so basically the message is 'man to man' the Luftwaffe fighter pilots were better correct?
No one said that. However, I would suggest you go back to the statement by Angus that began this whole discussion:
I will quote it once again since most of you don't seem to take the time to actually read what has been written:
Well on the eastern front the LW really had success, and LW veterans have often said that it was tougher in the air on the western front.
LW
experten were 'successful' where ever they went. As I pointed out above 30 LW experten in the West 30 'out scored' the top Ami pilot, this only considering their scores against Ami aircraft. Not to mention the experten with 100 + kills or the total number of experten that scored more then 15 kills just against the western allies.
Relative skill was fluid. It began with the LW pilots holding a clear edge and ended with the Allies having the clear advantage.
I will re-quote this as well form the article I linked:
The situation was different on the "Western Front," where the modern equipped and trained RAF was an equal opponent already from the start of the war. The Luftwaffe's pilot losses against the Western Allies in 1941-1943 did not allow such a tremendously experienced core of fighter aces to develop as was the case in the East...
... For several reasons, the German fighter pilots in general held a slight upper hand in air combat with the Western Allies air forces until 1943. This however changed with the appearance of large formations of US heavy bombers and long-range US escort fighters. From the Fall of 1943, the "hunters" of the German fighter force had turned into "hunted." While the German fighters had to be concentrated against US bombers, the escorting Thunderbolts, Mustangs, and Lightnings, operating in increasingly superior numbers, could bounce German fighters and shoot them down in scores. Added to this was the severe losses as a result of the heavy bombers' defensive fire. Increasing losses in the air battles over Germany resulted in reduced pilot training courses, which in turn further increased German fighter losses. This mainly affected the units with the highest losses - namely the fighter units in the "West".
Another important difference between the "West" and the Eastern Front was that until June 1944, the USAAF and RAF fighter pilots had no frontline on the ground to cover (this regarding Western Europe), and thus could concentrate on hunting German planes in the air. This advantage was never enjoyed by the Soviet fighter pilots.
The Allies enjoyed total operational freedom and held the initiative in the west from 'late 40 on ward. There were only 2 Geschwader in NWE (JG 2 and JG 26, some gruppen / staffeln rotated to other fronts and others rotated in but basically there were 2 Geschwaders in NWE) until '44. There's was only 1 Geschwader tasked with Reich defense until mid '43.
However, range may have allowed the allies the ability to hit the LW while they were forming up, or on their airfields it was Allied numerical superiority that made this tactic possible in the first place. Numerical Superiority is what led to 'attrition'. Couple that with Germany's lack of resources (fuel and war materials) and LW losses would have grown (and did) progressively worse. They rushed untrained pilots to fill their ranks and these pilots were 'man for man' worse pilots due to their lack of training. So much so (again I will quote from the article I linked):
... This air superiority was based on both a qualitative superiority and a numerical superiority.
The qualitative superiority manifested itself both regarding the technical field and pilot training. The Allied fighters generally were superior to the German Bf 109 G and Fw 190 A in service in 1944. Moreover, at this stage, the quality of the Luftwaffe pilot standard was being worn down to a mere shadow of what it had once been, and this was the result of a terrible attrition in a long fight against numerically superior US formations over Germany.
Don't under estimate the effect that allied numerical superiority had on breaking the LW in the west.
OK going back to my favorite RAF squadrons 41 & 91. October 20, 1943 they claimed 9 109s and 190s for no loss and had another kill credited to them as one pilot didn't claim a 109 he flew into the ground.
Some of the folks here with better LW resources tell me those numbers were accurate and not big over claims.
What can we discern from that? OK they were flying Spit XIIs which were an even or better match to the 190s and 109s unlike the Spit Vs of Fighter Command that were clearly outclassed by the 190s, but does it mean that from Dieppe to October 20, 1943 the quality of LW pilots dropped?
The message I seem to be getting is that in an even fight the LW was just that much better and I guess I'm not willing to accept that. Too many quality pilots on both sides.
I don't know what you are trying to say here, or even if its directed at me, but I will no longer entertain 'strawmen'. I am most likely missing your point or how it relates to the current line of discussion, if so please explain it to me.
The LW had the option not to engage those short range incursions into France. The whole point of beehive and circus operations was to try and get the LW into the air to fight at war of attrition. I have no problems with the decision of LW planners not to engage every time. What would be the point. They couldn't win a war of attrition.
The LW strategy in the west was simply to hold the line until the war could be concluded in the east. With just 2 Geschwaders in NWE that's exactly what they did. Had it not been for the LW at Dieppe the allies could had opened up a bridgehead (pure speculation of course but its not to far fetched). The LW stuck with this strategy well into late '43. Clearly they fought when they had to.
The LW couldn't win a war of attrition and they didn't. When the allies made their landings at D-Day both JG 2 and JG 26 had been worn down. Even so (see this article):
The effect of Allied numerical superiority in the air over Normandy in 1944Even as outnumbered as the LW was at Dieppe they were more so leading immediately up to D-day. Yet once again the LW experten were again able to out score the allies:
Figures for the air war over Normandy in June 1944
Here are the aircraft loss figures for the air war over France during the period 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944:
2nd TAF: 322 aircraft (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 170)
9th AF: 302 aircraft (Rust, "The 9th Air Force in World War II", p. 90)
8th AF: 359 aircraft (137 bombers, 222 fighters) (Freeman, "The Mighty Eighth War Diary", pp. 259 - 283 - only losses in France included)
Total losses by 2nd TAF, 9th AF and 8th AF in France 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944: 983.
Since losses sustained by ADGB, RAF Bomber Command (which alone lost over 300 bombers in June 1944, many of them over France), and other commands must be added to the figures above, the total number of Allied aircraft lost over France during the period 6 June 1944 - 30 June 1944 definitely exceeds one thousand, I would say approximately 1,200 Allied aircraft were lost over France during this period.
During the same period, the Luftwaffe lost 646 fighters, fighter-bombers and medium bombers in France. (Clark, "Angels Eight", p. 170)
Thus, while almost two Allied aircraft were lost for every German aircraft loss, these losses should be compared with each side's numerical strength. During this period, the Allied air forces performed 99,000 sorties over France (Clark, p. 98 ), while the Luftwaffe only flew 13,315 sorties over France (Prien, "JG 1/11", p. 1051). Thus, the Allied loss rate was only around 1 % while the German loss rate was almost 5 %.
Out of a total of 13,000 Allied aircraft on 6 June 1944, less than 10 % were lost over France between 6 and 30 June 1944. Out of 1,300 Luftwaffe aircraft in France (the peak number, reached on 10 June), around 50 % were lost between 6 and 30 June 1944.
The LW was in no way shape of form capable of stopping or directly opposing the D-Day landings. That is what 'attrition' does. However, despite overwhelming allied numerical superiority the LW remained a viable force until late '44.
Karnak,
Bruno,
With all those RAF squadrons you are saying that not one RAF pilot made a kill claim for 19 August, 1942? I guess it is possible, but it seems unlikely given the number of claims the smaller American contingent claimed.
Their were plenty of allied kill claims. However when fighting over enemy territory what might have been a 'kill' some where else (just like the RAF in BoB damaged planes and pilots could make emergency landings etc..)
German Loss List - 19 August 1942
