps and dates,- operation Torch goes off about the same time as the colossal fight for Stalingrad, - the landings at Sicily go off at the same time as the fight for Kursk. In both cases the LW (or the Wehrmacht as you choose) transfer aircraft FROM the eastern front. Well, perhaps the LW could have won the front if not being bothered too much at other fronts. Well, - that happens.

The Soviets were in terrible shape at the end of '41. The core 'backbone' of Soviet armed forces was broken. However, for the German's to have 'won' and to have capitalized on this 'break' they needed to get to the Volga before winter and consolidate a defensive line.  The Wehrmacht took larger losses in men and equipment then expected and their advances stalled. This gave the Soviets time to bring troops from the east. This was only possible because Soviets spies in Japan passed information back to Moscow stating that there was absolutely no threat from an invasion by Japan.

Torch didn't have any effect on Stalingrad. Stalingrad was lost due to miscalculations by Hitler. He split his forces, sent them in different directions, failed to secure the Soviet bridgeheads and failed to adequately secure 6th Armies flanks. But as Operation Uranus was underway another major Soviet offensive, Operation Mars, jumped off simultaneously in the central sector.

Sicily had no impact of the course of events at Kursk. Kursk was lost long before it began. Hitler's delays and Soviet spies gave the Soviets the intelligence and time to prepare for the German attack.

Neither the Wehrmacht defeats at Stalingrad or Kursk were the sole responsibility of the LW.

Germany was gradually mobilizing for war from Hitler's takeover. Britain on the contrary was somewhat in a disarming mood.
And don't put a blind on the fact that when Germany was fully mobilized (although being bombed heavily), a stunning amount of workforce, counting millions, were prisoners and slaves. You know, the Todt organization worked brilliantly to compensate for the losses of German workforce and accomodation. Well,- since you brought it up ....

There's a ten volume series (expected to be 10 volumes 1-7 are out 8 expected next year sometime) entitled:

Germany and the Second World War: The Global War

It was published under the supervision of the MGFA (Office of Military Historical Research of the Bundeswehr). Vols. 1-6 are published, in German and English; Vol 7, 9/1 and 9/2 in German. These books can be expensive (up to $300 USD per volume depending on publisher).  After you have researched the German war economy then come back tell me how wrong I am.

Look at a map will you, as well as peeking into some facts.
Firstly, the Allies had to cruise from the UK through Gibraltar, throught the Medeterranian to Malta or N-Africa with all aircraft, manpower and vehicles. With a lot of Supplies they had to go past Africa southwards, up again and through the red sea and Suez. The Axis had to hop from S.Italy.
The Italian Navy was significant, - it alone was AFAIK a bigger part than the RN in the med. The Italian Merchant navy was quite effective, and delivered its designed goods quite effectively. Airbases in N-Africa could be reached from Sicily with single engined fighters (drop tanks)
Recommended reading material about the supply status and such is "Blood Tears and Folly" by Len Deighton, and belive me, it is not a Brit coloured book.
As for Manpower, - in the routing and rounding up of Tunisia, some 300.000 Axis were taken prisoner. No Manpower, eh? No Priorities? Well, the Priorities were being screwed on the eastern front anyway, if that would suit the reference. And for the airwar side, the LW kept loosing roughly the same numbers in aircraft at the N-African theatre as in the whole of the eastern front.
Göring gave Heinz Baer a tough time after this, - loosing the Med front.
About the losses, - I have no exact figures. But I did browse the LW loss records and was stunned how many aircraft they actually lost in the N-African theatre.

It doesn't matter how long supply lines are as long as they are secure and you have sufficient  transport ability. The Germans and Italians were unable to secure their supply lines, they didn't have enough aircraft and naval strength to do it. NA wasn't a priority and what little supplies were ear marked for NA, very little got through.

The Italian Navy was a hollow force, See Karnak's reply.

The whole German strategy in NA and the Med following Torch was to conduct a fighting retreat. They followed this policy right up the Italian peninsula. Allied investment in NA, Med and Italy far out weighed what the Germans had invested. Not only that those German forces in Italy were able to put up a fight until the war ended.

The majority of Rommel's forces in NA were made of of ill-trained, ill-equipped and ill-motivated Italians. Even so with the limited amount men and resources Rommel made a fight out of it. The reason those '300,000' axis soldiers were left in Tunisia is because neither the Germans nor Italians had the resources (ships and transports) to get them out.

How comes that the LW presumably lost more aircraft fighting only the RAF in 1940 (May/June to Dec) than on the eastern front in 1944?
If the the LW had 2/3 of their power in the east in 1944, why did they yet loose more to the western allies in the exact same period. Where did the priorities go???

Because they didn't....  

Luftwaffe Aircraft Losses By Theatre September 1943 - October 1944

East Front:

Jan - Mai '44 - total LW losses = 3214
Jun - Oct '44 - total LW losses = 3650

Now where did the RAF claim 6800 LW aircraft shot down in '40?

The LW had 2/3 of all aircraft in the east in '44 yes, but the majority of these aircraft were not single engined day fighters. A good number of these weren't even combat aircraft.

Only a max of 25% of day fighters were in the east in '44.

I already told you that the airwar in the east and west were completely different go back and re-read it. While you are at it take the time to read the articles I linked :

The situation was different on the "Western Front," where the modern equipped and trained RAF was an equal opponent already from the start of the war. The Luftwaffe's pilot losses against the Western Allies in 1941-1943 did not allow such a tremendously experienced core of fighter aces to develop as was the case in the East...

... For several reasons, the German fighter pilots in general held a slight upper hand in air combat with the Western Allies air forces until 1943. This however changed with the appearance of large formations of US heavy bombers and long-range US escort fighters. From the Fall of 1943, the "hunters" of the German fighter force had turned into "hunted." While the German fighters had to be concentrated against US bombers, the escorting Thunderbolts, Mustangs, and Lightnings, operating in increasingly superior numbers, could bounce German fighters and shoot them down in scores. Added to this was the severe losses as a result of the heavy bombers' defensive fire. Increasing losses in the air battles over Germany resulted in reduced pilot training courses, which in turn further increased German fighter losses. This mainly affected the units with the highest losses - namely the fighter units in the "West".

Another important difference between the "West" and the Eastern Front was that until June 1944, the USAAF and RAF fighter pilots had no frontline on the ground to cover (this regarding Western Europe), and thus could concentrate on hunting German planes in the air. This advantage was never enjoyed by the Soviet fighter pilots.

This is one those never ending discussions where by you jump from issue to issue. Unless you are willing to address the points in the original discussion (and stay on topic) I see no reason to continue.

[OttoJespersen2]

Originally posted by Angus
It seems to be somewhat forgotten that for the RAF to get at the heart of Germany they had to cross some hundreds of miles of hostile airspace, while for the LW to get at the heart of Britain including the capital the distance was mere 100 - 150 miles. Maybe somewhat of selective forgetfulness, but it would also be nice for some people to have a look at a map. Fact remains about the BoB though, that the first and perhaps only LW objective of total Victory (plan was either to bend Britain to surrender or prepare for a victory-bringing assault) failed.

Selective memory is not an ailment limited to LW enthusiasts. You seem to forget that the LW could fly wherever they wanted over Britain and the RAF could not stop them - "only cause attrition" as you put it. And in the end the RAF bombing campaign failed as well. Like with the British the German will to fight was never broken by terror bombing.

Originally posted by Angus
Now as for the airwar over France in 1941 1942 and 1943 mostly this was IMO a rather daft plan from the RAF site, - trying to get the LW to come up and play, and the LW, brilliantly controlled, would come and play on their own initiative.
Yet, regarding daylight ops, the LW was already the underdog as soon as 1941. I.E. they could not bomb the brits with any weights in daylight, while the brits were gaining guts and harassing the LW over their own turf.

Now that is not merely a case of selective memory. That is downright dishonesty. In that period the RAF could only mount low level hit and run raids with Mosquitoes, and fighter sweeps over the French coast. And the LW met and won the vast majority of these engagements with the Kanaljäger reigning supreme until 1944. The LW however continued daylight and night bombing of London even into 1944. Nuisance raids to be sure, but still one third of London was in ruins when the war ended.

Originally posted by Angus
As for the Med, the same things get emphasized even better.
Axis can go through Italy and hop straight over the med, Allies have to sail their aircraft, troops and gear some THOUSANDS of miles before being able to get into action.
Don't know so much of scores over there, except from Marseille and Munchenberger of course, but the bottom line remained, Axis lost the arm wrestle steadily, also in the air. Beginning with superiority the end was a total mess with squadrons drawn from the eastern front to patch-up a bit.

Again you seem to want to provoke more than find the truth. The British did not need to travel thousands of miles to get to North Africa, they were already there. The Axis invaded remember? Sure you do, but the truth isn't much of a concern for you Angus, only "winning" the argument. The British drew their resources from the entire Commonwealth, and didn't have to cross perilous waters to get to Egypt. Still the "wrestling match" as you put it wasn't steadily lost by the Axis. It was a one sided conflict with the Axis advancing and the British retreating all the way to El Alamein. The first battle the British won, and in popular belief the decisive battle. However the reality was that the Axis did not lose Africa because of El Alamein, but because of the Americans opening a new front in the west. The Axis could not hope to win on two fronts, so they went on the defensive.


Bruno has you covered on the rest.

[Angus]

OOpsie lot's of work ahead.
Ok, begin:
"Selective memory is not an ailment limited to LW enthusiasts. You seem to forget that the LW could fly wherever they wanted over Britain and the RAF could not stop them - "only cause attrition" as you put it. And in the end the RAF bombing campaign failed as well. Like with the British the German will to fight was never broken by terror bombing."

They could fly wherever they wanted, - at night. Daylight ops after 1940 were hit&run.
The bombing campaigns failed, - but not by far. London was close to a civilian revolt in the autumn of 1940, and members of the German high command have said that if the Hamburg raid would have been repeated (on another City) within a short period (say a month), Germany would have had no option than to resign. That was in 1943.

Then here:
"Now that is not merely a case of selective memory. That is downright dishonesty. In that period the RAF could only mount low level hit and run raids with Mosquitoes, and fighter sweeps over the French coast. And the LW met and won the vast majority of these engagements with the Kanaljäger reigning supreme until 1944. The LW however continued daylight and night bombing of London even into 1944. Nuisance raids to be sure, but still one third of London was in ruins when the war ended."

First they had Rhubarbs, then Circuses, both rather dicey and rather uneffective. As you point out above.
But the RAF usually had to cross the channel to get some game. Or can you point out to me some source of LW holding the front at the English side of the channel in that time???????

Then on to the yellow sands:
"Again you seem to want to provoke more than find the truth. The British did not need to travel thousands of miles to get to North Africa, they were already there. The Axis invaded remember? Sure you do, but the truth isn't much of a concern for you Angus, only "winning" the argument. The British drew their resources from the entire Commonwealth, and didn't have to cross perilous waters to get to Egypt. Still the "wrestling match" as you put it wasn't steadily lost by the Axis. It was a one sided conflict with the Axis advancing and the British retreating all the way to El Alamein. The first battle the British won, and in popular belief the decisive battle. However the reality was that the Axis did not lose Africa because of El Alamein, but because of the Americans opening a new front in the west. The Axis could not hope to win on two fronts, so they went on the defensive."

I do not follow your logic here.
Of course the British were in N-Africa. So were the Eyeties.
But their gear and their fuel was all transported from Britain or the east, and they DID indeed have to do a long crossing to get their stuff to the right place. Aircraft, tanks, ammo, oil, troops, - everything basically.
Why else bother with a thing like Malta?
The Brits did retreat to El Alamein, they did reverse the situation, and Axis were in retreat before the Americans joined the fray.
And what front do you refer as a "New" one in the west? Torch?

[Angus]

On it goes.
Losses and claims east and west lookie here:
http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Those are the numbers I had.

So:
1944 - All Combat Types
 Total West
 Eastern Front
 West/East
 
Sorties
 182,004
 342,483
 0.53
 
Losses
 9768
 2406
 4.06
 
Losses/Sortie
 0.0537
 0.00703
 7.66
 
Summary for the period:
"4.06 times as many aircraft were lost in combat in the West than were lost in the East, a ratio reasonably close to Groehler's 3.41 for all "losses". The most chilling statistic for the JG 26 pilots appears in the sortie data. An airplane flying a combat mission in the West was 7.66 times more likely to be destroyed than one on a similar mission in the East. It is clear that the burden of sacrifice was borne by the Luftwaffe aircrew on the Western Front and over the Reich, not on the Eastern Front. "

[OJespersen]

Originally posted by Angus
They could fly wherever they wanted, - at night. Daylight ops after 1940 were hit&run.

They could fly wherever they wanted, period. They would of course be challenged, but the RAF never succeeded in turning back an escorted LW bomber raid. That the LW (like the USAAF in 1943) chose to preserve its strength instead is beyond my point. They could if they wanted to.

However the British could not hope to mount a daylight bomber raid into France, except for fast hit and run Mosquitoes. The RAF simply wasn't equipped for it.

Originally posted by Angus
First they had Rhubarbs, then Circuses, both rather dicey and rather uneffective. As you point out above.
But the RAF usually had to cross the channel to get some game. Or can you point out to me some source of LW holding the front at the English side of the channel in that time???????

The Kanaljäger kept the frontline firmly in the channel (that's why they were called Kanaljäger). They would also fly aggressive fighter sweeps over the channel and English coast, probing the RAF response.

Originally posted by Angus
I do not follow your logic here.
Of course the British were in N-Africa. So were the Eyeties.
But their gear and their fuel was all transported from Britain or the east, and they DID indeed have to do a long crossing to get their stuff to the right place. Aircraft, tanks, ammo, oil, troops, - everything basically.
Why else bother with a thing like Malta?
The Brits did retreat to El Alamein, they did reverse the situation, and Axis were in retreat before the Americans joined the fray.
And what front do you refer as a "New" one in the west? Torch?

The British didn't have to transport their supplies through perilous waters with enemy torpedo planes and subs like the Germans did. The supplies for the British in Africa were not transported through the Med, but through the Commonwealth trade routs in Africa and the Middle East. Malta was the only exception, and the main reason why the Axis lost so much of their supplies on route to Africa. (I have a Deutsche Wochenschau from '42 I think, that among other things shows a RAF attack on a AK convoy. Very impressive footage).

The Battle for El Alamein ended on November 4 1942 with the German withdrawal from battle. The Americans landed in Morocco and Algeria four days later on November 8 1942. From that point on the Germans were on the defensive.