Spitfire Vb: Did it carry 120 rnds OR 240 rnds of Cannons?

[Angus]

Hey Crumpp!
Well, welcome to the group of the BoB addicted.
As I mentioned before, and promised,- if you look more into it, it gets more interesting.
Now, keep your head a tad above the frame of time you two are tugging each other about and see things a little wider. I'll do a 1, 2 and perhaps 3 :

1: No matter where the haggle goes, the LW mounted roughly the same number of servicable 109's as the total fighter force of the RAF.

2: After some changes and tactic tests, the LW went to really heavy escort. They mounted 3 fighters for each bomber, - some being tied close, some flying high, some flying escort.

3: As a comparison, the USSAF escorts in deep penetration daylight bombings of Germany mounted much less fighters pro bomber, while covering many times the distance.

Little fact points for the database:

a. Calais- London is only 100 miles
b. South coast--London is only half that far.
c. Dover-Calais is easily a gliding distance from som 15K or less.
d. RAF responce time from scramble to interception was often not enough to be at the required altitude. They attacked uphill.
e. Park considered 3 squadrons to be the absolute maximum to get synchronised as a fighting force for interception. (36 at best)
f. on several cases the RAF fighters did not get through to the bombers. This applies mostly to the first phases of the BoB.
g. FC's radar was actually blinded on big patches throughout quite a bit of the battle.
h. The setup of FC made it impossible to use 13th group at all, - it was too far from the theater of ops. Same applied to several squadrons of 12th and 10th group.

Good for now

[Crumpp]

No matter where the haggle goes, the LW mounted roughly the same number of servicable 109's as the total fighter force of the RAF.

Not true.  The sides were roughly equal in numbers of fighters.  That has been shown.  The German numerical advantage was hardly a decisive one.  Unlike the allies in 1944.

For gaining air superiority, fighters are the key.  The German High Command never acknowledged this until it was too late.

Radar allowed the RAF to properly employ their forces:

The smaller defending air force can win if its aircraft are properly employed, and if they are concentrated in such a way as to outnumber the attacker in any given engagement. Concentrating to achieve numerical superiority is imperative, even if doing so leads to some attacks escaping without interception. Far more important and effective is imposing heavy losses in one battle or on one day, than getting a constant 1 or 2 percent a day.

They did not outnumber the Luftwaffe in every engagement but in enough.  Many they just achieved numerical parity.

As a comparison, the USSAF escorts in deep penetration daylight bombings of Germany mounted much less fighters pro bomber, while covering many times the distance.

They mounted roughly the same ratios on average as the Luftwaffe especially in 1944.

In the 1944 raids, the USAAF was able to achieve vast numerical superiority in fighters.  Growing from 3:1 to over 8:1 by early 1945.

Just over a month later, on 19 February, a force of 941 bombers escorted by 700 fighters met German opposition of about 250 fighters.

Which is typical for 1944.  Only on a handfull of occasions was the Luftwaffe able to get more than a few hundred fighters in contact.  They operated usually in Gruppe or less and attacked piecemeal as the individual units arrived at the bomber stream.

Park considered 3 squadrons to be the absolute maximum to get synchronised as a fighting force for interception. (36 at best)

No different from the Gruppe being the largest operational element, 39 planes at full strength but usually around 20-30.  The difference is in the German system the Gruppe is already part of the structure.  

Park simply formed ad hoc "Gruppes" out of 3 available squadrons.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Now I've lost you Crumpp:
"--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No matter where the haggle goes, the LW mounted roughly the same number of servicable 109's as the total fighter force of the RAF.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Not true. The sides were roughly equal in numbers of fighters"

I have the numbers. Servicable 109's on the channel front roughly equal ALL RAF fighters in the WHOLE of the country. Clear as daylight.

I'll dump some more numbers in later....

[Crumpp]

Yes Angus,

The numbers were almost even.  The Luftwaffe did not have an overwhelming numerical superiority.  While they had more planes, they also had more territory to secure.  

That is one of factors that caused them to lose the battle.  The consistently underestimated the size of the RAF.

The ratio is closer to 1:1.25 - 1.5 in the Luftwaffe's favour.  A ratio the force multiplier of Radar easily countered.

Nothing on the scale the allies were able to field in 1944.

Luftflotte 2 was the major German battlefront mainly due to the 109's restricted range.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteII.html

On the 16th of August 1940, Luftflotte 2 had 471 serviceable single engine fighters:

http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/Aug40.html#13Aug

Especially when you consider the RAF's building program which had built the force up to 890+ Frontline fighters with a further 330 frontline fighters in reserve!

http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm

Now, not all of those fighters were in 11 Group.  However due to the fact the RAF was fighting over it's own territory, other Groups did move into 11 Groups area to fight.  That was FC job to co-ordinate!

The BoB was a microcosm of the Daylight Bombing campaign.  Germany just did not have the numerical superiority needed.  Nor did she posses a single engine fighter with the range to escort the bombers all the way to many targets or stay in the combat box long enough to fully protect the bombers.

Since this was all essentially new territory for Military strategist at the time some the mistakes made by the Luftwaffe are understandable.  The allies learned them well.  They placed priority on developing a fighter with the range to provide adequate escort.  They then deployed them in overwhelming numbers.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Just a minute....
805 109's on the SE front vs. 620 Hurris and Spits which belong to all 10th to 13th group.  A rough count of radius would leave one with 2 109's for each Hurri/Spit in the first phaseS of the Battle.

Anyway I'll type something from Johnny's book. It's a pretty good read actually.

[Crumpp]

805 109's on the SE front vs. 620 Hurris and Spits

No Angus,

That is 805 109's total in the Luftwaffe.  Only 470 were in Luftflotte 2 at it's height.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Nashwan]

That is 805 109's total in the Luftwaffe. Only 470 were in Luftflotte 2 at it's height.

Crumpp, you are forgetting Luftflotte 3. Based mostly in Normandy, it had almost all the rest of the 109s in the Jagdwaffe. Only a tiny number of 109s were not deployed along the coast of France against Britain.

Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, gives a Luftwaffe OOB for 13th August, Luftflotte 2 had 568 fighters, 130 heavy fighters, Luftflotte 3 had 303 fighters, 101 heavy fighters.

I believe the only front line 109s not committed to the battle at that stage were the 37 of II/JG77 in Norway.

And at it's height, I believe Luftflotte 2 had many more 109s, as the majority of Luftflotte 3s 109s were transferred to Luftflotte 2 during the battle.

[Crumpp]

Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, gives a Luftwaffe OOB for 13th August, Luftflotte 2 had 568 fighters, 130 heavy fighters, Luftflotte 3 had 303 fighters, 101 heavy fighters.

The distances that Luftflotte 3 had to cover made it useful for interdicting channel shipping.  It could not reach far into England at all.  It could however defend against RAF attacks into France should they occur.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftorg.html

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/luftflotteIII.html#cherbourg
 
What is being neglected here is the RAF replacement program. While the Luftwaffe was building up slowly, the RAF was expanding at a faster rate.

Especially when you consider the RAF's building program which had built the force up to 890+ Frontline fighters with a further 330 frontline fighters in reserve!

http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm

Radar ensured that the RAF were able to ignore what they wished and attack where they wanted with the forces they wanted.

I am not forgeting them, Nashwan.  The discussion has centered around the main combat area and it was claimed that only Group 11 of the RAF fought.

I used the Luftwaffe OOB for 13 August to arrive at the numbers:

http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/Aug40.html#13Aug


All the best,

Crumpp

[MiloMorai]

Originally posted by Crumpp
I am not forgeting them, Nashwan.  The discussion has centered around the main combat area and it was claimed that only Group 11 of the RAF fought.

In only your eyes Crumpp is it claimed that 11 Group was the only RAF Group that fought the LW.

Nashwan, Crumpp is having trouble with his reading comprehension. He has still not told us how the squadrons in the north of 13 Group participated in the air battles over southern England at the same time as the squadrons from that area were in combat.

He ignores that the fighters from Luftlotte 3 were tranferred to the Luftlotte 2 area.

On Aug 13, there was 544 109s in Luftlotte 2 and 347 109s in Luflotte 3. Three weeks later on Sept 7, when the air battles over southern England really heated up, there was 649 109s in Luftlotte 2 and 118 109s in Luflotte 3. In Aug, 61% of the 109s were in Luftlotte 2 area while in Sept 85% of the 109s were in the Luftflotte 2 area.

from http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/2072/Aug40.html#13Aug and for Sept 7

There was at least 250 Spits and Hurries (~17 squadrons)  that were too far away to participate in the air battles over south-east England. That left just under 400 Spits and Hurries to combat the 650 109s PLUS the other LW a/c (110s, bombers) for interception over s-e England.

[Crumpp]

In only your eyes Crumpp is it claimed that 11 Group was the only RAF Group that fought the LW.

First Milo, you tried to claim that the RAF fighters were outnumbered by Bf-109's 2:1.

Milo says:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)

When this was disproved you he changed the argument to only the 11 Group RAF fighters were outnumbered 2:1.

Milo says:
It is not a gross exageration that 11 Group was outnumbered 2:1 especially when there was LW bombers that also had the attention of RAF fighters.

Now suddenly I am the one claiming 11 Group fought alone...

Keep track of your own argument Milo.

Of course if you keep changing it, at some point you will appear correct, right?

Milo says:
There was at least 250 Spits and Hurries (~17 squadrons) that were too far away to participate in the air battles over south-east England. That left just under 400 Spits and Hurries to combat the 650 109s PLUS the other LW a/c (110s, bombers) for interception over s-e England.

Great speculation.  Do you have documentation on the RAF numbers or are you just spouting your most hopeful?

Wait a minute; we are talking about single engine fighters....  You know the type designed and built for the express purpose of winning the skies.

Milo says:
The 109s did pretty good? Not with 51.5% of the LW casualities being 109s and out numbering the Spits and Hurries of 11 Group by at least 2:1. (11 Group being the main combat area)

Remember Milo???  Your gross exaggeration...

The one that started this whole argument.

Facts are you just don't want to count the numbers the RAF says and most historian's agree was available for the battle.  Not counting the reserves.

According to your source, the RAF had 816 fighters available on 06 September 1940 with another 142 fighters in reserve!!

http://www.geocities.com/Broadway/Alley/5443/fcweek.htm

All the best,

Crumpp

[Charge]

"Bader was just plain wrong about it."

I'm not so sure about that. It was easy to score hits with a battery of .303s and any damaged plane was in high risk of ditching to England or on the way home. Any damaged British plane could RTB or be salvaged where ever it ditched.

***

Even it the Germans had five times as many fighters that would mean only a temporary airsuperiority over the target area and the 109 did not have adequate amout of fuel to establish this on a large area.

I don't understand what you people are arguing anyway. Are you trying to convince us of a superiority of some a/c over another by trying to point out how much more there was the other type over the other?

I think it's kinda pointless, considering the strategic situation during BoB.

You should rather argue on strategy and tactics more than aircraft quality as far as BoB is concerned.

-C+

[Angus]

OK, another angle here. I'll go into numbers that the LW actually mounted in raids rather than availability numbers.
From Martin Gilbert's WW2.

13th of August. LW attacks with 1.485 aircraft.
15th of August. 520 LW bombers and 1.270 fighters cross trhe channel to attack in the timezone from 11:30 and 18:30
30th. 800 LW aircraft attack the nine British operational centres in southern England. That night they start bombing London with incendiaries.
Sep 7. 300 LW with 600 escort attack the London Docks
Sep 8. RAF manages to intercept 400 raiders with 200 aircraft.
(wonder why that seems to be big news....)
Sep 14. Hitler emphazises the need to break the British with heavy bombings on London.
Sep 15. BoB day. The LW attacks the London area with 230 bombers and 700 fighters.

So, it seems to me that the LW was actually throwing more fighters into the air than they could have according to Crumpp. But he has a point on the replacement and manufacture.
If you go as far back as Dunkirk and the Channel fights, the FC was down to 504 servicable aircraft. (June 2nd)  At the time they are still sending aircraft to the "slaughterhouse" in France. On June 6th they sent 144, many of which never returned.
Then you see the order of battle just 1-2 months later. Now there were quite some fightings in June over the channel, so there were definately losses on both sides. But the FC is still growing and growing.

Anyway, on we go. Look a little better into the fights over London. I do not have the exact figures for how many RAF fighters made an interception on the 15th of Sep, but they were definately almost all from 11th and 12th group. - some of the 10th might have made it, and none from the 13th.
If it had been the half of FC's strengths they still would have been outnumbered by the German fighters (110's included) by 2 to 1. But they may have had some better odds, - some of the 109's never made it to London due to fuel shortage.

[Nashwan]

The distances that Luftflotte 3 had to cover made it useful for interdicting channel shipping. It could not reach far into England at all. It could however defend against RAF attacks into France should they occur.

The Luftflotte 3 fighter bases were 75 - 100 miles from the British coast, and many of the important targets were along the coast (Supermarine, the radar stations, ports, airfields etc)

[Crumpp]

I think it's kinda pointless, considering the strategic situation during BoB.

Exactly.  It's very silly to try and claim an individual aircraft performance conclusion from a strategic point of view.

So, it seems to me that the LW was actually throwing more fighters into the air than they could have according to Crumpp.

Those are not Crumpps numbers, Angus.  They are the Luftwaffe's own status reports!

The Luftflotte 3 fighter bases were 75 - 100 miles from the British coast, and many of the important targets were along the coast (Supermarine, the radar stations, ports, airfields etc)

Check out the Emil's combat radius.  Depending on the amount of time flown under combat power the range dramatically decreases.  125 miles is about the maximum to have 20 minutes useful time at combat power.

http://home.monet.no/~oddbass/me109main.html

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/7607/luft.html

So Luftflotte 3 was pretty much a minor player in the fight as reaching the coast of England was pretty much the useful limit.

The only way the Luftwaffe could have won the Battle of Britain was to have completely spent itself and kept a focused strategy on the airfields after knocking out the Home Chain Radars.

It would have been a Pyrrhic victory that would have left the Germans wide open to Stalin's Russia.  Stalin definately had designs on pushing west as soon as his forces were ready.  With the Luftwaffe destroyed the way would have been open.

Even then it would have been dicey.  Strategist today IMHO would have waited, outproduced the RAF, built up and developed a viable invasion fleet with a Navy to cover it.  You would need an 6:1 minimum and more comfortabley a 10:1 advantage in fighters with the range to cover all of England to make an invasion a success.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Angus]

Ehhhm.
"Those are not Crumpps numbers, Angus. They are the Luftwaffe's own status reports!"

If the LW reports conflict actual documented events, I tend to belive the actual events, if you see what I mean. This is not the first time I run across numbers from the LW that don't quite hold water.
As for the status reports, they were read by the Brits as well, - welll at least shortly later. But that's antother story.

Anyway, about other items of the Luftflotte 3:

"The Luftflotte 3 fighter bases were 75 - 100 miles from the British coast, and many of the important targets were along the coast (Supermarine, the radar stations, ports, airfields etc)"

This is really a shorter distance than the bulk of 10th and 13th group, - in fact much closer than the closest of 13th group!

Well, off to bed. This thread makes a ton of fun, will post something tomorrow. All the best yer latenighters