Humble and the failure of strategic air warfare in WWII

[Lumpy]

Nah ... more like USAAF not so 1337!!!!111!!!!!1 as some people want to believe.

[Bronk]

Ahh my bad please continue .

[Lumpy]

Thank you Sir. 

[humble]

I'm always fasinated by the relative claims regarding the spitfire and the 109.

If we compare the british tests...

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-I.html

and the german tests

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/Tactical_trials/109E_vergleich110SpitHurCurtiss/109E_vergleichsflg_Aug1940.html

You'd assume they are flying totally different airplanes...

The realities are that at moderate altitudes the overall handling and speed of the spitfire gave it an edge. However at higher altitudes the combination of the 109's better vertical performance, superior rudder authority and variable pitch prop gave it the advantage. This is a truism that held across the history of the conflict. While I've always felt the sptfire got better and the 109 got worse after the 109F4 Mark Hanna felt that the 109 was clearly dominant to the spitfire. THe actual reality is that the lftwaffe tied the 109's to close escort duty at unfavorable altitudes and severly limited the 109s ability to favorably engage. This same reality played out on the eastern front where the terms of engagement favored the russians for much the same reasons.

[Stoney]

Stoney, you should add your post after the quote tags. Makes it more readable.

However lets not turn this thread into a Vietnam War hijack.

Air forces were putting guns on bombers long before Giulio Douhet wrote "The Command of the Air" in 1921, so I'm afraid you argument is flawed.

When I said that the B-1 and B-2 only use passive defense (including speed and stealth) I simply meant that they do not use any form of active defense.

1.  Sorry, saw that I did that after I posted but was running off to lunch so I didn't fix it

2.  You started the Vietnam stuff--I countered .  I suppose we could debate the political pressure vs. Linebacker effectiveness some other time .

3.  I didn't say that Douhet's theory was the catalyst for arming bombers with guns.  But, his theory of bombers that could defend themselves without escort fighters drove the strategic air force thought of almost every Air Force in the world during the inter-war development period.

4.  You're correct.  But, they took the tail gun off the Buff too, and its about as stealthy as an outhouse.  Of course, it looks like the ground is the best way to deal with the B-1 and B-2 at this point

[Lumpy]

I'm always fasinated by the relative claims regarding the spitfire and the 109.

If we compare the british tests...

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-I.html

and the german tests

http://kurfurst.allaboutwarfare.com/Tactical_trials/109E_vergleich110SpitHurCurtiss/109E_vergleichsflg_Aug1940.html

You'd assume they are flying totally different airplanes...

The realities are that at moderate altitudes the overall handling and speed of the spitfire gave it an edge. However at higher altitudes the combination of the 109's better vertical performance, superior rudder authority and variable pitch prop gave it the advantage. This is a truism that held across the history of the conflict. While I've always felt the sptfire got better and the 109 got worse after the 109F4 Mark Hanna felt that the 109 was clearly dominant to the spitfire. THe actual reality is that the lftwaffe tied the 109's to close escort duty at unfavorable altitudes and severly limited the 109s ability to favorably engage. This same reality played out on the eastern front where the terms of engagement favored the russians for much the same reasons.

Humble note this in the German test: "The Spitfire and partly the Hurricane have two-pitch propellers." This indicates that the Spitfire tested was captured during the battle for France. Just in time for the BoB the British fighters were equipped with Rotol constant speed propellers. I would venture that this explains the under-performing Spitfire in the German test compared to the British test.

[Squire]

The problem with the debates around WW2 Strategic Bombing, is that it is quite impossible to really know the effect on the war had the offensive NOT taken place between 1942-45.

Can folks make debating points and educated guesses? of course...but nobody will ever really know, because thats not what happened.

Its like asking a question like "what if the Soviet Union had not beed invaded by Germany", it unravels the entire timeline, and thread of history, and anything after that, is just educated speculation, at best.

I wont jump into the pro or con part, maybe another day, I just thought I would make that point.

[Lumpy]

1.  Sorry, saw that I did that after I posted but was running off to lunch so I didn't fix it

2.  You started the Vietnam stuff--I countered .  I suppose we could debate the political pressure vs. Linebacker effectiveness some other time .

3.  I didn't say that Douhet's theory was the catalyst for arming bombers with guns.  But, his theory of bombers that could defend themselves without escort fighters drove the strategic air force thought of almost every Air Force in the world during the inter-war development period.

4.  You're correct.  But, they took the tail gun off the Buff too, and its about as stealthy as an outhouse.  Of course, it looks like the ground is the best way to deal with the B-1 and B-2 at this point

1. np

2. Sure we could do that in a different thread, but as I said: Vietnam is not my cup of tea, so I won't be of much use in that debate.

3. Yes, but you also said "otherwise, they wouldn't have put guns on any of them" which I honestly doubt. Even if Douhet never existed I think they would have continued to put defensive armament on bombers.

4. Sure, but the Buff is still pretty fast. Dashing towards friendlies it's a difficult plane to intercept before reaching cover. In a modern environment it is a bit outdated though.

[Lumpy]

The problem with the debates around WW2 Strategic Bombing, is that it is quite impossible to really know the effect on the war had the offensive NOT taken place between 1942-45.

Can folks make debating points and educated guesses? of course...but nobody will ever really know, because thats not what happened.

Its like asking a question like "what if the Soviet Union had not beed invaded by Germany", it unravels the entire timeline, and thread of history, and anything after that, is just educated speculation, at best.

Unquestionably.

[Lumpy]

Humble, I find it somewhat ironic and refreshing to see you argue on behalf of the 109 for a change (and me for the Spitfire no less!). 

[humble]

Humble, I find it somewhat ironic and refreshing to see you argue on behalf of the 109 for a change (and me for the Spitfire no less!). 

I'm not arguing for or against per se, simply trying to look at the objective realities. From my perspective the limited range of the 109 was an achillies heel (sp?) even in 1940. Tying the 109's to close escort, especially given the tactical doctrine of the luftwaffe was semi-suicidal. My main point is that your strategic/tactical view effects your weapons choice, asset distribution and shapes your linear thinking. The changes to the luftwaffe almost predetermined their failure in WW2. They simply were an army air arm and not a true airforce,so they never thought or acted like one. A true higher altitude percision bombing capability would have drastically altered the course of the BoB in the germans favor. The only reason the british didnt withdraw planes inland was the defesne of London, accordingly they would have had to defend the attacks on London and the radar & airfields vs the higher attacks which would have only helped the Germans. Of course the real difference is that the germans would have chosen the He-100 and the entire course of the war would have been different IMO...this is the same reciprical logic for the Germans...they defended against the bombing because they had to.

Had the Germans had an offensive capability in 1940-43 capable of striking England with daylight percision bombing from germany I bet we'd have seen not only the 262 a year+ earlier but a true german long range day fighter and a better german ground attack plane. Since the "vision" of the luftwaffe was really the vision of the wermacht instead to much was attempted with too few plane types IMO.

[Lumpy]

Going in circles Humble, but your characteristic lack of humor has not changed at least.

[RRAM]

They simply were an army air arm and not a true airforce,so they never thought or acted like one.

While in most of what you've posted in this thread I agree 100% with you, Humble, I'm in disagreement with this statement.

The Luftwaffe was a 100% independent air force. G�ring wouldn't have had it any other way. Starting from that point we can debate that the focus of the Luftwaffe as a fighting force was to cooperate with the Wehrmacht, and that it's bassic nature was that of a tactical air force.

And there I would agree with you to some extent, but again I would have to point out that while the Luftwaffe's focus was cooperating with the army, they still had serious inter-service problems (mostly started from the top of the power estaments, G�ring itself) to the point that there was no good system for a german ground unit to directly calling CAS from the lufwaffe in place under later in the war, and by then it was too late to have any real application because the LW was on the defensive. And the system itself wasn't without problems anyway.
 
There were many instances of stukas dropping ordinance over german forces between 1939-41 and that was because there was no forward observer calling for air support at the tactical level. The CAS missions were ordered and directed from the operative level, and it was not rare for the stuka crews to arrive their intended attack position when the german forces had already overran it. The result was the avobe-mentioned cases of friendly fire.

The true Forward observer calling CAS on spot system was created by the british during 1942 and later adapted by the americans. As far as I know the germans never had such a well-working system on the field. And that not such a system was put in place even pre-war (should have, given that the accepted luftwaffe role was to support the Wehrmacht's operations) was in part because of inter-service misunderstandings and rivalry.

Summing it up, the Luftwaffe was a completely independent service branch from the Wehrmatch, at all levels; and that while I agree it's focus was to support the army, and that it did it quite succesfully, they were never in really good terms with it.

In all the rest you wrote about, I'm 100% in agreement.

[Murdr]

I doubt that very much. Can you document that number?

I didn't need to read past this post.  Anyone challenging Widewing to produce documentation to back up a post where he stated something as fact without any wiggle room, is clueless and reading their posts would be a waste of my time.

[Lumpy]

Oh my, Widewing must be God!