Originally posted by SMIDSY
couple things i would like to point out about modern russian fighters:
the present day luftwaffe flies (among other things) MiG-25s and they are as good, if not better than most f-18 pilots. and have proven so in wargame after wargame.
the most recent in the sukoi series of fighters has the best turn radius of any fighter in history (including the mighty F-22). the russian airforce has developed a type of plasma that masks their fighters from radar.
modern US superiority in the air is derived from our tactics and the skill of our pilots, not our aircraft. a good pilot in a mig 21 will beat a noob pilot in an f-15 any day of the week.
LW flies MIG-29A's chief. And yes, even with De-rated engines and manual controls they can still out maneuver the FBW unstable F-16. The F-18 will lose in a sustained turn, but instantanous high alpha it'll do ok for about 1.5 turns around the circle.
Here's a report I did a couple of years ago that is still valid.
AVI 140
Aircraft Report
The Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum
The USSR launched a Prospective Frontal Fighter of PFI in 1969 to counter the United States F-15, selected in that same year as the USAF’s FX program. The PFI requirement specifically referred to the F-15, but set Soviet designers a wider challenge. The new fighter must counter NATO’s new low-level ground attack fighters, cruise missile carrying bombers, and other threats. Tasked to operate at levels from 100 feet to 60,000 feet, at speeds in excess of 900 mph at sea level to 1,500 at altitude, the climb and acceleration requirements were about 1.2:1, with a low level combat radius of 300 miles and a high level of 1,000 miles. The need to meet or beat the F-15 imposed severe turn rate/radii and acceleration requirements.
If their task wasn’t difficult enough, the PFI would be expected to operate from what the Soviet air forced called “Third Class” airfields – semi prepared strips which might be as little at 4,000 feet long. While it was expected that the new fighter was to rely on GCI control for vectoring to threats, it was expected to have a much greater capacity for autonomous action or “freelance fighter operations” using its onboard sensors and armament without reference to ground control. This single trait marked perhaps the greatest break from Soviet Air doctrine and Russia’s past fighters.
Mikoyan, Sukhoi and Yakovlev produced competing PFI designs, though Yak dropped out of the race to concentrate of what became the VTOL Yak-141 for the Soviet Navy. The fuel necessary to meet the requirements dictated a large aircraft (MiG-25 Foxbat size or bigger) and Mikoyan’s original designs included one aircraft which looked like a A-5 Vigilante, and others which looked like a modernized MiG-25 Foxbat with LERX's (Leading Edge Root Extension).
One design had a high degree of wing/fuselage blending, much like the F-16. But it became clear that no single design could meet all of the requirements of the PFI, and the head of Mikoyan-Gurevich, Artyom suggested that the US example with the F-15 should be followed more closely. The MiG-29 as we know it began in 1970, when Mikoyan began studies into a light front-line fighter, or LFI in the mold of the MiG-21. In 1971, Mikoyan was instructed to proceed with the LFI project while Sukhoi proceeded with its T10, or the SU-27. The SU-27’s performance at air shows tended to obscure the difference between the two aircraft. Sukhoi managed to produce two dramatically a different aircraft within the SU-27 airframe. At lightweights, the Su-27 was an extremely agile air superiority fighter, but when fully laden, is a real long-range interceptor, with very different performance, g and AOA (Alpha) limits. Whole groups of internal fuel cells in the Su-27 are left empty for short-range air defense missions, where by contrast the MiG-29 is a straight forward air defense fighter, optimized for agility at full combat weight but having limited range and, endurance and payload.
The early “heavy” MiG-29s were designed around the proposed R-25 missile, a Soviet copy of the AIM-7 Sparrow which had been compromised in Vietnam, although it failed to materialize by the time the new small Mig-29 emerged and was replaced by the R-27 (AA-10 “Alamo”). For short-range engagements, a number of optional weapons were proposed, including the “Atoll” based R-13 with AIM-9 P type forward control fins and AIM-9L double-delta fins rearward. By the time the mock-up was fitted with armament, in late 1976, the weapons of choice became the R-27 and R-76.
Development of the Mig-29 was remarkably untroubled, certainly by comparison with the Su-27, and the transition from development to service was very smooth. Nor has the aircraft suffered from any major problems in service. In comparison with the Su-27’s early days, there is no comparison.
The first Sukhoi made its maiden flight on May 20 1977, five months before the first MiG-29, but the Sukhoi’s aircraft required an extensive and very expensive redesign. The revised version flew in April of 1981, and even by 1986 the aircraft was still suffering major problems. A huge stockpile of partially complete SU-27’s await radar sets, flight control system modifications and other work at the factory floor.
By contrast, the MiG-29 started to enter service in 1982, and by 1986 was in widespread service, and even began the re-equip regiments in the former East Germany. In that same year, India received its first MiG-29’s, and production built up at an astonishing rate. It wasn’t until 1985 and 1986 that the world began to see the Fulcrum in international airspace, and the first photos were published. The cloak finally came of the MiG-29 when six mounted a goodwill visit to Finland in August 1986. Suddenly, Western aviation magazines were full of assessments of the mysterious Fulcum.
Aspects of the MiG-29’s appearance were noted as “a typical Soviet copy of this or that Western fighter.” The twin fin and LERX's led some to believe that it was a crude copy of the F/A-18 Hornet or F-16 Falcon, while the widespread engine pods could only have been from the Grumman F-14 Tomcat. To other analysts, the MiG-29 showed some obvious F-15 influences. Sadly, to even some of the more open-minded analysts, they concluded that the MiG-29 was merely a clever conglomerate of design ideas stolen from the West, and was not a unique design. The ability of the Russian’s to design anything original was discounted, and the nation’s heritage as the first to put a man into space, the first to produce a supersonic airliner and the nation which produced great aircraft like the MiG-15 studmuffingot or MiG-21 Fencer and record-breaking Mig-25 Foxbat was discounted.
Even to those who credit the Russians with the ability to design their own airframe refused to believe that it could be aerodynamically more advanced then its Western counterparts, and poured disparaging remarks on intelligence predictions of the aircrafts performance, and on numerous reports that the Fulcrum had been seen performing maneuvers that no Western fighter could emulate – reports which would prove correct. The myth of the MiG-29 being a Western copy was very slow to die. In many ways, the MiG-29 has been consistently underrated throughout its life, although a more balanced view of the aircraft is starting to take form.
Opinions vary as to the quality and capability of the MiG-29. Mikoyan marketers have had to operate in an environment which the strengths and weaknesses of the aircraft have been endlessly debated – often without reference to the facts. For one example, many in the West simply cannot believe that the USSR, our old Cold War enemy, ever produced anything of quality and write off the Fulcrum as inferior in all respects. Some observers see a MiG-29 performing maneuvers which still to this day cannot be emulated by any Western fighter, and yet cannot believe the evidence offered before their own eyes. On the other hand, many desk-bound experts were so enthralled by the MiG-29’s appearance in the West, and its spectacular air show routines, that they are quite unable to view the aircraft objectively. Many accept the relevance of air how maneuvers to combat capability. They believe Russian claims about the performance of weapons, avionics and other systems, without much evidence to support the claims.
Most flights against the MiG-29 have been against relatively heavily laden aircraft, inevitably carrying a 600-gallon centerline drop tank and under wing missile launch rails, and against aircraft whose engines were deliberately de-rated to extend their service lives. This naturally has a tremendous impact on sustained turn rate and marks a major (if not artificial) limitation in the kind of slow-speed turning fight in which the MiG-29 excels. Remarkably, most opponents have found the aircraft a very difficult foe in such engagements, even with the 10 % reduction in thrust. This is partly because the results of the comparison trials are cloaked in classification and partly because NATO pilots who have flown against the aircraft are seldom willing to acknowledge that they could be bettered. In laymen’s terms, no mother ever has an ugly baby, and no fighter pilot ever flies anything but the best fighter – yet there are ugly babies, and many second – rate fighters.
